

THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK
PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, 1918-1935

THE UNITED NATIONS SERIES

ROBERT J. KERNER, GENERAL EDITOR

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA



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PRINTED BY OFFSET IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TO THE MEMORY OF
THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK
(1850-1937)

PRESIDENT-LIBERATOR
PHILOSOPHER, STATESMAN, HUMANITARIAN
DEFENDER OF DEMOCRACY

EDITOR'S PREFACE

PERHAPS NO OTHER ACTION of Hitler's created such world-wide indignation and resentment as his destruction of Czechoslovakia. Certainly no action of his so completely proved to the world the hollowness of his propaganda of self-determination for the minority of Germans in that state. It was in his treatment of Czechoslovakia that Hitler completely and irrevocably unmasked himself and his movement as having a policy which was nothing but rampant, unbridled, and irresponsible imperialism.

If Czechoslovakia had rendered to civilization that service alone, it would have been sufficient. To have gone down thus exposing Hitler and Hitlerism as but a new phase of the old Prussian militarism and imperialism, with even uglier features added, in itself meant that in the end Czechoslovakia deserved restoration, for it was there that the signal was given and the lesson learned.

It was in the light of this fundamental importance of Czechoslovakia to the world in the present crisis that a number of collaborators in this volume insisted that the present writer should undertake the editorship of such a volume and invite others to share in writing it. In spite of the war which broke out in the meantime, the response from British as well as from American scholars was very generous, and important phases of

Czechoslovakia's record as a progressive and cultured democratic state have been covered with thoroughness and insight. The collaboration of twenty distinguished and able scholars and writers has made it possible to present a volume which is an honest, unprejudiced, and frank appraisal of the important contribution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars. Few nations, if any, can show such a record. Few, if any, have a better right to live. The Czechoslovaks have earned the right to freedom and independence by their achievements in the past and by the indomitable spirit with which they face the future.

ROBERT J. KERNER

CONTENTS

	PAGE
<i>Czecho-Slovakia, a Poem</i>	xxi

By EDNA ST. VINCENT MILLAY, A.B., Litt.D.

American poet; A.B., Vassar College; Litt.D., Tufts College, Russell Sage Foundation College, University of Wisconsin; Pulitzer Prize winner (1922); author of numerous collections of poems, among them: *Renascence and Other Poems* (1917); *Figs from Thistles* (1920); *Second April* (1921); *The Lamp and the Bell* (1921); *Two Slatterns and a King* (1921); *The King's Henchman* (1927); *The Buck in the Snow* (1928); *Fatal Interview* (1931); *Huntsman, What Quarry?* (1933-1939); *Wine from These Grapes* (1934); *Conversation at Midnight* (1937).

PART I: BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I

<i>The Czechoslovaks—Anthropological Notes</i> . . .	3
--	---

By ALEŠ HRDLIČKA, M.D., Sc.D.

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CHAPTER II

<i>The Czechoslovaks to 1620</i>	8
--	---

By S. HARRISON THOMSON, Ph.D., B.Litt.

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CHAPTER III

The Czechoslovaks from the Battle of White

Mountain to the World War 29

By ROBERT J. KERNER, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D.

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CHAPTER IV

The World War, the Revolution, and the Peace

Conference 51

By ROBERT J. KERNER

CHAPTER V

What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to

Czechoslovakia 71

By HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER, Ph.D.

Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology, Oberlin College (1914-1925), and Ohio State University (1924-1931); chief, Division of Immigrant Heritages, Carnegie Corporation; director, Mid-European Union; chairman, Ohio Commission on Penal Conditions; president, Masaryk Institute; author of *The School and the Immigrant* (1916); *Old World Traits Transplanted* (co-author) (1916); *Races, Nations and Classes* (1924); *The Beginnings of Tomorrow* (1933); and numerous articles on social and national questions.

PART II: POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER VI

PAGE

The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy 91

By HANS KOHN, J.D.

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CHAPTER VII

Constitutional and Political Structure 106

By MALBONE W. GRAHAM, Ph.D.

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CHAPTER VIII

Parties and Politics 137

By MALBONE W. GRAHAM

CHAPTER IX

PAC

Czechoslovakia and Her Minorities 17

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology, and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Hofstra College; member, editorial board, *World Affairs Interpreter*; knight, Order of the Star (Rumania), Crown of Yugoslavia; author of *The Working of the Minorities System under the League of Nations* (Prague, 1928); *Contemporary Rumania and Her Problems* (1932); *The Politics of the Balkans* (1939); and co-author of *Our Racial and National Minorities* (1937); *Contemporary World Politics* (1939); etc.

CHAPTER X

The Problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia 19

By OSCAR JÁSZI, Ph.D.

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PART III: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER XI

Agriculture and Agrarian Reform 219

By LUCY E. TEXTOR, Ph.D.

Professor of History, Vassar College; Ph.D., Yale University; corresponding member, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London; corresponding member, American Institute, Prague; author of *Official Relations between the United States and the Sioux Indians* (1896); *A Colony of Emigrés in Canada, 1797-1815* (1905); *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia* (1923).

CHAPTER XII

PAGE

Czechoslovakia's Economic Development and Achievements 240

By GERHARD SCHACHER, D.R.P., J.D.

Member, faculty of Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University; Doctor of Economics and Political Science (Würzburg); Doctor of Law (Greifswald); staff correspondent, London *Economist*, *Financial News*, *News Chronicle*, and Manchester *Guardian-Commercial*; author of *Central Europe and the Western World* (1936); *Germany Pushes South-East* (1937); *Germany Pushes West* (1939); etc.

CHAPTER XIII

Social Reform and Social Legislation 252

By BRACKETT LEWIS, A.B.

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CHAPTER XIV

Humanitarian Progress 271

By HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER

CHAPTER XV

The Religious Situation in Czechoslovakia 284

By MATTHEW SPINKA, B.D., Ph.D.

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CHAPTER XVI

Education in a Democracy

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CHAPTER XVII

Czechoslovakia's Contributions to Science

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CHAPTER XVIII

Czechoslovak Music, Art, and Literature 31

By JAROSLAV E. VOJAN, J.D.

President, Bohemian Arts Club (1912-); J.D., Charles University, Prague; Professor of Economics, College of Commerce, Prague (1899-1904); editor, *New Czech Review* (Prague, 1903-1904); editor, *Svojan* (1928-); editor, *Free Czechoslovakia* (1939-); author of *Czech-American Epistles* (1910) and numerous articles on art, history, and philosophy.

PART IV: FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHAPTER XIX

Diplomatic Origins and Foreign Policy 34

By FELIX JOHN VONDRACEK, Ph.D.

Professor of European History, University of North Dakota; Ph.D., Columbia University; author of *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia* (1937).

CHAPTER XX

PAGE

The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente . . . 368

By HARRY NICHOLAS HOWARD, Ph.D.

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PART V: THE PASSING OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CHAPTER XXI

Hitler and Hitlerism . . . 389

By (HENRY) WICKHAM STEED, LL.D.

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CHAPTER XXII

The Road to Munich and Beyond . . . 409

By BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT, Ph.D.

Andrew MacLeish Distinguished Service Professor of Modern History, University of Chicago; B.A. and M.A., Oxford (Rhodes Scholar from Tennessee); Ph.D., Wisconsin; Guggenheim Fellow (1927); Pulitzer Prize winner (1931); editor, *Journal of Modern History* (Chicago,

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CHAPTER XXIII

Czechoslovak Democracy: Was It Worth While? . 441

By JAMES T. SHOTWELL, Ph.D., LL.D.

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A Prayer for Tonight 448

By KAREL ČAPEK

Greatest Czechoslovak dramatist and novelist and one of the leading writers of our time; Ph.D.; editor, *Lidové Noviny*; author of numerous plays, novels, and *feuilletons* which have been translated into many

CONTENTS

xvii

PAGE

languages and produced on stage and screen, among them: *R.U.R.* (Rossum's Universal Robots) (1920); *The Life of Insects* (1921); *Krakatit* (1924); *The White Sickness* (1937); *The Mother* (1938); *Letters from England* (1924); *President Masaryk Tells His Story* (1934). Čapek died brokenhearted after the partition of his native land at Munich.

PART VI: CHRONOLOGY

Chronology 453

By HARRY N. HOWARD

INDEX

Index 479

PRONUNCIATION OF CZECH LETTERS

Č (č) = *ch* in "child" or "church"; Š (š) = *sh* in "show" or "shot"; Ž (ž) = *zh* or *j* in French *jolie*; Ř (ř) = *rz* or *rzh*

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	FACING PAGE
<i>Thomas Garrigue Masaryk</i>	iii
<i>Eduard Beneš</i>	152
<i>Antonín Švehla</i>	184
<i>Kamil Krofta</i>	184
<i>The Old Castle at Banská Štiavnica</i>	248
<i>The Wooden Church in Bodružal</i>	248
<i>Handicraft of Švajnsbach Peasants</i>	280
<i>Václav Square from the National Museum, Prague</i>	312
<i>The National Theater, Prague</i>	312
<i>Karel Čapek</i>	344

MAPS

	PAGE
<i>Czechoslovakia's Position in Europe</i>	110
<i>Minorities in Czechoslovakia</i>	180

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

By EDNA ST. VINCENT MILLAY

*If there were balm in Gilead, I would go
To Gilead for your wounds, unhappy land,
Gather you balsam there, and with this hand,
Made deft by pity, cleanse and bind and sew
And drench with healing, that your strength
might grow,
(Though love be outlawed, kindness contraband)
And you, O proud and felled, again might stand;
But where to look for balm, I do not know.
The oils and herbs of mercy are so few;
Honour's for sale; allegiance has its price;
The barking of a fox has bought us all;
We save our skins a craven hour or two.—
While Peter warms him in the servants' hall
The thorns are platted and the cocks crow twice.*

From *Huntsman, What Quarry?* (published by Harper
& Brothers. Copyright, 1933, 1934, 1936, 1937, 1939,
by Edna St. Vincent Millay).

PART I: BACKGROUND



Chapter I

THE CZECHOSLOVAKS— ANTHROPOLOGICAL NOTES

BY ALEŠ HRDLIČKA

THE TERM Czechoslovak is of recent coinage, dating from 1918, when the united Czechs and Slovaks proclaimed their independence of the Dual Monarchy and their establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. Before 1918 the Czechs were more generally known as Bohemians, after the name of the principal part of their country. This name, Bohemia, originally *Boiobaemia*, was given to the land by the Romans, and was itself derived from Boii, the name of an Alpine or Celtic tribe that extended from Bavaria (*Boio-varia*) into the southern part of the territory. The name Czech (pronounced Chekh) is derived, according to an old tradition, from the chieftain of the main Slav tribe who brought them some time during the dawn of history—probably in the fifth century A.D.—to the heart of the land. To this day there is shown a low mountain, the Říp, from which “Father” Czech is said to have surveyed the country, found it good, and decided to settle there with his people. The country at that time was largely wooded, forming a part of the great Hercynian forest, and but partly and sparsely inhabited. There probably were in parts of the territory remnants of the Germanic tribes of Marcomanni (Marchmen) and Quadi, but remnants so small that evidently

there was little opposition to the newcomers—at least there is nothing in the old traditions about any struggle.

The Czechs were but one of a number of closely related Slavic tribes that, from well before the Christian era, were spreading from the mother territory of all Slavs, the great Vistula watershed region, southwestward and southward, to the center of Europe and below the Carpathians. These tribes spoke closely related dialects of the same language, and, although differing more or less in habits, as would so many clans or tribes of any other large ethnic unit, they carried physically and otherwise so much in common that they must be regarded as one and the same people.

The extension of the Slavic clans into Bohemia was doubtless gradual. There are records of about eleven such clans, closely related, but already with some dialectic differences. They slowly occupied the whole natural geographic unit of Bohemia, and by the beginning of the sixth century A.D. were already well established there.

To the east of Bohemia, in the partly heavily forested and rough, partly alluvial lands of the watershed of the Morava River, there settled other clans or tribes of the same stock, which from their territory became known as the Moravians. And from eastern Moravia along and partly in the Carpathians to the far-away boundary of Ruthenia, there settled still other sister clans or tribes that eventually became known as the Slovaks—a collective name probably derived from the old "Slav" or "Slavian."

The peaceful occupation of the newly settled territories did not, regrettably, last long. Even as early as the 'sixties of the sixth century these lands were invaded from the southeast, and for a time subjugated, by the Avars; and from the seventh century on, there were struggles against the Germans. In fact, the history of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn of written

records to the present day, has been one of everlasting struggles against invaders—on the west, northwest, and southwest, the Germans; on the southeast, the Avars, Huns, and Magyars.

These struggles affected the people differently in the several territories they occupied. They resulted in admixtures, in the settlement in parts of the lands of German and Magyar elements, and in differing cultural developments. The Czechs in particular suffered, were much admixed, but through force of circumstances and innate ability rose also culturally. The Slovaks, who up to 1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Magyars, isolated from the west, forced away from the best grounds in the warm lowlands, and eventually repressed in every way. Yet they, as well as the bulk of the Moravians, remained on the whole purer than the Czechs, and their dialect, as also that of the Moravians, has suffered less, so that both remain nearer to the original language of the tribes; but the rude mountainous environment of the Slovaks, their isolation, and the repression they were subjected to, particularly since the earlier part of the nineteenth century, have restricted their cultural advance. However, the Slovaks and the Moravians have preserved more of their wonderful folk art and their individuality, whereas the Czechs have become more cosmopolitan.

Physically the Czechoslovaks, like all larger ethnic groups, although presenting basic similarity, show also some diversity. The original type is best preserved in parts of Moravia and Slovakia. It is a type characterized by good stature; strong, well-proportioned body; mostly rounded head (brachycephaly); face medium or rounded rather than narrow and long; physiognomy frank, smiling, intelligent, attractive; hair varying from blond to brunette and eyes ranging from blue to medium brown; absence of prognathism. Their principal mental characteristics are cordiality, sensitiveness, idealism, valor, love of family, love of

country, love of music and the dance, love of friendly social amenities. Also, they exhibit considerable individualism, ingrained love of the soil and all that goes with it, of order and cleanliness. And there is a universal hunger for knowledge, which leads to higher education of many of the children. The Czechoslovaks are industrious and thrifty. Their sense of humor and their idealism are above the general average, their criminality is virtually restricted to the mentally abnormal. They are not good money-makers, nor in general good politicians, or large-scale traders, having but infrequent inclination in this direction; but they excel in music, art, science, and literature. They enjoy good living, but not luxury.

The Czechoslovaks, in their homelands, numbered, before the crisis of 1938-1939, approximately 9,500,000. Of this total, over two-thirds were Czechs; something less than one-third were Slovaks. As there is in every respect a gradual transition between the two elements of the population, it is impossible to fix the exact numbers of each. In addition, several millions of Czechoslovaks are dispersed over the world, most of them being in the United States and Russia, in former Poland and Austria, in Hungary, Germany, and the Balkans. In the United States the 1930 census recorded 491,638 persons of Czechoslovak birth, and there were many hundreds of thousands of those born here who are of Czechoslovak derivation.

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Chapter II

THE CZECHOSLOVAKS TO 1620

BY S. HARRISON THOMSON

RECENT ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCHES give us assurance that the land of Czechoslovakia was well inhabited as early as 5000 B.C. Yet it is not until the fourth century B.C. that our information becomes definite. At that time a Celtic tribe, the Boii, occupied the plains and valleys. Under pressure from nomadic Germanic tribes from the east and north, the Boii, who gave their name to Bohemia (*Boiohaemia*), moved westward across the mountains, and, having given their name to Bavaria (*Boiuvaria*), soon disappeared from history. The Boii were followed in Bohemia, Moravia, and western Slovakia by the Germanic Marcomanni and Quadi, against whom Emperor Marcus Aurelius waged several difficult, if moderately successful, wars. These tribes remained a source of irritation on the northeastern Roman frontier for several centuries, and their incursions into Roman territory can best be explained as induced by the pressure of Slavic tribes from the north and east. Indeed it is reasonably well established that there had been Slavic agricultural settlers in fairly small numbers in these lands for several centuries before the Romans and the Marcomanni had met. The wars of the Marcomanni with the Romans weakened them, and the remainder, forced by the Hunnic hordes of

Atila to join his army, were wiped out at the battle of the Catalaunian Fields (Châlons) in 451.

It may be safely assumed that the Czechs and related Slavic tribes came into the country in increasing numbers after the extinction of the Marcomanni, but precise data are wanting. Their settling must have been peaceful and even docile, for during the sixth century and on into the seventh the Avars ruled over them. But this rule was so harsh as finally to arouse even the peace-loving Slavs to revolt. Led by a traveling Frankish merchant, Samo, the Slavic tribes freed themselves from the Avar rule, and chose Samo for their king (623-624). They maintained their independence even against the Frankish king Dagobert, whom they defeated in a three-day battle in 631. But the kingdom, whose boundaries were extensive if difficult to define, fell apart soon after Samo's death (658-659). This early kingdom, which would appear to have been premature, was neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to be called Western Slav, by reason of a large intermixture of Slavic tribes which became gradually differentiated as they settled in different localities.

For over a century we have little information that can be relied upon concerning the political or social development of the country and its inhabitants. Entertaining legends abound, and they may have some kernel of fact. The names of the princess Libuše and the peasant Přemysl whom she chose to be her husband are in all probability the names of real persons. At any rate the male descendants of this semilegendary Přemysl were to rule over Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306. Part of the army of Charlemagne, returning from the campaign against the Avars (791), passed through southern Bohemia without any unfriendly incident. But in 805 and again in 806 his son Charles led armies against the Slavs of Bohemia with only indifferent success. It is not certain whether the Slavic chieftains

engaged at this time to pay tribute to the Frankish emperor or not. Later in the century (846) Louis the German subjugated Moravia, but suffered defeat when he attacked the Slavs of Bohemia. This attack of Louis the German was directed against the empire of the Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown remarkable ability in consolidating his rule south, east, and west to include southern Poland, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube and Theiss rivers as far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empire. The German armies that invaded the land, though they won some victories also suffered some decisive defeats from the rulers of the Moravian Empire of the ninth century.

But the most significant event of this century was the arrival (*ca.* 863) of the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, missionaries from the Byzantine court, sent at the request of the Moravian prince Rostislav. There had been missionaries from neighboring German dioceses, but there was a growing demand for Christian teachers who spoke Slavic. The success of these two brothers was immediate, and the German priests denounced them to the Roman curia as heretics. The brothers answered these attacks by seeking and obtaining the sanction of the pope for their work, and the connection of the Western Slavs with the Western Roman Church, with all its important political and cultural consequences, may be traced to these missionaries sent from Byzantium. After the death of Svatopluk (894) the Moravian Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes of the Přemyslide line gained independence for Bohemia, and the Magyars, new arrivals in the east, extended their power over northern Pannonia. Germans and Slavs, united for the moment, were defeated by the Magyars in 907 near Bratislava (Pressburg), and the ruin of the Moravian state was complete. The significance of this incursion of the Magyars for

the history of Western Slavdom can hardly be exaggerated. It meant simply that a racial and cultural wedge was driven into the very center of the Slavs in the west, and made impossible the realization of any sort of cultural or political unity.

The tenth century was marked by the increased unification of the separate Slav tribes. The Czechs seem to have taken the lead in this work of unification. Their princes, the Přemyslides, at a time when the Saxon emperors were at their strongest, increased their dominions to include Moravia, much of Hungary, Silesia, and Poland. Prague was made a bishopric (973), under the archbishop of Mainz, and the second bishop, Vojtěch, completed the work of Christianizing Bohemia, a task in which German missionaries had failed because of the difficulties of an alien language. The Přemyslide princes succeeded in centralizing the government, not without bitter opposition from the hereditary counts (*vojvodové*), and in dividing the country into administrative districts (*župy*) with a royal representative (*župan*) at the head of each district. But once again, and now for the third time, on the death of a vigorous prince (Boleslav II, *d.* 999), a great Western Slav empire declined to a position of inconsequence. On this occasion dynastic dissension and absence of an established law of primogeniture to provide for the succession to the princely power were the direct causes for the rapid decline. German and Polish princes were frequently called in by one or the other party to a family quarrel, with the sad results to be expected from such shortsighted expedients.

In 1037 Břetislav I came to the throne and began the reestablishment of order and the rebuilding of the country. He not only conquered Poland (1039), but he succeeded in uniting under his rule Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and the dream of a great Western Slav empire seemed at last about to be realized. But Emperor Henry III was unwilling to have so strong a Slav power

on his borders. He was severely defeated in his first effort to subjugate Bohemia in 1040, but he returned with larger forces the following year, and Břetislav was obliged to pay tribute to the Empire. The Přemyslide princes were thenceforth drawn into closer relations with the Empire, and Emperor Henry IV owed the maintenance of his crown during his struggles with the German nobles in large measure to the Czech prince Vratislav. In return for his loyal support Vratislav was given in 1085 the title of King of Bohemia and Poland for himself alone and not as a hereditary title. Much of Vratislav's interest and energy were spent in active support of the work of missionaries, who had still far to go before the last remnants of paganism could be rooted out.

The first years of the twelfth century present a sad story of dynastic strife, with a consequent increase in German interference in the affairs of Bohemia. An ambitious and dissatisfied brother or son would appeal for German or Hungarian help, and the excuse for invasion in the name of justice was too tempting to be resisted. In 1158 Emperor Frederick Barbarossa conferred on Prince Vladislav II the title of King of Bohemia as a hereditary title (he was thereafter known as Vladislav I), and the Czechs sent a considerable contingent to Italy to fight for Frederick against the Lombard communes. In 1169 the king of Bohemia was one of the electors who chose Frederick's son Henry as king of the Germans. But Frederick now thought better of his generosity in giving Vladislav the title of king, and Vladislav's successor was allowed only the title of prince. The German emperors continued their interference in the affairs of Bohemia. Their particular desire was to strengthen the ecclesiastical power in Prague as opposed to the royal power, supporting the bishop of Prague against the king, and contriving to have Moravia set up as an independent march. But in the course of

the next several decades the imperial power was to have its own troubles and a capable Czech prince was to come to power.

Přemysl Otakar I (1197-1230) was able to use circumstances for the benefit of his dynasty and the Czech kingdom. In the disputes between Innocent III, Philip of Suabia, Otto of Brunswick, and Frederick II over the imperial crown, Přemysl pursued a policy which he had learned in the many years spent at German courts. He shifted his allegiance four times, each time gaining concessions or confirmation of concessions previously granted by another claimant to the throne. At the very beginning of his reign (1198) Emperor Philip had granted him the title of hereditary King of Bohemia and the right to invest the bishop of Prague, a privilege hitherto reserved to the emperor. These privileges were confirmed by each successive emperor and by the pope as well. Přemysl's legal position was consequently very strong. Though there was a colony of German merchants in Prague in the eleventh century, the colonization of Germans in Bohemia and Moravia can be said to have begun in the twelfth century when the land was subjected to frequent German invasions. But to Přemysl must be assigned the responsibility for inviting the German immigration. Encouraged by the court, many Czech nobles had married German women; some of the best positions of the Church in Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; German minnesingers were in high favor at the royal court and at the courts of the richer nobles. The twelfth century saw throughout Europe the process of urbanization going on. The Lands of the Bohemian Crown were to experience this same economic and social revolution, though perhaps half a century later than in the more advanced parts of Europe to the west. It was in general the German merchants who brought urban law and concepts. The political and economic power which they thus acquired evoked increasing

resentment in the following centuries. The king sought the financial and political support of these towns as a counterpoise to the power of the nobility. The fact that so much of this urbanization was Germanic only complicated the ultimate issue. An anti-Germanism that was voiced but feebly in the early twelfth century was destined to become so intense as to eventuate in open warfare in the fifteenth century. Whether this conflict between Slav and Teuton is really the key to all Czech history or not may be debatable, but there can be no doubt that there have been many periods of Czech history when this racial antagonism was the paramount issue.

Under the later Přemyslide rulers, Přemysl Otakar II (1253–1278) and Václav¹ II (1278–1305), the Lands of the Bohemian Crown grew in importance and prestige and attained a height of culture and prosperity surpassed only by the golden age of Charles IV. Indeed Emperor Rudolph of Habsburg can fairly be accused of having determined to crush Přemysl Otakar II because the latter was too influential.

The Přemyslide male line became extinct in 1306. In 1310 a son of Emperor Henry VII, John of Luxembourg, was elected king. He married a Přemyslide princess, so that the Přemyslide blood did not disappear from the royal line for two more centuries. John was a gallant knight, but a poor king. Royal power declined, whereas the decisive power of the nobles grew. The nobles gained control of the offices of state, which they managed in their own interests. The king was seldom in the country, though he did add Silesia and Lusatia to the crown of Bohemia and succeeded in having Prague raised from a bishopric to an archbishopric (1344), thus making it independent of the German archbishopric of Mainz. The reign of John is a period of literary and cultural maturing, and some of the most significant

¹ The Czech equivalent for Wenzel, Wenzeslaus, Wenceslaus, or Venceslas.

works of the Czech creative genius were produced under the rule of this foreign prince. But John's greatest gift to the Czech people, greater far than any territorial conquests he might have made, was his own son Charles. Elected Roman emperor in 1346, he ruled both Empire and kingdom from Prague for thirty years. He is known in Czech history as the "Father of his Country." He consolidated administration, established by the decree known as the Golden Bull (1356) the manner of succession to the imperial throne and the special place the Bohemian king was to occupy in the Empire, secured the internal independence of Bohemia from interference by the German king, reformed the coinage, founded the University of Prague (the first in central Europe), suppressed brigandage, reorganized the functioning of the law courts, furthered reform in the Church, beautified with buildings, bridges, and sculpture the city of Prague and enlarged it by planning a new section to be known as the New City, and patronized arts and letters throughout the kingdom. As emperor he has been called the "Priest's Kaiser," but he was, in politics, a realist far ahead of his century. He saw the lack of logic in a German emperor's effort to rule Italy, which was by language, geography, race, and history a people apart, and in his Italian policy he considered himself a foreigner and the pope the logical ruler. North of the Alps, however, he acted independently of papal dictation, considering himself the divinely appointed ruler and the pope a foreigner. The reign of Charles was brilliant in its achievements, but its significance is greatly heightened if we see that it was a period of cultural and moral preparation for the period of stress and strain of the fifteenth century.

The Hussite movement, called also the Czech Reformation, had its roots in several antecedent circumstances: the general corruption of clergy grown rich through royal favor; the preaching of several eloquent reformers of the second half of the

fourteenth century—Konrad Waldhauser, Milič of Kroměříž, Thomas Štítný, and Matthew of Janov, representative perhaps of an undercurrent of anticlericalism sweeping over Europe, coming to the surface in numerous small sectarian and evangelical groups like the Beghards, Béguines, and Waldenses; the increasing tension existing between German and Czech throughout the kingdom; and last, and fundamentally less important than any of these other circumstances, the teachings of the Oxford reformer John Wyclif.

Jan Hus (1369–1415) was the central figure of the movement, and by his death at the Council of Constance he has become a symbol of the Czech spirit of religious freedom. The struggle was originally a doctrinal dispute at the University of Prague. Hus and his partisans defended the realist philosophy and its proponent, John Wyclif, and the opposition, consisting largely of German students, professors, and clergy, attacked Wyclif's theses. In the heat of the battle the king, Václav IV, sanctioned a reorganization of the university to give the Czech "nation" a ruling voice in its own university. The Germans migrated and founded the University of Leipzig (1409), but opposition to Hus and his friends continued, now from the higher clergy of Prague. After condemning the sale of indulgences, Hus was excommunicated for heresy, summoned to Constance, and after a brief trial "relaxed to the secular arm" to be burnt at the stake (July 6, 1415). But the real issue could not be decided so easily. Hus was more than a popular preacher, a leading theologian, and the rector of the university. He represented two profound hopes of the Czech people: reform of the Church and national aspirations for independence from German domination. Hus might die, but his death made him the symbol of these national hopes, and the chalice, the emblem of lay participation in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper in both kinds—*sub utraque*

specie—became the rallying point of the followers of Hus. Party lines were clearly drawn in the ensuing years. The high clergy opposed any spread of the new reform doctrines, and the followers of Hus preached openly the necessity for a complete reform in the Church in Bohemia.

Armed conflict broke out in 1419 between the Hussites and the forces of Emperor Sigismund, who was supported and encouraged by the Roman curia. But the Hussites, led in the early stages of their war by a military genius, the blind Jan Žižka, were animated by a fervent conviction of the righteousness of their cause. They believed that they were fighting for the purity of the Church and the free preaching of the gospel. Their aims were formulated in the "Four Articles of Prague" (1420), which represent the religious aims of a large section of the Czech and Moravian peoples to this day. Because many Slovak students came to Prague and imbibed the new teaching, the Hussite movement had a considerable number of adherents in Slovakia, as well as in Bohemia and Moravia.

From the very beginning of the militant movement there were two factions within the Hussite camp, the radicals or Taborites and the conservatives or Utraquists. But so long as Žižka lived (*d.* 1424), these divergent groups did not develop sufficiently to weaken the unity of the cause. After his death, however, the division began to be serious. The radical Taborites, who got their name from their headquarters, Tábor, in southern Bohemia, felt that the more bourgeois Utraquists, who were strongest in Prague and were sometimes called the Praguers, were being influenced in the direction of Catholicism. The division between the two parties was real, but the Catholic diplomats were unable to split the two groups widely enough to control the country, and at the Council of Basel in 1432–1433 the Roman Church had to make concessions to the Hussites as a group. The

radical Hussites, however, thought that even with these concessions too much had been given away. Feeling was so high between the two Hussite camps that a great battle was fought at Lipany (1434) between the Taborites and the Praguers, in which the Taborites were defeated. In 1436 the now dominant moderate Hussites were received back into the Church with only minor concessions to their original demands, formulated in the *Compactata*, namely, permission for the Sacrament to be given in both kinds to those who wanted it in Bohemia and Moravia. Hussitism had weakened itself by internal dissension and the Catholics in the land were now in a strong position.

Sigismund's death in 1437 was followed by a few years of uncertainty until a strong Czech noble, George Poděbrad, representative of the national party, became regent of the kingdom (1452) and restored order. In 1458 he was elected king, and is known as the Hussite King. The Catholic reaction that had set in before Sigismund's death was arrested and, with the help of an able churchman, Jan Rokycana, who was recognized as archbishop of Prague, order and peace were brought into the Church in Bohemia and Moravia. King George would tolerate neither the radicalism of the Taborites, whose organization he crushed in 1452, nor any attempt to further a return to pre-Hussite Catholicism. He was recognized as king in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and for many years ruled over part of Slovakia.

The reign of King George saw the rise of a movement destined to have great importance in the spiritual history of the Czech people—the Unity of Czech Brethren. The founder, Peter Chelčický (*d.* 1460), a layman of peasant origin, believed in the absolute sinfulness of bloodshed and in a Christianity without artificial institutions of any sort. In the sight of God, according to him, all believers are equal. The movement that he founded broke from the Church completely in 1467. George put forward

a project for a league of nations to combat the Turk and maintain peace in Europe, but the plan seems to have been somewhat premature. The last years of his reign were troubled by disputes and wars with King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary, and disputes with the pope, by whom he was put under the ban in 1465. All things considered, however, the reign of King George was a period of prosperity and growth for the Czech people. The Germanization of their land was successfully combatted, and Czech influence in commerce and urban life increased markedly.

For the next half-century the country was ruled by two kings of the Jagellon dynasty of Poland. Because these rulers were foreigners and had other interests beside the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, the real power was in the hands of the Estates. The nobility had become much richer during the fifteenth century, chiefly by reason of the fact that most of the rich property formerly owned by the Church had passed into the hands of the leading noble families. Virtual serfdom for the peasants was decreed in 1487. The relative weakness of the crown and the great increase in power of the nobility at this period help to explain the course of Czech history during the next century and a half. At a time when unity under a strong head was to be desired above all else, Bohemia, broken off from Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia, became an oligarchy, divided within itself by religious and class disputes. Though these lost Lands were soon (1490) to be restored to the Czech crown, the work of division had broken the feeling of unity which had been such an element of strength throughout the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. If, added to the political rupture of Bohemia from the other Lands, we find class enmities, the situation is sad indeed. And a peasantry in bondage could not be expected to be anxious to bear arms in defense of their oppressor landlords. A personal union of Bohemia and Hungary by the elevation of Vladislav II

to the Hungarian crown in 1490 had no noticeable political effects. The two kingdoms continued their separate courses. A new constitution, published in 1500, gave expression to the new conditions: a weak monarch, a dominant feudal nobility, royal towns stripped of their former political rights, and a peasantry reduced to hereditary serfdom. Soon thereafter, as if the land were not sufficiently demoralized by despair and dissension, a systematic repression of the Unity of Czech Brethren was carried on for over a decade. Yet in the face of this determined effort at its extinction, the Unity grew in strength, and the persecution was finally given up as useless.

On the death of Vladislav II in 1516 his minor son Louis became king of Bohemia and Hungary, but it was not until 1522 that he came to Prague. In spite of his good intentions Louis was too young and inexperienced to be able to make any headway against the centrifugal forces of the selfish and short-sighted oligarchy, which was, furthermore, sharply split into two camps. At the Battle of Mohács in 1526 the powerful Turks defeated Louis' meager forces, and most of Hungary was to remain in Turkish hands for two centuries. The young king was drowned as he fled from the battlefield across a marshy river.

From among the many candidates for the throne of Bohemia, the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, brother of Emperor Charles V and brother-in-law of the late King Louis, was elected by the Estates to be king of Bohemia, October 24, 1526. With the exception of short intervals, the Habsburgs were to rule over the Lands of the Bohemian Crown and Slovakia until 1918.

In the meantime the Lutheran revolt had broken out in Germany, and with the dynamic of a new and vital creed Lutheranism spread rapidly into Bohemia and Slovakia. The ferment of the new doctrines, possessing many points in common with na-

tive Hussitism, brought to life ancient factionalism. Some of the Czechs favored moderate reconciliation with the Catholic Church, though desiring to preserve the form of the *Compactata* of 1436. Others were more zealous along lines of the Lutheran Reformation in opposition to Roman faith and practice. The new king, Ferdinand, sagaciously abstained from impressing his own Catholicism upon his Czech subjects, but set about consolidating his power, both over the divided and recalcitrant nobility and over the royal cities. But Protestantism continued to spread, and when Ferdinand called on the Estates to provide troops to aid Emperor Charles against the Protestant princes in Germany (January 12, 1547) the Estates refused and presented a list of fifty-seven demands to the king (March 18, 1547) which would seriously have abridged his prerogatives. Ferdinand, however, had little difficulty in effecting the submission of the Estates and the city of Prague by quick military action. Now in a stronger position than ever before, he began a systematic repression of the dissident Protestant sects, particularly the Unity of Czech Brethren. He also made great progress in centralizing the administration of the Lands of the Crown, and appointed Germans to key positions throughout the kingdom. German came to be used almost exclusively in official documents, but this substitution of German for Czech was in violation of the constitution of the kingdom and the solemn oaths Ferdinand had taken. Resentment against this Germanization was naturally widespread, but the king persisted in his course, and aggravated the resentment by carefully choosing for high office Germans who were Catholics; and, in view of the fact that a large majority of the population was by this time Lutheran or of the Unity of Czech Brethren, religious antagonism was added to racial feeling. In 1556 Ferdinand called into Bohemia the Jesuits, who, though few in number, were very able. With the

active support of the court they were soon in control of higher education throughout the kingdom and were appointed as chaplains and as tutors to the sons of leading nobles. But the roots of Czech religious independence lay deep, and resistance to Catholicization was determined. The fond hopes of Ferdinand and the new archbishop, Prus, of breaking resistance through control of the Utraquist consistory were vain, and concessions to the new Utraquists who favored Lutheranism served only to crystallize opposition sentiment.

Ferdinand's eldest son, Maximilian II, succeeded him as king (1562) and as emperor (1564). If he had been free to choose, Maximilian would have desired to continue the ecclesiastical policy of his father. But the reaction against the Romanism of the court party was so considerable as to compel the king to declare the *Compactata* of 1436 to be no longer binding (1567). The national party now found them unacceptable in that they bound the nation to the Roman Church, whereas the majority of the Estates, desirous of achieving the freedom of the Lutheran Church in Germany, demanded (1571) full legal recognition of the Augsburg Confession. The Catholic court party was strong in land and influence, though not in numbers. The national Czech Lutheran party, supported in this struggle by the Unity of Czech Brethren, was strong in the cities and counted many wealthy landowners among its adherents. The king-emperor was for many years busily engaged in campaigns against the Turks on his southern and eastern boundaries, and was unable to stay the growth of Protestant sentiment and power. The Diet of 1575, predominantly non-Catholic, prepared a composite *Confessio Bohemica*, based on the cardinal points of Hussite and Lutheran doctrine. Maximilian had calculated that dissension among the Protestants would make any agreement among them impossible, but events proved his hopes to be false. At the open-

g of the Diet he gave a verbal promise not to persecute the Protestants for their faith and to allow them to choose fifteen "defenders" who should administer the Lutheran Church. Yet immediately after the Diet had voted new taxes and accepted the emperor's son Rudolph as king, Maximilian found ways to avoid fulfillment of his promises.

The *Confessio Bohemica* signified a union between the Hussite tradition and the Lutheran currents. In this union the principal desire was for independence from Rome. Some Czech nobles, belonging to the old Utraquist party, became, in the early years of the reign of Rudolph II (1576-1611), secretly or openly Catholic. Party lines were henceforth more distinctly drawn: Protestant, comprising Lutherans (both German and Czech), Czech new Utraquists, Brethren, Calvinists, and Zwinglians; Catholic, comprising many Czech Catholics, as well as Austrian and German Catholics, and old Utraquists recently become Catholic. The issue had become one of world-wide interest, arising especially out of the failure of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) to give complete religious toleration in the empire.

Bohemia and Moravia became, during the reign of Rudolph, the scene of almost unprecedented intellectual and cultural activity. Many Czechs went abroad to study at Protestant universities, and on their return brought back informed enthusiasms which they hastened to pass on to their own people. There was a revival of Latin letters reminiscent of the zest of the earlier humanistic renaissance. Art and architecture were greatly enriched by importations both of works of art and of artists from Italy. Rudolph himself was a passionate collector of *objets d'art*, and was eager to have around him treasures from all over Europe. His collections set the style for the nobility, and the economic prosperity of the country made possible the acquisition of costly paintings, sculpture, and books.

The policy of Germanization persistently adhered to by the Habsburgs was beginning to bear some fruit. Numerous German noble families settled in Bohemia, and the towns and villages continued to indicate German infiltration. Though the temporary compromise between Lutheranism and Hussitism effected in the *Confessio Bohemica* had tended to soften the anti-German feeling of the Czechs, we hear, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, warning voices in Czech literature, inveighing against the growing influence of imported Germans in Czech affairs.

Rudolph was not psychologically stable and his policies suffered from this instability. In 1602 he issued a decree which, if carried out, would have destroyed all the gains that the Protestant and Hussite party had made in a century. The issuance of the decree, though it was not put into effect, precipitated strong remonstrances (1603), and only the family quarrels of the Habsburgs and troubles with the Turks in the east prevented an open outbreak at this time. Rudolph's ambitious brother Matthias, supported by most of the family of the Habsburgs, planned to depose Rudolph, and Matthias was actually accepted by Moravia (April, 1608). But the Czech Diet supported Rudolph, at the same time presenting to him detailed demands for religious freedom for all classes. The king temporized with these demands, and signed a treaty with Matthias, ceding to him Hungary, Moravia, and Austria. The Protestants expected some consideration in return for their support of Rudolph, and at the 1609 Diet pressed their demands for legal recognition of the *Confessio Bohemica* and Protestant control of the consistory and the university.

The emperor, acting on the advice of the papal nuncio, dissolved the Diet, but the Estates were unwilling to accept that solution of the question and met independently. They made

military preparations and presented again their detailed demands to the vacillating monarch. Civil war seemed certain. Rudolph, faced with certain disaster, either from his brother Matthias or from his rebellious Estates, gave in and signed the "Letter of Majesty," granting *in toto* the demands of the Protestant Estates, allowing full religious liberty to the Protestants and providing for the choosing of twenty-four "Defenders" to guard the rights of the Protestants. This legalization of the Protestant faith might have been expected to bring peace to the country. But Rudolph's mind was less steady than ever, and, thinking only of the vengeance he might wreak on his brother Matthias, he allowed his nephew Leopold, bishop of Passau and Strasbourg, to try to take possession of Bohemia with troops (1611). The troops of the Estates drove Leopold out of Prague, and, because they were certain that Rudolph had planned to annul the Letter of Majesty, they forced him to abdicate in favor of Matthias.

Matthias' reign (1611-1619) was a period of growing tension. His promises to the Protestant Estates were soon seen to be worthless. His ministers favored the Catholics and strove to weaken the position of the Estates. In this period of stress it is worthy of note that many Slovak students were attending the university in Prague, and took back to their homeland Utraquist and Czech Lutheran ideas.

Because Matthias was elderly and childless and the succession had to be assured, his cousin Archduke Ferdinand of Styria was "recognized" as king of Bohemia in June, 1617, after confirming the Letter of Majesty. But Ferdinand's determination to uproot Protestantism was soon made only too evident. Protestants were deprived of offices and aggressive Catholics put in their places. The Catholic clergy began to wage openly an anti-Protestant campaign.

An incident, rather inconsiderable in itself, was the spark that set off the conflagration. Protestant citizens of the towns of Broumov and Hrob had built chapels in accordance with the provisions of the Letter of Majesty. One of these chapels was destroyed by order of the archbishop of Prague, and the other closed by the abbot of the monastery of Břevnov. The protest of the Estates to the emperor in Vienna evoked a sharp reprimand. Public resentment was at a high pitch, and the Estates were forbidden to meet. On the morning of May 23, 1618, after a threatening letter from the emperor had been read to the Estates, the two royal councilors of Matthias, Martinic and Slavata, Czech Catholics, and Fabricius, secretary of the royal council, were thrown from the windows of the council room of the Hradčany into the moat fifty feet below. No one of the three was killed by the fall, and they escaped to Vienna. This "Defenestration" was the beginning of the Thirty Years' War. A provisional government was established by the Protestant Estates with the supreme command in the hands of thirty directors, who, realizing the certainty of war, looked for allies among Protestant princes and at the same time sought a new king. It was natural that the Estates should have counted upon the unity of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown and support from Lutheran and Calvinist princes. But Moravia, under the influence of Charles of Žerotín, declared herself neutral. Matthias was ill and dying, and the aggressive party was more influential with Ferdinand II, the new king.

At first the forces of the Czech Protestants, led by Count Mansfeld and supported by Frederick of the Palatinate, head of the Protestant Union, and Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, who had good reasons for hating the Habsburgs, had some successes. The issue now was one of complete freedom from Habsburg rule, and Lusatia and even Moravia, after her initial hesitation,

soon joined Bohemia on this issue. The search for a new king finally settled on the Calvinist Frederick of the Palatinate, who had married Elizabeth, the daughter of James I of England. Frederick was willing, but he was hardly the ruler to guide a nation through such critical times. Furthermore, the German Protestants did not feel justified in supporting actively the ambitions of one of their princes for a foreign crown. On the contrary, the aid which Ferdinand could command was much more substantial—financial and military assistance from Spain and the pope, and later the enlistment of Maximilian of Bavaria.

The decisive military campaign began in July, 1620, and ended in the Battle of White Mountain (November 8, 1620), a few miles west of Prague. The Hungarian cavalry which had been sent to help the Czechs fled after an hour's fighting, and at the end of two hours the Czech army was routed. Prague could still have been defended, but King Frederick fled with his wife early in the morning of November 9, 1620, and the morale of the Czech leaders was broken. The imperial general Bucquoy, with Maximilian of Bavaria, entered the city before noon. Independent Bohemia ceased to exist.

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Chapter III

THE CZECHOSLOVAKS FROM THE BATTLE OF WHITE MOUNTAIN TO THE WORLD WAR

BY ROBERT J. KERNER

THE DISASTROUS BATTLE OF WHITE MOUNTAIN on November 8, 1620, ushered in a period of three centuries in which the Kingdom of Bohemia was reduced to three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, in the Habsburg Monarchy. During the first century of this period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholars, and its national independence. A remarkable national renaissance took place in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czechoslovak nation, after failing to bring about a reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy on a federal basis, or to secure the same rights as the Magyars, carried out a successful revolution and obtained its independence.

The Thirty Years' War, in which the kingdom of Bohemia was one of the principal battlegrounds, reduced the population from about three million to about nine hundred thousand. The estates and wealth of the Protestant nobility and bourgeoisie were confiscated and handed over to a preponderantly foreign Catholic nobility and to the Jesuits, who proceeded forcibly to

re-convert the population to Roman Catholicism. They were chiefly responsible for the destruction of the Czech language and literature, because they did little to create a Catholic literature in place of the Protestant one which they destroyed. Thereafter for a century the nation was kept alive only by word of mouth in the huts of the peasant folk.

To complete this picture of desolation, in 1627 Ferdinand II, as king of Bohemia, issued a new constitution under the title of the Renewed Land Ordinance, in which he reserved to himself and his successors the power of legislation and established the Habsburg dynasty as hereditary in both the male and female branches. Actually the Bohemian Diet was reduced to the apportionment and collection of taxes demanded by the king. Czech historians and constitutional lawyers argued later that the ruler had not reserved to himself the right to change the constitution at will, in spite of the fact that he did so in practice. On the contrary, it was to the interest of the Habsburgs to maintain the fiction of the existence of the Kingdom of Bohemia, even though in practice they reduced it to the three provinces indicated above, because it gave them the leading lay vote in the College of Electors of the Holy Roman Empire. To the Bohemian Diet was left the right to elect its own king after the extinction of the Habsburg dynasty. In place of religious toleration, the Roman Catholic faith was proclaimed as "the only reigning faith."

It should be noted here also that in the course of a century even the new nobility, which was the creature of the Habsburgs, began to view the Renewed Land Ordinance of 1627 as a penal document in which the punishment fell chiefly on innocent peasants and that element of the nobility which had remained loyal after most of the Protestants had fled or been converted. The greatest of the Czech Protestants who were condemned to perpetual exile by the Treaty of Westphalia, Jan Amos Komen-

ský (Comenius), leader of the Unity of Czech Brethren, in his Testament (1650) exhorted the Czech nation in the following prophecy: "I believe that, after the tempest of God's wrath . . . shall have passed, the rule of thy country will again return unto thee, O Czech nation!"

In general the same development took place in the Slovak counties of Hungary as in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, but the tempo of the course of the Counter-Reformation was slower and never wholly extirpated Protestantism there. Although many of the Magyar magnates returned to the Roman Catholic fold, the Magyar nobility as a whole feared the absolutist tendencies of the Habsburgs. Moreover, the presence of the Turks on Hungarian soil almost to the end of the eighteenth century gave encouragement to Slovak and Magyar Protestants, first under Emeric Tököly and then under Francis Rákóczi. It was not until the last half of the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth that the Jesuits triumphed. In 1687 Leopold I had the Hungarian Diet, assembled at Bratislava (Pressburg), proclaim the Habsburgs hereditary kings of Hungary and accept a limitation of religious liberty.

The Kingdom of Bohemia was the richest country in central Europe before the Battle of White Mountain. In spite of the devastation which resulted from the Thirty Years' War, that country remained the richest and most reliable source of revenue which the Habsburg dynasty possessed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This income was used to promote dynastic ambitions in the west and in Italy in the wars for balance of power, and to reconquer Hungary from the Turks. The vast revenue required for such purposes could not be raised without financial oppression—a policy which led to the revolt of the Czech peasants in 1680 and resulted, through a series of royal patents, in their complete enslavement. A noted German scholar,

in describing the turn of events which took place thereafter, wrote: "It codified the conditions brought on by force and out of the injustice of the lord created justice."

When the docile Bohemian Diet accepted the Pragmatic Sanction in 1720, it agreed to a real union instead of only a personal union between the Bohemian and Austrian Lands; and when in 1740 Frederick the Great seized Silesia and began the War of the Austrian Succession, a new period in the history of the Czechoslovak nation was inaugurated. In order to meet the threat of dismemberment and partition, the young Maria Theresa and her councilors needed a larger and better-organized army and this in turn required a highly centralized administration and vastly increased revenues. Moreover, the loss of Silesia meant a decline of 10 per cent in the revenues of the dynasty. It gave Prussia the necessary physical resources ultimately to defeat Austria and drive her out of Germany. It was from this set of circumstances that the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II originated. These not only culminated in the completion of the evolution which transformed the Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence the virtual amalgamation of the Austrian Hereditary Lands with the Lands of the Bohemian Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with loss of identity as a nation by the process of Germanization in schools, government, and church. And this in turn led to a great national revival which after the revolutions of 1848 became one of the vital problems of the Habsburg Monarchy. We shall now turn to the details which illustrate these general characterizations of the second century of the period analyzed by this chapter.

Although Maria Theresa's objective was an immediate reorganization for the purpose of an effective resistance to Frederick the Great, and Joseph II planned to create a modern German

tional state out of the polyglot monarchy, there was no essential difference, so far as their ultimate effect upon the Czechoslovaks was concerned. The reforms of both monarchs were the culmination of the policy of the Habsburg dynasty in its strife for absolute power and centralization in their motley possessions. That they were Germans was, so to speak, an accident so far as they were concerned, but for the non-German nations over which they ruled it was a vital and ominous fact.

The increase in the army and the need for greater income resulted in putting the greater part of the burden upon the Bohemian Crown Lands. The creation of great central offices in Vienna for the supreme political, judicial, and financial affairs of all the Bohemian and Austrian Lands, the complete subordination of the administration of each of these Lands, and their further subservience to the central government laid the foundation of the Empire of Austria, as distinguished from the Kingdom of Hungary. Even the Church of Rome was restricted in its direct relations with its flock. The Jesuit order was abolished and the Peasant Revolt of 1775 in Bohemia, the result of financial oppression and religious persecution, was a signal, not only for economic and social reforms if healthy soldiers were to be brought up, but for religious toleration, which Joseph II introduced in 1781. Incidentally, the dissolution of the Jesuit order had to be followed by a reform of the system of education which had been under its charge from the days of White Mountain; and the improvement in the lot of the serf meant the dissolution of the alliance formed in those tragic days between the monarch and the foreign nobility.

Under Joseph II the school system, government offices, and preaching in the churches became German. The peasant was personally freed, but not with respect to his obligation as tiller and tenant of the soil and as taxpayer, even though his burdens

in this respect were diminished at the cost of the landlord. Moreover, to encourage commerce and industry, Joseph II abolished all internal tolls in the Bohemian and Austrian Lands and endeavored, unsuccessfully, to create a customs unit out of all the Bohemian, Austrian, and Hungarian Lands.

Many of these reforms injured the income and the privileges of the nobility and the Church. They therefore fell back on the ancient rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia, inaugurating a period of reaction coincident with the French Revolution, after the death of Joseph II in 1790, and forcing his successor, Leopold II, to withdraw or modify a number of the reforms. But to the bulk of the Czechoslovak nation the reforms were a godsend in most respects, except in one vital point—the effort to Germanize the nation. Joseph II's strenuous policy of trying to denationalize Czechoslovaks, Magyars, Italians, Jugoslavs, Poles, and Rumanians aroused them to activity. From that time onward, theirs is the story of fervent national revivals.

The Czech renaissance developed momentum step by step as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II sought to abolish the use of the Czech language. When Joseph II completed the official demise of the national language in school, government, and church in 1790, the Czech nation revived. So mysterious was this development that its exact causes have been a subject of dispute among the best scholars. The Renewed Land Ordinance of 1627 had given the German language equal rights with the Czech in government offices. Under the conditions already described, German was used more and more as time went on. The University of Prague ceased to give instruction by Jesuits in Latin; and from the dissolution of the order in 1774 German was the language of instruction used by the new corps of German professors, who brought in the Age of Enlightenment. The Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and

ences was founded at this time. An unpublished manuscript Balbín's, then 150 years old, entitled "The Defense of the Czech Language," was allowed to pass the censorship and was polished. Two years later one of the few Czech noblemen, Count Kinský, followed Balbín's classic by one of his own in praise of the language. As a consequence, the last verse of the hymn to St. Václav, cited by Balbín, became popular: "Do not let us and our posterity perish." The historians Pelcl and Dobner, the journalist and publisher Kramerius, the scholar Dobrovský, and the peasant sheriff of Milčice, František J. Vavák, in his memoirs, came out with fervent appeals, and the Bohemian Diet took its fear before the absolutist monarch even began to whisper Czech. The Church feared that it would lose its grip on the Czech nation if its priests spoke only German. These and other considerations led to the establishment by Leopold II of a chair in the Czech language at the University of Prague in 1791. It required only the fervent romanticism of the period following the Napoleonic Wars to transform the incipient revival and the literary development of a modern Czech language into a national movement.

At the same time the situation of the Slovaks in Hungary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In the reaction which followed, the Magyars had the satisfaction (which the Czechs did not have) of seeing the essentials of their old constitution restored. Since Latin remained the language employed in the Hungarian Diet and government offices, the question of treatment of non-Magyar peoples did not come up at this time. German had been substituted by Joseph for Latin, but in the reaction Latin was used again.

Just as in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries the Hussites, the Unity of Czech Brethren, and Czech Lutherans had kindled the Slovak Reformation, so now what was

going on in Bohemia, linked with the philosophy of enlightenment and the romanticism of Herder, began a Slovak renaissance which found its center in Bratislava (Pressburg), where the *Pressburg Journal* began publication. In Banská Bystrica the *Old Beaux-Arts Gazette* began appearing. A Protestant school, with a chair in the Czech language and literature, was founded in Bratislava, and this institution counted among its students the future Czech historian František Palacký from Moravia and the Slovaks Jan Kollár and Pavel Josef Šafařík. The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the development of the Czechs, whereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonín Bernolák tried to create, with indifferent success at the time, a written Slovak dialect, which was separate from but closely akin to the Czech because a western dialect of spoken Slovak was used.

The course of political events could not check the national revival of Czechoslovaks. Leopold II had restored the Renewed Land Ordinance and the laws dealing with the Bohemian constitution as they existed to the year 1764, thus annulling some of the decrees of Maria Theresa and all the legislation of Joseph II on these matters. His successor, Francis I (1792-1835), who lived completely under the fear of the French Revolution and its consequences, was most properly characterized by the two words which he wrote into his will for the benefit of his successor, Ferdinand V: "Change nothing." Metternich, who gave his name to the period between the Napoleonic Wars (1815) and the revolutions of 1848, labored to prop up what was left of the old order by means of establishing a perfect "Police-State." Because of this, romanticism became the dominant trend in literature. This was in turn a fertile soil for the full development of national revivals. Thus national revolutions were being prepared inside the Habsburg Monarchy, while Metternich was actively engaged in crushing them elsewhere.

After Dobrovský, Jungmann and his disciples labored in scholarship to purify the developing Czech literary language. F. L. Čelakovský, as much a scholar as a poet, popularized Czech songs. Kollár's *Daughter of Sláva*, a dream of Slavic unity, fired the imagination of the nation. The creation of the Bohemian National Museum in 1820, publication of its *Journal* started in 1827, and the edition of Czech books begun in 1831 by the Czech Mother (*Matice Česká*) were national enterprises in which Jungmann and the rising young Czech national historian Palacký were the chief spirits. The latter's *History of the Czech Nation* became the bible of the awakening people, and the Husite period its golden age. Šafařík's *Slavic Antiquities* had the same influence among the Czechs, who were the most conscious among Slavs that they were Slavs. František Škroup not only wrote the first Czech opera, but composed the Czech national anthem, *Where Is My Home* (*Kde domov můj*). Klicpera and Tyl wrote patriotic drama. In 1840, as a sort of culmination of the national fervor, the first Czech ball was organized in Prague, which was then still a Germanized city. Its resounding success led to criticism by the Germans, who took their self-appointed superiority—racial, economic, and political—seriously. As a consequence, the Czechs demanded equality and saw the need of a political program, which Palacký and Karel Havlíček, the leading Czech journalist, fulfilled. The Bohemian Estates asked Palacký to elucidate the Renewed Land Ordinance of 1627, and thereafter debates followed in the Diet, the majority asking the monarch to restore the ancient rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia. The minority asked for a modern constitution, since the nation, as a whole, owing to the loss of its native nobility, was democratically based, and demanded equal rights with the Germans, who formed the minority of the inhabitants in the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. Thus the official equality of the Czech

language alongside the German in government and in school became one of the chief planks in the Czech national political program on the eve of the revolutions of 1848.

While the Czech national movement grew in momentum, ready to transform itself into a serious political reality, the Slovaks in Hungary lived through a similar experience. Caught between their sympathies with the Czechs and their fears of their Magyar overlords, Slovak patriots saw their security, not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in working to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once more the unsuccessful idea of Bernolák—that of developing a separate written Slovak language. Ludevít Štúr, Michal Hodža, and Josef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak peasant masses, chose in 1845 to make a dialect spoken in the central Slovak counties the new literary language. The Czechs warned in vain against this departure from the practice of a thousand years. They argued that its results would only be to the benefit of the Germans and Magyars. Whatever its consequences, the die was cast. The poets Samo Chalúpka, Janko Král, and Jan Botto popularized the language, and original Slovak songs were collected and preserved. The Slovaks thus came to a national consciousness of their own. This development was in full swing when the Hungarian Diet in 1847 substituted Magyar for Latin as the official language of Hungary and led the Slovaks to ask modestly that they be allowed to use Slovak in elementary schools. They were met with stern opposition from the Magyars, who accused them of being the allies of the Czechs who, they argued, opposed the restoration of the Crown of St. Stephen.

The revolution which took place in Paris in February, 1848, led to a series of uprisings in the Habsburg Monarchy. They

opened a period which, so far as the Czech nation was concerned, lasted for over two decades, in which it tried unsuccessfully to bring about, first, a federal reorganization of the Monarchy and, then, a "Bohemian Compromise" similar to the "Hungarian Compromise" of 1867. These failures made inevitable the struggle for independence, which was finally achieved in 1918.

When early in March, 1848, the atmosphere in the Habsburg Monarchy became surcharged, there were two groups in the Czech national movement, the one liberal and bourgeois, the other radical, supported by students, lesser bourgeoisie, and a part of the laboring class. Among the leaders of the former were Palacký, Dr. Pinkas, the Slavic scholar Šafařík, the historian Tomek, and the lawyers Brauner and Rieger, the latter the young son-in-law of Palacký. Karel Havlíček, who edited the *National News* (*Národní Noviny*), became their mouthpiece. They regarded it as necessary to gain the coöperation of the nobility in any constitutional convention or diet which might be called. The radical group, which centered around the secret club "Repeal," numbered among its leaders Sabina, Arnold, Vávra, J. V. Frič, and Sladkovský. They were opposed to the privileged nobility. They were the more democratically based wing of the "national party." Although they took the initiative at times, they reluctantly followed the élite of the liberal wing on other occasions.

The population of Prague was called to an assembly by the radical wing on March 11, in the St. Václav Baths, where a petition was prepared which combined some points in the liberal platform (civil rights and autonomy of municipalities) with the radical demands calling for a partial restoration of the Kingdom of Bohemia, equality of the Czech and German languages, the abolition of serfdom, organization of labor, and regulation of wages. In the meantime, Metternich's ministry fell on March 13,

and news came that Emperor Ferdinand V would promulgate a constitution. Before the Czech delegation left for Vienna on the nineteenth, the Magyars had been promised the restoration of the Kingdom of Hungary. The constitution promulgated by the emperor on the twenty-fifth treated Bohemia as a province, and the delegation returned deceived and cajoled with vague promises. Another petition was drawn up, this time signed by the governor, Count Rudolph Stadion, and presented by a delegation headed by Rieger. This received some concessions.

In the midst of this confusion, the dynasty realized that neither the Germans (among whom a Pan-German movement was developing with the object of union with the Germans in Germany), assembled in the Frankfurt Parliament, nor the Magyars, who aimed at complete independence, would support it. Only the Slavs remained faithful. A committee of Germans from Bohemia opposed the admission of the Czech language on a plane of equality with the German, and fearing this might be granted they sent a delegation to Frankfurt. This caused the Czechs to draw closer to the other Slavs in the Monarchy and led to the calling of the Pan Slav Congress in Prague. Palacký¹ refused to go to Frankfurt, but he also opposed any Slav reciprocity outside of the Monarchy, that is, with Russian Slavs. He now proposed to reconstruct the Habsburg empire on a federal basis in opposition to its dismemberment at the hands of the Germans and the Magyars. He took the stand that if Austria had not existed it would have to be created. A diet, representative of the three Lands of the Bohemian Crown, was to be called at this time (May 17) before the Parliament was to meet in Vienna. However, revolution broke out in that city. In the midst of this situation the Pan Slav Congress assembled at Prague. It was there that the radicals based themselves on

¹ See chap. vi, below.

rights derived from natural law, whereas Palacký sought to base his case on the historic rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia. The Congress was still debating when it was interrupted by the so-called rising of Pentecost, skillfully managed by the new military commander of the Prague garrison, Prince Windischgrätz. Thoroughly representative of the reactionary faction in the Habsburg court, he adopted measures calculated to incense the population, especially the radicals, and to provoke an incident, scotching thereby the entire movement on June 12. A harmless crowd after celebrating a solemn mass in St. Václav Square was suddenly fired upon while dispersing. The city of Prague was declared in a state of siege and the leaders were hunted down and brought before a military court. As a consequence, the previously elected Diet was not allowed to assemble and the fate of the Czechs was left to the confused Parliament in Vienna, which later continued its labors at Kroměříž, in Moravia, while reaction gained headway. Even then centralism emerged victorious over federalism. Parliament did, however, abolish serfdom, which was a great step forward. Otherwise, its labors were fruitless, for Emperor Ferdinand V abdicated and the young Francis Joseph, wholly under the domination of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, a reactionary, succeeded to the throne on December 2, 1848. The Parliament was dissolved. A constitution promulgated by Count Francis Stadion, minister of the interior, also went into the discard. Events followed in quick succession. In August, 1849, the Magyars were defeated after Francis Joseph called on Russia for aid. Two years later the German Confederation was revived, after the humiliation of Prussia. Reaction reigned supreme. The Police-State was revived with all its terror and stupidity.

The foreign policy of the Habsburg Monarchy managed to estrange both sides in the Crimean War, and led to its disastrous

defeat in the Italian War in 1859, which became the signal for the dismissal of Bach, who had revived the Police-State. There followed more experimentation with constitutions to be promulgated by the sovereign. The Diploma of October, 1860, announced the return to "constitutionalism." The federalist October Diploma, hailed by the Slavs and opposed by the Germans, was followed by the centralist Constitution of 1861, of Schmerling, opposed in turn by the non-Germans. As a result, the latter refused to coöperate to put it into effect. In 1863 the Czechs, losing hope, left Parliament in a body and remained away until 1879.

It was under such conditions that Bismarck succeeded in involving Austria in a war with Prussia and Italy in 1866 and in ejecting Austria from the German Confederation. To save itself, the Habsburg dynasty agreed to the Compromise of 1867 with Hungary whereby the Lands of the Hungarian Crown were to govern themselves, that is, were to be ruled by the minority, the Magyars. As a consequence, the Constitution of 1867 granted by the emperor to Austria gave the dominant power to the Germans. Thereafter, up to 1918, the Dual Kingdom of Austria-Hungary was ruled by two minorities.

The Czechs realized at once that the Austro-Hungarian Compromise was the death knell of their hopes. They were relegated to live once more in three provinces of the Austrian Empire. Their kinsmen, the Slovaks in Hungary, were subjected to the wrath of their Magyar overlords because they had sided with the dynasty in the revolutions of 1848—the dynasty which now abandoned them to the tender mercies of the Magyars. Protest followed protest. The Czechs threatened to submit their case to the bar of international public opinion, and some of the leaders, as a demonstration, attended in 1869 the Ethnographic Exposition at Moscow. The government replied with repressive

measures which culminated in declaring Prague in a state of siege after October, 1868. The remaining non-Germans, who had coöperated on the basis of the Austrian Constitution of 1867, now recalled their deputies from the Parliament in Vienna. As a result, there was no choice left in Austria except a civil war or concessions. The government under the ministry of Hohenwart adopted the latter policy and the emperor in the Rescript of September 26, 1870, promised for the third time to have himself crowned king of Bohemia, to change the electoral laws then giving the German minority the voting majority, and to regulate the political rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia.

After long and tedious negotiations, a document called the "Fundamental Articles" was drawn up in which the Czechs agreed to accept the Compromise of 1867 in return for reserving to the Bohemian Diet all matters of internal legislation and to delegates from it the power to represent the Lands of the Bohemian Crown in a congress of such delegates from other Lands. The minister of the crown of the Kingdom of Bohemia was to have the title of Chancellor of the Court of Bohemia. Common ministries, in which each of the Lands was to be represented by national deputies, were to be established. The imperial Parliament was dissolved and for the fourth time, on this occasion in a Rescript to the Bohemian Diet (September 12, 1871), the emperor promised to have himself crowned king of Bohemia. But Germans and Magyars combined in fierce opposition, supported by William I in an interview with Francis Joseph, against this "compromise" with Bohemia. In such a situation, the emperor weakened, the Hohenwart ministry fell, the Bohemian Diet was dissolved, and the Czechs were once more betrayed. It was then that Palacký wrote another of his famous lines: "We existed before Austria, we shall exist again after she is gone!" From this moment on, until the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918, the

masses of the Czech nation lost hope that they could get justice for their legitimate rights within the Dual Monarchy. In line with this development, the Magyar Law of Nationalities of 1868 was not honestly carried out, especially after 1875 with the advent of Koloman Tisza to power in Hungary. The Slovaks were degraded to the position of a submerged nationality. Their national organization, the Slovak Mother (*Matice Slovenská*), was dissolved in 1875 and its property confiscated. The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the Jewish merchant, screened behind a blatant Magyar propaganda, worked to denationalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history and by asserting that his language had no relation to the Czech and did not belong to the languages of western Europe. There was only one way before the World War for the Slovak peasant to escape the national oppression and economic serfdom inflicted upon him, and that was by emigration to America. Those who remained began to look to Prague for leadership.

The four decades which followed and which culminated in the World War may be characterized on the one hand as a period of waiting for the time when the Czechoslovak problem might be opened up, whether inside or outside the Habsburg Monarchy, and on the other hand as a time of tremendous material, economic, and social development which assured the Czechs a place among the nations of Europe.

The Czech people refused to be terrorized and stolidly continued their passive resistance after their betrayal by Francis Joseph in 1871. Their Diet was in the hands of the great landowners and the Germans; the Parliament in Vienna was dominated by centralist tendencies. The Czechs abstained from participation in both. Such a situation, however, could not last forever. Greater rights of participation in the political life of the empire had to be given to ever wider circles of the population,

even if only to favor the centralizing policy of the dynasty. The rise of a vigorous young Czech bourgeoisie, dependent no longer upon landed wealth, but on the greater opportunities created by the Industrial Revolution, made itself felt. It aimed to make use of every means to develop the national existence. Abstention from politics would keep it back or block its development to the advantage of the Germans. This was the background of the emergence of the Young Czechs as a political party in opposition to the Old Czech party of Palacký and Rieger. In 1873, after a critical political campaign, they entered the Moravian Diet, and thereafter the Parliament in Vienna. The next year they entered the Bohemian Diet. The death of Palacký in 1876 facilitated a more active policy. Two years later all the Czech deputies entered the Bohemian Diet and in 1879, under the ministry of Taaffe, they once more took their places in the Parliament of the Austrian Empire. Although each time full reservation was made of the historic rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia, theirs was admittedly a policy of "crumbs." They were there to get what they could and prevent others from injuring them until other times should come.

The results of this policy became evident at once. In 1882 the University of Prague became a Czech university and a German university. Among the professors called to teach in it were the social philosopher Thomas G. Masaryk, the philologist Gebauer, and the historian Jaroslav Goll. These and others created a second national renaissance in all fields of intellectual and material endeavor. No sooner had the Czechs acquired the majority in the Bohemian Diet and legally put through legislation making the Czech language equal officially to the German than the Germans in Bohemia began an agitation to divide the country into German and Czech regions, thus to prevent the revival of the Czechs living in German districts, as well as the migration

of Czechs to those regions now in the midst of the Industrial Revolution. These negotiations, known as the "Points" (*Punkte-tationen*), led nowhere and caused the fall in 1891 of the Taaffe ministry, which had worked for the reconciliation of Slav and German. The granting of universal suffrage in the Austrian Empire in 1907 changed the political picture by creating proletarian parties and ushered in class influence in the guise of the agrarian and social democratic blocs. The German-Czech differences often made impossible the functioning of the Bohemian Diet and the Vienna Parliament, causing the central government to rule absolutistically in between times by virtue of Paragraph 14. In 1913 the Diet of Bohemia ceased to function. In the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy, the Magyar landowners who dominated the Hungarian Parliament gave up their policy of becoming wholly independent of Austria in fear of the possible introduction of universal suffrage by the emperor. Hungary's medieval or feudal structure still stood in the way, as did also the fear that the non-Magyars would have the majority in a parliament freely elected on the basis of universal suffrage. Thus it may be said that when the Habsburg Monarchy became involved in the World War in 1914 its Parliament in Vienna could not function and could not have passed a declaration of war had it been proposed, and that the Parliament in Budapest represented only a mere fraction of the peoples who lived in Hungary.

Two leaders of real stature emerged during the last three decades before the war: Karel Kramář and Thomas G. Masaryk. Although they started their political careers with almost the same fundamental views, they began to diverge along certain definite lines. Kramář, a young and moderately wealthy man of education, married to a Russian, gradually developed the view among the Young Czechs of the Slavs dominating Austria-

gery, of Slavicizing it, as the logical outcome of the extensive economic development in Bohemia and in other Slavic lands of the empire. Included in this scheme was the dissolution of the Austro-German Alliance signed in 1879, which the Czechs viewed to be the greatest blow to their aspirations after the events of 1871, and the substitution for it of alliances with Russia and France so as to escape from the threat of Pan-Germanism. Many Pan-Slav ideas as Kramář had were doomed to disappointment because of Russo-Polish relations and later developments such as the Bolshevik Revolution. He was led in his policy of Pan-Slavism to lean on the dynasty to such a degree that in 1905 he was forced to resign the leadership of his own party. His shift to the right Masaryk pointed out in a letter to Kramář as far back as 1898. Although the course of events had turned away from or gone beyond him, Kramář remained a dominant figure to the first year of the Republic.

Whereas Kramář became, so to speak, the symbol of the economic upsurge of the Czech bourgeoisie, Masaryk² became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks. He educated two generations of leaders in all walks of life before the war, not only in the Czechoslovak districts, but among the Slavs in Austria and in the Balkans. He viewed his own long philosophical and historical studies and participation in politics as preparation to lead his people out of the dilemma which he found them. He based his philosophy on Hume, Mill, Spencer, and Comte, and rejected Kant and the entire German school of philosophy. He looked at life from a deeply religious and moral point of view, which his marriage with Miss Charlotte Garrigue, an American, encouraged. He became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading

See R. J. Kerner, *Masaryk: A Memorial Address* (Berkeley, 1938), pp. 13-16; chap. vi, below.

of Czech history, he believed that he found its philosophy in the religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren. Thus he became an admirer of Palacký and Havlíček. He opposed the leadership of backward, autocratic, Pan-Slav Russia among the Slavic nations. His program was to create a just and federalized state made up of a number of politically independent nations of the old empire. And he declared: "If it will work with Austria, very well; the Czech nation is willing to make peace. If it will not work, the Czechoslovaks will await a favorable opportunity to pay back to Vienna that which they suffered for centuries at her hands." He viewed Pan-Germanism as a vital danger embroiling Austria in conflict in the Balkans, which he tried desperately to prevent. He was one of the keenest critics of Marxism and argued that progress should depend upon the scientific results of the social sciences applied patiently and gradually in a sane democracy. Born a commoner, he never lost contact with the common man. Social justice could come, in his opinion, only by parallel reforms of morals and ideals and not from economic determinism. He viewed the problem of the small oppressed nations as the political and international phase of the social question—the exploitation of one nation by another, for political exploitation meant cheap labor to the laboring classes.

When the World War broke out, Masaryk became the leader of the diplomatic and military struggle for independence abroad, and then the Republic's first president, and Kramář, after a period of imprisonment, as leader of the national front at home during the war, became the first prime minister.

In the period before the war, Bohemia became the seat of the bulk of the industry in the Austrian Empire, which, in addition to its progressive and prosperous agriculture, made it again the richest country of the Habsburgs. This development was at

least partially made possible by the abolition of illiteracy and the establishment of a splendid system of schools in all grades from the kindergarten to the universities and the professional and technical colleges. The Prague Conservatory of Music became justly famous. The names of such composers as Smetana, Dvořák, and Fibich became international. The Czech National Theater took its place as the center, not only of high dramatic achievement, but of a fervent national aspiration. Vrchlický, Čech and Neruda, Machar, Sova and Březina, Winter and Jirásek, created a Czech national literature of outstanding importance. Crowning all scholarly and intellectual endeavor was the establishment of the Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1890.

It is no wonder, then, that the Slovaks were attracted to this expansive and dynamic national development among the Czechs. In their submerged state they sought encouragement and comfort from them. Their students attended the Czech University of Prague because they were not allowed to have a Slovak university or even Slovak secondary schools. Illiteracy and backwardness played an important rôle, as a result, among them. Magyarization stared them in the face. A new collaboration between Czech scholars and the Slovak élite was forged. The Czech scholar Vlček wrote a history of Slovak literature. Masaryk, himself of Slovak parentage in Moravia, inspired Slovak youth at the university, and they in turn produced men like Milan Hodža, destined to become a prime minister in the Republic. Hviezdoslav, the greatest Slovak poet, fired his people with a faith in the future. Dialectical differences were no barrier since the Czechs easily understood spoken and written Slovak, and the other way around. Spiritually they were being united into one people.

It was at this stage of the nation's development that the

World War came. It was a war that the Czechoslovaks did not desire and, so far as they were able, they refused to participate in it from the start. Yet it was to bring to them their national independence.

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Chapter IV

WORLD WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE CONFERENCE

BY ROBERT J. KERNER

THE WORLD WAR brought to the breaking point the slowly developing conditions which caused the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy from within in 1918 by means of a bloodless revolution in which various peoples, the Czechoslovaks among them, emerged as independent nations and were so recognized before the war ended. The Peace Conference, in which their delegates sat as victorious allies, had the task of giving these newborn nations their future boundaries.

The non-German and non-Magyar peoples felt that they had been forced into the war without their consent since war had been declared by a decree of the emperor and not with the approval of Parliament. This body had not been allowed to meet in Austria because of the conviction that it would never vote for war. The Czech masses, moreover, believed that the war was being fought for Pan-Germanism and to this belief they instinctively opposed their vague longing for Slavic brotherhood, Pan-Slavism. Czech soldiers vowed, as they marched through the streets of Prague, that they would not fight their Slavic kinsmen, the Serbs and the Russians, for a government that had failed to make good its promise to them, and, as a result, they

mutinied or committed sabotage or surrendered in large numbers to the Russians and the Serbs. The Government replied with military absolutism at home and courts-martial at the front. Many Czech regiments which did not desert were decimated and then finally dissolved, the soldiers being scattered among German and Magyar regiments. This only increased the dislocation and disruption of the Austrian army, which within a year was virtually put under the control of officers from Germany.

As the Government and the army resorted to measures calculated to stifle any manifestation of resistance, the Czech political leaders, at first caught by the rush of war without unity and without program, gradually gave up party distinctions and evolved a secret committee late in 1914 and early in 1915 which became known as the Czech Mafia (*Ceská Maffie*). Here were found Masaryk, Kramář, Beneš, Scheiner, Rašín, and several others. This group became the connecting link between those who later went abroad to carry on the struggle and those who stayed at home. Masaryk in two trips abroad in 1914 had made contact with his old friends Wickham Steed, Seton-Watson, and Ernest Denis. These were contacts which were to bear fruit in the years of struggle ahead.

The Government proceeded to imprison the outstanding leaders at home. In September, 1914, Václav Klobučník, leader of the Czech National Socialist party, was thrown into prison. In May, 1915, Kramář, Scheiner, Rašín, and Červinka were arrested and charged with treason. They were tried and condemned to death. They were imprisoned pending execution. The leading newspapers were suppressed; the Sokols (the gymnastic organizations) were disbanded; and martial law was enforced, if not actually proclaimed. But the Mafia continued in existence and the struggle abroad was carried on by Masaryk as a result of

previous agreement with the now-imprisoned leaders. The nation engaged in passive resistance, fighting day by day in every conceivable manner.

There are many interesting episodes in this struggle and many romantic events in the history of the Mafia. Such Czech newspapers as were allowed to appear were forced to urge the people to subscribe to war loans. One printed the Government slogan "Subscribe to the war loans!" in this form: "Austrians, subscribe to the war loans!" The Czechs understood this to exclude them since they did not consider themselves to be "Austrians." When some newspapers had no blank spaces produced by the censor and others printed whole pages in blank, newsboys shouted, "That which is white is the truth—that which is black is a lie!"

Before Czech passive resistance the Government officials began to lose their heads, and harsh prison terms were meted out for such expressions as, "I do not know whether the Emperor was ever crowned King of Bohemia," or "Those of the 28th [a regiment which had mutinied] are our boys," or, referring to the same regiment, "That is still a good regiment."

As the Government closed down upon the outstanding Czech leaders at home, the organization abroad was being developed under the leadership of Masaryk, who was warned by Beneš in time (February, 1915) to stay abroad. On July 4, Masaryk publicly inaugurated the revolutionary movement by a lecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Switzerland. After Beneš succeeded in escaping from Austria, the Czech Foreign Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence in Paris on November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France—a point on which Masaryk insisted. This Committee led to the creation of

the Czechoslovak National Council in 1916, which under Masaryk, Beneš, and Štefánik gradually assumed the functions of government.

The surrender of thousands of Czechoslovak soldiers to the Russians, the Serbs, and the Italians, as well as the volunteering of many Czechoslovaks for service in France, led to the formation of the Czechoslovak Legions (later armies) in Russia in 1916, in France in 1917, and in Italy in 1918. Their indomitable spirit and fighting qualities soon gave them a significance far beyond their numbers. Thus the November manifesto against Austria-Hungary and the gradual formation of the Legions directed the attention of the Allies to concrete facts, and they now began to envisage the Legions' possibilities in the larger conflict.

Early in 1916 Premier Briand received Masaryk and publicly expressed the sympathy of France for the Czechoslovak people and their struggle for liberation. After the Slavic prisoners of war in Russia were liberated in April, 1916, by the intervention of the Russian Czech Federation of Societies, the permission to form a Czechoslovak army was given in August of the same year. At first difficulties between the National Council in Paris and the Russian Government threatened trouble. After the Russian Revolution in March, 1917, a new arrangement was made.

In the meantime, Premier Count Stürgkh of Austria had been assassinated in November and Emperor Francis Joseph had died on December 16 and was succeeded by Emperor Charles, an event which presaged changes in the Habsburg Monarchy. Germany had initiated a peace offensive by a note to President Wilson. The Czechoslovak National Council, through Masaryk and Beneš, was able to have the clause "the liberation of the Czechoslovaks from foreign domination" inserted among the war aims of the Allies, as indicated by their reply of January 10, 1917. The drastic Austrian policy of oppression, in the midst of

which came the condemnation of Kramář and other Czech leaders to death, made the propaganda for liberation a relatively easy task.

The events indicated above foreshadowed important changes in the Habsburg Monarchy which the Russian Revolution in March, 1917, precipitated. This event shook the foundations of central Europe and destroyed the morale of its armies. It ended the military despotism of the first two years of the war in Austria and forced the calling of the Austrian Parliament. Thereafter the Habsburg hierarchy could do nothing with the non-German and non-Magyar nations of that country. The masses intimidated such political leaders as leaned toward the Monarchy and encouraged others to stand up for their rights. The Russian Revolution made the self-determination of the nations one of its slogans, and the entry of the United States into the war in April made certain Allied victory. That same month Count Czernin, Austrian minister of foreign affairs, wrote to Emperor Charles, "we must finish things at any price . . . [and] begin peace negotiations at a moment when the enemy is not yet fully conscious of our decaying strength . . ." But before this could happen, the Austrian Parliament had to be called, for it was hoped that it would demonstrate its loyalty and prove to the enemies that the Habsburg Monarchy was a "liberal" state.

When Parliament met on May 30, 1917, it proved to be a great disappointment to Czernin. Deputy František Staněk, representing the majority of the Czech deputies, made a declaration for the reconstitution of the Monarchy into a federal state composed of free and equal national states and stated that they would "work for the union of all branches of the Czechoslovak people into a single democratic state, including also that branch of the race that lives adjoining to the historic frontiers of our Bohemian Fatherland." Deputy Antonín Kalina, speaking for

himself and one other deputy, was much more radical when he declared, "We Czechs absolutely reject every responsibility for this war," and demanded complete independence for the "whole oppressed Czechoslovak nation . . . in the sense of the new democracy."

The majority of Czech deputies might not have gone so far had they not been called to order by the Manifesto of Czech Writers, published on May 17, which ended with the admonition: "If you cannot carry out all that the nation demands of you and charges you with, then resign your right to sit and appeal to the highest authority—to your nation." Kalina's statement truly expressed the sentiment of the masses of the people.

Other nations, Yugoslav and Polish, followed suit. It meant the end of dualism; the disintegration of the Monarchy now became only a matter of time. Premier Clam-Martinic resigned on June 21. His successor, Premier Seidler, announced amnesty for the political prisoners sentenced by the military courts. Some eighteen thousand were thus liberated, among them the Czech leaders Kramář, Klofáč, Červinka, and others. Like the calling of the Parliament, the amnesty had just the reverse effect from that which had been expected by Emperor Charles. "They themselves," said Klofáč, "pardoned their own sins, which they committed against the Czech nation." From this it is clear that the nations of the Monarchy were on the road to successful revolution. Passive resistance had been abandoned for active resistance.

The Czechoslovak National Council, which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by the nation at home. On the contrary, it now had an active ally inside the Habsburg Monarchy. The entry of America into the war gave wider scope to the activity of American Czechoslovaks, who supplied the financial resources for the work of the National Council. The Russian Revolution gave Masaryk an opportunity to go to Rus-

sia, and there he arranged for the complete organization of the Czechoslovak Legions into an army which was destined to play a rôle out of all proportion to its numbers, then some fifty thousand men. A brigade of this army distinguished itself in the Battle of Zborov (July 2, 1917), which led Kerensky to consent to the formation of an independent army corps (October 9, 1917) under the political control of the Czechoslovak National Council. The success which Masaryk had had in Russia was being duplicated by Beneš in France. In December an autonomous Czechoslovak army was created in France under much the same conditions as in Russia. The creation of this army and the Bolshevik Revolution in November produced a situation which permitted the Czechoslovak National Council on February 7, 1918, to declare the army corps in Russia an integral part of the Czechoslovak army, and to decide upon its departure from Russia. It also ended the vacillation in certain French circles which had been engaged in secret negotiations with Austria-Hungary. That same month Italy consented to the principle of the creation of Czechoslovak military units. The creation of the national Czechoslovak army, fighting on three Allied fronts, led to the Declaration of January 6, 1918, by the Diet of the Czech Crown Lands, a declaration much stronger than that of May 30, 1917, to the effect that an absolutely independent Czechoslovak state must be created.

The Czechoslovak national army had been created and the Czechoslovak National Council was recognized as its political head. There remained the political recognition of the Czechoslovak revolution and the juridic recognition of Czechoslovak independence, in other words, that of a new state. The negotiations which created the national army were the starting points for this development because they really ended in conventions. The Congress of the Oppressed Peoples of Austria-Hungary

held at Rome, April 9-12, 1918, caused the Italian Government to come out for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and to sign, on April 21, a convention with the Czechoslovak National Council calling for the actual creation in Italy of separate Czechoslovak army detachments. In the following week, on the twenty-ninth, Secretary Lansing issued a statement to the effect that, as a result of the Congress of the Oppressed Peoples, the United States expressed her sympathy in the struggle of the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs for liberty. Beneš secured promises from France and England at this time for the *de facto* recognition of the National Council as a government and of the Czechoslovak army as an Allied and belligerent army by a collective action of the Allies. That this did not take place in a specific act at the Interallied Conference of June, 1918, was due to Italian hesitations in the Jugoslav problem.

In the meantime, it had been agreed with the Bolshevik General Staff, because of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk concluded between the Germans and the Bolsheviks on March 3, that the Czechoslovak army corps would withdraw from Russia by way of Vladivostok. The Germans, however, demanded of the Soviets the disarmament of the Czechoslovak army corps and indirectly its surrender as prisoners of war. By the Convention of Penza concluded with the Soviets on March 26 the Czechoslovaks were to be allowed to depart eastward, not as an army but as free citizens carrying with them some arms for protection against possible counter-revolutionary attacks. This did not satisfy the Germans nor the local soviets on the Transsiberian, who feared the Czechoslovaks might join forces with Semenov. In the meantime, the Interallied Conference at Abbeville decided to accept an agreement between the French military attaché and the Soviet Government permitting that part of the corps which had not yet reached Siberia to withdraw by way of Arkhangelsk

and Murmansk. But neither the Allies nor the Soviet Government informed the Czechoslovak army corps of this brusque decision in time. The latter could not understand the motives of this arrangement and many feared it was the result of German intrigues. Mutual suspicion and fear between the Soviet Government and the army corps command added to the confusion of contradictory directives.

The situation was further complicated by the incident of Cheliabinsk of May 14, 1918, in which a Magyar prisoner threw a missile into a train transporting a part of the corps, whereupon the attacker was killed. The Soviet authorities imprisoned the sentinel sent by the commander of the regiment to deal with the incident. Thereupon the Czech soldiers freed the sentinel and returned to the train. The Soviet Government interpreted the incident as "counter-revolutionary," arrested the heads of the Russian section of the Czechoslovak National Council in Moscow, and ordered that the Czechoslovak detachments be completely disarmed and transformed into companies of laborers. The Czechoslovak army corps representatives, then in preliminary session before their projected military congress, decided not to submit to the decrees of Soviet authorities or to the change in direction of departure from Russia (via Arkhangelsk) but to continue eastward through Siberia "under their own disposition," with France as their destination. Trotsky thereupon ordered every Czechoslovak found with arms to be shot on the spot. This made conflict unavoidable for the army, an army which had fought victoriously at Kiev, Zhitomir, and Bakhmach, and which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict against the Germans in the west. The Soviet Government refused to modify Trotsky's order and ordered that a regular expedition be sent against the Czechoslovak army corps, to which the latter responded with a counter act, in spite of the

insistence of the Interallied representatives, and especially that of the French, that conflict be avoided and that their arms be surrendered. In this way followed the forcible occupation of the Transsiberian Railway from Cheliabinsk to Vladivostok so as to facilitate in safety the withdrawal of the army corps. The Czechoslovaks insisted on their neutrality in internal Russian affairs.

The success which attended this eastward movement of the Czechoslovak army corps gave birth in Allied countries to the idea of the re-creation against the Central Powers of the eastern front, which had been destroyed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March, because by this time many Allied leaders believed Soviet Russia to be either a secret ally or a vassal of Germany. Various motives were screened behind the idea of the establishment of an eastern front, the inception of which was probably genuine. Among these was the insistent hope of Japan to intervene *alone* in eastern Siberia for imperialistic reasons of her own, besides those of warding off the spread of bolshevism—a policy consistently opposed by President Wilson. It was believed that Japan would thereafter directly or indirectly control eastern Siberia (to Lake Baikal), which was a close neighbor of Alaska. Such a situation would exclude Russia, a great white Power, from the Pacific balance of power and exert a decisive influence not only on Manchuria and Mongolia, but on China as well, and thus upon the future problem of American security on the Pacific. Apparently vital interests of American high policy were concerned.

These events precipitated others. Shortly after Masaryk's visit to President Wilson, Secretary Lansing informed the Serbian minister in Washington on June 24 that in the opinion of the United States Government "all branches of the Slavic race should be completely liberated from German and Austrian rule."

President Wilson became interested in a project for using the Czechoslovak army corps in Siberia in order to prevent the sole intervention of Japan. When finally he yielded at the request of Marshal Foch, the Siberian intervention became an Interallied intervention expressly safeguarding the internal affairs and territorial integrity of Russia (August 3).¹

Beneš was able to secure from France on June 29 a statement officially recognizing the Czechoslovak National Council as the supreme organ administering all the interests of the nation, which it was announced had the right to independence. The Czechoslovak army was recognized as an Allied and belligerent army. France was followed on August 9 by England, which declared the Czechoslovak National Council to be the "trustee" of the future Czechoslovak Government, and by the United States, Japan, and Italy early in September. Conventions formally ratifying these *de facto* recognitions were signed with England (September 3) and France (September 28).

In Prague the Czechs organized a national council during the summer, and the deputies in Parliament publicly proclaimed their solidarity with the Allies. Early in October the Prague National Council declared that it stood firmly for national independence and designated the Czechoslovak National Council abroad as its representative at the future peace conference.

Bulgaria had asked for an armistice on September 25. It was apparent that the war might end quickly. Accordingly, Emperor Charles proposed through the Swedish minister in Washington to reorganize his empire on a federal basis. President Wilson had promised not to act in regard to Austria-Hungary without consulting Masaryk. Thereupon, the latter issued the Declaration of Czechoslovak Independence in Washington on

¹ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918*, Suppl. I, Vol. I, pp. 815-816; *ibid.*, *Russia*, II, 324-329. See also chap. v, below.

October 18.² Thereafter, the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia, with Masaryk as president, was recognized *de jure* by the Allies. President Wilson replied to Emperor Charles that he could no longer accept "mere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of peace . . . that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations." On October 28 the Austro-Hungarian Government accepted this basis and on that day, without bloody incidents, the Prague National Council took over the power and declared itself one with that in Paris. Representatives of both national councils met in Geneva, October 28–31, and agreed on details for the Provisional Government in which Masaryk served as president, Kramář as premier, and Beneš as minister of foreign affairs. It was then as a full-fledged ally that Czechoslovakia was invited to the Peace Conference. Its boundaries, however, had not yet been determined, and that delineation was one of the many tasks of that assembly.

In the aims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechoslovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the self-determination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fundamental question just what "self-determination of the nations" meant at the time. It seems most probable that when it was first uttered it meant the determination of an entire nation to choose whether it wished to be independent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it. It was then taken for granted that minorities, that is, parts of nations apart from the main body, would continue to be features of the picture, because no boundary making, no matter how scientifically accurate or skillful (and totally regardless of its other political, strategic, or eco-

² See chap. v, below.

conomic consequences in the make-up of the world as it was) could obliterate them. In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in composition. Such was the situation in central, eastern, and Balkan Europe, owing to the polyglot character of its inhabitants. As far as the Czechoslovaks were concerned, the matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, and on the rights of nationality for the Slovaks in Hungary, where the Magyars claimed the historic rights of the Lands of the Hungarian Crown. The sad experiences which the Czechs had at the hands of the Habsburgs and the brutal denationalizing policy of the Magyars toward the Slovaks had brought the two together. The war had cemented their brotherhood, and their demands represented a real motivating force for the better in the regions where they lived.

The Peace Conference chose to give the Czechoslovaks the historic boundaries in the Czech regions of Austria and ethnic boundaries in the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it added, under conditions of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.³ It thus created a state in which 34 per cent of the population was non-Czechoslovak, and this element included a German population of over three millions, living chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of less than fifteen millions.

There were, however, cogent reasons behind the Peace Conference decision for including this German population (later called the Sudete Germans) in the new state. First, there was the fact that an ethnographic boundary inside of Bohemia and Moravia would have made impossible the existence of an independent nation, as long as the Germans in the Reich had not

³ See chap. x, below.

found "their place" in the world. This has since been confirmed in the course of events in the so-called "ethnic" justice of the Munich Agreement of October, 1938, and the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, in the guise of a German protectorate, in March, 1939. These events, together, substituted German imperial domination in place of prewar Habsburg imperialism to the utter disregard of the right of self-determination of the Czechoslovaks. It has also led to healthy skepticism concerning whether Nazi Germany's real objective was the self-determination of the Sudete Germans. The inclusion of the Germans in the new Czechoslovak Republic was based on sound geographic and strategic arguments. Next, in few regions was the economic unity of the area so emphasized as in Bohemia, where the cutting off of the regions bordering on Germany and Austria—mountainous regions, for the most part, containing mineral resources and industry, which in turn were vitally dependent upon the rest of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, and the reverse—meant virtual economic disaster. This also was conclusively demonstrated from October, 1938, to March, 1939, when particularly the Sudete region suffered terribly because it had been severed from its fundamental economic unity. And, finally, since the Czechoslovaks bound themselves voluntarily to the signature of the Minorities Treaty and even offered to go beyond it, there was no insuperable obstacle to the inclusion of a German minority in a highly cultured state led by liberal and conscientious statesmen. That this new state might add a deterrent to renewed expansive tendencies of the Reich was not lost sight of by France, Italy, and England, as well as by others, but in itself it was not the conclusive argument, although it was doubtless contributory to the decision.

Against the inclusion of the Germans was first the fact that they had long been a minority favored over the majority and

that it was contrary to human nature to expect them to readjust quickly their traditional habits of domination and assume habits of coöperation even on terms of complete guaranty of their nationality. For over ten years considerable coöperation was achieved, but the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany and their intervention, at first veiled and then direct, in the Czechoslovak State made coöperation impossible. Would it have been different if the Nazis had not dominated Germany? Possibly, but no positive answer can be given unless we envisage an entirely different Europe, a sort of enlarged Switzerland, in which militarism and imperialism, as well as extreme nationalism, have been discarded.

The Peace Conference, by its act of giving the Czechoslovak State these historic boundaries, made its decision in the last analysis on the ground that nine or ten million Czechoslovaks should be favored with independence over three million Germans.

The boundary which bordered on Hungary, that is, Slovakia proper, included about two million Slovaks and some six or seven hundred thousand Magyars. There were two disputable smaller areas which were awarded to the new state: the city of Bratislava (Pressburg) and the Danubian island of Grosse Schütt. Bratislava at that time had a plurality of Germans and counted among its inhabitants more Magyars than Slovaks. But the district for which it was a metropolitan center was preponderantly Slovak, and it was a natural port on the Danube for the entire state. The Grosse Schütt was compactly inhabited by about one hundred thousand Magyars. It was included because the southern channel of the Danube was the better defensible frontier. Its economic outlet, however, was Bratislava. The loss of Slovakia, like the other Magyar losses to Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Austria, was a great blow to Hungary, which was reduced

to the plains. The Magyars, though they signed the peace treaties, yearned to recover these territories. History had offered them two possibilities: a truly federal Hungary, which their leaders had indignantly rejected in 1848 and 1867, or an imperialist Hungary, over which either the Germans, Russians, or Italians would be the ultimate masters. After 1919, they might have obtained minor border rectifications from the other states, in return for coöperation in some form of Danubian customs union or federation. This they rejected. They therefore clung to the imperialist solution for their problems. Had they given their non-Magyar nationalities even a trace of liberty, their fate at the Peace Conference and their lot at the present time would have been happier ones.

Difficult as were the German and Magyar problems in boundary delimitation, the settlement of the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Poland, two allies among allies, was more difficult. It came to be known as the "Teschen Question."⁴ Here the historic, ethnic, geographic, strategic, and economic problems were even more complicated. The problem passed from the Peace Conference to a Plebiscite Commission, and then to the Council of Ambassadors, where it was decided on July 28, 1920.

The Duchy of Teschen was what was left of Silesia, one of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederick the Great had seized fourteen-fifteenths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the Czechs went back to the fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy had been Polish. It was geographically and strategically of great importance since it was the eastern part of the famous Moravian Gap between the plains of the Polish Vistula and the Austrian Danube. It was a watershed or portage between these two great river systems. It was the cross-roads of railway lines running north and south from Berlin and

⁴ See chap. ix, below.

Prague to Bratislava and Budapest and from Warsaw, Lenin-grad, Moscow, and Kiev to Brno, Bratislava, and Vienna. As far as the Czechoslovaks were concerned, their main railway connection from Bohemia and Moravia with Slovakia ran through this region to the Slovak pass of Jablunka. Extensive coking-coal reserves and mines were to be found there. To cap it all, some of the old inhabitants (Slonzaks-Slazacy) of the region spoke a dialect which was chiefly a transition between the Czech and Polish languages. Since the opening of the mines, more or less migratory Polish labor from Galicia had invaded the district, thus adding further complications. The Austrian census of 1910, used throughout by the Peace Conference as a basis for all the problems indicated above, based as it was on the "language of intercourse" and not the "mother tongue," gave the Poles 54.85 per cent, the Czechs 27.11 per cent, and the Germans 18.04 per cent out of the total of 426,370 inhabitants (101,138 of whom did not hold the rights of citizenship in the Duchy, and over half of these came from Galicia and Bukovina). For the Czechoslovaks to lose all of the Duchy meant the loss not only of more than 100,000 Czechs and their most direct avenue of contact with Slovakia, but the Karwin coal basin, which was a vital supply base for the industries of Bohemia. For the Poles to lose all of the Duchy meant a loss of some 230,000 Poles and native Silesians and the coal mines, though not all the coal reserves. Poland, moreover, had other coal areas of this character. Division was therefore the only solution. But a division acceptable to both sides was almost impossible.

Various more or less temporary lines dividing the Duchy from the north to the south were arranged, such as the line of November 5, 1918, set up by the local national councils, which was very favorable to the Poles; the line of February, 1919, which was set temporarily by the Interallied Commission after the military

conflict, and which was more favorable to the Czechs; and the line created in 1920 by the decision of the Council of Ambassadors agreed to by the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries and ratified by them. The final frontier was still more favorable to the Czechs. It included the Karwin coal basin (about one-half of the reserves), the main railway line to Jablunka Pass, but not the city of Teschen. The Poles, dissatisfied with this decision, later declared that they would never have agreed had they not been engaged at the time in the war with Soviet Russia. However, it may be pointed out that this was chiefly a coincidence, and it is doubtful if any better arrangement would have been obtained from any international arbitrators.

It was, however, Poland's dissatisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into demanding and acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Munich (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her Western allies. Perhaps it was not understood sufficiently by the Poles that to undermine the existence of Czechoslovakia was to undermine the existence of Poland. Such a policy made inevitable Poland's ruin by Germany and the Soviet Union a year later. The destruction of Czechoslovakia, in which, like Poland, Hungary participated, made inevitable the latter's vassalage to either Germany or Russia.

German propaganda later sought to spread the view that the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, as well as those of Poland, were drawn by the Peace Conference in ignorance and that they represented a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. Nothing could be farther from the facts. The delegates of the Peace Conference had access to and used the best available information and considered these problems from all possible angles. No one then knew what would be the fate of the League of

Jations or the development of the problem of Germany in the postwar period, both in domestic affairs and in foreign relations. Another solution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be sought by some future peace conference, if the poignant problem of the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerland rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism. Until then it may be said that the work of the Peace Conference was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have secured a durable settlement.

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Chapter V

WHAT WOODROW WILSON AND AMERICA MEANT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER

THE YEAR 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate knowledge of the Czechoslovaks and their aspirations could almost have been counted on the fingers of one hand. Even up to May, 1918, when Thomas Garrigue Masaryk came to America, the *New York Times* had not carried a single serious editorial on the Czechoslovaks. When he left in December of that year, he was one of the acknowledged great men of the war period and also president-elect of a country soon to become of recognized importance in the family of nations.

What happened in those few short months is the subject of this chapter, though it will be necessary also to indicate how the ground was prepared. In these days it is difficult to understand the utter ignorance concerning central Europe that then prevailed in America. To the sophisticated, Bohemians were some sort of intellectual gypsies; to theologians, Jan Hus was a great figure, now dead for five hundred years; and to educators, the exiled Comenius had three hundred years ago set education on a new road. Beyond these facts there was a blank.

There were a few books in England from which some information might have been gathered, but in the United States, in 1912, there were only: Thomas Čapek, *Slovaks of Hungary, Slavs, and Pan-Slavism* (1906); Lützow, *Bohemia, an Historical Sketch*, ending, however, in 1620; Emily Greene Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow-Citizens* (1910); C. E. Maurice, *Bohemia* (1910); and W. S. Monroe, *Bohemia and the Czechs* (1910). Of the last, a reviewer in *The Nation* was justified in asserting that "this is the first general work of travel and description on Bohemia in our language." In 1915 Čapek's *Bohemia under Habsburg Misrule* was published. Up to 1918 there was no other book with "Czech" in the title.

Of short articles there was an even greater dearth. Beginning with 1900 there had been occasional articles by social workers on various Slavs in the United States in *Charities*, predecessor of *The Survey*.

The first magazine article dealing with the national aspirations of the Bohemians appeared in the *North American Review* in December, 1914, entitled "Nationalism in Bohemia and Poland" by the present writer. The substance of this article had been given in a paper before the American Sociological Society at Minneapolis in December, 1913.

In the face of such a complete lack of information it was impossible for the American people to give any help to a national cause. There was a traditional predisposition for Americans to be interested in freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States to establish their right to freedom. This they undertook with vigor from the very beginning, but not until much later did the news of Czechoslovak activities in Europe and Asia get into the papers. Finally the arrival of Professor Masaryk in America started a new phase of education and organization. The rapidity of change in the last six months of

the war would have been impossible without the work that preceded the coming of Masaryk.

The Czech colonies in Chicago, Cleveland, Cedar Rapids, and many other places had long been organized and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The Czech National Alliance was formed on August 18, 1914, with the purpose of informing the people of America and Europe of the just demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of Catholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs were brought together, and soon afterward the Slovaks came in. Beneš, in his *War Memoirs*, discusses at some length the value of this American movement.¹

In January, 1915, a meeting was held at the Cleveland Athletic Club. It was the occasion of the founding of the Czechoslovak National Council and plans were made for the organization of the Czechs and Slovaks throughout the country for unified action. From that moment until the end of the war, this Council was the agency through which money was raised to enable Masaryk to carry on his work. It also published several pamphlets, two of which, by Charles Pergler, were *Bohemian Hopes and Ambitions* (1916) and *Heart of Europe* (1917).

Beneš says that from the autumn of 1917 he had had contact with the counselor of the American Embassy in Paris, and in the following April he had talks with Ambassador Sharp, who became sympathetic and sent enthusiastic pleas on behalf of the Czechs to President Wilson, urging that "nothing could be done with the Habsburg Empire, that the nations in it were gradually liberating themselves, and that the Allies in Europe were clearly directing their policy in accordance with this circumstance." Beneš never learned whether or not this had any specific influence on President Wilson.

¹ Eduard Beneš, *My War Memoirs* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1928) p. 336.

The process of education was a slow one. Miss Mary McDowell of the University of Chicago Settlement, an old friend not only of Professor Masaryk and his daughter Alice, but also of the many Czechs and Slovaks whom she had seen grow up in Chicago, was a constant interpreter of the people and their hopes. The present writer was the only other consistent outside worker for a better understanding. His interest began by being purely academic and it has continued largely objective, but, in 1912, in order to get a better perspective on the Bohemians in America from a sociological aspect, he visited Bohemia with a Sokol delegation. Miss McDowell had given him a letter of introduction to Professor Masaryk. He spent nearly a week with Masaryk in Moravia and became familiar with his interpretation of the relations of the minorities to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Masaryk's moral and intellectual integrity impressed the present writer, as it did many others who came to know the Czech leader later, and he felt a responsibility for presenting the case as well as he could whenever and wherever possible.

In the early years of the war there was scarcely any reference in the newspapers to central Europe. In fact it was not until the spectacular march of the Czechoslovaks across Siberia at a moment when other war news was scarce that attention finally became focused on the issues created by Czechoslovaks.

Until May, 1918, the *New York Times* index had mentioned Czech and Czechoslovak only under the general heading "Austria-Hungary." In July and September, two full pages in the index were given to the Czechoslovak army and a half-page to other aspects of the situation. This demonstrates Masaryk's wisdom in insisting that it would be necessary for the Czechoslovaks to have an army before they could expect to exert influence on the statesmen of the world.

The prime influence in securing the help of America came

from Masaryk himself. In this effort his understanding of America and his character played important parts. In both of these Mrs. Masaryk was a dominant factor. An American with Puritan background, she never yielded the moral fiber of her inheritance. Masaryk frequently mentioned this influence. He had been in the United States many times, and, although maintaining the same critical objectivity that he applied to his own people, he felt the dynamic forces of American democracy and American tolerance. In his *The Making of a State* he begins his discussion of America by telling of a visit in 1918 to Gettysburg, where he felt that the statues to many generals, instead of to one, demonstrated the democratic expression. In the cemetery at Gettysburg, the thought came to him that "our Czechoslovak State would resemble America in that we would have no dynasty of our own, and no liking for a foreign dynasty; that we have no aristocracy, no army and no military tradition."

When Masaryk arrived in America on May 5, 1918, the spontaneous reception given him by the Czechs and Slovaks in Chicago instantly stamped him as a recognized authority on the issues of the war. Through Mr. Morris, American ambassador in Japan, he had already sent President Wilson an important memorandum and so was immediately accepted in governmental, as well as in popular, circles.

The principle of self-determination of nations had been formulated by President Wilson early in the year, without, however, his envisioning the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This was an outcome that he was slow to accept. The subject nations immediately seized upon self-determination with hope. The arrival of Professor Masaryk and the increasing impetus of an informed public opinion raised a concrete case that could not be dealt with academically.

In early January, 1918, the present writer, who had already

given addresses for the Y.M.C.A. at Camp Sherman in Chillicothe, Ohio, on "How Germany Treats Subject People," and had returned to his work at Oberlin College, received an invitation from the General Staff of the Division to come back for further talks. He arrived on January 24. On January 20, an order had been issued by the War Department to discharge as enemy aliens all subjects of the Central Powers who wished discharge. The present writer immediately presented the argument that the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs were much more anxious than anyone else in America for the defeat of the Germans in both empires. Meetings were arranged at Camp Sherman for the seven or eight thousand men belonging to these various groups, to be addressed in their own languages on American war aims. The result was that more than a thousand men who had already applied for release withdrew their applications, assuming that victory for America would mean self-determination for the countries of their origin.

In the early spring, Major General E. F. Glenn, commander of the Division, invited the present writer again to discuss what could be done about reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity. A meeting of the leaders of the various groups of central Europe was arranged. Charles Pergler and Professor Písecký represented the Czechoslovaks. Some of the representatives complained that as long as the American Government and public opinion treated them as enemy aliens and passed such drastic laws against them as were then in vogue in many states it would be impossible for America to get full cooperation from them. Finally, General Glenn burst out: "Damn it, the people are the government of the United States; if they express their opinion the government will follow." Attention then was turned to the education of public opinion. The story was told to the Committee on Public Information, and immedi-

ately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the newspapers, and information of this changing American attitude was dropped from airplanes behind the Austrian lines.

American public opinion was stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did in America from the very beginning of the war, and then later in Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk. Finally, when the weight of President Wilson's support was added, the conclusion was near.

President Wilson had been slow in being convinced of the logical consequences of his principle of self-determination, though his pronouncements on freedom had had a great influence in encouraging the Czechs, both in this country and abroad. It was not until May, 1918, that the full significance of their desire for self-determination began to dawn on America. On May 30, the *New York Times* had an editorial apropos of an Austrian proposal to divide Bohemia into twelve districts, in which the statement was made: "The government of Bohemia recognized by an overwhelming majority of the nation is not the Austrian Kaiser, or bureaucracy, not even the Diet or the Czech deputies in Parliament, though these have done heroic service as representatives of the nation; it is the Czechoslovak National Committee, whose President, Dr. Masaryk, was recently in New York, whose armies have recently fought in Galicia, in France, in Italy." The next day in another editorial Secretary of State Lansing was quoted as saying: "The proceedings of the Congress of Oppressed Races in Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome in April, have been followed with great interest by the government of the United States," and also: "the nationalistic aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this government." On June 1,

in a news item there appeared the statement that "this message has gone to the oppressed races of Austria as a further assurance of the purpose of the United States to enter into no peace treaty with their oppressors that does not concede their right to a separate national existence." Two days later, June 3, an editorial writer declared: "Every day brings more news of riots in Bohemia, burning of public buildings, tearing down of the Austrian flag, and running up of the Bohemian, sacking of German newspaper offices. The Czechs, treated with the utmost brutality since the beginning of the War, are bent inexorably on independence."

Again, on June 6, news from London indicated that the British, French, and Italian prime ministers were bringing their policy into harmony with that of the United States on two important points: the first, the creation of a united and independent Poland with free access to the sea, and "the second is the endorsement of Lansing's expressed sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations toward freedom of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav peoples . . . showing that the allied governments have come to recognize, no less than President Wilson does, the crucial importance of Central and Eastern Europe among national issues for which the war is being fought."

On July 8, Beneš sent a letter to Prague in which he said: "Masaryk is in America. He has spoken several times with Wilson, and informs me that our cause has been won so completely that Wilson and the American government have promised not to make any fundamental decisions on Austro-Hungarian affairs without us or without our approval."² On August 3, 1918, President Wilson announced an agreement to send a small American expeditionary force to Siberia for the purpose, among other things, of occupying Vladivostok "and in safe-guarding, as far as

² Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

it may, the westward-movir zechoslovaks." Two days later, Masaryk wrote Wilson expressing satisfaction over the latter's decision, concluding, "Your name, Mr. President, as you no doubt know, is cheered in the streets of Prague. Our nation will be forever grateful to you and the people of the United States, and we know how to be grateful!" This support of the Czechoslovak army by President Wilson was the first evidence that he had yielded in his conviction that Austria-Hungary should be maintained.

There was continual activity by Masaryk in the United States and by Beneš in Europe during the summer of 1918, for the purpose of securing the recognition of the Czechoslovak State before the end of the war. On August 9, Balfour issued a declaration recognizing the three Czechoslovak armies (in France, Italy, and Siberia) as an Allied army, and also the Czechoslovak National Council as the trustee of the future government. On September 2, the United States Government gave recognition of the state of belligerency existing between the Czechoslovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian empires and included the declaration: "It also recognizes the Czechoslovak National Council as a *de facto* belligerent government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. The government of the United States further declares that it is prepared formally to enter into relations with the *de facto* government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, the empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary." This complete recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as a *de facto* government was an important addition to the progress already made and had a positive influence on both France and England.

During the summer the newspapers carried many stories of the progress of the Czechoslovak army across Siberia, and it

became a symbol of both the romantic and the heroic. In fact, for most Americans the Czechoslovaks as a people existed only through the army in Siberia. Many Americans could not pronounce their name nor visualize a location for them. It occurred to the present writer that some help could be given by a map. In coöperation with the New York office of the Committee on Public Information, he had a large map of Europe made with outlines indicating the various national groups in Europe and with the area inhabited by the Czechoslovaks in white. This was placed in front of the Public Library on Fifth Avenue and Forty-second Street, where for two weeks vast numbers of people stopped to study it. At the same time in a number of prominent store windows on Fifth Avenue there were exhibits which included pictures of Professor Masaryk and maps with the red and white flag of the Czechs showing the progress of the army through Siberia.

The Committee on Public Information recognized the immediate value of focusing public attention on the objectives of the war. With this end in view, a great mass meeting was held in Carnegie Hall (New York) on Sunday afternoon, September 15. Several American organizations assisted, including the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A., among whose representatives there were many persons with a clear understanding of the national purpose of immigrant groups in America. The meeting was called "The Will of the Peoples of Austria-Hungary. Victory Meeting for the Oppressed Nationalities of Central Europe."

Although the present writer had not initiated the meeting, he was asked to prepare the resolutions to be presented. The leading speakers were Masaryk and Paderewski. The following extracts are taken from the report of the meeting as published in the *New York Times* the next day: "The meeting was of

historic interest to the peoples of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, for it was the first occasion on which representatives of the seven oppressed nations of Austria had sunk their differences and met on the common ground of war to the death against their common oppressor . . . A resolution was adopted calling for the dissolution of the present Austrian Empire. 'The primary object of this war is the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary,' asserted Professor Masaryk . . . 'Much must be done before Eastern Europe is reorganized. But it must be done. Every creation is difficult and so the restoration of mankind is a big and great task. The heads of the Allied countries must not shrink if they encounter difficulties. The Kaiser well said that this war is the principle of Prussianism against the American principle. The war is a struggle for the rights and liberties of mankind. We accept this as your principle and we will fight with you to the end for this eternal principle.' "

The following day, according to agreement, the speakers met in a room in the Hotel Biltmore to sign the resolutions and make plans for presenting them to President Wilson. Masaryk was chosen chairman; feeling that there should be an American to act as executive, he proposed the name of the present writer. As soon as Masaryk had accepted the chairmanship he said, "I have long looked forward to such an organization. If it were known in Austria-Hungary that we are sitting in a room together it would fill them with consternation." Paderewski added, "Just to be polite to each other smooths out differences."

It was arranged that the committee of speakers should go to Washington the following Thursday, September 19, to present the resolutions to President Wilson. When the committee had been received by the President, Masaryk in a brief speech presented the resolutions. The President responded in effect that Austria had been viewed as an old building whose sides had

been held together by props and that it was now clear that the props must be removed.

As the committee of speakers was passing through the lobby of the White House, it was agreed that a permanent organization should be formed. A room was secured and the organization, called the Mid-European Democratic Union, was started on its way. The present writer secured a leave of absence from Oberlin College to act as director of the Union, which became the forerunner of the Little Entente. Several public meetings were held and much publicity was given the organization's activities, though the Italian ambassador tried to undermine its influence since the Jugoslavs were members and they threatened to demand Fiume.

Events that culminated in the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence were moving rapidly. Masaryk and Beneš were collaborating in perfect harmony. The American recognition of the *de facto* status of the Czechoslovak National Council as the government, with Masaryk as prime minister, Beneš as foreign minister, and Štefánik as minister of war, gave them full authority to act. The particular proposals for the new State had been the product of four years of discussion among these three men in particular, although many others had been consulted. Much of the theory was unquestionably Masaryk's own, modified somewhat by his observations in America.

Beneš states³ that affairs were reaching a head in Europe and overtures were being made to Wilson by the Central Powers for an armistice, which "made it clear to us that fateful decisions were at hand. In this sense I [Beneš] telegraphed on the morning of October 10, before leaving Rome, to Masaryk in Washington that the decisive moment was approaching, that Rome agreed to our plans, that we should evidently be prepared any day for

³ Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

proclamation of independence, and that therefore, it was necessary to draw up the required declaration immediately and send it to us in Paris."

According to William E. Dodd,⁴ "on July 4, 1918, a mass meeting of the Czechoslovaks in Independence Hall in Philadelphia, issued a formal Declaration of Independence. President Wilson lent his support to this movement and finally announced American recognition of Czechoslovakia on September 2, 1918." Mr. Dodd confused the frequent claims for independence by an unauthorized group with the official Declaration made by Masaryk, which was dated October 18, 1918. There is, however, a widespread and erroneous belief that Masaryk proclaimed it from Independence Hall.

The facts are as follows. Early in October, through the Swedish minister, President Wilson had received a communication from Emperor Charles of Austria, proposing a reorganization of the empire. Wilson, as has been stated earlier, had told Masaryk that no decisions would be arrived at about Austria-Hungary without consulting him. Wilson knew at this time that a Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence was being prepared by Professor Masaryk.

About four o'clock on the afternoon of October 16, Mr. Císař, Professor Masaryk's secretary, came to the room of the present writer in the Powhatan Hotel and, handing him an envelope, said: "This is the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence. The Professor wants you to put it into good English." On reading it over, the present writer decided that its style would be quite without appeal to the American public which it, in part, sought to influence, and that it needed complete revision. Accordingly, through chance assistance, he gathered together seven men, including two lawyers and Mr. Císař, and set to

⁴ William E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and His Work*, p. 278.

work. Great care was taken to keep all the meaning of the original and at the same time to give a vigor of statement that would appeal to Americans. Every word and every sentence was weighed. The original typewritten copy was cut into more than a hundred pieces and pasted together in different order and then revised again and again. The group worked from seven-thirty in the evening until one-thirty in the morning of October 17, 1918. Later in the forenoon, with Mr. Calfee, a Cleveland lawyer who had been present the previous evening, the present writer went to Professor Masaryk's residence, where again a detailed study was made of form and content, modifications being made wherever the meaning had been changed in the work of the night before. The rest of the day was spent in working on the text and about two o'clock on the morning of the eighteenth the Declaration was cabled to Dr. Beneš in Paris.

In the forenoon of October 18, the present writer had a number of copies multigraphed and a special typewritten copy made for President Wilson. These are the only original copies of the Declaration that ever existed; even the copy that was given the multigrapher has been lost. The question of when the Declaration should be published, whether in the morning or in the evening papers, was carefully weighed and it was finally decided to have it published in the morning papers, October 19. It was deliberately held until 4:00 P.M. of the eighteenth, for two reasons: that gave time enough for the Declaration to be cabled from Paris, where it was technically issued on October 18, and made its release too late for the evening papers.

In the meantime, President Wilson had been preparing his reply to Emperor Charles. Beneš had feared some yielding, but, after receiving the Declaration from Masaryk, Wilson informed Beneš in a letter that he was greatly touched by the proclamation and that Masaryk would be satisfied with the

reply that was being sent to Austria-Hungary. In that reply, signed by Lansing and dated October 18, 1918, Wilson stated: "The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of January 8 last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States of America. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following: 'The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.' Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czechoslovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czechoslovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugoslavs for freedom. The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere 'autonomy' of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations."

The Czechoslovak Declaration and the letter of Emperor Charles were published in the Saturday morning papers, October 19, 1918, the two appearing in many papers in parallel columns; the reply of President Wilson quoted above came on the Monday following.

It was still thought that American public opinion was not sufficiently informed; while the men mentioned above were trying to devise what to do next, the suggestion was made that, if a declaration were issued from Independence Hall in Philadelphia, it would make a striking impression on the American people. They immediately consulted the State Department and obtained its approval, provided Professor Masaryk took the leadership. The members of the Mid-European Union were immediately summoned on Saturday morning, the nineteenth, and a preliminary draft of a declaration was made. The following Wednesday, the Union met in Independence Hall and continued in session until Saturday noon, with Masaryk as chairman. The discussion, which was very heated at times, was concentrated on controversies between the various groups.

Because of the prominence attained by Professor Masaryk through the Declaration on Saturday, the press gave the meetings much space, and minimized the often bitter discussion. Saturday noon a Declaration of Common Aims was read by Professor Masaryk in the courtyard back of Independence Hall. This Declaration was really the first statement leading to the Little Entente.

At a luncheon in the Bellevue-Stratford, held after the formal ceremonies were over, Professor Masaryk received two telegrams; one, from President Wilson, read as follows:

*Professor T. G. Masaryk
Independence Hall
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*

WASHINGTON, D.C., October 26, 1918

Please extend my warm greetings to the oppressed nationalities of Mid-Europe and express to them my deep pleasure that there should be such impressive and irresistible unanimity of principle and purpose amongst us with regard to the issues that are at the heart of the great struggle for justice in which the nations of the world are engaged.

WOODROW WILSON

The other telegram came from Europe, announcing that Masaryk had been appointed president of the provisional state, though he was not formally elected until November 14.

In *The Making of a State*, President Masaryk says that it was not he who prejudiced President Wilson against Austria but "American democratic ideas turned him not only against Russian-Germanism, but also against German-Habsburgism. The War was a moral question as well as a question of power, strategy, and politics."

PART II: POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Chapter VI

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CZECH DEMOCRACY

BY HANS KOHN

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY regarded liberal democracy with its parliamentary representative institutions, its equality of all citizens before the law, and its respect of inalienable individual rights and liberties, as an attitude which was destined to become common to all mankind. The events of that century, culminating in the victory of the liberal democratic Powers in the first World War and in the ensuing democratization of the whole planet, seemed to bear out this conviction. At the beginning of the twentieth century society had been organized on progressively democratic lines, even in the Far East, in Turkey, and in Latin America. The year 1918 accelerated the development. The old conservative monarchies were everywhere swept away, republics were constituted, and suffrage was extended to all. The ideals which had moved the peoples in their Spring of 1848 seemed now realized; in an Autumn sixty years later a bountiful harvest was reaped. But for many peoples this harvest was premature; there had not been a sufficient period of growth. Thus it is not surprising that new forces arose, denying democracy and the progressive ideals of the nineteenth century. These new forces were not half-hearted and partly apologetic, as was the antiliberal movement in the

nineteenth century; they did not remain on the defensive, drawing their inspiration from the *ancien régime*. They were aggressive, proselytizing, with an exuberant faith in their own future. Liberal democracy, east of the Rhine and of the Alps, could nowhere withstand the tremendous pressure of these new forces. This was not only true of nations which preserved their aristocratic structure and where the national movement had taken shape under aristocratic leadership, as with the Germans, the Poles, and the Magyars. It became true even of peoples whose whole structure was democratic, who had lost their aristocracy by extermination or by assimilation, and whose national movement had been shaped by a middle class rising from peasant stock, as with the Bulgarians, the Ukrainians, the Slovaks, and the Baltic peoples. The only exception to this general trend was presented by the Czechs. Sociologically they resembled the peasant peoples; virtually all leaders of their national movement came from the lower or lowest classes, sometimes directly from peasant stock, like Masaryk or Beneš, sometimes only one generation removed from peasant origin. The Czechs had an aristocracy among whom some felt patriotically Czech, but it did not play any rôle in the national renaissance. As regards the sociological foundations for democracy, the Czechs resembled other peoples in eastern Europe for whom the nineteenth century brought the awakening from a long slumber and reintroduced them into history. But only with the Czechs was this sociological foundation strengthened by a philosophy of democracy, which was based upon an interpretation of Czech history and became part, by pervading the whole of Czech education, of the mental and moral inheritance of the nation.

Democracy can develop vigorously only if supported and inspired by historical tradition, embodied in some conspicuous works and deeds. This function is fulfilled in the United States

by the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence, as well as in the lives and thoughts of men like Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln; in England by the Magna Charta, in the revolutions of the seventeenth century, in the struggle for the reform of the Parliament, in the works and lives of Milton, Locke, and Gladstone; in France by the enlightenment of the eighteenth century and by the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848. Historical facts and examples grow into social myths which are closely interwoven into the whole texture of national life. Historiography frequently plays a great rôle in this process. Interpretation of the national past serves to answer the question of the meaning and the destiny of the national existence of a people, as a symbol around which the national cultural life is integrated and by which the vision of the future is determined. These symbols express and in a certain measure determine the national character; they shape the ways of the people and the mood of its literature. Their importance should not be underestimated. It was the tragedy of the Weimar Republic that it did not understand how to create a new symbol for the German people as a new foundation for its faith in itself and its mission. By its preparation for *revanche*, by its elevation of the imperial marshal to the highest civilian office, it left the symbol intact which from the times of Frederick II and Bismarck had progressively determined German life, namely, the belief in the invincibility and in the moral example of the Prussian army. In the shaping of these symbols, historians played a great rôle. Similar tragic consequences for Germany, and for Europe, were involved in Bismarck's success and in the fact that her leading historians were either strictly conservative or glorified the pre-eminence of the militarist and monarchial state over the liberal and democratic attitudes of western Europe. As the victory of 1870 definitely raised Bismarck to the rank of a national hero,

so it seemed to confirm the tenets of the school of Prussian historians about the superiority, even the moral superiority, of conservative monarchism over liberalism. The Weimar Republic did not produce a reinterpretation of German history; thus this brief interlude was followed by an intensification of the tendencies which had dominated German historiography from romanticism to Treitschke. On the contrary, a long line of French historians, from Lamartine and Michelet on, played a decisive rôle in determining the outlook of the French people on the French Revolution and its own past and thereby its conceptions of its future and of its place in the world.

What was accomplished among other peoples by a number of historians was accomplished among the Czechs by one man, František Palacký (1798-1876), who was much more than the first great Czech historian. He has been called the "Father of the Nation," the first of the National Awakeners; he certainly could claim to have been the national educator. He helped to create Czech national consciousness by giving to Czech history a meaning which dignified the past by a proud and inspiring vision and justified the hard struggle which the Czechs had to fight for their national renaissance. He gave to the Czechs the sense of a mission, a *raison d'être* for the aspiration to take anew their place on the field of history. His interpretation of the Czech past created the secure foundation for Czech democracy; it became a living intellectual tradition, vitalizing all manifestations of Czech life.

Palacký was the father of modern Czech nationalism. The Age of Enlightenment had witnessed, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the rise of a new feeling of patriotism; but this new feeling, which expressed itself largely in learned and antiquarian enterprises, was not a Czech nationalism. It was a Bohemian patriotism which looked for its foundation not in the

Czech people, but in the geographic territorial entity of Bohemia and its historical traditions founded upon the rights and privileges of the Bohemian Estates. This patriotism could be common to all peoples living in Bohemia, Czechs and Germans alike. It was very much removed from any nationality demands in the modern sense of the word. It could be compared to the Irish patriotism of those Protestant landlords in Ireland who in the second half of the eighteenth century insisted upon the rights and privileges of the Irish nation, of the Irish parliament, a patriotism of a purely constitutional and even English character, worlds apart from any Gaelic nationalism or any identification with the Catholic Gaelic people of Ireland as opposed to the English. In this eighteenth-century patriotism an insistence upon historical privileges was tied up with the emphasis of the eighteenth-century enlightenment upon education, facilitated so much in the Habsburg lands by the benevolent and progressive policy of Maria Theresa and especially of Joseph II.

It was Palacký who provided the rising Czech nationalism, a product of the influences of the French Revolution and of German romanticism, with a firm foundation. He created for the Czechs a distinct idea of their own, an idea which explained and integrated their history, and at the same time distinguished them from and opposed them to the Germans. Under the existing geographic and historical circumstances Czech national consciousness could develop only by comparison with and contrast to the Germans in whose midst the Czechs had lived politically, economically, and culturally. Palacký replaced the Bohemian patriotism of the Estates by a Czech nationalism of the people and gave the Czechs a national *raison d'être*. Thus he solved also a problem which preoccupied him and his disciple Masaryk, the problem of the right of small nations, of the desirability and necessity for the renaissance of small nations. Palacký was too

deeply steeped in the moral philosophy of Kant to derive the rights of a small nation from its mere existence or to justify it merely politically or vitalistically; for him rights must be based upon moral and cultural foundations. And Palacký anticipated, already in the middle of the last century, the progressive unification of mankind as the result of technical and economic developments; he was convinced that the time of small states had passed and that mankind was driven irresistibly toward the creation of very large political and economic units and soon even toward world organization. Thus for him a small people could exist only on the strength of its intellectual and moral achievements. "Whenever we were victorious," he used to remind the Czechs, "it was always more as the result of spiritual forces than of physical might, and whenever we succumbed, there was always the insufficiency of our spiritual activity and of our moral courage responsible for it." If the Czechs wished to exist they must not only equal their neighbors, spiritually and morally, but surpass them.

Palacký created his symbol of Czech national consciousness by reinterpreting Czech history. During the two hundred years from the Battle of White Mountain (1620) to the publication of the first volume of his *Geschichte von Böhmen* (1836),¹ Bohemian historiography, under the influence of the victorious Counter-Reformation, had regarded Bohemia as a whole as an integral part of the Catholic world and had therefore condemned the Hussites and the Czech Brethren as a heretic revolt against this world, in fact as a deplorable madness responsible

¹ It is interesting to note that Palacký wrote his great history first in German and that he characteristically changed the title for the Czech edition, which is not titled a "History of Bohemia," but is called *Dějiny národu českého* (History of the Czech Nation), the last volume of which appeared only in 1876, shortly before Palacký's death. The first volume of the Czech edition was published, appropriately enough, in March, 1848, the Spring of the peoples.

for the devastation of Bohemia, for her isolation from the general currents of Europe, for the decline of the Czechs, and ultimately for their defeat in 1620. Palacký, who himself came of a Protestant family, rehabilitated the Hussites; to a certain degree his interpretation can be compared to the rehabilitation of Cromwell and the Puritan revolution by Carlyle against the treatment which they had suffered in the historiography of the Restoration and the eighteenth century; only the ethos underlying Carlyle's historiography was fundamentally different from that inspiring Palacký. The Czech historian found in the Czech Reformation the culmination and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive period of which began with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experienced its last and most sublime flowering in the Czech Brethren. This interpretation determined not only the character of Czech history and of the Czech mission, but also their relations to the Germans and to Europe generally.

We can trace clearly in Palacký the several influences which determined his attitude.² The first of them was that of French enlightenment. He accepted from it on the one hand its deep liberalism, its respect of individual rights, its optimistic faith in progress; on the other hand its dislike of the Middle Ages and its scant interest in theological dogmatic speculations. Although he was a deeply religious man, his religiosity bore the character of the humanitarian theism of the eighteenth century, not that of the speculative fervor of the seventeenth-century transcendentalism. From Kant, who may be regarded as the philosophical consummation of Western enlightenment in Germany, he accepted the fundamental thesis that men must consistently put the good of mankind and scientific truth above their nation's

² There is no satisfactory study on Palacký in English or in German. In Czech we have, besides a number of important studies, the comprehensive work by Josef Fischer, *Myšlenka a dílo Františka Palackého* (Prague, 1926-1927), 2 vols.

interests and that political life must be governed by the same moral rules as private life. From romanticism and Hegel, Palacký learned the fundamental conception that history and life are struggle and that their development proceeds under the law of contradiction or, as he called it frequently, polarity. Eighteenth-century enlightenment had stressed more the elements of unity and harmony in the world and their growth with the progress of time; the nineteenth century emphasized more the elements of struggle and conflict, later even glorified life as heroic struggle. Palacký in 1848 shared the cosmopolitan enthusiasm of his generation, late children of the eighteenth century. Later on he grew more and more conservative, more and more nationalistic, and more and more cautious in his hopes for the future. He never abandoned the faith in natural rights and in *die humane Bestimmung* which had characterized him as an 1848'er, but in his political and cultural utterances he became more and more reactionary, a determined opponent of general suffrage, of complete political equality, of socialism; he also became anti-Semitic, and stressed more and more the importance of aristocracy and even of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, in his historiography he continued to regard history as a struggle of ideas, of ethico-religious conceptions, and in this struggle, which was for him the essence of history, he claimed for the Czechs the honor of having been the first fighters for human freedom and for liberal democracy.

In his conception of history as a struggle of two opposite principles, the Germans and the Slavs appeared to Palacký as the representatives of the two opposed tendencies. Herein he followed a general trend of the time. The outline of the scheme had been proposed by Herder and accepted and overworked by the Russian Slavophiles. The famous Královedvorský and Zeleňohorský manuscripts which Václav Hanka asserted he had

discovered in 1817 and published in 1818 seemed to provide historical proof for the picture which Palacký and the Slav romanticists drew of early Slav civilization. Palacký never doubted the authenticity of these manuscripts, which only after his death were definitely established as forgeries. He regarded the Slavs as a people approaching the Rousseauian ideal, pious, peace-loving, close to nature, gaining their livelihood by hard labor as peasants and shepherds. The Germans represented the opposite ideal, bellicose and well organized under competent leadership, trying to gain their livelihood, not from peaceful work, but by conquest and by obliging the vanquished to work for their lords. The Slavs lived in a primitive democracy where classes and castes were unknown and all were equal. But they loved liberty too much to subject themselves to authority and thus to create a strong and durable state; their communities inclined toward anarchy and suffered from a lack of leadership and organization. Thus they became an easy prey of their stronger and more progressive neighbors. This picture was common to the Russian Slavophiles, to the Polish Messianists, to Palacký; but only Palacký drew from it a conclusion which made the Czechs the protagonists of freedom and democracy in their more developed stages. The Slavophile stressed an authoritarian order and glorified the Orthodox Church, the Polish Messianists accepted the Catholic and aristocratic tradition of Poland; it was only Palacký who stressed and proclaimed the Protestant and liberal character of the Czech struggle against the Germans.

For him the essence and meaning of Czech history was the opposition between the Czechs and the Germans, not in the sense so much of a political struggle, and certainly not in the sense of warlike conflicts, but as a differentiation based upon moral ideas and national psychologies. Roughly it may be said that the Germans represented the authoritarian and aristocratic

principles, the Czechs the liberal and democratic. This opposition culminated in the Hussite movement, which originated, according to Palacký, in a typically Czech interpretation of Christianity. He underestimated the medieval character of the movement; he saw in it the beginning of modern Europe, the first definite blow against the Middle Ages with their spiritual authoritarianism and their feudal structure of society. The Czech people in the Hussite Wars pioneered for the whole of humanity in a spiritual struggle for freedom of conscience, for the equality of men, against authority and hierarchy. Of course, the Hussites were in no way modern men, but their fight contained the seeds out of which later a freer and more human Europe grew up. The Hussite revolution not only started the Protestant Reformation, but carried the germs for the future growth of rationalism and of freedom of thought, of democracy and of socialism, founded on religious idealism, of nationalism, and of the new spirit of activity pervading the masses. In the Hussite movement with its ethical rigorism and its chiliastic enthusiasm he saw the forerunner of the Puritan revolution, which in its turn heralded the American and the French revolutions. The fact that the Czechs could fulfill this function in history, Palacký explained by pointing out that the level of education had been higher in Bohemia, especially under Charles IV, than in any of the surrounding countries, that feudalism and selfdom had not yet fully been established among the Czechs, and that, with the more intense intellectual life, the old Slavonic democracy and liberty lived on with them. The old opposition of Slav democracy and German aristocracy was resumed on a higher level under the religious inspiration of Hussitism and became of world-wide importance.

Palacký explained the breakdown of Hussitism and with it the decay of the Czech people by the fact that by the end of the

fifteenth century the aristocratic feudal principle had gained the upper hand in Bohemia; serfdom was introduced in 1487. Outside the movement of the Czech Brethren, which continued and purified the Hussite attitude, Hussitism itself tended to turn into an oppressive orthodoxy. Whereas Bohemia regressed, the seeds of the new humanism which the Hussites had sown began to bear fruit in the progress of the world outside Bohemia, where the free spirit of the old Slavonic democracy disappeared. The Czechs had undertaken the great task of the liberation of the human spirit from medieval authority too early; as forerunners they could not reap the harvest themselves. The German and the Swiss reformations, the Puritans, eighteenth-century rationalism, the French Revolution, all continued, deepened, and amplified what the Czechs had begun. The Czechs themselves succumbed to the power of Rome and of Spain; the Hussite past became in their own eyes heretical and damnable. The Czech catastrophe was due to the desertion by the Czechs of their own democratic ideals, to the oppression of the common people and their ensuing lethargy. The emancipation of the peasants under Emperor Joseph II and the improvement of their economic and educational status made possible the Czech renaissance of the nineteenth century, a renaissance which Masaryk declared to be directly linked to the Czech Reformation and to be similarly an ethico-religious movement.

Thus Palacký endowed the Czech people with the consciousness of the identification of the Czech cause with that of democracy. The Hussites had fought for the liberty of conscience and for democratic equality against the authoritarianism of Rome and the bellicose feudalism of the Germans. Their movement was ethico-religious, national, and social at the same time. Hus, like Luther, fought against Rome. German national historiography sometimes interpreted Luther's Reformation as the first

great act of national emancipation, as Palacký regarded the Hussite movement. But in Luther's Reformation the democratic and liberal elements in which Palacký saw the core of Hussitism were entirely lacking. In spite of the fact that Czech nationalism found its expression in a moral and ideological opposition to what could be called the "German idea," Palacký always rejected an interpretation of the relations of the Slavs and Germans as hammer and anvil. He opposed German rule over the Slavs, but he repudiated any idea of Slav domination over the Germans. In the epilogue of his *Gedenksblätter*, two years before his death, he found it necessary to defend himself against the many attacks directed against him for his conciliatory attitude toward the Germans and the Austrians: "Trust in humanity and in the love of the Germans for justice: who will be the first to cast a stone at me for that? Or should I even today be ashamed for that?" He welcomed the voluntary union of the Bohemian and Austrian Lands under Habsburg rule in 1526, because it put an end to the possible conflicts of the different neighboring peoples. He was in no way looking forward eagerly to political independence for small peoples. He believed instead in their coöperation within larger federations. At the time of the Polish revolution in 1863 he took an entirely realistic attitude. He blamed the Poles for not having emancipated their serfs and for not having improved the lot of the peasantry within the nation, and he advised the Polish patriots to devote themselves to the cultural and social development of their own masses, instead of aiming at the impossible goal of Polish independence which either would subject non-Polish populations to the Polish rule or would leave Poland at the mercy of her stronger neighbors. Thus he repeated fourteen years later a conviction which he had expressed on March 21, 1849, when he wrote against the "dream" of political independence of the Magyars and the Czechs, of

the Serbs and the Rumanians. He always stressed the need of association of the smaller peoples in view of what he called the centralization or progressive unification of the whole globe.³ He did not see in political independence a panacea. The Czechs had had political independence and had lost it. What was needed, according to Palacký, to make the Czechs a strong national organism was a more intense cultural life, a juster social order, a greater devotion to the true spirit of Czech democracy as embodied in the Czech Reformation. This emphasis upon the lasting character of Czech history and destiny gave to Czech democracy the foundation which made it independent of changing currents of thought or of shifting historical situations in the neighboring countries.

Palacký gave to the Czech people not only an interpretation of their history which supported their democratic program of the present and of the future by its foundations in the past. Through him the question of Czech freedom and of Czech national development became indissolubly linked with the world problem of democracy. Through him Czech history became of importance for the history of Europe, the Czech question, a universal question. By regarding the rise of modern Europe and the French Revolution as fundamentally identical with the ideas

³ Palacký said in his speech of August 27, 1861, in the House of Lords: "The Magyars and the Czechs are equally forced by destiny to join politically in a larger state and to accept the conditions of life of this larger state." T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his *Palackého idea národa českého* (Prague, 1926), pp. 42 f.) that "the conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically independent is one of the fundamental political conceptions of Palacký." The Czechs did not lose their national existence in 1526 by the union with Austria, as Palacký knew very well. But it is doubtful even whether the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 can be regarded as the defeat of Czech nationalism. In that battle the Habsburg prince defeated a Bohemian king who was a German. It is an open question whether the Czechs if they had remained Protestants would not have come very strongly under German and Prussian influences and would not have been closely incorporated into Germanic life, whereas in the nonnationalistic Habsburg state they escaped the fate of Germanization more easily.

of the Czech Reformation, the Czechs found their place in modern Europe on the side of the great and progressive democratic currents and peoples. Their struggle against the Germans for national self-preservation became a struggle for democracy—a struggle for a better world and for more humane relations of all peoples. Under these circumstances Palacký's great disciple, T. G. Masaryk, could declare that "the problems of humanity specifically Czech problem."⁴ Masaryk saw rightly not only that Palacký had educated the Czech people to democracy, but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite reformation as the most valid Czech title to recognition. The Czech question, the question of Czech existence, had been in the past essentially "the question of religion and of humanity." It was again in the twentieth century indissolubly linked with the question of democracy, not only for the Czechs, but also for Europe and for mankind. By the recent subjugation of the Czechs the Germans dealt, not accidentally, a decisive blow to world democracy.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century the ideals upon which modern civilization is founded were first proclaimed, so Palacký taught the Czechs, by the Czechs in a new interpretation of Christian thought and life. The Czechs were the first to fight for these new ideals and to orientate their national life in accordance with them. Five centuries later, when the ideals of

⁴ T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (New York, 1927), pp. 59 and 479 ff. Masaryk stresses several times the importance of Palacký for him and for the Czech people. For example, on page 29: "Inasmuch as my political outlook was derived from Palacký"; on page 472: "My guide and master was Palacký, the Father of the Fatherland, who gave us the philosophical history of our nation, understood its place in the world and defined our national objective"; and especially on page 373, where he says that in Prague during the World War "Palacký's writings were sold out. Thinking people immersed themselves in his national program and in the testament of the Father of the Nation—an eloquent proof of political maturity."

modern civilization seemed to triumph everywhere, the Czechs were able to build their existence, under the leadership of Palacký's disciple, Masaryk,⁵ the liberator of the Czech nation, on these principles, which they derived not only from the example of western Europe, but from their own national traditions which predated the former. Twenty years later, when modern civilization, as the result of the lack of foresight, courage, and coöperation on the part of its defenders, seemed to recede before the onslaught of a new barbarism, the foundations upon which Czech national life rested collapsed. The resurrection of Czech national life is bound up, as Palacký and Masaryk foresaw, with the reassertion of those principles of human liberty and of rational humanism which, according to the Father and to the Liberator of the Czech nation, have formed the backbone of Czech history and the justification for Czech national existence.

⁵ At the centenary of Palacký's birth in 1898 Masaryk published his *Palackého idea národa českého*, which was also published in the same year in a German translation—*Palackýs Idee des Böhmischen Volkes*. All of Masaryk's writings about the Czech problem, his *Česká otázka*, and his books on Hus and on Karel Havlíček are indebted to Palacký's conception of Czech history. The Palacký-Masaryk conception of Czech history was criticized by the great Czech historian, Josef Pekař (who died in January, 1937), in his *Masarykova česká filosofie* (1912; third edition, 1927) and in his *Smysl českých dějin* (1929). To Pekař we owe also the best brief biographical and critical evaluation of Palacký (published in 1912 in the *Světová knižovna*). The father of modern Czech historical scholarship, Jaroslav Goll, delivered in 1898 a lecture on Palacký which may be regarded as the best critical appreciation of the lasting importance of Palacký's work from the strictly scholarly aspect (*Vybrané spisy drobné* [Prague, 1928], I, 39-112). He is nearer to Masaryk than Pekař is. The present appreciation of the Palacký-Masaryk concept of Czech history as the guiding principle of national life was presented in a lecture of Jaroslav Papoušek, "T. G. Masaryk a československé dějepisectví," which was delivered at a meeting of the Czechoslovak Historical Association in 1937 and published in the *Český časopis historický*, XLIV (no. 1), 1-29.

Chapter VII

CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

BY MALBONE W. GRAHAM

THE MEDIEVAL BOHEMIAN STATE, whose overthrow at the hands of the Habsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by its historical origins, essentially a feudal structure. Its constitution, like that of contemporary England, was the institutional reflex of its social structure, combining the principle of monarchy on an elective basis with periodic consultations of the nobility of the realm. While the Hussite Wars undoubtedly mirrored the stirring of mass consciousness and were the expression of a democratic movement in the field of religion, they did not, of themselves, effect a change in the social structure of the country and left behind them no major institutional embodiment, no great Estates-General, no Parliament, to channel the changes of power or epitomize the shifting composition of seventeenth-century society. However comforting it may have been for the residual leaders of the Czech nation to receive from the Habsburgs in 1627 assurances of respect for their fundamental laws, those promises were honored by consistent breach, and, after the completion of the Habsburg conquest, the ancient Bohemian constitution ceased to have any real, and very little theoretical value.


There is thus a distinct break of nearly two hundred and fifty years in the constitutional and institutional evolution of the Czechoslovak people, a break roughly approximating the historical interval between the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 and the resumption of constitutional life in Austria in the 'sixties of the last century. During this "great interregnum," constitutionally speaking, vast social changes took place in the Czech nation—changes which were inadvertently accentuated by the virtual extirpation of the old Czech nobility in the long Habsburg *revanche*. For, in default of a hereditary upper class of any significant proportions, Czech and Slovak nationalism either took refuge in the Church or rose to significance in the commercial and industrial world. Thus the ancient Bohemian State died as a state of the nobility, to be reborn as the offspring of the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie.

A measure of political preparation for national independence came in the last half-century of the dynasty and the monarchy. After the abandonment of separatist obstructionist practices from 1860 to 1879, the Czech deputies in the Austrian Reichsrat learned the techniques of parliamentary procedure—of compromise, of coöperation with the representatives of other nationalities, of schematic obstructionism when it appeared a political necessity. Meanwhile, during the long ministry of Count Taaffe, the Czechs began their systematic infiltration not only into the bureaucracy of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, but into the imperial civil services as well. Thereby they served their apprenticeship, acquiring familiarity with the processes of administration, and were endowed with at least the nuclear personnel for the future departments of government under a régime of national independence. Finally, the Czechs and Slovaks alike learned solidarity and civic cohesion through the self-discipline which was required to resist effectively the various measures of cultural

denationalization to which they were respectively subjected by the authorities in Vienna and Budapest. When to this incremental experience was added the stubborn resistance to the various war measures of the imperial and royal governments, the final impetus was given to the cause of liberation.

The problem of the political reconstruction of the Czechoslovak State was early considered by the leaders of the independence movement. Constitutional monarchy, the ideal of those who looked forward to seating a Russian grand duke on the throne of a restored Bohemia, was thrown into the discard by the coming of the Russian Revolution. With it went the last chance for an "eastward orientation" which might have tied the fortunes of Czechoslovakia to those of a decadent dynasty and a dying régime. Thus Czechoslovakia was spared the necessity of those dynastic experiments which were inevitable, in the political climate of the nineteenth century, for Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Moreover, the leadership of Masaryk and Beneš consciously oriented the rising Czechoslovak State toward the political ideology of the Western Powers, an ideology which reflected their liberal bourgeois character. It is hardly necessary to prove, by citation of chapter and verse of his writings, the profoundly democratic character of Masaryk's political philosophy or his unfeigned republicanism. There is a certain historical predestination in the fact that Masaryk and Beneš, molded respectively by American and French political philosophies, were privileged to crystallize the institutions of Czechoslovakia and to give to them the positive imprint of republican democracy. The final determinant of Czechoslovakia's orientation was social; because the achievement of independence entailed the coming into power of a partnership of bourgeois and farming classes, its institutional reflex was fore-ordained to be democratic.

In its genesis, the Constitution of Czechoslovakia was different from its compeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other instrument of government was the product of a democratically elected constituent assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought into being without elections, by a strictly *national* assembly created through a distinctive coöperative process. This apparently antidemocratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having available for the country from the outset a body with plenary authority and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy called for the prompt creation of a substitute authority—stable, definite, and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly supplied. It was a unicameral body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and Silesian Crown Lands, as elected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Charles's Federalization Manifesto of October 16, 1918, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks to the new state, by the Declaration of Turčiansky Sv. Martin of October 31, 1918, then coöpted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the body to give fundamental representation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of virtually all means of political self-expression. Later, when the definitive boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty of Trianon with Hungary, additional representatives were allotted to Slovakia. Down to the end of the constitution-making period, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia remained unrepresented, owing chiefly to the fact that Czechoslovakia's title to the region



was still inchoate, and was not juridically settled until the "Certain Frontiers" treaty was signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920.

All formal aspects aside, however, the assembly which adopted both the provisional and definitive constitutions for the Czechoslovak State was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of the nation, and utterly unobstructed by the presence, in its midst, of divergent and discordant national minorities. It was not intended to leave the adoption of a permanent norm for national evolution to the caprices and whims of fortuitous political majorities such as were found in the contemporary Polish Constituent Sejm, but it cannot be charged that the Czechoslovak National Assembly refused to accord minority guarantees to the non-Czech and non-Slovak populations. In fact, it is of record in the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference's Committee on New States that the Czechoslovak Government's proposals regarding minority guarantees went "far beyond anything which the Committee would have felt justified in putting forward." "Under the circumstances, therefore," it declared, "the more general propositions which are included in the draft treaty are so moderate that it is anticipated that they will be accepted without any demur by the Czechoslovak Government."¹

Furthermore, the Czechoslovak National Assembly was stable, even politically conservative. This is attributable to the fact that, by adopting the yardstick of 1911 as the measure for political forces, the Czechoslovak founding fathers gave ample opportunity for political expression to the parties of the Right, themselves the yeomen of the long campaign for national emancipation, and did not take the tidal wave of social dissatisfaction which culminated in the downfall of the Monarchy as in itself an authentic representation of the nation's permanent mood.

¹ D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, XIII, 62.

This not only enabled the National Assembly to ignore the calls to social revolution which were occasionally heard outside its walls, but operated to maintain an internal balance of forces which gave to the nation, in the shaping of its fundamental law, the moral assent and constitutional consensus of its most distinguished representatives of Right and Left alike; and, finally, the weighting of the Assembly in favor of the bourgeois, democratic elements was in itself reinsurance against departure from the Western, republican orientation to which Masaryk and Beneš were committed.

The first task before the National Assembly in its constituent capacity was that of defining and stabilizing the *de facto* relations of power in the state born of the revolution of October 28, 1918. This it did by the Provisional Constitution of November 13, 1918, which, with one small but significant amendment, transferring to the president the power to appoint cabinets, governed Czechoslovakia down to February 29, 1920. The Provisional Constitution was a relatively brief document, defining the membership of the National Assembly and giving it "legislative authority over the whole state as well as over its component parts, and supervising authority over the executive branch" pending the convocation of a permanent parliament. In order to guard against the possibility of a coup d'état during the period of transition, a two-thirds majority of a two-thirds quorum was prescribed for amendments to fundamental statutes, election of a president, or the declaration of war.

To replace royal authority in the Crown Lands, there was created a presidency of the Republic endowed with the necessary authority to meet the country's new international responsibilities, dispose of the armed forces, declare war subject to the decision of the National Assembly, and negotiate treaties requiring its approval and ratification. In the chief executive were

vested the appointing of the higher civil, judicial, and military officers, the power of pardon and commutation of punishments, and the authority to quash legal proceedings in criminal cases. Finally, a suspensive veto on legislation was accorded the president, although repassage by the National Assembly sufficed to make a bill law even without presidential concurrence. The responsibility for all presidential acts was laid upon the cabinet, the National Assembly thereby accepting the principal norms of parliamentary government as rules of conduct for the new state. Apart from rigorous stipulations against membership of ministers on governing boards of joint-stock companies or corporations, few rules were laid down concerning the conduct of cabinet government. In order to assure that all governmental action would come under parliamentary control, provision was made for the recall of the cabinet by express resolution of the National Assembly. For such action a motion of want of confidence, signed by at least one-fourth of the membership, was necessary, and a majority vote of at least one-half the membership was required. With this working instrument at its disposal, Czechoslovakia passed smoothly through the period of transition, with only one cabinet change, and proceeded to the drafting of a permanent constitution.

The problems involved in constitution making were primarily those of detail, rather than of principle, as the broad lines of the régime had already been predetermined. Thus there was never any question concerning the republican character of the Czechoslovak State, or the maintenance of the parliamentary régime; cabinet government, under a strong executive, was already a part of the constitutional consensus. The existing judiciary, carefully separated in Austrian times into ordinary and administrative tribunals, continued essentially unchanged, merely handing down its decrees in the name of the Republic;

local government remained virtually intact, except for the wider franchise which the democratic revolution introduced into the Bohemian Crown Lands. In the parts of the country formerly Hungarian, certain additional changes to democratize local government were necessitated. The political parties that had been inherited from Austria and Hungary remained unaltered except for their formal subscription to the principles of political republicanism. The essential task of the National Assembly was therefore to adapt the inherited institutions of the Austrian and Hungarian monarchical régimes to the requirements of liberal, social-agrarian republicanism. This meant the elaboration of standards of legality for the new régime, the determination of basic orientations in foreign and domestic policy, and the creation of legislative, administrative, and judicial control devices which would ensure adherence to the norms established. This the Constitution of February 29, 1920, together with two enabling acts, attempted to do.

It is unnecessary to recount the details of the actual enactment of the Constitution. The National Assembly was guided in its deliberations by the counsel of Professor Jiří Hoetzl, who occupied a rôle not unlike that of Professor Hugo Preuss in relation to the Weimar Constitution of the German Republic, or that of Professor Kaarlo J. Staahlberg in the contemporary framing of Finland's fundamental law. His draft project received the thorough consideration of the Assembly and its Constitutional Committee, neither of which altered much of its form or its substance. Today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their significance and do not require consideration. Rather is it of interest to discern how the basic ideology underlying the republican régime was translated into fundamental law. That ideology is admirably expressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly redolent of that of the

American Constitution, is also in itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk and Beneš:

We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect unity of our people, to establish the reign of justice in the Republic, to assure the peaceful development of our native Czechoslovak land, to contribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State and to secure the blessings of freedom to coming generations, have in our National Assembly adopted the following Constitution for the Czechoslovak Republic; and in doing so we declare that it will be our endeavor to see that this Constitution, together with all the laws of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in the spirit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of self-determination, for we desire to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and progressive.³

The primordial principle enunciated is that of the unity of the nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so far as the Czechs and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to be consolidated. What is important in this affirmation of achieved constitutional unity is not only its validation of the acts of the October revolution—for every constitution essentially legitimates the situation which it inherits—but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist tendencies, and the scant leeway which it offered for racist autonomy. Finding the justification for the country's unitary administration in the historic symbiosis of different races in the Danube basin and in the self-determination, by overwhelming majorities, of the Czechs and Slovaks in the new state, the constitution makers proclaimed the "united and indivisible" nature of the Republic,

³ The exact degree of American influence on the ideology of the Czechoslovak Constitution can be noted by comparing the preambles. The American preamble reads as follows: "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common Defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America."

together with the principle of single and uniform citizenship. It was not the intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist movements by conceding to the inhabitants of various parts of the country differential status. This passion for uniformity and equality before the law was in part a manifestation of social equalitarianism; it was also derived from the democratic nationalism which had brought Czechoslovakia into being.

The principle of national unity implied a central administration for the country. In consequence, the National Assembly, while leaving in the Constitution only general norms for the conduct of national administration, provided by law for the general reform of the administration to establish in the Czech provinces the system of county government inherited, in the Slovak lands, from Hungary. This would have introduced a prefectorial system roughly comparable to that in France, and ignoring altogether the ethnic divisions of the country. Had this plan been fully implemented, it would have destroyed the historic structure of the ancient Crown Lands, and replaced them by twenty-one artificial administrative areas called *župy*, with purely territorial delimitations. "In the new administrative services the bureaucratic element was to be united, in a rational collaboration, with the purely civic element, and while the necessary centralization was to be established, room was left for genuine self-government; the old provinces were abolished as administrative entities, but in view of their extensive tasks the *župy* could be federated in provincial unions of administrative regions." It is idle to speculate on the eventual outcome of such a régime had it been continued indefinitely and applied uniformly. "The administration was here conceived in a truly modern and democratic spirit, and the fundamental administrative problem of a state composed of two different parties, and each of

them forming a separate whole—the problem of centralization and autonomy—was solved with a genuine understanding of affairs.” Actually applied only in Slovakia, the scheme was abandoned by an enactment of July 14, 1927, which regrouped the country into four provincial areas—Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia—each with its own administration. This effected a marked integration of all local government, placing it in the hands of democratically chosen district and provincial assemblies and executive committees, with partly appointive, partly elective presiding boards. This gave to the provinces a distinct degree of supervisory authority. Because the areas were larger, and included diverse populations, the reform went far in the direction of consolidating the administrative unity of the country. Too wide a decentralization of authority, in districts so small as to be dominated, at times, by Magyar or German minorities, would have opened the way to cantonalization—a formula which was recognized in 1938 as utterly fatal to the ideal of national unity. By returning to the province as the basic unit in administration, the country was given a framework which lasted down until the initial dismemberment after the Peace of Munich. Whether this in fact operated to facilitate separatism in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and to accentuate their differences from the other provinces must always remain conjectural; it would appear to be nearer reality to say that the prefectorial system originally intended would have done much to blot out Slovak and Ruthene separatism, although augmenting the sense of cultural and ethnic differences in the heavily German- and Magyar-populated border zones. For more than a decade, however, until outside pressures overawed the forces normally operative in local governmental life, the provincial administrative system of the Republic operated efficiently—justification enough for its existence.

In emphasizing the establishment of the reign of justice in the Republic, the Czechoslovak Constitution included far more than the mere retouching of a judicial system. It in fact connoted the establishment of a régime of democratic legality in lieu of the capricious arbitrariness of the antecedent Habsburg régime in the Crown Lands of both halves of the Dual Monarchy. Positing the people as the sole source of state power in the Czechoslovak Republic, the Constitution set itself up as a law of superior obligation, determining through what organs the sovereign people should express their will in law, provided the executive machinery for giving effect to such laws, and established a system of juridical guaranties for popular rights and liberties. In keeping with the vogue of the hour, a special custodian of constitutionality was created by the Enabling Act in the form of a Constitutional Court of seven members, two named by the highest administrative tribunal, two by the ordinary Supreme Court, and the other three nominated by the president of the Republic. This interesting body, unlike its Austrian compeer, in imitation of which it appeared to have been modeled, did not create for itself any particular rôle during the history of the Republic, as it was called upon only once in the eighteen years of its existence to decide an issue, and then only in relation to the forms of procedure to be followed. It would appear that the attempt to graft on to a parliamentary system positing legislative supremacy a vermiform appendage of the doctrine of judicial supremacy was historically predestined to be futile.

Nor is the reason far to seek. It rests in the fact of scrupulous adherence to the principle of majority rule in the enactment of legislation, and in a no less serious regard for the interests of minorities. For the two decades of parliamentary rule, the Czechoslovak nation adhered with punctilio to the procedures

of legality, and there was little reason for recourse to cumbrous litigation to determine the boundaries of assertable rights. Thus neither of the fundamental streams that brought water to the mill of judicial supremacy in America was present in the Czechoslovak scene; the country was not federal, permitting judicial review of the jurisdictional controversies between its parts, nor was it organized on the principle of separation of powers which has led to the assertion, by the judiciary, of the right to delimit and determine the extent of executive and legislative authority.

Legislative supremacy, the ascendancy of parliament, the monopoly on lawmaking by the official legislative body, were the foundation stones of the reign of justice contemplated by the Constitution. Having emancipated herself from the Austrian and Hungarian traditions of a privileged noble class, Czechoslovakia was predestined to reject a hereditary upper chamber. Moreover, having decided upon a unitary republic, there was no place for a house representative of territorial areas. Czechoslovakia therefore turned to France for a model and created as her legislature a National Assembly composed of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, vesting in the two houses acting as a parliament the legislative power from the entire Czechoslovak Republic. Both chambers were made directly elective, by the vote of different-aged electorates—all persons over twenty-one enjoying the franchise for the Chamber, those over twenty-six for the Senate. The electoral system was organized on the principles of universal, equal, direct, secret suffrage and proportional representation, thereby enfranchising at once the womanhood of the nation. In order to differentiate the chambers still further, they were given different terms—six years for the Chamber and eight years for the Senate. In practice, however, these distinctions were obliterated, for no Parliament ever lived

out its normal life span, but each was terminated, when the occasion seemed politically propitious, by a dissolution followed by new elections. The real differences between the chambers derived from the age qualifications for membership, the minimum set for the Chamber being thirty years, whereas the Senators were compelled to be at least forty-five. Thus the Constitution contemplated selecting a Chamber representing the younger, active generation, together with a Senate that should literally be old. Actually, the average age of members of the Chamber was far above the minimum, so that the differences were somewhat bridged in reality. To the differences in age were added those of size, the Chamber comprising a membership of 300, the Senate having only 150 members. Rigid legal safeguards were established by the Constitution to assure the observance of proper procedures in the election of public officials to Parliament, in the filling by deputies of government positions created by laws of their making, and in the maintenance of tenure by bureaucrats and professors entering parliamentary life. Disqualifications were no less rigidly drawn up to exclude district governors categorically, and all those already holding another elective or important appointive position. Finally, refusal to take the simple oath pledging fidelity to the Republic, maintenance of its laws, and conscientious execution of the electoral mandate was made the ground for unconditional disqualification. This stipulation was intended to preclude in the future such a recalcitrance as was manifested by the Young Czechs in the old Austrian Parliament when they refused to take the oath unless accompanied by a reservation of their ancient constitutional rights. This pinning of faith on verbalism is undoubtedly a relic of the Age of Chivalry for it did not deter the Sudete deputies from taking their oath to the Republic while palpably working for its disruption. The further stipulation of the Constitution that members of Parlia-

ment, bound to exercise their functions in person, should not receive orders from anybody proved in reality merely a paper safeguard without psychological or juridical content when applied to the Sudete deputies. The present writer, having been a witness to the mass withdrawal of the Sudetes at the summons of Konrad Henlein, himself a figure utterly outside of the parliamentary framework, can attest to the impossibility of establishing by fiat norms of behavior which only conscience can enforce. But that the constitution makers intended to relieve deputies of legal responsibility to outsiders there can be no doubt. To members of the National Assembly the Constitution gave the traditional parliamentary immunities, preventing prosecution of members for official actions, and permitting discipline only by the regulations of the house to which they belonged. Consent of the house was necessary to the prosecution of a member even if caught *flagrante delicto*. The immunities of membership could not prevent prosecution of members who were also responsible editors on charges of libel or incitement to crime. Members were entitled to regard as privileged information matters confidentially given them during the term of their office, and no compulsion could be put upon them to divulge these matters, even after the expiration of their service, except that testimony could not be refused in corruption trials. With memories of the abuses to which the Austrian parliamentary system lent itself, the Czechoslovak constitution makers could be pardoned for writing into the fundamental law special safeguards for the status of their legislators.

Another corrective for the evils of the Austrian régime is found in the extremely explicit rules concerning the convocation, prorogation, and dissolution of Parliament. Here the long hiatus in Austrian parliamentary life from 1914 to 1917 had seared its lesson deep into Czechoslovak mentality. Provision

accordingly was made for compulsory spring and autumn sessions of Parliament annually, with flexible provisions for extraordinary sessions at the discretion of the president, or on the demand of half of the members of either chamber or after the lapse of four months, with secondary guarantees of automatic convocation by the officers of each chamber in the event of the failure of other officials to act. So, too, with regard to the termination of parliamentary activity; closure by the president as the normal rule; prorogation for not more than a month and not more than once in a year, in the event of parliamentary recalcitrance; dissolution by the president as a general right at any time except within six months of the expiration of his term of office. New elections were made compulsory within sixty days after the dissolution of either chamber or after the expiration of its natural term of office. Special safeguards were thrown about the Senate in its capacity of a court of impeachment to prevent a decree of dissolution from altering its judicial functions or bringing them to an untimely end. In the long period of nearly a score of years, however, the Czechoslovak Senate was never called upon to act in impeachment matters.

The seriousness with which parliamentary life was taken is apparent from the careful provisions for very large quorums. With a two-thirds quorum required for the conduct of all ordinary business and a simple majority of that quorum for passage of measures, the possibility of important actions being taken by a rump parliament was excluded. Moreover, the requirement of a three-fifths majority of a one hundred per cent quorum for passage of constitutional amendments or declarations of war indicates the solemnity with which both acts were to be regarded. For impeachments, a two-thirds majority of a two-thirds quorum sufficed.

In keeping with the general trend of postwar constitutions

and with the practice of the Revolutionary National Assembly, the fullest internal autonomy was allowed both chambers. They selected their own officers, adopted their own rules of procedure, selected their own committees, and could summon ministers to appear before them. When convoked in joint session as a national assembly, the rules of the lower chamber were applicable. The internal *règlement* of the houses, passed by the Revolutionary National Assembly just before its adjournment on April 15, 1920, gave the widest latitude to minorities—German, Ruthene, Hungarian, or Polish—to use their own national languages in parliamentary deliberations in addition to the use of Czech and Slovak. Interestingly, following a tradition of the old Austrian Reichsrat, every member was compelled to belong to some parliamentary club.

So normally did the Czechoslovak Constitution follow the principles of parliamentary procedure that little comment is necessary on the exact régime of legality with which it surrounded legislation. Perhaps the most important safeguards relate to the imperative requirement of presentation of a bill at one sitting and its enactment, no matter how rushed the calendar or urgent the situation, at a different sitting, and under no circumstances within less than one day. This provision appears to have been inserted in order to prevent juridically any coup d'état such as might alter the basic framework of government at a single closed sitting. A second series of safeguards were designed to maintain the primacy of the lower chamber, and to assure that the Senate would be not only a second chamber, but also not more than a secondary one. These gave primacy in financial matters to the Chamber of Deputies, in which all fiscal measures must originate, and ensured the final enactment of the budget within a month, whereas the Chamber allowed itself the luxury of a three-month interval in which to examine Senate

bills of whatever character. Tacit assent thus became the rule, and veto by one chamber of the work of the other the extraordinary exception. Recourse to referenda was strictly circumscribed by the Constitution and never put in practice during the twenty years of the Republic's existence. This is an eloquent commentary on the efficacy of parliamentary institutions to reflect the popular will. Finally, the power of veto on the part of the president, as contrasted with the people, was given in only a suspensive form. The primary purpose of the constitutional arrangement, that is, to assure the supremacy of Parliament, was attained to an extraordinarily high degree in the Czechoslovak instrument.

One of the outstanding innovations made by the Constitution was its introduction into the parliamentary framework of a special committee, a miniature of the whole National Assembly, made up of sixteen Deputies and eight Senators, each with alternates, to keep the golden thread of parliamentary continuity during the adjournment, or recess or dissolution, of the chambers. Endowed with almost plenary authority to act (except for the election of a president or vice-president of the Republic, the amendment of the Constitution, the imposing of permanent financial obligations, or giving its consent to a declaration of war), the committee was regarded as an effectual safeguard against the recrudescence of the antiparliamentarism which had so long plagued the defunct Dual Monarchy, at least in its Austrian half. For quasi legislation, consent of half of the members of this joint committee was required; for all other matters, a simple majority of a 50 per cent quorum. In order to guard against illegalities, acts of the joint committee were to be laid before the Constitutional Court, whose jurisdiction over all matters of legislation was preassured. It is again noteworthy that this was an unnecessary safeguard, and that the sanctioning by judi-

cial authority of the acts of Parliament was not in practice a necessity.

Probably the most remarkable trait of the Constitution was its stabilization, at an amazingly early date in postwar Europe, of executive power in a rather imposing institution—the presidency. Although the details of the presidential office could well have been left nebulous so long as Masaryk's massive personality dominated it, the constitution builders looked forward to the day when a postwar generation might be in power, and resolved to erect a series of safeguards against the abuse of the funded authority of the nation. The Czechoslovak presidency was clearly modeled on the French executive office, not only in the requirement of election at the hands of the National Assembly, but in the specification of a seven-year term. It differed sharply in permitting a second term, followed by a mandatory gap of seven years before a third term could be attempted, except in respect to Masaryk, who was made president for life. Nevertheless, to observe all the constitutional formalities with the greatest punctilio, the National Assembly elected Masaryk to the permanent office in 1920, again in 1927, and once more in 1935. Only as the aging liberator-president was compelled by his infirmities to give up the responsibilities of office were the constitutional stipulations regarding presidential elections really brought into force in the election of Dr. Beneš to the presidency on December 18, 1935. In view of the outstanding character of Dr. Beneš, there was no competition. Only when he resigned, on October 5, 1938, and it became necessary to fill his office did a real occasion for competition present itself. But by the time of the election of Dr. Emil Hácha to the presidency of the rump state, the situation was no longer one for the free play of political forces. Czechoslovakia had already been put under the Teutonic manacles. The National Assembly was not convened within the

requisite fourteen days, nor in the interregnum was any provision made, as would have been possible in ordinary circumstances, for a vice-president.

The powers of the presidency were virtually predetermined even before the Revolutionary National Assembly itself came into being. In reality, they carried over from the Provisional Constitution virtually unchanged, except that the rights over Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia were new, the province having been outside the State at the time of the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, and that donations and pensions, matters not thought of in the hour of revolution, were confined to the president's custody, always, of course, on the recommendation of the Government. In order to obviate all doubt and remove the possibility of the assumption of arbitrary powers by any president, it was most specifically provided that all other governmental and executive power was reserved to the Government. Although leaving the president legally irresponsible for the exercise of his constitutional functions and placing the responsibility for his official utterances on the Government, the Constitution made provision for prosecution for high treason by the Senate, on indictment by the Chamber of Deputies. The only punishment constitutionally permissible was the loss of office and permanent disqualification from it, there being no desire on the part of the constitution framers to make possible the sort of personal persecution and vindictiveness characteristic of the Austrian régime.

All told, the Czechoslovak presidency struck an unusually sensitive balance between the impotent leadership of the French Republic and the powerful magistracy of the Weimar régime. Retaining the method of election of the one, the Czechoslovak fundamental law invested the presidency with most of the powers of the other, subject, however, to the most rigorous parliamentary control. The result was to give to Czechoslovakia

a chief magistracy of unusual power and stability, capable of being extensively used for the national well-being, although incapable of serious political abuse. In short, the Czechoslovak presidency was invested with the maximum elements of presidential government compatible with the unshaken control of parliament over the general conduct of governmental policy.

In keeping with the current tendency in postwar constitutions to reduce the rules of the system of ministerial responsibility to writing, special attention was given to the government, ministries, and subordinate administrative offices, the main rules carrying over from the Provisional Constitution without sharp deviation. Whereas collective formulation of, and responsibility for, government policy fell upon the cabinet, the right was given to the president of the Republic to convoke the whole cabinet or any of its members into conference, to appear at and preside over cabinet meetings, and to demand from the Government collectively or from its individual members reports on matters falling within their jurisdiction. This gave to the chief executive a guiding hand of no little importance to the aggregate parliamentary structure. In the early years of the Republic, President Masaryk added to these constitutional provisions an extraconstitutional practice of worth, consisting in the writing of a letter to each newly appointed minister, outlining, from the presidential standpoint, the duties he ought to perform and the services he could best render the ministry, the cabinet, and the country. This proved of inestimable value in orienting ministers in the way they should conduct their departments. At the time of the passage of the Constitution there existed fifteen ministers, exclusive of a special ministry for Slovakia. One of the ministries of a temporary character was that entrusted with the unification of the laws, a special and important task due to the mixed heritage from the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the defunct

Monarchy. This functioned until 1923, when it was replaced by a commission of experts, to which was given the final task of judicial synthesis. One or two other ministries underwent reorganization and consolidation. For the major part of the life of the Republic, and certainly throughout its last decade, the ministries at work were those of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, National Defense, Justice, Education, Commerce, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, Railways, Agriculture, and Social Welfare and Public Health.

In the permanent Constitution the judiciary received retouching and confirmation, the ordinary courts being rigidly separated from the administrative tribunals, and a single Supreme Court of Justice being established for the whole Republic. Various legal safeguards were provided to ensure the independence of the judiciary, and particularly to guard against arbitrary transfer, dismissal, or pensioning of judges against their will. Much of the detail of judicial organization was left to future legislation. Safeguards to the citizenry against judicial tyranny, to be properly understood, require a knowledge of the conditions obtaining in the Bohemian Crown Lands during the World War. Thus the guaranties that no one could be tried except before his legal judge, that only in cases of criminal procedure could special courts be established and then only for a limited period and for cases specified *in advance* by law, that the jurisdiction of courts-martial might be extended to the civil population according to legal regulations in times of war only and only for acts committed at such times, are meaningful only when the wartime sufferings of the Czechs and Slovaks are kept in mind. The natural temptation would have been to insert a constitutional stipulation forbidding the dragooning of the civilian population by the military authorities even in wartime. However, the experience of the Czechs in coping with recalcitrant

populations during and after the forays of Béla Kun into Slovakia in 1919 appears to have borne in upon the constitution makers at Prague the necessity of a reserved right, to be used only in emergencies and then only in respect of acts committed during such emergencies. It should further be noted that the National Democrats, as strong defenders of the army, were not anxious, after the achievement of independence, to forego prerogatives which they did not concede to be rightful when exercised—and abused—by the Austrian authorities.

The establishing of a régime of justice,³ and not mere formalistic legality, in the Republic called, therefore, for the strictest constitutional safeguards against old abuses, for the establishing of new norms of equalitarian law, and for the democratizing of the judicial process wherever possible. This meant the application of the jury system in new domains, the providing of new means of civil redress, particularly in regard to private property claims, and the abolition of secret proceedings in criminal cases. It further entailed the unification of the laws, since there was in force a curious complex of regulations issued by the joint government of the Dual Monarchy, the Austrian Reichsrat, the Bohemian, Moravian, and Silesian Diets, the Hungarian Parliament, and the authorities of the former Hungarian counties. As already indicated, the efforts to accomplish the unification through a special ministry from 1918 to 1923 tended to show that unification could be made a matter of partisan politics. By entrusting the task of unification and codification to

³ By a law of November 2, 1918, an independent Supreme Court was created. In 1919, as a concession to Moravian sentiment, the seat of the Supreme Court was transferred from Prague to Brno. The Supreme Administrative Court remained, however, in Prague. In order to cope with the matter of conflicts of jurisdiction, a special Senate attached to the Supreme Administrative Court was created. This arrangement, left untouched by the Constitution, continued in force down to the end of the Republic.

experts, Czechoslovakia was enabled to move more rapidly and equitably in the direction of wiping out legal anachronisms.

Of the major objectives of the Constitution enumerated in its preamble, two—the peaceful development of the Republic and the contribution to the common welfare—were intrinsically matters of diplomacy and social policy, and therefore outside the general *cadre* of strict constitutional law. Unlike the Weimar Constitution of the German Republic, the Czechoslovak Constitution did not profess a detailed social credo, but confined itself to classic nineteenth-century liberalism in establishing the norms of civic conduct and collective behavior. It was left to the legislation basically enacted by the Red-Green coalition during the Revolutionary National Assembly and in the first Parliament to block out the pattern of collective life. Therefore, the emphasis on the securing of individual and public liberties rightly concludes the Constitution. Without attempting dogmatically to establish a formal equilibrium between rights and duties, as did the German constitution, the Czechoslovak instrument globally grouped the rights, liberties, and duties of the citizen. In keeping with the precepts of democracy and republicanism, the Constitution recognized no privilege due to sex, birth, or occupation; it proclaimed not only for nationals but for all residents in the Republic the guaranty of “complete and absolute security of life and liberty, without regard to origin, nationality, language, race, or religion, setting the standards of international law as the measure of this equality, and imposing on it no constitutional restraint.” By putting such personal guaranties on a positive basis, the Constitution avoided the detailed enumeration of restrictions on governmental activity—the specific “Thou shalt nots” of the traditional bills of rights familiar to the Anglo-Saxon world.

Free choice of domicile, ownership of land, carrying on of

business, except when contrary to the public interest and laws, were guaranteed. Except as provided by statute, no limitation was permitted on the rights of private property. Expropriation was permitted only under legal authorization with presumptive compensation unless otherwise explicitly provided by law. This was the constitutional anchorage intended to safeguard agrarian reform and permit the confiscation of the estates of the Habsburgs. Freedom of migration, secrecy of communication, the right to equitable taxation, were among other guaranties to be limited only by statute. The right of petition was particularly broad, restrictions being placed only on the petitionary rights of legal persons and corporations, which were forbidden to petition on matters outside their chartered competence. This is a most unusual provision in constitutions and was doubtless intended to prevent the obtrusion of great industrial concerns into matters of a juridical or technical character. Similarly great explicitness attached to the constitutional guaranties of the right of association, restrictions being made applicable to assemblies in public thoroughfares, to profit-making associations, and also to participation of foreigners in political associations. These stipulations, intended at the time to fend off Bolshevik agitation, became applicable, though not wholly enforcible, in later days against Nazi agitators.

Freedom of the press, to the exclusion of the preliminary censorship so dreaded under the Austrian régime, was guaranteed. With unusual foresight, not matched by the political leaders of either Weimar Germany or Socialist Austria, the framers of the Czechoslovak Constitution made provision for legal restriction on the rights of the press, of assembly, and of association "in time of war or in case of events taking place within the State seriously threatening the republican form of government, the Constitution, or public peace and order." This proviso struck at

the possibility of monarchical restoration on the one hand and of social revolution on the other. But that the Czechoslovak Constitution was not designed to be a deeply conservative instrument is clear from the wide place given to the right of association for securing and improving the conditions of the workers. This set the seal of constitutional approval on the aims and demands of the socialist groups at the time of the enactment of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the rigors of the depression in 1930-1933, there was no endeavor to limit the right of organization of labor, and down to the end of the Czechoslovak State the labor unions, as well as employers' associations, enjoyed full liberty of organization.

That freedom of the intellect was fully to be safeguarded is clear from the very detailed stipulations of the Constitution on the subject—the provisions going farther than those in contemporary Germany or Austria. In keeping with the motto of Masaryk, "We must dare the competition of ideas," the Constitution guaranteed freedom of expression through word, writing, printing, by picture, et cetera. Down to the end of the Republic, Prague was a center for every kind of thought. To permit the simultaneous sale on its sidewalks of the émigré journals of Jews and Russians with those of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union was ample witness to the sincerity of Czechoslovakia's professions in this line. On only one point was there a negative safeguard: public education could not be given so as to conflict with the results of scientific investigation—a point on which a number of qualms of conscience were suffered by the Slovak clergy, yet wholly in accord with the motto of the nation: *Pravda vítězí*—Truth Conquers! The principal positive safeguard in this connection was the emphasis given to public education, in order that an enlightened social control might be established where Austrian bureaucratic tyranny and Magyar abuse had

long prevailed. To the end of the historic chapter of national independence, the schoolhouses were the principal beacon lights of Czechoslovak liberty.

To the Czechs as the spiritual and temporal heirs of the Hussite tradition, religious liberty was of primordial import. Hence the constitutional stipulations guaranteeing liberty of conscience and religious belief. To alien as to citizen, the Czechoslovak Republic extended the plenary right to profess and exercise, publicly and privately, any creed, religion, or faith whatsoever, so long as such practices did not conflict with public law or the prevailing mores. Whereas all religious confessions were treated as equal before the law, no one could be compelled, directly or indirectly, to take part in any religious rite or ceremony whatsoever. The Constitution quite naturally linked the performance of military duty to the problem of religious guaranties, making it clear, by affirmation of indefeasible military obligation, that the founders of the Republic did not intend to recognize any religious obligation as freeing the citizenry from military duties. After the lessons of the war of liberation, no room could be left for doubt on that ground.

Last among the great constitutional safeguards were the arrangements for the protection of national, religious, and racial minorities. These were promised the same equality accorded to Czechoslovaks in civil and political matters. Differences in race, language, or religion were no legal bar to admission to public office, employment, or calling, or to promotion in service. Freedom of use of any language whatsoever in private and business intercourse, in all matters pertaining to religion, the press, publication, or public assembly, was guaranteed "within the limits of the common law" and existing or future legislation affecting the public order and the security of the State. In order to give effect to this constitutional promise a special language law, itself

of a constitutional character, was issued February 29, 1920, making the Czechoslovak language the official state language of the Republic but making other languages, when used by a minority consisting of at least 20 per cent of the inhabitants of any jurisdictional area, coördinately valid for virtually every legal purpose. Pending the organization of provincial autonomy in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the general stipulations of the law were made applicable. Owing to the delays in extending the régime of autonomy to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the plan envisaged was destined to remain chiefly executory. Very wide ordinance power was vested in the hands of local government officials to carry out the provisions of the law.

In respect to education, the law went unusually far in allowing the use of minority languages in public instruction. The right to create, direct, and control charitable, religious, and social institutions or schools under private auspices and at their own expense was guaranteed to all nationalities alike, the use of minority languages and observances by religious minority groups being permitted. By the terms of the law, where a considerable proportion of Czechoslovak nationals speaking a language other than Czech existed, the right of children to receive education in their mother tongue was guaranteed, but instruction in the Czech language could be made obligatory at any time. The general principle underlying all these arrangements was that wherever public funds were allocated to education, to religious or philanthropic ends, local minority needs would be met by contributions from the public treasury proportionate to the ratio of the minorities to the rest of the population in the area. Thus the Sudete Germans were entitled to a share in the public expenditures for education proportionate to their part of the total population. In practice, not only did the Sudete German regions receive their proper quota, but it was also generally admitted,

even by the Henlein party in the closing year of the Republic, that they had received more than their proportionate share, and that there were more German schools in the Sudete areas in 1938 than there had been in 1918. This was an eloquent tribute to the high tenacity of purpose of the Czechoslovak educational authorities in carrying out the guaranties assumed toward minorities. After their own experiences at the hands of Germans and Hungarians alike, the Czechoslovak leaders determined to allow no linguistic or educational denationalization. That they persisted in this endeavor up to the moment of the country's partition is eloquent testimony to the magnanimity of character and breadth of cultural purpose of the founders of the Czechoslovak Republic. To the moment of partition it could truly be said, by German, Magyar, Slovak, Ruthene, or Czech, that the very air breathed the freedom of the human spirit, a freedom to which the Republic was dedicated by its founders.

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Chapter VIII

PARTIES AND POLITICS

BY MALBONE W. GRAHAM

THE RETROSPECT OF TWO DECADES, the political history of the Czechoslovak Republic reveals a pattern of continuity and stability unequaled by any other country in Europe. In contrast with the political history of every other one of the Danubian states, that pattern exhibits no break in legal continuity, no coups d'état to mar the smooth working of the institutions devised under the Constitution of 1920. This does not mean that there were no differentiations in policy, no shifts in public opinion, but it is indicative of the fact that the ebb and flow of political currents were constructively and safely channeled within the established constitutional framework, and that, down to the moment of her partition, Czechoslovakia's basic institutions stood every test to which they were subjected.

When viewed more closely, this remarkable epoch of continuity falls into four phases of unequal length but clearly differentiated orientation: first, a brief period of decidedly nationalistic policies, representing the release of the pent-up forces of a thwarted nationality, and roughly coinciding with the ministry of Karel Kramář; second, an interval characterized by a marked socialistic policy—Czechoslovakia's psychological reaction to the wave of mild, liberal collectivism which swept over Europe in

1919 and 1920; third, after a colorless transition, a long era of agrarian dominance, lasting for a decade and a half, down to 1935; and, finally, the "critical period" resulting from the incursion of German national socialism into Czechoslovak affairs, and lasting down to the dismemberment of the Republic by the so-called Peace of Munich.

Along with this sketch of the evolution of domestic policies a word should be said concerning the foreign policy of the Republic, kept for two decades—from 1915 to 1935—in the expert hands of Dr. Eduard Beneš. As secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council down to the time of the establishment of the Republic, as minister of foreign affairs until his elevation to the presidency in 1935, Dr. Beneš was given an opportunity, seldom vouchsafed by history, to organize foreign policy realistically, to build up among the diplomats of the new republic an ideological unity and a splendid *esprit de corps*, and to elaborate, in messages and addresses before Parliament and its committees, as well as in pronouncements to the country and in foreign capitals, the consistent principles of a foreign policy based on conceptions of democratic equalitarianism and international coöperation. Even in the period of his presidency, Dr. Beneš continued to dominate morally the enterprise of diplomacy, which was left, in the last three years of the Republic, in the capable hands of Dr. Kamil Krofta. To a continuity in leadership Czechoslovakia therefore added the continuity of principle which gave to her foreign policies, as well as to her domestic politics, calmness, balance, and objectivity in the two decades between the first and the second World Wars.

In the light of this bird's-eye view of both domestic and diplomatic evolution, it is possible to turn to the individual phases of policy and, seeing them in the focus of the larger whole, appraise more closely their significance in the life of the country.

I. THE NATIONALIST PHASE, 1918-1919

In order to appreciate the political atmosphere at the time of Czechoslovakia's liberation from Habsburg rule, it is necessary to remember the historic Polish-German coalition in the Austrian Reichsrat to keep the Czechs from political power. From the days of Count Badeni to the outbreak of the World War, the Bohemian and Moravian deputies in the old Austrian Parliament were placed in inexorable opposition to the successive German cabinets which ruled with the aid of Polish votes. Thanks to this unscrupulous combination, the German elements were permitted to suppress, even late into the World War, the vigorous evidences of Czech nationalism. The logical consequence was the development of an uncompromising bitterness on the part of the Czechs toward the German oligarchy in Vienna and the German bureaucracy in Prague. A similar attitude pervaded the Slovaks in their dealings with Budapest. The result was that, with the sharp reversal of the relations of power resulting from the break-up of the Dual Monarchy and the military defeat of the Central Powers, there was a tendency to settle old scores by the same violent means which the Germans and Magyars had employed against the Czechs and Slovaks.

The issue, however, went much farther than the matter of injured feelings; it involved a sharp break with the ideology of the old order and its replacement by a new and strongly nationalist conception of political life. This meant the substitution of republicanism for monarchical rule, of parliamentary government for irresponsible bureaucracy, of democracy for the rule of a privileged oligarchy. The sudden and integral realization of the demands of the old political parties in the Austrian Reichsrat entailed a thoroughgoing reconstruction of political parties to turn them from instruments of passive, then active, resistance

to the policies of Vienna into serviceable implements for the realization of the wishes popularly expressed in Prague. One of the first and outstanding results of the national revolution in 1918 was to bring about in Czechoslovakia, as in Germany, a relabeling of political parties, and to force, at almost break-neck speed, the recrystallization of party programs to meet the changed situation. For the Slovaks, previously almost unorganized, it meant the opportunity to reorient their collective life around the democratic norms which the other Czechoslovak groups were adopting.

In the Revolutionary National Assembly the forging of the new national consensus took place: from the extreme Left to the extreme Right the new Czechoslovak nationalism found agreement on republicanism, democracy, parliamentary government, controlled executive power, and majority rule. The conception of democracy was quickly carried over into the field of local government based on the widest possible franchise—a factor of no little importance to Slovakia, previously accustomed to oral voting under the hectoring régime of the Magyar landlords. Finally, the experiences of half a decade of conspiratory collaboration against Austria produced a solidarity of feeling among the parties which crystallized in the *Pětka*, or coalition of the five major parties, as one of the unwritten conventions of the Czechoslovak Constitution. Having reached this major consensus on as wide a basis as possible, agreement among the political parties stopped, and thereafter partisan conceptions concerning the ultimate values in politics and the purpose of the social order broke across social and racial lines. Under the reorganization after 1918, the principal party groups, taken from Right to Left, were approximately as follows:

The National Democrats: This party, apostolic successor to the Young Czechs, who took the lead in the struggle against

Austria, was formed in 1918 by a coalition and fusion of five small parties. Intensely nationalist, it was chiefly responsible for the exclusion of minorities from the Revolutionary National Assembly and hence from any share in the framing of the permanent Constitution. In season and out of season, it opposed a *rapprochement* with the German parties, and steadfastly opposed a generous policy toward Czechoslovakia's minorities. Inheriting the old Pan-Slavic legacy from its constituents, it continued to preach the solidarity of the Slavonic nations, and for that reason, in the period of the Russian civil war, consistently favored the White Russians. This advocacy of intervention, coupled with a rejection of the League of Nations and all its works, quickly placed the National Democrats in violent opposition to Beneš' foreign policy, although Dr. Alois Rašín, one of their ablest leaders, continued to serve in the cabinet down to the time of his untimely death in 1923. Deriving its principal support from the industrialist, banking, and bureaucratic classes, the party stood for the vigorous maintenance of individual property rights and the firm rejection of socialism. It staunchly supported the army, developing, before long, open fascist tendencies which were reflected in higher army circles. Despite its nomenclature, it opposed universal suffrage and, after the granting of equal suffrage for communal elections, consistently sought to restrict the franchise in the interest of the property-owning classes. Because of its strongly anti-Austrian and nationalist character, the party demanded separation of Church and State and the secularization of education. Extremely powerful, if not dominant, at the time of the Revolution of 1918, its influence was bound, by the very fact of the attainment of independence, to wane rapidly, and after the enactment of much of its program into the permanent Constitution it was predestined to become in increasing degree the focal point of opposition to Mašaryk

and Beneš. In many respects Karel Kramář and the Czechoslovak National Democrats shared the fate of their compeers in Poland, who were destined after the achievement of Polish independence to become the exponents of a raucous, chauvinistic nationalism, altogether out of touch with the changed situation of the postwar era.

The Populists: As in Weimar Germany, the Roman Catholic political forces in Czechoslovakia underwent a baptism of democracy and emerged as a Czechoslovak People's party and a Slovak People's party, respectively. Deriving their membership from the religiously devout of all classes, the Populists nevertheless found the principal bastions of their political strength in the small farmers and the workers of the rural districts, although a certain cross section of the intelligentsia was also caught up into their ranks. Tinged with provincialism by their origin in small parties which fused after the proclamation of the Republic, the Populists demanded wide autonomy for the local communities. For twenty years the Slovak People's party, led by Father Andrej Hlinka and for a time seconded by Professor Béla Tuka, was the principal *foyer* of Slovak particularism and separatism. In general, however, both branches of the Populist movement subscribed to the philosophy of Christian socialism as conceived in Austria, and, after the first effects of their democratic baptism died away, stressed the fundamental principle of hierarchy—the *gerarchia* of Italian fascism. In the words of one of its apologists, populism, in Czechoslovakia, as in Austria and Hungary, "endeavored to bring Christian, i.e., Catholic ideas into effect in legislation and to fight for the preservation of the influence of the Catholic Church in the schools and in public life." Notwithstanding their openly antisocialist character, the two Populist parties were compelled in practice to capitulate to realities and expound a relatively radical social policy in competition

with that espoused by the various socialist parties. Believing in moderation in the treatment of national minorities because of a common bond of religion transcending racial differences, the Populists acted for the major part of the period of national independence as a force for toleration. They opposed the separation of Church and State, however, and from the outset sought to establish through a definitive concordat a permanent liaison between Czechoslovakia and the Holy See.

The Agrarians: It was to be expected that in a country with a large agricultural population political groupings on the basis of economic interests would produce a powerful agrarian party. In Czechoslovakia, however, an unusually large proportion of the citizenry came to make their affiliation with the agrarian groups. In consequence, agrarian parties were formed by every significant racial group, with the Czechoslovak Republican party by far the most important, both in numbers and in organization. By contrast with the National Democrats and Populists, each of whom had a fusion background, the Czechoslovak Agrarians had almost a quarter of a century of solid growth behind them, during which party activity had ramified along economic lines and entrenched itself deeply through various mutual benefit societies, agricultural unions, et cetera. Originally fighting the Socialists on its Left and Christian Socialists on its Right, the Agrarian party had to formulate a broad program capable of bringing to it the support of masses of peasant farmers. This gave the Agrarians a strategic position, alike in the Revolutionary National Assembly and in the subsequent parliaments, where they formed the largest grouping. Avid for land reform, thoroughly imbued with republicanism, they were anxious to effect a general, if gradual, leveling upward of national life by support of public education and far-reaching social legislation. Little difference, except occasionally with respect

to tactics, existed between the Czechoslovak Agrarians and the various German, Magyar, Slovak, and Ruthene agrarian groupings, which, despite their differing racial composition, were basically permeated by the same mentality and ideology.

The Socialists: The evolution of socialism in Czechoslovakia must be understood in the light of the fact that the social democratic movement, after 1878, had a fairly uniform development throughout the Austrian half of the old Monarchy. In ideology it followed respectfully in the wake of the German and Austrian Social Democrats, and made the famous Erfurt Program its own. The oldest of the organized parties in the Bohemian Crown Lands, it had a record of consistent struggle for the bettering of laboring conditions during the ante-bellum days and throughout the war period; although it supported the cause of Czechoslovak liberation, it never broke with the Viennese Social Democrats. With the liquidation of the Monarchy, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party emerged as a unit from the débris, entered the Revolutionary National Assembly with a membership second only to the Agrarians, and was predestined, by the trend of public opinion throughout the country, to rise in the ensuing months to a position of unquestioned dominance, influencing to a certain degree the final constitutional structure of the Republic. Although developing dissension within its own ranks during 1919, according as individual members looked toward Amsterdam or Moscow for leadership, it did not break with its communist contingent until after the new Constitution had gone into effect. During the existence of the Revolutionary National Assembly, therefore, it represented a curious, tolerant symbiosis of social democracy and communism within the same fold, differing in this respect but little from the ideology of the Social Democrats in Austria. Only as the swing toward conservatism established itself generally throughout Europe in 1920 was an

open break reached, resulting in the creation by expulsion of a communist party.

Along with the major current of social democracy in Czechoslovakia, there developed a subsidiary, reformist, non-Marxian socialist party with a definitely evolutionary program. Founded in 1896 to compete with the Social Democrats for the votes of the newly enfranchised workers of Austria, it endeavored, by the moderation of its program, to "group together a section of the working class and a section of the lower categories of public and private employees, as well as of the artisans and intellectuals," in somewhat the fashion of the British Labor party. Being "a radical national party of the lower middle class and of the workers," it called itself the National Socialist party in the pre-war period, changed its name after the Revolution of 1918 to the Czechoslovak Socialist party, only to return to the old name in 1925—long before the Hitlerite brand of national socialism had attained any significance in the republican Reich. The party continued without formal change of label down to the end of the Republic, although great care was taken, particularly as the Henlein movement grew in importance, to translate the name into foreign languages as "People's Socialist," "Socialist Populist," et cetera, much as was done in Lithuania. Accepting a program of evolutionary state socialism and general collectivism, without overstressing the claims or the interests of industrial workers, the party was predestined to be disproportionately influential in the determination of policy, because a number of its members were highly placed in the government in the constitution-making period and because foreign affairs were in the hands of Dr. Beneš, who affiliated with the party in Parliament. The party, moreover, through its principal journal, *České Slovo*, acquired a far-reaching hold upon an intellectual electorate not formally affiliated with it.

The Slovaks: In the Revolutionary National Assembly the Slovaks initially formed a compact bloc, but shortly began to act with their Czech colleagues along definite party lines, following in general either a clerical, agrarian, or socialist orientation. Not until regular parliamentary elections were in prospect, however, did they form definite party organizations with crystallized programs. During the transitional period of constitution making the Slovaks learned to become politically articulate and to master the techniques of parliamentarism. More than this could hardly have been asked in so dynamic and rapidly shifting a political climate.

In the presence of these forces Czechoslovakia ironed out immediate political issues from the national revolution to the passing of the permanent Constitution. This was a period of decisive action destined to have long-range influence in the life of the youthful Republic. Political reconstruction started from the ground up, by the definition of the franchise for local government purposes, universal, equal, and secret suffrage with proportional representation being opened to all men and women over twenty-one without any property or fiscal requirements. In the ensuing municipal elections of June, 1919, issues of a constitutional character were uppermost in the minds of the electors—questions of Church and State, the nature of the presidency, bicameralism, minority rights, educational policy, agrarian and financial questions, and the prospects of socialization. The result of the elections was to reveal the loss of prestige of the National Democrats, whose historic rôle as champions of Czechoslovak independence was now played out, and to give channeling and force to the wave of socialism then sweeping Europe. Accordingly, once peace had been signed with Germany at Versailles and the terms of the settlement with Austria became known, the pronouncedly National Democratic cabinet

of Karel Kramář resigned on July 8, 1919, and gave way to a coalition of Social Democrats, People's Socialists, Agrarians, and Slovaks, headed by Vlastimil Tusar, a Social Democrat. This inducted into office the so-called Red-Green coalition, whose policies will presently be reviewed.

Before discussing the effects of the transition to socialist rule, however, two important acts of the period of nationalist supremacy deserve notice: (1) the financial reforms engineered by Dr. Alois Rašín, which gave to Czechoslovakia the enviable distinction of being the only one of the Succession States to forego the dangerous luxury of inflation, and (2) the extraordinarily important land reform. By a series of Draconian edicts stopping the inflow of depreciating notes of the old Austro-Hungarian bank, by stamping at half their value all notes presented within the area of the Republic within a fixed time limit, by making the Czechoslovak Republic the sole source of new currency issues, Rašín not only avoided the inflation systematically practiced by Czechoslovakia's neighbors, but virtually doubled the value of the currency overnight by halving its total volume. Once this reform was effected, Czechoslovakia started on the road to financial normalcy. Alone of all the Danubian countries, she avoided recourse to the printing press to solve her monetary troubles.¹

The land reform was no less basic and salutary.² But, whereas conservative circles greatly favored the anti-inflationist policies of Dr. Rašín, they trembled for the future status of private property in land when the Socialists and Agrarians in the Revolutionary National Assembly joined forces in demanding the partitioning of the great estates. Notwithstanding, Czechoslovakia

¹ See A. Rašín, *The Financial Reconstruction of Czechoslovakia* (New York, 1923).

² See chap. xi, below.

showed no hesitancy in carrying out the radical reform which was at once a historic reckoning with traditional oppressors and a measure of social justice eminently calculated to ensure domestic tranquillity and prevent social revolution. By the law of April 16, 1919, there was created the Czechoslovak Land Office, an agency subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture, with a president appointed by Masaryk and an administrative board appointed by the Revolutionary National Assembly. To this body were given plenary powers for the expropriation and re-allocation of land. All large estates of arable and nonarable land over 250 hectares in area were *ipso facto* subjected to expropriation, as were arable estates in excess of 150 hectares, the State assuming the encumbrances or indebtedness of the lands expropriated, and offering appropriate compensation, except for estates of the crown and the nobility, which were expropriated outright and without compensation. In this way the Czechoslovak Republic undid the historic wrongs by which after 1620 the greater part of the Czech nobility were deprived of their lands and German servitors of the Habsburgs were colonized upon them. The Czechoslovak Government established minimum areas which might be retained by the owners, and considerable discretionary authority in the application of the law was accorded the Land Office. The major demand of the landless peasantry was thus satisfied, and a program of social reconstruction which took some fifteen years to complete was inaugurated.

II. THE SWING TOWARD SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, 1919-1920

The period of socialist rule in the Czechoslovak Republic covers the two ministries headed by Vlastimil Tusar (July 8, 1919-May 25, 1920, and May 25, 1920-September 15, 1920), during which a number of significant legislative and social reforms were accomplished, in addition to the formulation of the permanent

fundamental law. The legislative grist of the Red-Green coalition, as the Tusar ministry was popularly called, was manifold. It began in the domain of private law by the reform of the laws on marriage and divorce, to make them conform to the secularized State. It continued in the field of public education by making instruction in the public schools nonsectarian. It tackled with vigor the problem of separation of Church and State, for a time threatening the coalition's unity over this issue and precipitating a short-lived ecclesiastical ruction with the Holy See over the use of the Czech language in the liturgy. These and the passing of the Constitution completed the work of the first Tusar ministry.

On being recommissioned by Masaryk, Tusar turned to the carrying through of the socialistic, as contrasted with the constitutional, measures in his program. But Czechoslovak socialism, close enough to Vienna and Berlin to watch the operation of socialization in those two centers, rapidly moderated its economic program. In lieu of setting forth a blueprint for a socialized or collectivized economy, the parliamentary leaders of the two socialist parties found themselves faced with the necessity of compromise, and therefore confined their attention to industries which could most easily be placed under national control, such as the railways, the mines, and hydroelectric power. By affirming the principle of state control over the operation of these industries, it was possible to claim their socialization, but further than this a change of economic régime did not go.³ The development of workers' councils in the railways—which were state-owned—and mines and other industries was guaranteed by statute, and the labor movement was thus given new leverage in an hour of historic opportunity. But there had been too long a delay in approaching the question of socialization. After the

³ See chap. xiii, below.

middle of 1920, socialism was in ebb tide throughout Europe. The gestures made by Tusar in this direction, or even those laws brought to enactment during the ministry of his immediate successor, Jan Černý, served to illustrate that, although Czechoslovakia was ready for very advanced social legislation on matters of education, housing, social insurance, et cetera, and was anxious to have the workers participate in the running of industry even if only in a deliberative way, industry and private management would—except for a few examples of state ownership and so of state socialism—continue as under the preëxisting régime. In short, although better than those in Germany or Austria, the chances of success in a large-scale socialization program in Czechoslovakia were small from the outset, and any far-reaching experimentation would undoubtedly have weakened the new Republic's financial position. This is not to say that Czechoslovakia became a financial colony of the principal Allied Powers, but it is unquestionably true that her financial reconstruction, dependent in the last analysis on foreign loans over a transitional period, could not have been consummated if large-scale experimentation with the economy, rather than with the human factors, had been in process. By keeping to the ground of constructive social reforms and not attempting a major reorganization of her household, Czechoslovakia did not abuse the confidence which her Western protectors and benefactors reposed in her, nor arouse economic hopes which were incapable of fulfillment.

Czechoslovakia's first national elections, held under the new Constitution on April 18 and 25, 1920, revealed for the first time under conditions of democracy the approximate strength of political forces. Although the principal gains accrued to the socialist parties, in part from the spirit of the moment, in part from the prestige of office holding, their internal solidarity, as has

already been noted, was far from strong, and cleavage into socialist and communist ranks was not deferred for long. The Agrarians, on the contrary, lost appreciably, and the National Democrats suffered a defeat from which they never recovered. Gains were also made by the various clerical parties, which showed marked strength in the Sudete and Slovak regions, where they doubled their representation by comparison with that in the Revolutionary National Assembly. This was due in part to the appearance of Magyar and German clerical parties—evidence of the counterforces already mobilized against the weak socialism of Tusar. A handful of independents, representing small bourgeois parties, completed the parliamentary picture. This gave to Tusar overwhelming parliamentary support, but, when division took place in the socialist ranks and a communist party emerged, it was obvious that no ministry in power could hope to govern with the aid of those actively insistent on the overthrow of the régime it exemplified. Tusar therefore resigned to make way for a ministry of experts headed by Jan Černý, by origin a National Democrat but not an active partisan. This rather colorless ministry governed Czechoslovakia for a year (September 15, 1920–September 26, 1921), during which the *Pětka*, a steering committee formed by the five principal parties—the Social Democrats, People's Socialists, Agrarians, Populists, and National Democrats—supervised the conduct of policy. Without deviating from the broad lines of policy already laid down by Tusar, the Černý ministry confined itself to enacting measures of detail within the general framework of Tusar's program, and to reorganizing the administration, so far as the provisions of the Constitution required it. In this way considerable financial legislation was enacted by the Chambers, the railway councils were brought into being, and a factory council law, affecting industries not covered by the Mine Councils Act, was

put into effect. During this period an interministerial commission grappled with the problem of relations between Church and State, approaching it tactfully and in a nonpartisan manner, by the introduction of a few strictly administrative reforms. Thus the keeping of the civil register of births and deaths, and the compulsory recording of marriages—irrespective of whether they were performed under civil or religious auspices—were transferred to state authorities. Likewise the reorganization of the dioceses to conform to the new boundaries of the State marked a further approach to the peaceful dissolution of the bonds existing between Church and State.

Only one "crisis" marked an otherwise uneventful year. In December, 1920, the Left Wing Social Democrats, in the process of separating from the Right Wing, organized a general strike in the hope of effecting a coup d'état which would put them in power. Still under the illusion of the imminence of world revolution, the nascent Czechoslovak Communists seriously misjudged the temper of a public which only eight months before had given the constitutional parties a clear mandate for extended social reforms, but not for the implantation by violence of social revolution. The abortive coup failed and was "energetically suppressed" within three days. It served to steel the bourgeois parties against further concessions of a socialistic character and to inaugurate a rightward swing which was destined to last for more than a decade. In itself, however, the attempted coup at no time endangered the stability of republican institutions.

The interregnum of nonparliamentary government, after a series of interparty negotiations, was ended by a resumption of parliamentary life under a cabinet made up of the *Pětka* coalition and headed by Dr. Eduard Beneš. The growing renown of the minister of foreign affairs, added to his abstention from

* See Vlastimil Kybal, *La République Tchecoslovaque*, p. 33.



EDUARD BENEŠ
PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, 1935-1938, 1940-

artisan politics, peculiarly fitted him for a moderative rôle as prime minister. In consequence, the year covered by Dr. Beneš' ministry (September 26, 1921—October 7, 1922), although spectacular in its achievements in the field of foreign affairs, was no less noteworthy on its domestic side. Declaring his cabinet to be one of fulfillment rather than of promises, Dr. Beneš carried on the financial reconstruction, bringing to completion the persevering work of Dr. Rašín by floating a gold loan in both New York and London. This almost trebled the value of the Czech crown and gave it an exceptional stability in a world of continually fluctuating currencies, a stability consistently maintained by the Czechoslovak Government down to the time of the partition of the country. Completion of the agrarian reform, of the social insurance program, of the balancing of the budget, and of the legislation regulating religious instruction in the public schools were all achievements of the Beneš ministry, to which could also be added the elaboration of a permanent military policy for the Republic. Meanwhile Dr. Beneš continued the work of establishing definitive commercial relations with the principal countries of Europe and the New World. When viewed in retrospect, Beneš' ministry marks a halfway stage on the return to a full-fledged parliamentary régime. Assuaging party bitterness while remaining, in a sense, above the battle, Dr. Beneš led the nation through a period of realignment of political forces until the municipal elections of 1922 revealed a marked rift toward the clerical parties—a turn of events destined to impede the settlement of accounts between Czechoslovakia and the Holy See. Once the rescue of Austria from her precarious position had been effected at Geneva in October, 1922, Dr. Beneš laid down the premiership and Masaryk entrusted it to the veteran hands of Antonín Švehla, the first of a succession of Agrarian premiers, inaugurating the Agrarian Era.

III. THE AGRARIAN ERA, 1922-1935

The advent of the Švehla cabinet, a "ministry of all the talents," marked the beginning of a remarkably sustained phase of Czechoslovak political life. With the nationalist and socialist phases now over and the agrarian reform prominently under way, the next decade was predestined to be replete with agrarian politics, involving the manipulation of agricultural tariffs, the stabilization of agricultural prices, the safeguarding of the interests of the farming population against too rapid an increase in the price of industrial products, et cetera. From the social aspect, the problems of the Agrarian Era involved the maintenance of a fair balance between Czechoslovaks and other national elements in the carrying out of the land reform and the distribution of small holdings, and in a considerable reallocation of national expenditures in regard to education for the agricultural classes. Emphasis on these aspects of the coalition policy does not mean that national interests were neglected; in this period Czechoslovakia revamped her military system and organized her forces on a permanent basis with an essentially civilian army, always subordinated to political control. Although from time to time the ugly head of militarism showed itself in the ranks of some of the former members of the expeditionary forces in Siberia, the Czechoslovak legionnaires, as a whole, merged into the other political parties, and did not obtrude militarism into politics. In this respect Czechoslovakia was signally fortunate, and escaped the incubus from which the Polish Republic was predestined, from its outset, to suffer. Probably Czechoslovakia was saved from any lapse into praetorian politics more because of the unusual diversity of her social structure, and the high cultural level of the great mass of the population, than because of any particular dispensation of Providence. The salient

fact throughout the epoch is that the parliamentary controls, once slackened, then reasserted, were never released.

Under the leadership of Švehla the principle of co-deliberation in economic matters was furthered by the passage, in 1923, of the Agricultural Chambers Act, designed to create autonomous agricultural associations capable of giving the Government, and particularly the Czechoslovak Land Office, their counsel and aid in the completion of the agrarian reform, and the framing of important agricultural legislation. As normalcy was reached in financial matters, a multitude of legislative tasks were undertaken—reform of the press laws, of the jury system, and of the procedure of courts in special cases, and the introduction of the elaborate social insurance system which was destined to prove, in depression times, a bulwark of internal stability, as some seven and a half million people were covered by the benefits of this legislation.

By 1924 the successful working of the interparty coalition, in which Švehla was the moving spirit, had overcome a number of major obstacles on the religious, political, and diplomatic fronts, and the position of the Czechoslovak Republic was seen on all sides to be increasingly consolidated. In such circumstances the solid phalanx of German opposition, which had showed scant desire for political coöperation after 1918, began to break up. The German Agrarians and German Social Democrats were the first to make the break with their nationalist kinsmen, and to seek a common ground for political collaboration. Abandoning the Pan-German chauvinism which characterized the grouping of Bohemian Germans headed by Dr. Rudolf Lodgmann, they saw in the socially constructive policy adopted by the Czechoslovak Government an opportunity to work for their own doctrinal objectives. It was not long before German Agrarians saw fundamentally eye to eye with Czechoslovak

Agrarians, and German Socialists with those of Czechoslovak hue. Without raising any major question such as potential autonomy for the regions preponderantly German in character, they proffered support for the policies which the government coalition was sponsoring. It required, in consequence, only a genuine electoral consultation, such as came with the parliamentary elections of November, 1925, to clear the air and reveal the possibility of an active collaboration of political forces across racial lines.

The first Czechoslovak Parliament, after having virtually lived out a six-year mandate, was dissolved in the autumn of 1925 and elections were set for November. There being no question of lack of confidence in the cabinet, no personality issues, as such, dominated the campaign. It was obvious, however, that the schism in the ranks of the Socialist party would bring about a considerable reduction in its ranks, and the latent issue of anti-clericalism played a certain part in the election. To the rural population, not wholly secular in its thinking, the program of the largely urban socialist groups seemed far-reaching; to the Slovaks, pietistically Catholic, the celebration by the Czechs of the birthday of Jan Hus as a national holiday seemed almost sacrilegious. Accordingly the lines were drawn on these fronts. The result of the election was to reveal a bloc of forty-one Communists and twenty-nine Czechoslovak Social Democrats in lieu of the seventy-four members of an unhappy single party in 1920; to give the difference (four deputies) to the People's Socialists; sharply to reduce the National Democratic contingent, whose program was now well-nigh spent, from nineteen to thirteen; to reveal the basic fusion of Slovak and Czech Agrarians into an indissoluble bloc; to double the modest representation of the middle-class so-called Traders party from six to thirteen; and, last but not least, nearly to double the Catholic

representation, particularly from Slovakia. It was clear from this realignment that the nation at large had drifted away from the socialist extremism of 1920 to a palpable clerical reaction. The German and Hungarian parties reflected this orientation.

The swing to clericalism in the elections established a common denominator for political action and portended change. The change did not come immediately, however. It required an interim cabinet under Švehla's leadership (December 9, 1925–March 18, 1926) to deflate the Social Democratic and National Democratic representation in the coalition and augment the clerical contingent; then a return to the colorless second cabinet of officials under Jan Černý (March 19, 1926–October 12, 1926), before Švehla could come back to the parliamentary scene with the kind of coalition he desired—one representing Agrarians, Populists (both Czech and Slovak), Small Traders, German Agrarians, German Christian Socialists, National Democrats, and experts. This cabinet was a triumph for the policy of shrewd bargaining; it gathered in parliamentary symbiosis the principal conservative elements in the life of the Republic; it excluded not only the Communists and the Hungarian groups, but the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and People's Socialists. This move was regarded both within Czechoslovakia and abroad as a basic effort to bring the different citizens of the Republic to look upon issues through social orientation, rather than from racial or nationalist viewpoints. There can be no question that this exclusion of the socialist forces in the Republic from all political power was in conformity with the general swing to conservatism then operative in Europe. But Švehla, as the guiding genius of this completely revamped coalition, rode the political waves with serenity, and managed to stay in power until February 1, 1929, when illness made him retire from office, leaving his post in the hands of František Udržal, also an Agrarian,

who kept the cabinet otherwise unchanged, down to the elections of the Czechoslovak Parliament in November, 1929.

This period of the Green-Black coalition, which ran athwart racial lines, was successful in bringing about a *modus vivendi* between the Czechoslovak Government and the Vatican whereby the social tension which had at one time threatened to reach serious proportions over issues of special religious significance, such as the celebration of Jan Hus's birthday, was brought to an end. With Slovakia overwhelmingly Catholic, and the Ruthene Uniates virtually handed over to the Holy See for tutoring, it was clear to Germans and Czechs alike that more was to be gained by compromise than by direct conflict. Therefore the issues were liquidated peacefully, and to the end of the Republic no further religious schism developed.⁵

The elections of 1929, held at the end of a period of relative prosperity, presented to the Czechoslovak electorate an opportunity to affirm its fundamental wishes and validate, or reject, the principal traits of governmental policy. Conducted in complete order and quiet, the polling returned a Parliament basi-

⁵ The fond expectation cherished by a number of Czech intellectuals that the large-scale secessionist movement from the Roman Catholic Church at the end of the World War period would mark a vigorous reorientation of Czechoslovak nationalists, numbering some 1,300,000 communicants, toward a sort of national ceremonial religion not unlike that represented by the Anglican church in England was destined to frustration. Not on the issue of a Slavonic, and therefore national, ritual, nor on the general system of church governance was the issue decided, but on the question of the ordination of bishops. When appeal was made to the Anglican clergy to consecrate the new ecclesiastical leaders, Westminster demurred, and the Czechoslovak National Church movement, sadly disillusioned, turned in fraternal spirit to the Metropolitan of Belgrade, Yugoslavia, for the ordination of its highest functionaries. Thereby the movement of religious emancipation, instead of becoming Anglican or even nonconformist, was predestined to run into the political Byzantinism that characterized the Serbian and Balkan Orthodox churches. The movement then largely lost ground as a political force and became cognizable only as a spiritual, even Pan-Slavic, impetus, running ecclesiastically parallel with the fortunes of the Little Entente. (See chap. xv, below.)

ally divided into the same grouping as its predecessor, but revealing a shift away from the clerical reaction of 1925. The Communist party, second in strength between 1925 and 1929 because of the coöperation of all Communists across racial lines, was reduced by the polling to fourth place in strength, whereas the more moderate Czechoslovak and German Social Democrats, together with the People's Socialists, comprised almost a third of the new Chamber. Curiously, the total number of Catholic seats was only slightly reduced, the gains of the German and Hungarian Catholics almost offsetting the losses of the Slovak and Czech Catholic groups. It would appear in retrospect that at this historic moment two forms of separatism, temporarily beaten on political and ideological fronts, took refuge in the Church. Two other developments in the elections had portentous significance: by creating a fusion ticket the German agrarians and the German middle-class party gained sixteen seats at a blow, thereby demonstrating what possibilities were implicit in a unified front drawn on strictly racial lines. On the extreme Right, the League for Electoral Reform, led by General Hajda, entered the lists with a ticket and a program espousing a corporative régime, but failed to make any extensive gains, electing only three deputies. All in all, the "depression parliament," elected while there was still an epoch of prosperity, revealed a swing to the middle-of-the-road parties and away from political extremism.

The consequences of this electoral consultation opened up to Premier Udržal the possibility of reforming his government on either the clerical-agrarian (Green-Black) coalition basis, in which event it would have to find among the lesser parties a continuous day-to-day basis for a parliamentary majority, or on the socialist-agrarian (Red-Green) foundation of the early twenties. There was also the possibility of forming a socialist-

clerical (Red-Black) coalition to the exclusion of the agrarians, or, most favorable of all, a very wide foundation of national government in which all three parties, Socialist, Agrarian, and Catholic, would coöperate. After some six weeks of tedious negotiations, Udržal completed his second cabinet on December 7, 1929, with a coalition of the Agrarians, Social Democrats, People's Socialists, Populists, National Democrats, and Small Traders behind him and represented in the cabinet, in addition to the German Agrarians and Social Democrats. At a moment of heightening economic tension and the beginning of the extremely severe depression period, Czechoslovakia avoided the errors of contemporary Austria in excluding the powerful socialist minority from her national life, and chose instead to create the maximum possible basis for effective collaboration. This coalition weathered the major part of the depression period (December 7, 1929–October 29, 1932) without any serious crises, although it was obvious that so multiplex a coalition afforded numerous possibilities for internal political friction. In this difficult period the German Clericals and Nationalists, the Magyar minority groups, and the Slovaks remained in the Opposition, although the Government was bent on aiding them, no less than other groups of citizens throughout the Republic, to recover from the increasingly intense depression. In an effort to overcome this, Czechoslovakia resorted wherever possible to international coöperative means for relieving the hardships of her people, but found it increasingly difficult, owing to the intensified trends toward autarchy on every side, to maintain her export markets. In this adverse political and economic climate, which would normally have reversed every liberalizing and constructive social trend, Czechoslovak legislation turned to social themes and undertook a steady, enlightened revision of the criminal code, tempering its incidence to the unfortunate par-

ticularly as regards illegitimate children, and broadening, in lieu of restricting, the benefits of social insurance, particularly as regards the sick. This is a gallant record to look upon in retrospect, as it betokened the firm desire of the Government and the people to level up the benefits to, and the cultural standards of, the whole country.

As the depression deepened, it became impossible to treat the crisis without running counter to the political credo of the Small Traders party, which sought to avoid new sales or excise taxes. This led to its withdrawal from the coalition and the replacement of its cabinet member by a nonpolitical expert, in April, 1932. The coalition thus weathered another half-year, but owing to renewed friction between the agrarian and socialist elements over the deflationary economic program, as well as to the illness of the premier, Udržal resigned on October 29, 1932. He turned over nearly his entire cabinet to Jan Malypetr, virtual successor to the mantle of Švehla in the Agrarian party, who carried on through the lowest point of the depression, in the disheartening year of 1933, with a coalition which gained by the adhesion of a "fraction" of "moderate communists" to the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party, a partial offset to the defection of the Small Traders. By maintaining the gold standard and a balanced budget—the credo of the National Democrats from the days of Rašín on—in spite of mounting unemployment and dwindling market, Czechoslovakia made it more and more difficult for herself to compete in foreign markets. Small wonder that in 1933 sporadic outbursts of resentment, set aflame by the events taking place in contemporary Germany, took place on the part of the extremist youth in both Czech and German camps. It required a hard-learned lesson in public finance, taught by a bitter experience for every part of the Republic, before the fetish of the inflexible gold standard was abandoned, an end was made

to the policy of deflation, and a carefully planned devaluation of the currency by one-sixth of its gold value was put in force. It called for heroism to effect this change, but Malypetr was equal to the task, even though it meant the loss of the National Democrats from the coalition and a complete recasting of the cabinet. Malypetr returned to office on February 14, 1934, and the reform immediately manifested its beneficent effects in the national life by speeding up production, sharply reducing unemployment, and quickly winning new markets for the exports of Czechoslovak industry. In order to aid in this process Czechoslovakia set in motion a peculiar variant of state capitalism—the State Grain Monopoly, on the one hand, which was designed to protect the agricultural classes from too sharp a fluctuation of price levels, and the Export Institute, on the other hand, a state-controlled agency for hunting foreign markets. In order to meet the autarchical trend surrounding her, Czechoslovakia created this mixed form of state and private enterprise. Small wonder that the National Democrats took refuge with the fascist group of General Gajda, already convicted of connivance in conspiracies against the republican régime! As has happened in more than one modern country, finance capital, when threatened by democratic evolution, took refuge in the bastions of authoritarianism.

Undaunted by the secession of the ultraconservative elements in his coalition, Malypetr carried on with the powerful support of Dr. Milan Hodža, a Slovak Agrarian, finding it necessary to combat legislatively the abuses of the press to which the extremist organs of indigenous Czech fascism and the imported German variety lent themselves. Without surrendering fundamental liberties, it was made difficult for factions hostile to the democratic order to pursue their activities in the press with impunity. Although applicable to all factions, including Com-

munists, the fascist groups and the German National Socialists were the principal ones to feel the brunt of the new legislation.

IV. THE CRITICAL PERIOD, 1935-1938

National socialism of the German variety early found a foothold in the regions bordering the Reich. Confined, at first, to mere local agitation and the cultivation of grievances, it ramified its activities among the younger generation, forming athletic and sport associations, as well as seeking to win over the older generation of nationalist fire-eaters among the German Bohemians. Only a minor current in the days when *Mein Kampf* was being written, it emerged to poll almost 200,000 votes in the election of 1925, but did little more for itself, owing to the divided field, in the election of 1929. Apparently learning the technique employed by the various minor German segments in that contest, it effected an utter change of leadership and blossomed forth late in 1934 as the *Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront* under the nominal guidance of Konrad Henlein, who announced a program accepting the Czechoslovak Republic and its frontiers as established facts and opposing a restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy or the revision of frontiers. Declaring himself a supporter of the democratic-republican form of government, Henlein rejected fascism and the principles of totalitarianism, upholding, instead, the rights of the individual. The demands of his group were merely for "a considerable decentralization of administration in favor of the districts with German population," but fell short of a demand for "wide concessions of autonomy." In this guise the National Socialist program, considerably watered down for local consumption, went before the electorate in the last parliamentary elections of the Czechoslovak Republic, on May 19, 1935. The result was to return a solid bloc of forty-four Deputies and twenty-three Senators, essentially equaling

the Agrarian party in numbers, and revealing a total polling strength of a million and a quarter voters—larger than that of any single party—and taking with it 40 per cent of the German socialist, 60 per cent of the German agrarian, and 50 per cent of the German clerical vote. Although far from creating a single phalanx of German parties, the Henlein movement emerged from the contest in a position to overawe all other minority groups and claim a right to speak for two-thirds of the German populace.

The Czechoslovak parties suffered no such drastic realignment, the Agrarians, with a considerably increased poll—some 70,000—holding their own, the Social Democrats losing but a single seat but gaining 60,000 new votes among the electors. The People's Socialists lost slightly, falling back to their 1925 level, whereas the Czechoslovak Populists lost to the Slovaks three seats—indicating a static balance in Parliament, although the Slovaks acquired 150,000 new supporters. The Communists likewise held their own in Parliament, although increasing their electorate by almost 100,000. The vote of the Small Traders increased by another 150,000. The National Union bloc, composed of the National Democrats and dissidents, barely held its own. The Magyar minority remained virtually unchanged. Only the fascist group earned three new seats, giving it a half-dozen in Parliament, and polled some 170,000 votes. All told, the elections showed among the Czechoslovak parties a decided stability, although the increase in Catholic votes among the Slovak and Magyar parties was a portent of the manipulability of that electorate.

The consequences of the election were to stiffen the Czechoslovak parties and increase their resolve to broaden the coalition without admitting new minority groups to power. Malypetr included the Small Traders once more in his third cabinet (June

4, 1935) and the coalition remained unshaken either by Maly-petr's resignation (November 8, 1935) to become speaker of the lower Chamber, paving the way for Hadža's premiership, or by the formal resignation presented by the cabinet to Beneš on the latter's elevation to the presidency (December 18, 1935). The "permanent minister of foreign affairs" being thus removed from active political life, Hodža carried Beneš' portfolio until March, 1936, when Dr. Kamil Krofta took over the Foreign Office. The policy of the Government was unchanged, Maly-petr warning the Opposition, however, that "an Opposition which would perhaps work against the State and its vital interests would not be tolerated." Notwithstanding this admonition, Henlein's group openly began to espouse the leadership principle, to subscribe to the totalitarian philosophy of German national socialism, and to stress the Pan-German character of their grouping, although Henlein assured Masaryk of his "willingness to collaborate on the soil of the Czechoslovak Republic and within the scope of its Constitution for the attainment of harmony between the peoples in the Republic." How deceptive the movement was from the outset, only the later moves of the *Sudetendeutsche Partei* were to reveal. This orientation caused genuine apprehension on the part of the Czechs, and the accession of Hodža to power was viewed as an open indication to the world of Czech and Slovak solidarity, although to the end of the Republic the Slovak Populists under Hlinka retained their diffidence and refused to participate in the coalition, demanding too high a price by way of autonomy for Slovakia for even Hodža, himself a Slovak, to pay. With a *rapprochement* between all Czechs and all Slovaks politically impossible, it became Hodža's difficult task to make an attempt to ward off the impending German danger.

Two courses were possible: either to invite the collaboration

of the Sudete Germans in the cabinet, thus bringing immediately to a crisis the contrariant ideologies of Government and Opposition, or to endeavor to cut the ground out from under Henlein by removing the alleged or asserted grievances of the German minority. With much astuteness, Hodža took the latter course, inviting the recommendations of the German parties in the coalition concerning remedies for real or fancied griefs. The result of careful discussion was the Declaration of February 18, 1937, embodying the points of agreement reached by the Government and the German agrarian, clerical, and socialist groups. Acting always within the framework of the Constitution, the Declaration promised special care in allocating public works to the Sudete areas, local enterprise and local workers to be employed therein. It further accepted the principle that relief was to be measured not only according to the population of a given area but also according to the incidence of unemployment there. In the future, recruiting for the public services was to follow a type of proportional representation—a process of adjustment being necessary since many of the applicants for public office possessed little or no knowledge of the Czech language and had given, in past years, scant proof of either their desire to enter the public services or their loyalty to the Republic. Government subventions to private educational and cultural agencies were pledged. Finally, the cabinet promised to extend the same privileges to the Hungarian and Ruthene minorities, planning to execute this program within a year. But time was not destined to be an ally, and the Czechoslovak Government found itself increasingly confronted with ever exaggerated demands on the part of the Sudete Germans—demands for a corporative reorganization of the various nationalities into closed racial compartments in ways totally at variance with the constitutional precepts of the Czechoslovak State. Hodža was therefore com-

pelled, time after time, to reject demands that exceeded the *cadre* of the existing fundamental law. Thus matters stood until February, 1938, when it became obvious from the utterances of Chancellor Hitler that the Reich was "the protector of those Germans who are subjects of another country." This marked the formal claim of Germany to obtrusion in the internal affairs of neighboring states—a claim destined to be acutely pressed after the annexation of Austria on March 13, 1938.

The repercussions of the *Anschluss* on Czechoslovak political life were almost instantaneous, and resulted in the withdrawal of the German Agrarians and the German Christian Socialists from the Hodža coalition, thus making the issue far more sharply drawn between Czechs and Germans. Only the German Social Democrats remained with the coalition, and in the emergency the party of National Unity—rump of Kramář's National Democrats and even more conservative groups—joined the coalition. Hodža thereupon promised a fundamental reëxamination of the nationality problem, to cover and codify all regulations within the Republic governing minorities. This opened the gates to aggressive demands from Slovaks, Ruthenes, and Hungarians, as well as the Germans, but the pressure came solely from the *Sudetendeutschen*, who now openly threw off the mask and revealed themselves as National Socialists (Nazis) alike in ideology and technique. Although, in the municipal elections held in the spring of 1938, the old party *cadres* held firm except for the German Agrarians and Christian Socialists, it became evident that no amount of concession by the Czechoslovak Government, no yielding to the minimal demands of the Sudete Germans, would suffice. Each time compromise was attempted, their demands rose sharply. In consequence it is altogether idle to speculate on the success which the carefully drafted Statute of Nationality, based upon the *desiderata* of the

various national groups, might have had, as the definite demand raised by Germany for annexation of the Sudete lands killed every possibility of compromise and took the problem out of the hands of the Czechoslovak leaders to lay it upon the *tapis* of blood-and-thunder diplomacy whose consummation was reached at Munich. In retrospect, all that can be said of that carefully milled proposal was that it followed, with only minor deviations, the principles of the Declaration of February 18, 1937. But the political leaders of Nazi Germany were in no mood to let a paper statute stand between them and the seizure of the Sudete territory; hence every concession, no matter how far-reaching, was *a priori* insufficient to placate.

It is impossible here to recount the steps by which the Hodža government was driven to capitulation, rather than resistance. Suffice it to say that, when the Anglo-French demands upon Czechoslovakia for the peaceful surrender of the Sudete areas were agreed to, mass opinion forced the resignation of Hodža on September 22, 1938, and the turning over of authority to General Jan Syrový, who formed a government partly out of the residues of the Hodža régime and partly out of the ranks of tried administrators, on a clearly defensive program. It was not even then contemplated in Prague that an unconditional surrender would be exacted, not merely by Germany, but by Italy, Britain, and France as well. When, on September 30, the Syrový government was faced by the accomplished fact of the Munich Agreement, it had to make the supreme choice—"the choice between a desperate and hopeless defence which would have meant the sacrifice of the whole younger generation, their wives, and their children, and the acceptance of the conditions forced upon us—and without war—which in their ruthlessness are unexampled in history. . . . In the choice between the reduction of our frontiers and the death of our nation, we have felt it our

sacred duty to preserve the life of the people." The choice ended the possibility of maintaining the régime of equalitarian democracy and organized multi-party life which had made Czechoslovakia renowned throughout the world, and occasioned the departure from public life of President Beneš.

Although the truncated Republic was given a short lease of life, from October, 1938, to March, 1939, before its formal extinction in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, it is idle to think of the rump Czech-Slovak-Ruthene state, whose existence was temporarily tolerated by the Third Reich pending its ultimate partition, either as identic with the Czechoslovak Republic whose political annals have been recorded in these pages or as actuated by the same spirit and ideology. Politically, the régime which was born of the lifelong endeavor of Masaryk and Beneš to found institutionally the resurgent Czechoslovak nationality passed out of existence on October 5, 1938, betrayed but not defeated. For those of us who have survived its passing, the ironic tragedy is that its chastisement brought neither peace nor healing to the Danubian and central European world.

A BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY

The distinctive literature in accessible languages respecting the internal development of Czechoslovak political life is relatively limited. Leaving aside the data contained in the literature of liberation, which embraces the downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy and the rise of the Czechoslovak Republic, and the literature of advocacy, which endeavored to acquaint Western peoples with the details of Czechoslovak political life, the principal sources are:

E. Čapek, *Yearbook of Czechoslovak Politics* (Prague, 1929); Josef Chmelař, *Les Partis politiques en Tchécoslovaquie*, and its English equivalent, *Political Parties in Czechoslovakia*, as also the much more monumental work in Czech, *Státy, politické strany, a tisk celého světa* (States, Political Parties, and Press of the World) (Prague, 1927); an

official three-volume publication of the Czechoslovak Government issued on the tenth anniversary of independence, *Deset let československé republiky* (Prague, 1928); and an excellent brief volume by a Czech historian eminent in the diplomatic service of his country: Vlastimil Kybal, *La República Checoslovaca: Su formación política y administrativa, su potencia económica* (Madrid, 1933). A glimpse of the constructive activities of the Republic on the social side is contained in a volume, *Social Policy in the Czechoslovak Republic*, put forth by the Social Institute of the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague, 1924). For English readers the files of the *Central European Observer* provide a continuous, intelligent, and semiofficial commentary on men and events.

Chapter IX

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HER MINORITIES

BY JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

WHEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA renewed her independent existence as a state in 1918 she had to face, from the very beginning, the problem of the minorities included within her borders. In this respect the new Republic was no exception to other European states, each with its heterogeneous ethnic composition, since "there is no country in Europe which has no national minority."¹

The international aspects of this problem caused considerable concern at the Peace Conference. The World War was fought in the name of liberation and self-determination of submerged peoples. But it proved impossible to draw up the new political map of Europe with strict application of the principles of ethnography. The stories of pogroms against the Jews in Poland and of the old language difficulties of the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia seemed to indicate that the problems of minorities were to become sore spots of the new world order. The situation obviously necessitated that strong assurances be given to such peoples as the Germans who felt that their social and political affairs were being handed over to the control of "inferior" people.

¹ J. S. Roucek, "Minorities—A Basis of the Refugee Problem," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCIII (May, 1939), 14.

The first proposal for protecting minorities in the new states was made by President Wilson.² The entire matter was referred to a small committee, which held sixty-four meetings between May and November, 1919. It was at once decided that Poland and Czechoslovakia, the two new states to be recognized by the treaty with Germany, should agree in the peace treaty to accept such guaranties as the principal Powers should deem necessary "to protect the interests of inhabitants . . . who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion." The question concerning the Czechoslovak minorities came up twice. Lansing brought it up the first time before the Supreme Council in regard to the Germans; the second time, Beneš was asked by the committee to submit a memorandum stating what rights Czechoslovakia was ready to grant to all her minorities. At the same time the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was also dealt with.³ Eventually, the definite opposition of the small Powers, which considered any international protection as a slur on their sovereignty and an indication of their inferiority, culminated in a stormy session in the plenary conference of May 31, 1919. Nevertheless, the international system for protecting minorities was imposed on ten states; in this regard, Czechoslovakia, by the treaty of September 10, 1919, was placed under the guaranty of the League of Nations. As was true with respect to all other minorities, this document guaranteed absolute and unlimited protection of life and liberty, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion, to all inhabitants

² M. O. Hudson, "The League of Nations and the Protection of Inhabitants of Transferred Territories," *Annals of the American Academy*, XCVI (July, 1921), 78-83. H. W. V. Temperley, in *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* ([London, 1920-1924], V, 123), states, however, that "it was first brought before the notice of the Supreme Council at the end of April by the American and British delegations."

³ Eduard Beneš, *Problémy nové Evropy a zahraniční politika československá* (Prague, 1924), pp. 81-99.

of Czechoslovakia, and entitled them also to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief whose practices were not inconsistent with public order or public morals. Equality in civil and political rights was granted to all citizens in Czechoslovak territory, as well as free use of the mother tongue in private and public intercourse, the possibility of using the minority language before the courts, the right to form and direct various institutions (particularly educational institutions), and the right not to be discriminated against in civil service.⁴

Strange to say, the minorities treaties provided for no obligations on the part of the minorities themselves. It was only the Third Assembly of the League which recognized the inherent danger in this situation—a situation which was eventually to destroy Czechoslovakia—as shown in the following resolution:

While the Assembly recognizes the primary right of the minorities to be protected by the League from oppression, it also emphasizes the duty incumbent upon persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities to coöperate as loyal fellow citizens with the nations to which they now belong.

Czechoslovakia accepted without hesitation international responsibility for the protection of minorities as an integral part of the Constitution.

The nationalities living in Czechoslovakia, according to census statistics for 1910, 1921, and 1930, are shown in table 1 on page 174.

Politically, the number of representatives of the minorities in the Parliament corresponded almost exactly to the proportion of the minorities to the Czechoslovak majority, as can be seen from table 2 (p. 175), which shows the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. The last two columns give the proportion of the

⁴ For more details, see Roucek, *The Working of the Minorities System under the League of Nations* (Prague, 1928), chap. iii.

TABLE 1

NATIONALITIES LIVING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ACCORDING TO CENSUS STATISTICS FOR 1910, 1921, AND 1930

	Total	Number of					Percentage of total									
		Czechoslovaks	Russians and Ukrainians	Germans	Magyars	Poles	Jews	Czechoslovaks	Russians and Ukrainians	Germans	Magyars	Poles	Jews		
CENSUS OF 1910 ^a (BASIS: LANGUAGE OF INTERCOURSE)																
The Republic in 1910	13,441,689	8,034,887	434,005	3,750,325	1,070,854	169,641	...	59.48	3.21	27.76	7.93	1.26			
CENSUS OF 1921 ^b (BASIS: MOTHER TONGUE)																
The Republic in 1921	13,374,364	8,760,937	461,849	3,123,568	745,431	75,853	180,855	65.51	3.45	23.36	5.57	0.57	1.35			
Bohemia.....	6,576,825	4,382,788	2,007	2,173,239	5,476	973	11,251	66.64	0.03	33.04	0.03	0.02	0.17			
Moravia.....	2,616,436	2,018,426	976	547,604	533	7,080	15,335	78.29	0.04	20.93	0.02	0.08	0.58			
Silesia.....	622,738	296,194	338	252,365	94	69,967	3,681	47.56	0.05	40.52	0.02	11.24	0.59			
Slovakia.....	2,958,557	2,013,792	85,644	137,900	637,183	2,536	70,529	68.07	2.89	4.73	21.54	0.09	2.18			
Ruthenia.....	599,808	19,737	372,884	10,160	102,141	297	80,059	3.29	62.17	1.74	17.03	0.05	13.35			
CENSUS OF 1930 ^b (BASIS: MOTHER TONGUE)																
The Republic in 1930	14,479,565	9,688,770	549,169	3,231,688	691,923	81,777	186,642	66.91	3.79	22.32	4.78	0.57	1.29			
Bohemia.....	7,049,971	4,727,834	19,772	2,676,757	5,476	18,585	18,137	27.14	7.91	34.71	11.06	0.68	1.39			
Moravia.....	2,616,436	2,018,426	976	547,604	534	7,080	15,335	78.29	0.04	20.93	0.02	0.08	0.58			
Silesia.....	622,738	296,194	338	252,365	94	69,967	3,681	47.56	0.05	40.52	0.02	11.24	0.59			
Slovakia.....	2,958,557	2,013,792	85,644	137,900	637,183	2,536	70,529	68.07	2.89	4.73	21.54	0.09	2.18			
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^a Manuel statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque (Prague, 1925). II, 362-363.^b Ibid.^c Annuaire statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque (Prague, 1937), p. 9. N, natives; F, foreigners; T, total.

last Chamber (1935-1938) belonging to each nationality and the proportion of the general population.

TABLE 2
NATIONALITIES IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Nationality	1920	1921	1922	1935	Proportion of deputies in percentage	Proportion of population in percentage
Czechoslovaks .	199	107	108	106	58.56	66.9
Germans.....	73	75	73	72	34.00	22.3
Magyars	9	10	8	10	3.77	4.8
Ruthenians	6	6	8	2.6	3.8
Poles.	2	3	2	0.67	0.6
Jews.....	2	2	0.67	1.3
Totals.. . . .	281	100	100	100	100.0	99.7

The problem presented by the development of minority schools can be seen from the following table.

TABLE 3
NUMBER AND PROPORTIONS OF STATE-SUPPORTED SCHOOLS
ACCORDING TO NATIONALITIES*

A. PRIMARY, GRAMMAR, AND TRADE SCHOOLS

Nationality	Elementary schools	Primary schools	Grammar schools	Technical schools	Agricultural, industrial, commercial schools
Czechoslovaks...	5	0.40	2	16	1.5
Germans.....	3	3.21	2	12	5.1
Magyars.....	1	80	2	1	1.8
Ruthenians.....	5	5	1	1	1.0
Poles.....	1	5	1	1	1.5
Jews.....	1	1	1	1	1.5
Rumanians.	1	1	1	1.5
Mixed.....	..	1	1	1	1.5
Totals.....	..	5.21

* From *Statistical Year Book, CSR, 1938*.

TABLE 3—*Continued*

B. TEACHER-TRAINING AND MIDDLE SCHOOLS

Nationality	e t ; n d	Teacher-training schools		Middle schools (high schools)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Czechoslovaks...	5	46	73.0	209	71.5
Germans.....	1	10	15.8	73	25.0
Magyars.....	1	2	3.2	5	1.7
Ruthenians.....	1	4	6.4	4	1.4
Poles.....	1	1	1.6	1	0.4
Jews.....
Rumanians.....
Mixed.....
Totals.....		63		292	

Any statistical and legalistic statements are, however, always incomplete and fail to explain the social forces and dynamics involved in the majority-minority relationships. This is very obvious in the whole history of the Germans in Czechoslovakia.

Contrary to the popular conception, Czechoslovakia did not acquire the Sudete Germans from modern Germany. The Slav tribes which settled during the fifth and sixth centuries on the territories which were to become the foundation of the Czech (Bohemian) State were separated from their German neighbors by mountain ranges. But they were continually in contact. The Czech princes (later kings) often invited German courtiers to join their courts. The courtiers were followed by priests and later by artisans and miners, invited to promote the economic development of the Bohemian Lands. These Germans, led by ambition to improve their economic lot, became the foundation of the German minority in the Czech State. During this early period they were welcomed as the bearers of spiritual and economic progress. They settled, from the twelfth to the fourteenth

centuries, partly in the border regions and partly in the cities which they either built or helped to found.

Hence Czechs and Germans lived together for eight centuries in Bohemia. From one point of view, the history of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown is the history of the struggle between these two nationalities, although they have not always quarreled. In the Middle Ages, at times, these two peoples worked together to their mutual advantage, and the great contributions of Germans to the economic and cultural life of the country were appreciated by the Czechs. But throughout the history of Bohemia one fact stands out clearly—the Czechs got along with the Germans only so long as the latter did not try to become dominant and overthrow Czech independence. This explains the reaction against the German influence at the end of the fourteenth century under the inspiration of the first Protestant reformer of central Europe, Jan Hus; it also explains the emigration of the Germans from the University of Prague to Leipzig in 1409. It likewise throws light on the series of steps which led to Munich in 1938.

The Czechs learned their lesson from past experiences. After the disastrous Battle of White Mountain, which brought the Czechs under the dominance of Austria, the German element ultimately reduced the Czechs to a nation of servants and doorkeepers, despised in their own home by their German masters. The struggle went on with the reawakening of the Czech nation in the nineteenth century. The Germans, who were the dominant element in the Austro-Hungarian Empire until its dissolution in 1918, considered themselves the "superior stock" and looked down on the Czechs, as well as on all other Slavs.


With the formation of the Czechoslovak State, the Germans refused to accept the new situation and to coöperate with the new government at Prague.

But why did the Czechs ask that this hostile element be included in their state? In the memorandum which the Czechs submitted to the Peace Conference, they claimed the historic frontiers of Bohemia. All history showed, they argued, and economic and strategic considerations demanded, that the historic Lands of the Bohemian Crown should remain a single unit. The exclusion of the Sudete areas would have broken the virtually indissoluble geographical and economic ties with central Bohemia. The Germans of Bohemia desired to be united with the new Austrian Republic and not with the Reich. The areas settled by Germans were never, of themselves, component parts of the German Reich nor were they independent elements in the former Austria-Hungary. So far as these territories were connected constitutionally with the Holy Roman Empire, they were connected solely as part and parcel of the Czech State, consisting of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, and only as an entity with those Lands. When, again, long before the World War, they were brought under the sovereignty of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was only in conjunction with the Bohemian Crown Lands as a whole. Geographically, these 3,231,688 Germans (census of 1930) were far from forming a uniform entity within the territory of Czechoslovakia; hence, no human ingenuity could draw a just ethnologic boundary—as the settlement of Munich later revealed—between Czechs and Germans. On the contrary, they were split up, on the one hand, into a number of larger groups in the frontier districts of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and scattered, on the other hand, in language enclaves or fragments mixed up with the Czech population in the interior of those provinces. Even the largest and strongest German districts contained a percentage of Czech population. The areas in which the bulk of the German population was concentrated did not form a connected whole, but represented a frontier zone

of varying width, broken by a sometimes wide and a sometimes narrow sector either of purely Czech districts or of regions inhabited by a mixed element nearly 50 per cent of which were Czechs.

The Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority, naturally resented the new setup. Although President Masaryk, in his first message, invited them to collaborate, the Germans carried on in some districts an armed resistance against the occupying Czech army. For seven years the Germans remained aloof. Then in 1926, when Germany was beginning to come to terms with her former enemies in Europe as a whole, the Sudete Germans of Czechoslovakia began to come to terms with the Czechs. Two German parties, the Agrarians (*Bund der Landwirte*) and the German Christian Socialists, abandoned their former attitude of noncoöperation and entered the coalition government, each being represented by one cabinet minister. It was the beginning of the period of "activism," which came to an end only with the resignation of the three German ministers in March, 1938, under the shadow of the absorption of Austria into Germany and the threats of the German Nazis in Czechoslovakia.

The effects of the world depression after 1929 were naturally felt also in Czechoslovakia, and particularly in the German districts of northern Bohemia, because of the fact that a majority of the German concerns specialized in export trade, which was affected particularly by the development of Germany's system of self-sufficiency ("autarchy"). Furthermore, a larger proportion of Germans than Czechs engaged in industrial occupations and hence more of them suffered because of the depression. This is evident from the following statistical comparison: whereas only 39.43 per cent of the Czechs were employed in industries and trades, 46 per cent of the Germans were thus employed.



The Sudete Germans maintained that they were discriminated against in the administrative field by not receiving their share of appointments in civil service and in private industry; moreover, they asserted that government funds were allotted more generously to the Czech areas than to the German. That was obviously partly true. But the attitude of the Germans, intransigent in their opposition to the new Czechoslovak State in the early years of the Republic, was at least partly responsible for the situation.

The effects of the depression helped Hitler to gain followers in the German districts. Whereas German Nazis could blame a malicious outer world and the Jew for everything, the Sudete Germans could blame the Czechs for all their troubles. Hitler's agitation revived hope in the hearts of many Germans, particularly those who envisioned becoming again the masters in the "reorganized" Czechoslovakia, just as Germans as a whole hoped to become masters of Europe under Hitler. The elections of May, 1935, gave forty-four seats out of a total of seventy-two German mandates to Henlein, the *Führer* of the Czechoslovak Germans. German Centrists (Catholics) and Agrarians joined with Henlein in the general panic that followed the annexation of Austria; thus fifty-five representatives of the Henlein group were *opposed* by eleven German Social Democrats and five German Communists in the Czechoslovak Parliament. The municipal elections of May, 1938, also under the shadow of the *Anschluss*, and particularly under the terror spread by Hitler's threat to invade Czechoslovakia during the night of May 20-21, gave more than a 75 per cent representation to the followers of Henlein.

From the perspective of Munich and after, it is obvious that Henlein was unwilling to come to any reasonable agreement with the Prague government. Henlein's program eventually

proclaimed allegiance of the party to the totalitarian world outlook of Naziism, demanded recognition of the German minority in Czechoslovakia as a legal entity or juristic *persona*, and asked for autonomy for the German minority. Satisfaction of the demands meant the establishment of a "state within the state." The demand for recognition of the Germans in a body as a juristic person was incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy as understood and practiced in Czechoslovakia. There were, furthermore, many Germans in Czechoslovakia who did not accept the view of the Sudete party; moreover, the Constitution gave freedom of political views and decision to the individual and not to a collective, totalitarian entity. At any rate, Hodža's government failed to settle the problem, not because of unwillingness to settle it, but because of Henlein's technique of always "raising the ante" whenever Prague was ready to give in.

The whole problem of the Sudete Germans was a counter in the game of power politics and a part of the larger problem of Germany in Europe. It was not a debate between the 11,000,000 Czechoslovaks and the 75,000,000 Germans concerning the treatment of Germans in Czechoslovakia or the frontiers of that Republic or of the destiny of the national fragments which remained outside the German borders. It was a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire. This was exemplified at the time of the absorption of the remains of the territory of Czecho-Slovakia by Germany in March, 1939, when Hitler's demands for "self-determination" of Germans were replaced by the so-called "Lebensraum" doctrine. According to this doctrine, the German "Living Space" represents a more or less precisely outlined area in Europe over which Germany is "entitled" to rule politically and whose social development it is her "right" to regulate in accordance with her own racial theories. Econom-

ically, such a part or even a greater part of the globe must be subordinated to Germany's interests and serve to satisfy her needs and objects.

As far as the territories which belonged to Slovakia were concerned, the Magyar element penetrated the Slovak territory only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when, under the pressure of Turkish inroads, the Magyars had to migrate from the plains. From that time on dated a great majority of the Magyar "islands" in Slovakia and the Magyar strongholds in the cities, originally founded by German colonists and then joined by Slovaks. The problem of nationalism played no part in Slovakia up to the end of the eighteenth century because the official language of Hungary was Latin. But then the influence of Vienna's Germanizing policies began to foster demands for the use of Magyar instead of Latin; furthermore, expressions of the growing national consciousness of the non-Magyar nationalities were answered by an increased attempt at Magyarization. As a result of this situation, the Slovaks began the arduous struggle to retain their language and their cultural existence. After 1867, when the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* was signed, the Magyarization policy became so effective that it was doubtful whether the Slovak element would survive in Hungary.

With the formation of Czechoslovakia, the Magyars were placed in the same situation as the Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority. The Magyars also asked for self-determination. Distributed in the eastern districts of Slovakia and in the southeastern part of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in three areas surrounded by Slovak zones, these Magyars were joined to Czechoslovakia because of geographical reasons and because the areas in question were more or less permeated with either pure Slovaks or Slovaks who had become Magyarized during the last century. According to the census of 1930,

the Magyars numbered 691,923 (4.78 per cent of the total population of Czechoslovakia).

The following table shows the progress in all types of schools in Slovakia in 1910-1918 and in 1936:

TABLE 4
SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA

Schools	Under Hungary, 1910-1918			1936		
	Magyar	Slovak	German	Slovak	Magyar	German
Primary.....	3,777	429	20	3,212	730	177
Grammar.....	101	147	14	5
Industrial, commercial, agricultural.....	118	83	3	6
Teacher-training.....	14	2	..
Middle (high schools).....	39	40	7	3
University.....	1

The Magyars maintained, on the whole, a negative attitude toward the Czechoslovak Republic, and even irredentist elements worked in their ranks.

The Slovaks were not considered as a minority by Prague, and certainly not by the Slovaks themselves. This is attested to by the fact that the Czech parties had their adherents in Slovakia, that there was no discrimination against the inclusion of Slovaks in various cabinets, and that Dr. Milan Hodža, a member of the Republican party and a Slovak, headed the cabinets from 1935 to 1938. The autonomist tendencies of the Catholic Slovaks found their expression, however, in the Slovak Populist party of Father Andrej Hlinka, whose policies can be understood best when we recall the demands for states' rights in the United States which culminated in the Civil War. The claims of Hlinka represented the tendencies inherent in the different historical and cultural developments of the Bohemian Lands and of Slovakia. The Czechs and the Slovaks had been separated

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
The following table shows the progress in all types of schools in Slovakia in 1910-1918 and in 1936:

TABLE 4
SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA

Schools	Under Hungary, 1910-18				1936	
	g	v	n	v	g	man
Primary.....	77	12	10	21	10	77
Grammar.....	6	.	.	1-	14	5
Industrial, commercial, agricultural.....	1	..	.	8	2	6
Teacher-training.....	1	2	..
Middle (high schools).....	2	4	7	3
University.....

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FOUNDER AND HEAD OF FIVE-PARTY COALITION
PRIME MINISTER, 1922-1926. 1926-1929



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politically for one thousand years. The former had become very largely industrialized, influenced by German and Western thought and technical development. The Slovaks, on the contrary, remained agriculturalists and under a Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture. The Czechs were nominally Roman Catholics, and those who opposed Roman Catholicism during their national struggle against the Catholic Habsburgs had earned the reputation in the eyes of devout Slovaks of being "irreligious." Whereas the standard of literacy among the Czechs was high, the percentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low in 1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers, and intellectuals from the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia in 1918-1919, and many of them antagonized the Slovaks with their well-intentioned, but often too matter-of-fact, methods. Schools had to be built and staffed and, since there were few trained Slovaks available, Czechs received the appointments. When, during the course of time, Slovaks became available, it was not easy to dismiss the Czechs, many of whom had married and settled down. The effort of Prague to strengthen the State was criticized by these Slovaks as a tendency toward overcentralization. Hlinka summarized his views as follows:

All that we wish to secure is the political independence guaranteed by the provisions of the 1918 Pittsburgh Agreement. We are trying to defend our language, religion and national customs, which are not Czech but distinctly our own, from the same treatment they received from the Hungarians and Germans.⁵

What was the Pittsburgh Agreement? On June 30, 1918, when the World War was already approaching its end, the representatives of a number of American-Czech associations met at Pittsburgh, together with the representatives of several American-Slovak societies, to discuss the future structure of

⁵ *New York Times*, August 17, 1938.

Czechoslovakia with Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, the chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council. These American Czechs and Slovaks, together with Dr. Masaryk, agreed that Slovakia should "have her own administrative system, her own diet and her own court and that] the Slovak language should be the official language in the schools, in the public offices and public affairs generally."⁶ Actually the points in agreement were virtually carried out—except the one stipulating the setting up of a diet for Slovakia. Whereas the Czechs held that the Slovak Administrative Council amounted to a diet, Hlinka's Slovaks protested that a diet had legislative powers, which the council did not have. The situation was aggravated when Father Hlinka, who was seventy-three years old, was sentenced to eight days in prison for libeling President Masaryk in 1926, and when Dr. Béla Tuka was sentenced for high treason in 1929. As a defense witness, Hlinka insisted that Dr. Tuka was only a scapegoat, that the charges were really directed at his Slovak movement, and that "everything that Professor Tuka did was by my orders, including the autonomy program which is now called treasonable."

Whatever the merits of the case, the movement, in spite of Hlinka's death on August 16, 1938, achieved power after the Munich settlement, when autonomy was granted to Slovakia, and helped to dismember Czecho-Slovakia by seeking "protection" under Hitler in March, 1939.

It might not be amiss at this point to summarize the main elements of the population of Czecho-Slovakia after the cession of 30 per cent of her territory to Germany, Poland, and Hungary in October–November, 1938 (see table 5).⁷

It should be noted, as a commentary on "racial justice" and

⁶ Ivan Dérer, *The Unity of the Czechs and Slovaks* (Prague, 1938), pp. 23–24.

⁷ *Central European Observer*, XVI (December 16, 1938, nos. 25–26), 392.

"self-determination," that, of 3,576,719 souls ceded to Germany, 738,502 were Czechs and Slovaks; Hungary acquired 992,496

TABLE 5
A. NATIONALITIES LIVING IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER THE CESSION
OF TERRITORY IN 1938

Nationality	Bohemia	Moravia	Slovakia	Ruthenia	Czecho-Slovakia
Czechs and Slovaks.....	09,901 (23%)	2,143,956 (93.18%)	2,055,8 (85.59)	17,495 (1.21%)	8,527,154 (88.09%)
Ruthenians.....	6,1 (.14)	3,3 (.15)	89,187 (1.72%)	413,481 (75.90%)	512,289 (5.29%)
Germans.....	99,1 (.24)	35,344 (1.89%)	134,277 (5.59)	8,1 (.60)	77,830 (.90%)
Magyars.....	6,1 (.14)	2,1 (.11)	65,1 (.74)	25,1 (.75%)	90,379 (1.04%)
Poles.....	1,02 (.02)	2,1 (.10)	103 (.03)	72 (.02)	4,157 (.04%)
Jews.....	8,1 (.20)	12,1 (.54)	39,1 (.63)	65,1 (.08)	26,310 (.31%)
Others.....	1,1 (.03)	1,03 (.03)	16,1 (.70)	13,1 (.44)	31,949 (.33%)
Czechoslovak citizens in 1938	32,1 (1.00)	90,1 (1.00%)	91,1 (1.00.00)	44,1 (1.00)	80,068 (1.00%)

B. POPULATIONS CEDED

Nationality	To Germans	To Poles	To Hungary	Total	Percentage
Czechs and Slovaks.....	38,1	34,1	88,1	61,1	24.20
Ruthenians.....	1,1	1	35,1	36,1	0.77
Germans.....	22,1	17,1	13,1	53,1	59.46
Magyars.....	3,1		87,1	91,1	12.32
Poles.....	1,1	76,1	1	77,1	1.62
Jews.....	6,1	2,1	51,1	60,1	1.26
Others.....	2,1		15,1	17,1	0.37
Czechoslovak citizens in 1938	76,1 .53	30,1 .80	92,4 1.67	99,4	100.00

inhabitants, of whom 288,803 were Czechs and Slovaks, 35,261 Ruthenians, 13,608 Germans, and 51,578 Jews; Poland took

230,282 people, of whom 134,311 were Czechs and Slovaks, 17,351 were Germans, and only 76,303 were Poles.⁸

The tragedy of Czechoslovakia's fate hinged, of course, not on whether this democracy treated her minorities "justly" or not, but on the fact that the minorities were used as "Trojan horses" for the aggressive policies of the neighboring Powers. After all, it is not even debatable that Germany's minorities, and particularly the Jews, have been treated with much less "justice" than Czechoslovakia's minorities. The same statement applies to the fate of minorities in Hungary and Poland. The Polish treatment of her minorities in particular appears paradoxical in relation to the demands that Warsaw made on Prague regarding the Polish minority in Teschen. This southeastern corner of the province of Silesia formed, after the fourteenth century, part of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown.⁹ According to the Austrian census of 1910, nearly 55 per cent of the population of the Duchy of Teschen were Polish-speaking, whereas 18.04 per cent spoke German and 27.11 spoke Czech.¹⁰ When Polish troops occupied almost all of the Duchy in November, 1918, the Czechs seized the city of Bohumín. The Conference of Ambassadors, unable to settle the problem either by a plebiscite or by arbitration, divided the Duchy by an agreement of July 28, 1920, between the two countries. Poland received the eastern part, including a large part of the town of Teschen; Czechoslovakia was awarded the town of Fryštát, the whole of the developed Karvin mining area, and a considerable section of the railway. The division "clearly subordinated the ethnic to the economic principles."¹¹ But Poland continued campaigns on behalf of the Polish mi-

⁸ Roucek, "The 'Second' Republic of Czecho-Slovakia," *The Journal of Geography*, XXXVIII (March, 1939), 89-98.

⁹ Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, IV, 349.

¹⁰ R. L. Buell, *Poland, Key to Europe* (New York, 1939), p. 338.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

nority in Teschen, and particularly so after the conclusion of the Polish-German Nonaggression Pact of 1934. On the day of the Munich Agreement, Warsaw sent an ultimatum to Prague and forced the annexation of 134,000 Czechs and Slovaks and 18,000 Germans, in order to "liberate" fewer than 80,000 Poles.

The only democratic country in a world of fascist and semi-fascist central and eastern European states, Czechoslovakia consistently suppressed anti-Jewish manifestations. The Jews, numbering some 186,000, were scattered throughout all areas of the state; approximately half of them were to be found in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

The basic problem inherent in all the majority-minority relationships, that of dominance-submission, found its expression in the population trends in Czechoslovakia. During the last four generations before the World War, the Czechs had a higher birth rate than the Germans because the former had a wider agricultural base and resided in more prosperous Czech districts with better health and social conditions than those prevailing in the poorer borderline German regions. The Germans had a considerably higher death rate for children. The result was that up to the 'nineties the Czech natural growth was higher by one-third than that of the Germans. Changes came at the end of the century, when industrialization strengthened the Germans. But this did not change the results of the natural growth of the Czechs, especially in Moravia. The Czechs began penetrating the German cities and formed numerous and growing Czech minorities in German "islands," for the Germans were forced to import Czech laborers and these were followed by small traders, businessmen, and public officials. These powerful waves of migration, directed from the Czech districts into the German industrial regions, resulted in changing the composition of the German regions; particularly was this true after 1918, when the

Czech migrants received the support of their own government. This may be seen when the figures in the 1920 and 1930 censuses are compared. They show the lower birth rate of the Germans, who were here primarily city people. Thus the census of 1930 indicated that the average number of Czechoslovaks had increased, among one thousand inhabitants, from 1921 to 1930, as follows:

In Bohemia	from 666.4 to 671.9
In Moravia-Silesia	from 724.0 to 741.2

whereas the average number of Germans had decreased:

In Bohemia	from 330.4 to 323.8
In Moravia-Silesia	from 246.7 to 228.5

The declining number of Germans was also indicated in the elections of 1935. The German parties retained their previous number of mandates only because of the desertions from the communist ranks. Somewhat enlightening also are the statistics of the nationality of elementary school pupils. The nationality of one thousand pupils was as follows:

	Czechoslovak	German
In Bohemia in 1930	669.3	329.0
In Bohemia in 1934	677.9	320.1
In Moravia-Silesia in 1930	753.5	217.2
In Moravia-Silesia in 1934	763.4	208.7

The losses indicated found their parallel in the figures for other minorities. In 1910 Teschen had 138,184 inhabitants speaking Polish; in 1921 there were only 88,929. The gradual assimilation of the Poles was further indicated by the school statistics: from one thousand elementary school pupils, in Moravia-Silesia, the number who were of Polish nationality was as follows:

In 1921	36.3
In 1930	26.3
In 1934	24.3

No wonder, then, that the German and the Polish leaders were irritated by the declining strength of their minorities. They were seconded by the Magyar complaints. In 1910, of the inhabitants of Slovakia, 30.62 per cent had proclaimed themselves Magyars. But in 1921 the Magyar element was reduced to 21.68 per cent, and in 1930 to 17.58 per cent. The natural growth of the Slovaks was greater by one-third than that of the Magyars; the years 1931-1934 showed that the excess of births over deaths per thousand was 11.72 among Slovaks and 8.54 among Magyars. The picture as a whole can be judged from the following figures, giving for the years 1921 and 1930 the number of each nationality out of one thousand inhabitants of Czechoslovakia:

	1921	1930
Czechoslovaks	655.3	669.1
Russians (Ukrainians)	34.5	37.9
Germans	233.6	223.2
Magyars	55.7	47.8
Poles	5.7	5.7
Jews	13.5	12.9
Others	1.7	3.4

Hence the national minorities formed, with the exception of Russians, 31.02 per cent of the Czechoslovak population in 1921, and 29.39 per cent in 1930.

The inescapable conclusion is that the problem of Czechoslovakia's minorities was not so serious as the German and Magyar propaganda led others to believe; furthermore, that it could have been solved gradually and peacefully if Prague had been allowed to run its own affairs. Unfortunately, the utilization of the existence of minorities in Czechoslovakia as a weapon in the international game of power politics not only led to the temporary loss of Czechoslovakia's independence, but the same weapon may also be used against the national existence of the

very states which helped to dismember this little democracy. Did Czechoslovakia make a mistake in trying to solve her problem of minorities by democratic, rather than by brutal and violent, methods, as her neighbors have done?

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Chapter X

THE PROBLEM OF SUB-CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA

BY OSCAR JÁSZI

THE TERRITORY variously called Ruska Kraina, Podkarpatská Rus, Sub-Carpathian Russia, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, or Carpatho-Ruthenia belonged, for a thousand years, to the Kingdom of Hungary, and was assigned after the World War, by the peace treaties, to Czechoslovakia. After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia it was again reincorporated in Hungary, not without litigation and conflict, by the Nazi-fascist dictators (March, 1939). The Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian problem is far more than a controversial issue between the Czechoslovakia of the past (or a possibly newly arising Czechoslovakia) and Hungary; it is an international and strategic problem of the first magnitude. Especially after the spectacular events of September, 1939, when the old dream of the Ukrainian unification of a nation of more than forty million inhabitants on a territory larger than Germany has been accomplished under Soviet rule and the Russian world empire has become contiguous with Hungary, the future of the Ruthenian minority of the same Ukrainian stock may constitute an irreducible the repercussions of which are incalculable.¹ The more so

¹ The Hungarian Ruthenians, called also Hungarian Russians, form a branch of the Ukrainian family of 45,000,000 which is closely related in language and racial

because there is also an important Ruthenian minority in Rumania, estimated by Ukrainian sources as high as one million, which could assume the same centrifugal tendencies.²

In consequence of this situation, the appraisal of the work of the Czechoslovak Republic is not only a historical problem of considerable importance, as an estimate of the statesmanship and social interest which the Prague government developed, but it will also admonish us of the enormous difficulties inherent in the future of the little country.

Geographically, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia is a continuation of Slovakia, the end of the far-stretched tail which was attached, through the peace treaties, to the historic Bohemian and Moravian Lands. The bulk of the Ruthenian settlement is included in the Hungarian counties of Mármaros, Ugocsa, Bereg, and Ung, on the inner slopes of the Carpathians, with a small agricultural hinterland uniting it with the Hungarian plains.

Comparing the Hungarian census of 1910 with the Czechoslovak censuses of 1921 and 1930, we find the following figures for the population of the Ruthenian territory (see tabulation at the top of p. 195).³

stock with the Russians, the Poles, and the Slovaks. As the Czechoslovak Government itself stated in a memorandum to the League of Nations, "A person speaking the Ukrainian language . . . can easily make himself understood by a Great Russian or by a Ruthenian." This is also true concerning the Slovaks and the Poles. That is the reason why it was the Czarist Russian and the Polish doctrine, and is now the Slovak doctrine, that the Ruthenians do not constitute a distinct nation, but speak a corrupted dialect of the Russian, of the Polish, or of the Slovak, as the case may be.

² Before this article was printed, Stalin made an end to this possibility by the incorporation of Bessarabia and Bukovina into the U.S.S.R. (July, 1940).

³ The striking differences between the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak censuses are due, aside from "state considerations" and the great economic and political reshuffling after the war, to the fact that the Hungarian census put the Jews into the Magyar or German nationalities according to "maternal language." Furthermore, later censuses speak of Czechs and Slovaks and add to the Ruthenians, Russians and Ukrainians.

	1910	1921	1930
Ruthenians	319,361	372,500	446,911
Magyars	169,434	103,690	109,472
Germans	62,187	10,326	13,249
Rumanians	15,387	10,810	12,641
Slovaks	4,057	19,775	33,961
Jews	79,715	91,259
Poles	298
Gypsies	1,357
Others	1,062	278
Totals	571,488	597,114	709,128

For the completion of this picture, we must mention that, according to the last Czechoslovak census, there are also several Slovak regions (the former Hungarian counties of Sáros, Zemplén, Szepes) which contain a Ruthenian minority of about ninety-one thousand.*

The whole territory of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia formed an area of 12,639 square kilometers (4,886 square miles), with mountains covering some three-quarters of the area. The only mineral deposit of value is salt. The most important of the country's resources is timber, which covers almost 49 per cent of the total area.

The Ruthenians migrated from the adjacent Ukrainian territories in different waves. The dates of these migrations are controversial. Ukrainian authorities try to show that the initial settlement of the Ruthenians in the Hungarian Lands was co-equal with that of the Magyars; whereas Magyar historians repudiate this hypothesis and try to show that there was no Ruthenian colony before the fourteenth century, and that there

* This figure is hotly debated by Ruthenian patriots as a distortion in favor of the Slovaks. The correct figure according to them is nearly 250,000.

came to be a more fixed colonization only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵

The Ruthenian people were without doubt the most backward element of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, a real stepchild, in a state of slow starvation, alcoholism, and enormous illiteracy, with the mentality of the Dark Ages. In order to characterize the social, economic, and moral situation of this people, I wish to quote only from authorities who were close to the official Magyar politics or in sympathy with the Magyar claims. Nicholas Bartha, one of the most influential Hungarian publicists of the end of the last century, with strong nationalistic bias, wrote a book in 1901, entitled *In the Land of the Kazárs* ("Kazár" was the nickname of the ill-famed Jewish usurers of this region), in which he described the pathological condition of the Count Schönborn estate, covering 240,000 holds (341,280 acres). This estate, like a medieval state, included some two hundred villages. Two constituencies were under its exclusive control, and the management of the estate on every occasion asked the prime minister whom he wanted to be elected to Parliament. The small parcels of land cultivated by the peasants were scattered confusedly beyond the territory of the *fidei commissum*. In order to reach his tiny property, the peasant was compelled to walk several hours through a region without roads and over ditches without bridges. Game was the only concern of the administration. Bartha wrote:

The sovereign stag should not be disturbed in its family entertainments . . . What is a Ruthenian compared with it? . . . only a peasant. The hunting periods last two weeks . . . [For this pastime] 70,000 Ruthenians must be doomed to starvation by the army of the officials . . . The deer and the wild boar destroy the corn, the oats, the potatoes, and

⁵ For detailed discussion of this controversy, see A. P. Coloman and G. G. Běžinec, "The Rise of Carpatho-Russian Culture," in the *Central European Observer*, August–September, 1938.

the clover of the Ruthenians (the whole harvest of his tiny lot of half an acre) . . . Their whole yearly work is destroyed . . . The people sow and the deer of the estate harvest . . . It is easy to say that the peasant should complain . . . but where and to whom? Those who have the power he sees always together. The village mayor, the undersheriff, the sheriff, the district judge, the tax-collector, the forester, the steward, and the manager, all are men of the same education, of the same pleasures, and of the same standard . . . They constitute the one and same society . . .⁶

If one reads the account written by a completely Magyarized Ruthenian, Dr. Orest Szabó, who became later the first (and the last) Ruthenian minister in the Republican cabinet of Count Michael Károlyi, one finds the picture no less desperate. He describes the fear of the people because of the abuses of the administration, the enormous alcoholism, the pathological intensity of their religious life (it was not unusual for a Ruthenian to fast 250 days a year!), the lack of the most primitive hygienic provisions, the growing antagonism between the clergy and the people. (The Ruthenians regarded their priests as allies of their oppressors, and the taxes, the so-called "stole duties" for their various religious services, were felt to be extravagant.) In spite of the deep mystic and religious ardor of the people, the most primitive pagan customs (adoration of the fire, the high authority of the medicine men, and fantastic rituals connected with births and deaths) prevailed.⁷ This was in accord with the general moral situation of the country, through which so-called "Wonder Rabbis" often traveled, each with a retinue of several dozen people.

Illiteracy among the Ruthenians was the highest in the State, and usury assumed such proportions that a Hungarian state

⁶ Quoted by Oscar Jászi, in *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 234-235.

⁷ For particulars, see Orest Szabó, *A Magyar Országokról* (On Hungarian Ruthenians) (Budapest, 1913).

official of Irish extraction, Edward Egan, sounded the alarm—an alarm which ended with a short-lived state campaign for the salvation of the Ruthenians (“Highlands Commission”) and with the mysterious death of the promoter of the movement. The middle classes were completely Magyarized. No school system in the maternal tongue that was worthy of the name “system” existed. No political life, either national or local, was tolerated. Seats in Parliament were openly bought. The only relief, which was emigration to America (mostly secret and illegal), assumed colossal proportions. “There are Ruthenian villages,” wrote Dr. Szabó, “where practically every adult has been in America, some of them several times.” This American emigration was chiefly responsible for the idea of Ruthenian autonomy.⁸

It is no exaggeration to assert that the old Latin lines concerning medieval Poland

Est coelum Nobiliorum
Paradisus Iudeorum
Et Infernum Rusticorum

were even more true of the Ruthenian people. However, the idea of a Jewish paradise should not be exaggerated, as was done by propagandists. The bulk of the Jewish element in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was a poor, hard-working population, often engaged in agriculture. The truth is that the illiterate Ruthenian peasant, devoid of any public instruction, made degenerate by famine, epidemics, and alcoholism, had succumbed in the effort to compete with the rapidly increasing Jewish immigrants, who were of a keener and more elastic mind.

Only a few Hungarian progressives have visualized the tragic significance of this situation. The fact was exposed that certain

⁸ According to Ruthenian sources, the number of Ruthenians and Ukrainians in the United States and Canada totaled 1,250,000.

parasites attached to the Ruthenian people (both ecclesiastic and civil magistrates) accumulated enormous fortunes by cheating and exploiting the wretched Ruthenian peasants. Such figures as Arkad Pásztory and Simon Papp de Visó are representative of a social pathology which cries for the pen of an Emile Zola or a Sinclair Lewis.⁹

Looking back on the past history of the Hungarian Ruthenians, an English observer of considerable fairness, C. A. Macartney, declared in 1937:

Ruthenia was really treated by the Magyars as a great deer-forest. . . . The Ruthenes were not thought fit for any better employment than lumbering, acting as ghillies on the huge deer forests which covered most of the country, or scratching a miserable livelihood out of the tiny plots left to them under the shadow of the trees. Only the nobleman or his bailiff driving to the castle passed between long rows of cabins built of log or clay, with floors of beaten earth and chimneyless roofs of decaying thatch; the smoke, eddying through the single room, revealed dim outlines of a promiscuous crowd of cows and children, geese and grandparents.¹⁰

Yet the Ruthenian people have suffered their tragedy without murmur or resistance. On the contrary, their loyalty to Hungary remained unshaken. Hungarian writers called them *gens fidelissima*, and they participated ardently and bravely in the insurrection of Prince Rákóczi (1703–1710), when the feudal leader combined the cause of the nobility with generous promises to the serfs. Only later, after the failure of the revolution of Kosuth, when the Bach System (1849–1865) tried to win the support of the nationalities for Habsburg absolutism, were they induced by the Austrian authorities to present their grievances

⁹ The detailed accusations of a Hungarian journalist, Victor Aradi, in the review, *Huszadik Század* (Tom. XXVIII, 1913), remained unchallenged by those gentlemen.

¹⁰ C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 202, 205).

to the emperor. They did this in October, 1849, elaborating a program for the recognition of the Ruthenians as a "distinct political nationality," for the introduction of the Ruthenian language into the educational system, and for a modest autonomy in administration. But it was difficult to find even a few Ruthenian intellectuals for the presentation of the memorandum. It was kindly received, however, and Bishop Gaganetz reported that all of the ministers promised the Ruthenians that "they would take care that the Ruthenians might develop undisturbed under the protection of the Double Eagle and become revitalized."²²

But this was a short-lived hope. After the fall of the Bach system and with the introduction of the dualistic system, all the national minorities were put under the exclusive domination of the Magyar feudal classes, and the process of artificial Magyarization (after the death of Deák and Eötvös) was carried on with an ever-increasing momentum. The only resistance of the Ruthenian people manifested itself in the religious field, in the form of a schismatic movement which assumed menacing proportions in the years before the World War. Large masses of the people tried to get rid of the Greek Catholic, so-called Uniate, Church, a creation of the Habsburgs in order to make an end to the Greek Oriental Church, which was distrusted both by Vienna and later by the Magyars as a possible instrument of Russification. The union was established in 1649, and it became overwhelmingly victorious because of the privileged position which it offered to the Ruthenian clergy. In the schismatic movement, the people tried to return to the Orthodox Church. This movement was perfectly legal, as religious liberty was granted to all the churches in Hungary. But it was soon de-

²² H. I. Bidermann, *Die Ungarischen Ruthenen, ihr Wohngebiet, ihr Erwerb und ihre Geschichte* (Innsbruck, 1862), II, 119-120.

nounced as a hidden political movement, as treason under a religious mask, fomented by Pan-Slavistic propaganda and by the "Rolling Ruble." This led to the monster trial at Sighet (Mármaros Sziget) in 1914, when thirty-two peasants were condemned to a total of thirty-nine and a half years of imprisonment for treasonable activity. The Hungarian information service portrayed it exclusively as "Pan-Slavic machination" fostered by Russian emissaries, especially by the notorious Count Bobrinsky. Even such a distinguished author as Macartney accepts this story, which, however, needs a serious qualification. A Hungarian writer who studies the schismatic movement on the spot related that, aside from the Pan-Slavic propaganda, another strong inducement came from the emigrated Ukrainians in America. The schismatic movement was, at the same time, a social movement. It meant a protest against the Greek Catholic clergy, which was felt to be an instrument of the policy of Magyarization. The people also hoped that by establishing an Orthodox Church their religion would become less expensive and, at the same time, the old Slavic ritual would better satisfy the mystic religious cravings of the people.¹²

In spite of some popular tension which the trial and some other manifestations of religious intolerance aroused, in the World War nothing happened on the part of the Ruthenians which could have been construed as treason. A few priests were interned, a few intellectuals were watched, but the Ruthenian soldiers fought loyally for the Dual Monarchy, the existence of which they scarcely conceived. They remained the most apolitical element of Hungary and of the Habsburg empire.

This was the situation of the Ruthenian people when, immediately after the war, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy found

¹² Joseph Rédei, "A Rutének Vallásos Tömegmozgalmai" (The Religious Mass Movements of the Ruthenians), in *Huszadik Század*, Vol. XXX (1914).

itself in a rapid process of dissolution. The efforts of the young emperor to safeguard the unity of his realm failed. All the national groups of his variegated empire asked for complete independence. Inside Hungary the same situation was to be found. The centrifugal forces destroyed political unity. In vain did the newly formed democratic Hungarian Republic of Count Károlyi offer autonomy and self-determination to the Slovaks and the Rumanians; they repudiated a federal coöperation owing to the open and hidden promises of the victorious Allies. Under these conditions, this writer, as minister for national minorities, entertained the last hope of convincing the approaching Peace Conference of the sincerity of the Hungarian Government in making a new start and rejecting the old system of artificial assimilation. He tried to show that the new Hungary had embarked upon a policy of federalism which alone would have been capable of reconciling economic and geographic necessities with the right of self-determination. As a symbolic gesture and a solemn promise, the so-called "People's Law Number X of 1918" was elaborated, giving to the Ruthenians, the humblest and weakest nationality of the former Monarchy, such an extended autonomy as formerly none of the national minorities, with the exception of the Croats, had enjoyed. The counties of Mármaros, Ugocsa, Bereg, and Ung were to be united in an autonomous territory, to be known as Ruska Kraina, with complete self-government in religious, educational, and cultural fields, and in questions of internal administration and justice. Common affairs were to be regulated jointly with the Hungarian Republic. These common affairs were to comprehend foreign affairs, war, finance, civil and criminal law, and economic and social problems relating to the whole Republic.¹³

¹³ For the complete text of the law, see Theodor Veiter, *Nationale Autonomie* (Wien-Leipzig, 1938), p. 244.

This law was joyfully accepted by the small Ruthenian middle class, almost completely Magyarized, although it was beyond the comprehension of the bulk of the people. There was no time to make direct contact with the people. Both the author of the law and the Government were perfectly conscious of the fact that this autonomy was beyond the intellectual and moral maturity of the people, but they sincerely hoped that, through appropriate education and administration, the Ruthenian people might live up to their newly acquired liberties.

However, very soon, things developed in an entirely new direction. The Ruthenians in America, the only nation-conscious element of the Ruthenians, began to organize and, following the suggestions of Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, adopted a resolution in Scranton, Pennsylvania (in November, 1918), in favor of a federal union with the Czechoslovak State, on condition that the new Ruthene State should comprehend all the Ruthenian elements in Hungary, in both the eastern and western settlements. Afterward, a referendum was taken among the Ruthenian parishes of the United States: 67 per cent voted for this plan, 28 per cent for union with the Ukraine, 2 per cent for complete independence, and only 1 per cent for Hungary.

The American negotiations and plans aroused great controversy in the home country. Different national councils were established in Jasina, Prešov (Eperjes), Užhorod (Ungvár), and Chust, owing to the fact that there were probably fourteen different dialect groups in the country, some of them with their own local patriotism. For instance, the Hutzul council in Jasina declared itself for an independent republic, whereas the Užhorod council, in a mainly Magyar and Jewish town, greeted with enthusiasm the Hungarian People's Republic. Through the efforts of an American Ruthenian, Gregory Žatkovič, a majority opinion developed in favor of the Czechoslovak solution, and

both the Czechoslovak émigrés and the Ruthenian delegates convinced the Supreme Council of the Allies in Paris of the desirability of the Czechoslovak solution. In its final form, local autonomy was granted to the Ruthenian territory, in September, 1919, as a special chapter of the Czechoslovak Minorities Treaty.

The formation of a tri-united Czechoslovakia was not a pre-conceived plan. It came, rather, as a surprise, according to Dr. Kamil Krofta, the eminent Czech historian and minister of foreign affairs. When, on October 28, 1918, the separation of Czechs and Slovaks from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was enthusiastically hailed,

there can have been few people who connected Carpathian Ruthenia with these rejoicings, for few could have guessed that this territory, situated so far from Prague and, hence, very little known there, was to become a constituent part of the new state.¹⁴

The Czech enthusiasm for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia cannot be explained by racial reasons alone, as an expression of sympathy toward Slavic brethren suppressed for centuries by the Magyar feudalists, but showed rather the acumen of the Czech leaders, who, from the beginning, have realized that, in order to maintain the postwar state system, a direct connection of the Czechoslovaks with the Rumanians was a necessity. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was the bridge for this connection.¹⁵

The new Czechoslovakia began the work of reorganization

¹⁴ Kamil Krofta, "Ruthenes, Czechs, and Slovaks," in the *Slavonic Review*, Vol. XIII (1934-1935).

¹⁵ Later Dr. Eduard Beneš himself openly defended this thesis in his "speech to the Slovak Nation" which he delivered at Nové Zámky in December, 1933: "... It is Slovakia and Ruthenia which have rendered possible the whole conception of our foreign policy in collaboration with Poland, Rumania, and Jugoslavia, and it is that collaboration which makes us, in the eyes of France and of all Western Europe, a force in the whole policy of Central Europe. We shall, therefore, never allow our territorial link with Rumania to be cut. . . ." (The speech was reprinted in *Le Monde Slave*, February, 1934.)

in the Ruthenian territory with great energy and enthusiasm. The results of this work cannot be fully appraised, owing to the fact that it constituted a many-sided and complicated experiment, the consequences of which were not yet final when the Republic was destroyed. It would be naïve and unjust to expect that the most rigid and backward feudal structure of the former Monarchy could be remolded into a democratic organization in the lapse of twenty years. But that there were many important results of the experiment cannot be questioned.

In the *political field*, the Ruthenian peasant had ceased to be an obedient servant of the feudal latifundia and had become a *zoon politikon*. He was often misled and misused by demagogues and bosses, yet he embarked with ardent zeal upon his new freedom. He began to feel the dignity of being a citizen, instead of being driven to the polls by the sheriff and the priest. A real exuberance of political activity could be witnessed, which led often to curious results. The most backward Ruthenia became the bulwark of communism in the Czechoslovak Republic. The many-sidedness and the perfect freedom of this political activity are shown in the results of the parliamentary elections in 1935, as set forth in the table below:

Major parties	Percentage of votes polled
Agrarian party	19.6
Social Democratic party	9.6
Czechoslovak National Socialist party (the Beneš party)	3.6
Communist party	25.6
Catholic party	2.4
Autonomist bloc	14.9
Businessmen's party (small shopkeepers and arti- sans)	2.8
Hungarian Christian Socialists and Hungarian National party	11.0

Moreover, the intensity of political life also permeated the municipal elections. For instance, at the municipal election in Užhorod in 1931, more than 10,000 votes were cast among nineteen parties.

The political life of the new territory was so free that Polish Ukranian and Russian émigrés could propagate their ideas without hindrance. This liberalism went sometimes too far. For instance, the Fenzig party, under Russian disguise, could promote Polish and Hungarian propaganda; in fact, in their paper, the Polish consul in Užhorod published a series of articles violently attacking the country to which he was accredited.

The political field was intimately connected with the *cultural field*, owing to the fact that the political life was very much influenced by the problem of whether Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, when it should reach its maturity, would adopt the Russian or the Ukrainian language.¹⁰ Only a small part of the population was oriented toward the native Ruthenian dialect, which had become, through centuries of isolation, a somewhat modified and undeveloped species of the Ukrainian tongue. So the world could witness the strange spectacle of a country without a language. Also in this regard the Czechoslovak Government had shown a remarkable fairness, and once Dr. Eduard Beneš admonished the different Slavonic tendencies that a compromise must be accomplished in order to develop a real Ruthenian autonomy. In spite of these difficulties, it cannot be doubted that this rivalry between the different Slavic tendencies had the

¹⁰ Ukrainian or Russian orientation did not have (at least for the time being) any irredentistic implications. The struggle between them was concerning the literary language which should be adopted. In 1939 a plebiscite was held in 468 schools. Among them, 302 voted for the Great Russian language; 117 for the Ukrainian; 49 showed no interest. It is well known that the overwhelming majority of the younger intellectuals stood firmly for the Russian language, not because they liked the Soviets (most of them disliked the Soviets), but because they admired the language of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky.

beneficial result of organizing the masses culturally and of arousing interest in their history and literature.

Religious life, formerly a monopolistic dominion of the Greek Catholic Church, became really free, and those with Greek Oriental sympathies were at liberty to organize. The stole duties were made voluntary subsidies by state aid to the poor parishes.

In the *administrative field*, though the promised autonomy of the Ruthenians was not realized, the Czechs, in the key positions, with the support of the available elements among the Ruthenians, gave the country a sometimes pedantic and clumsy, but, in most instances, a solid, efficient, and honest administration. The times when the peasants regarded any official summons as a tragedy were over. They became more and more acquainted with the unheard-of idea that the administration must be a servant of the people. "The paradoxical result is," said Macartney, "that the Ruthenes, whilst denied anything more than the merest shadow of self-government, yet certainly enjoy more political liberty than the inhabitants of many states in Europe."

But the most fundamental of the changes was in the *field of public instruction*. The schools ceased to be an instrument of artificial assimilation. A solid and widely spread system of education was developed in the Ruthenian language, which, already in 1931, consisted of 45 kindergartens, 425 elementary schools, 16 higher elementary schools, 4 higher schools, and 3 teacher-training colleges.¹⁷ In the prewar period, according to the official Hungarian census, out of 16,929 fully operated elementary schools in all Hungary, there were only 47 in which the Ruthenian language was the language of instruction.

¹⁷ A. Vološin, "Carpathian Ruthenia," in the *Slavonic Review*, Vol. XIII (1934-1935).

Also the hitherto utterly neglected field of adult education was developed with great energy, and a considerable network of public libraries came into existence. One could witness the appearance of Ruthenian books, previously an uncommon occurrence: in 1930, twenty-three in the local dialect, seventy-one in Russian, and seventy-three in Ukrainian. A number of political papers and periodicals began publication. National consciousness developed among the intelligentsia, who were now numerous enough to give voice to the different shades of Ruthenian public opinion.

If, added to these signs of progress, we can point out that public security was adequate without evidences of brutality and the ostentatious use of police force, that the judicial system was generally respected, that communications had improved considerably, that posts, telegraphs, and telephones had multiplied, nobody can doubt in fairness that the work undertaken by the Czechoslovak Republic had made a good and promising beginning. And, though this work was carried out with a disproportionate number of Czech magistrates, one should not forget that the annual revenue of the country has never amounted to more than 50 per cent of its expenditure, and that the central government had spent very substantial sums, amounting, up to 1933, to no less than 1,600,000,000 Czech crowns.¹⁸

There is only one field where the results achieved seem to be doubtful. This is in the *economic field*, particularly with respect to the general standard of living of the wretched population. Expression of this doubt in no way minimizes the sincerity or the scope of the reforms attempted. On the contrary, a vast number of propitious beginnings were made. New methods of cultivation were introduced; tillable land and vineyards were increased at the expense of pastureland; experiments were car-

¹⁸ Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

ried on with better sorts of grains and plants; cultivation of tobacco was begun; three horticultural stations supplied the farmers with plants and fruit trees; nurseries and experimental stations came into existence; state aid for both cattle and horse raising, with yearly inspections and examinations, was instituted; industries connected with farming were encouraged; state aid for farmers was granted; a series of distinct producer groups were organized; and several agricultural schools came into existence.¹⁹

If, in spite of these many courageous and well-intentioned experiments, our judgment remains hesitating, it is due to circumstances which were not entirely under the control of the Government. First of all, the agrarian reform did not alter substantially the relation between large and small holdings. (Of course, the preponderantly forest character of the country created rather special problems, very difficult to handle.) In 1930, of the total area of the land, comprising 1,231,000 hectares, more than half was owned in 175 holdings of over 500 hectares each; whereas only 294,000 hectares were included in 103,000 small holdings of under 10 hectares each.²⁰ The inadequacy of the land reform was further aggravated by the blunder of settling Czech colonists in the plains and by establishing so-called "remnant properties," middle-class farms for influential Czech people. Furthermore, the purely capitalistic exploitation of the immense forest property by a French joint-stock company, Latorica, sacrificed social policy to the profit motive. (Here, as elsewhere, capitalists of the victorious Great Powers exercised their political

¹⁹ Ing. J. Brandejs, "What Progress Has Been Made in Agriculture in Sub-Carpathian Russia between 1919 and 1935," in a symposium published by the daily newspaper, *Russkij Narodnyj Golos* (Užhorod, 1936), edited by Dr. E. S. Bachinskij.

²⁰ Calculated on the basis of figures given by Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 236. One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

influence.) But the chief difficulty for the toiling masses came through the new political frontiers. Before the war, a great number of Ruthenian peasants found seasonal employment as crop workers on the large Hungarian estates (as a matter of fact, often as "scabs" organized by the state administration in order to overcome the resistance of the Magyar agrarian proletariat). This and other natural opportunities for a division of labor between the mountains and the plains were now arbitrarily interrupted by the severe territorial limitations of the new sovereignties, unnecessarily increased by the animosity between Czech and Magyar officialdom. One must also mention another source of deterioration. As in Slovakia, so in Ruthenia, the local industries could not stand the competition of the powerful Czech industry, and many of them succumbed. This is the reason why the standard of living of the average population remained very low. Another factor for deterioration was mentioned to this writer by a competent observer: "the unwillingness and, perhaps, psychological incapacity of the Carpathian peasant to part with the old economic pattern of his life and adopt new methods of livelihood. I remember having seen, myself, a father of eleven children who lived in a miserable hut with a goat and a pig, refusing to follow the suggestion of a Red Cross worker to send one of his sons to Moravia, where he would be trained in industry." All these circumstances contributed to keeping the standard of living exceedingly low.

Though the Ruthenian people under the Republic made great and rapid intellectual, political, and moral progress, a progress recognized by many impartial foreign observers,²¹ the achievements did not satisfy a part of Sub-Carpathian Ruthe-

²¹ Among others, Hugh Dalton, "Some Impressions of Czechoslovakia," in the *New Statesman and Nation*, May 18, 1935; Elizabeth Wiskemann, "Greater Ukrania," in *The Nation*, February 25, 1935.

nian public opinion; especially the American Ruthenians, who had the largest share in the creation of the new country, protested, sometimes vehemently, against what they called the Czech yoke. A representative document of this type, published in the name of the Rusin Council of National Defence in the United States,²² denounced the Czech policy, and a memorandum was presented to the League of Nations asking the fulfillment of the treaty under which the Ruthenian territory was transferred to Czechoslovakia.

Space does not allow a discussion of the details of this controversy; only the main points of the American-Ruthenian criticism can be emphasized. The chief grievance was that Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia did not obtain the promised autonomy. This charge was perfectly true. But the League of Nations accepted fully the argument of Dr. Eduard Beneš, who maintained that immediate autonomy in a country so backward, with a population just emerging from centuries of national torpor, would be suicidal for the future. Therefore, the people should have a period of education and preparation for their autonomy. But another consideration also prevailed. This was recognition of the fact that Hungarian and Polish propaganda, with the help of the considerable Magyar minority, Magyarized Ruthenians, and a part of the Greek Catholic clergy, could cause serious troubles in a country full of local dialects, particularistic feelings, and divergent tendencies, even among the Ruthenian population.

A further grievance was that the Czechs disregarded another point of the treaty: that the Ruthenian minority which lived in the Slovak territory was not reunited with the new country. This accusation is likewise true, but Slovak and Ruthenian

²² Michael Yuhasz, Sr., *Wilson's Principles in Czechoslovak Practice* (Hometown, Pa., 1929).

public opinion was hopelessly divided on this point. The Czechs were afraid that the detachment of Slovak territories for the benefit of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia would unnecessarily embitter Slovak particularism.

The third complaint was based on what the opponents of the régime termed "the Czechization of Carpatho-Ruthenia." The disproportionate number of Czech officials in the key positions and the disproportionate increase in Czechoslovak schools (there were more Czechoslovak gymnasia in the country than Hungarian) were interpreted as portents of the Czechization of the province. Though it is probable that nationalistic zeal and private interest made the Czech influence stronger than was either natural or necessary, the alleged facts do not show a tendency toward artificial assimilation. The truth is that, lacking a native intelligentsia of sufficient training, here, as in Slovakia, a preponderance of Czechs in the key positions was unavoidable at first. The disproportionate expansion of Czech schools was partly due to the fact that the Jews, very influential in the cities, developed a Czechoslovak patriotism, and they were extremely eager to learn the language which gave to them the greatest economic and cultural advantages in the whole Republic.

There was also another consideration which may have influenced the Czechs in their policy. This was the more distant future of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians. What should be done with the increasing middle class? It seemed impossible to build up a complex system of higher education for such a small and poor minority. Therefore, the alternative was to encourage them either to attend the Czech universities and institutions of higher learning or to go into the Polish or the Soviet Ukraine. It is easy to understand that, under the prevailing international difficulties, the Czechs regarded the first alternative as being the most beneficial for both themselves and the Ruthenians. But it was

understood and generally recognized that Ruthenian language and culture should be fully acknowledged in elementary and secondary schools, and, in 1931, only 1.8 per cent of the Ruthenian children frequented Czechoslovak schools.²³

What will be the future of the Ruthenian people after the unification of the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainians under Russian rule? Will not the Soviet Ukraine Republic exercise an almost irresistible force on the Ruthenians now in Hungary? Will the bulwark of the Carpathians be able to restrain a Russophile irredentistic movement? Though the "liberation of the Little Russians by Stalin" will be a doubtful privilege for them (R. L. Buell is perfectly right in saying that the Ukrainians were better treated in Poland than in the Soviet Ukraine, in spite of the violent brutality of the Polish upper class),²⁴ it cannot be questioned that the unification of the Ukraine nation by the Soviet Union and the guaranty of the free use of their language will be a historical fact of colossal importance and will lead to a complete national renaissance in the more remote future when Soviet autocracy will have been replaced by a type of free coöperative peasant economy.

The Russian attraction will be surely a great force, yet its further consequences will depend on the balance-of-power situation after the war comes to an end. In the event of a German-Russian victory, it is probable that Russia will ask the final accomplishment of Ukraine unification under the Soviets, disregarding the Hungarian claims. In the event of the victory of the Allies, the situation will be quite different. The Allies will

²³ The extreme liberalism of the Czechs in the educational field is demonstrated by the fact that Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was the only country where a special school for the gypsies was organized.

²⁴ R. L. Buell, *Poland, Key to Europe* (New York and London, 1939), p. 285. Cf. also I. Mazepa, "Ukrainia under Soviet Rule," in the *Slavonic Review*, January, 1934.

not allow a Russification of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian territory, something which would mean the Sovietization of the whole Danube basin. (The German dream of a united Ukraine as a vassal state of Germany will be definitely shattered in either event.) There will be only two possibilities: either to maintain the last German dictum and leave Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia under Hungarian domination or to restore it to a reborn Czechoslovakia. Already, before the dismemberment of the Republic, the first solution was advocated by Macartney, who argued that the natural economic connection between Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and Hungary is so manifest that

excellent as the work of the Czechs has been in Ruthenia since the war, and greatly as it has benefited the Ruthenes politically, socially, and culturally, yet it seems to the present writer that in view of the economic connections of the country, the course most advantageous to the Ruthenes themselves, as well as to the Magyars . . . would be to return the whole district to Hungary on condition that this could be done under a rigidly enforced statute of autonomy.²⁵

Of course Macartney fully realizes the difficulties of such a guaranty. How could Magyar feudalism be checked in its policy of forcible Magyarization? Even as late as 1933, a Hungarian advocate of frontier revision in favor of "Hungarian integrity" openly argued for the complete Magyarization of Ruthenia.²⁶ Yet the English expert contemplates an international commissioner

acting either for the League of Nations or for the Powers in Ruthenia; and further to conclude arrangements similar to those in force today in the Polish Corridor, for allowing Czechoslovakia and Rumania uninterrupted communication across Ruthenia.

The naïve artificiality of this plan is manifest after the tragic

²⁵ Macartney, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-248.

²⁶ Albert Bereghy, *Ruthén Kérdés és az Integritás* (Ruthenian Problem and Integrity) (Budapest, 1933), p. 51.

experiences in Danzig and in the Corridor. But it is equally manifest that a simple restoration of Czechoslovakia, Ruthenia included, would not solve the problem, but would leave the door wide open for new irredentas and new intrigues on the part of Germany and Russia. Here, as elsewhere, *no reasonable solution can be even imagined without the creation of an adequate federal structure*. With such a structure, both the linguistic and the economic problems of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia would be no more difficult to solve than those between the Swiss cantons. The old "Utopia" of an *Oriental Switzerland* would be the only realistic solution.

Whatever may be the ultimate decision of history concerning this difficult problem, no fair-minded observer will doubt that the young Czechoslovak Republic undertook here a memorable and partly successful initiative for the material and moral improvement of a backward and abandoned race.

PART III: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Chapter XI

AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM

BY LUCY E. TEXTOR

THE MOST CRUCIAL OF THE PROBLEMS which confronted the new Republic of Czechoslovakia concerned the re-distribution of agricultural land. A wholly disproportionate part was in the hands of large proprietors, whereas the great mass of the peasants either had too little to afford them a livelihood or had none at all. It has been estimated that approximately one thousand persons owned 26 per cent of the total area of the State. The Schwarzenberg family alone possessed one thirty-first of all Bohemia, the Lichtenstein family one-twentieth of all Moravia. The same predominance of great properties held in even larger measure for Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. On the contrary, the holdings of the peasants were pitifully small. In Bohemia 43 per cent and in Moravia nearly 50 per cent of the peasants each had less than one-half hectare.¹ The condition of the peasants farther to the east was even worse. In Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia they were for the most part tenant farmers who held their tiny parcels on short-term agreements and were thus dependent on the goodwill of their landlords, to whom they paid extraordinarily high rents in kind.

One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

These conditions were of long standing and had become intolerable. Even the Austro-Hungarian Empire in its latter years had recognized the imperative need of a change for the better. When the Republic was established, the people expected something would be done in their behalf. It was the part of wisdom to satisfy this expectation and thereby forestall agrarian disturbances which might, indeed, take the form of uprisings in favor of bolshevism.

Such was the situation which made the redistribution of land a crying necessity for Czechoslovakia. But there was another circumstance which absolutely clinched the matter. The Czech people remembered passionately that in 1620, after the Battle of White Mountain, the great estates of their country had been seized by the Germans as war booty, and now they felt to the depths of their being that the time had come to right a great historic wrong. This was a state of mind of which the Czechoslovak Government had perforce to take cognizance and one which would not brook delay. Twelve days after the Republic came into existence, a bill was passed which provided that great estates could not be alienated or mortgaged without the consent of the Department of Agriculture. Four months later the agrarian policy thus initiated was given definite form. On April 9, 1919, a law was passed which defined estates as units of more than 150 hectares of arable or more than 250 hectares of diversified land and gave the State the right to take over whatever was in excess of this amount. The State might go farther if the need for land in a given district was great. However, it could permit the owner to keep as much as 500 hectares if this seemed desirable as far as the public welfare was concerned. The land expropriated by the State, so far as it was not needed for purposes of general utility, was to be distributed to farmers, landless peasants, tradesmen, legionnaires, and war invalids, and to asso-

ciations made up of such persons, to communities, and to humanitarian and scientific institutes.

In order to make sure that the properties under sequestration would not be neglected or exploited by their owners during the time that must elapse before they could be partitioned, a law was passed on February 12, 1920, which gave the Land Office the right to appoint inspectors whose duty it was to visit these properties and to assume the administration of any that were being mismanaged. It was, for instance, quite conceivable that the owner of a forest might cut valuable timber in order to recoup himself for a possible loss in the forced sale of his land. He did not know what price would be paid him, but he feared the worst.

The question of compensation had been long under discussion. It would have been difficult under any circumstances to determine the value of property no longer on the market. Moreover, the Government had perforce to balance its land-reform budget. It could not charge its rural population more than they were able to pay, and what they paid must cover the purchase price of the land taken over, plus the cost of administering the law. The bill which was finally passed on April 8, 1920, laid down the principle that compensation was to be based upon the average price during the years 1913-1915, half of which period fell before and half during the war. This was eminently just in that it balanced peacetime and wartime values. The price was to be lowered one-tenth of one per cent, however large the estate. The kind and quality of the soil, the situation, and the nature of the production were taken into consideration in determining the basic figures. These were then modified with reference to each particular piece of property according to whether it had been well or ill managed. Improvements made since 1915 were to be paid for in full, and agricultural equipment was to be taken

over at the market price. These calculations were made in pre-war Austro-Hungarian crowns, whereas the landowner was to be paid in Czech crowns, a difference which in the end stabilized itself at a little more than six to one. It should in all fairness be said that this contingency was not envisaged at the time. The payment of compensation was spread over a long period, during which it was expected that the Czech crown would rise and that land would fall in value.

Since the execution of the land reform was not a matter that could be hurried and since it was necessary to satisfy quickly in some measure the insistent demand for land, certain interim legislation was passed quite apart from the expropriation and partition of estates. Such, for instance, was the bill of May 27, 1919, dealing with long-lease farmers. This gave to the tenant the right to buy land which he had rented continuously since October, 1901, provided that the sum total of his land plus any which he already owned did not exceed 8 hectares in extent and was cultivated by his family without extra help. The price was to be a matter of agreement between seller and purchaser; failing that, it was to be determined by the market value in 1913, with the expressed proviso that the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown was to be considered the equivalent of the Czech crown. The proprietors concerned coöperated generously in carrying out the law and were for the most part content to accept a modest payment. Though much of the land sold was not of the best, since owners customarily leased their poorest and remotest, those who were able to take advantage of the law profited thereby. This arrangement ceased in 1923 after 128,557 tenants had purchased 101,119 hectares. The change of long-lease status into fee simple involved no new adjustments and did not disturb the agricultural balance of the country. Each little farm remained in extent much as it had been and continued to be

worked in the same way. It should be said that the land acquired under this law could not be alienated for ten years.

The act of October 30, 1919, dealt with the small farmer who had no land of his own. It protected him from an increase of rent or an order to vacate, provided always that he worked no more than 8 hectares and hired no outside help. This arrangement came to an end in 1926. The act of April 11, 1919, was designed particularly for landless users of pastures in Slovakia. It required owners of suitable land to lease an appropriate portion to small farmers who were short of pasturage. This measure, after having been extended, expired in 1929. A fourth piece of interim legislation, that of January 30, 1920, gave the Land Office the power to require owners of estates to lease to qualified applicants a minimum area of arable land for a period not exceeding six years. This was meant to apply to regions where the need was urgent but where the agrarian reform would be shortly initiated.

To return now to the core of the land reform—the expropriation by the State of land in excess of a certain minimum and its redistribution. The execution of this program was put into the hands of the Land Office, created by the law of June 11, 1919, and consisting of a president appointed by the president of the Republic and twelve members elected by the Chamber of Deputies. The president was given an indefinite term so that continuity in the work might not be imperiled. The Land Office was charged with a heavy responsibility. It had to determine what estates fell within the law, in what order they were to be taken over, what estate industries, such as sugar refineries and distilleries, were exempt from the law, what part of the land might be retained by the owner, and what price was to be paid for the remainder. It had to divide the expropriated land into parcels that would meet the need of the district in which

they were situated, to decide to whom these should be allotted, and to arrange with the assignees the matter of long-term credit. It had to assist in establishing coöperative agricultural societies and to exercise supervision over them. All this entailed an immense amount of work the results of which can be only briefly indicated.

The number of estates which fell under the law was 1,913 and the total extent of land, both arable and wooded, 4,021,617 hectares, about half of which was left with the original proprietors. By the end of 1936 a total of 1,765,483 hectares had been distributed, and it was estimated that when the work was finished this amount would be raised to 2,000,000 hectares, including forest land. By the end of 1935 there had been allotted in small parcels 783,544 hectares, of which about 640,000 were agricultural lands given mostly to peasants to round out their inadequate holdings. Approximately 40,000 hectares were used to create new peasant farms, groups of which were planted in thinly populated districts to serve the needs of those applicants for whom no suitable provision could be made in their home regions. Of these colonies, four-fifths were placed in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. There were 242 colonies in all, comprising 3,068 peasant families, to whom the Land Office gave assistance in the form of credit for the erection of needed buildings and the repairing or remodeling of such as were already on the land.

The partition of the great estates brought with it the problem of using their equipment to the best advantage, a problem which was solved by the creation of "estate remnants." These were farms of from 50 to 100 hectares in extent, sold or leased to individuals or associations entitled to benefit under the law. Preference was given to former employees on the great estates whose technical training would otherwise have been lost, and

to other persons whose education and experience fitted them for the management of large properties. These "estate remnants" numbered 2,368, with a total extent of about 226,000 hectares. About one-fifth of them were given to the State, and to communities, agricultural schools, experiment stations, and coöperative societies. Over one-half went to coöperatives made up of persons formerly employed on the same land. These "estate remnants" bridged the gap between the small peasant farms and the estates proper, which continued to exist although of greatly diminished size.

In the distribution of expropriated forest land there was no division into small parcels, since forests are best exploited in large units. For this reason wooded land was allotted to individuals only under exceptional circumstances to round out that which they already possessed, and this only when the land thus given could not be used to better advantage as the property of a community or of the State. The amount of land distributed in this way totaled 46,000 hectares. About 416,000 hectares became the property of the State; 68,000 went to the Ministry for National Defense to be used for camps and ground for military exercises; and 145,000 fell to communities and 33,000 to coöperatives made up of communities or of individuals.

Agricultural industry is so organically bound up with the cultivation of the soil that it is almost impossible to separate the two. This was especially true in Czechoslovakia. Thus, for instance, the making of sugar gave a powerful impulse to the cultivation of the sugar beet, the brewing of beer to the growing of barley, the distilling of alcohol to the planting of the potato. Agricultural industry had reached great proportions in the regions which made up Czechoslovakia before the war. Sugar refineries, distilleries, breweries, flour mills, starch factories, and many other enterprises were established all over the State.

Since the agricultural industries of Czechoslovakia were situated for the most part on the great domains, the question naturally arose whether or not they were included in the agrarian reform. The law was not perfectly clear on this point, but it was interpreted to mean that only those industries could be taken over which were bound up in an absolutely direct way with the exploitation of the land on which they were situated. Those industries which were economically independent were excluded from the reform. In other words, an industry was counted as independent if it could exist without the estate and if the estate could exist without it. There were approximately 3,000 enterprises on the land placed under sequestration; of these, more than 70 per cent were left with the proprietors. Change of ownership took place most frequently in the distilleries, 32 per cent of the whole number being expropriated. Most of these were given to agricultural coöperative societies in the near neighborhood.

It goes without saying that there was not enough land to meet the need. The agrarian reform, indeed, touched only about 11 per cent of the entire area of the State. Nevertheless, the material condition of the rural population was immensely improved. Almost more important was the grateful recognition that an act of delayed justice had been brought to pass. In an orderly manner and by due process of law the State had transferred land from those who had much to those who had little or none at all. The performance of this beneficent work added prestige to the Government and drove deeper the foundations of democracy.

It is sometimes said that the application of land reform was made with a bias. It is true that there was a close connection between the Land Office and the dominant political parties. But it must be acknowledged that if now and then party patronage

played a part in the distribution of parcels the need of the people was always the guiding principle. When it is averred that it was primarily the Germans who suffered in the partition of estates, it must be remembered that most of the great estates were owned by the Germans. And when we are told that it was the Czech and Slovak farmers who profited most largely in the distribution of land, it must not be forgotten that it was they who had least. It is true that the breakup of estates wrought hardship for many of their former employees, since their livelihood was thus swept away. This unfortunate but inevitable circumstance was envisaged by the Government from the first. Provision was made for the compiling of a list of the persons thrown out of employment by the agrarian reform, and a whole series of laws was passed to ease the situation. These provided that employees who had been permanent should be supplied with land, an aggregate money indemnity, a pension, or a position elsewhere. A considerable number were given "estate remnants." Many pooled their compensation claims and set up coöperative societies, each of which received a combined piece of land. Those who accepted money by way of compensation fared less well.

It is difficult to pass judgment upon the nationalization of the forests. There is something to be said on both sides of the question. Approximately one-third of all Czechoslovakia is wooded land, fully one-half of which belonged to the great estates and thus fell under the law of expropriation. Technically, then, the State had the right to proceed as it did. However, the intent of the agrarian reform was primarily to better the lot of the small farmer, and this was the ground on which the great landowners took their stand. The Government maintained that the expropriation of at least a part of the forests was for the public good, representing as they did vast potential wealth

which could be realized only if they were subject to a unified, rationalized public economy. It held that the State was in duty bound to increase its area in order that it might, among other things, exercise an influence on the price of wood and protect the water supply. It must be acknowledged that in Bohemia the forests had been admirably administered by their owners; in Slovakia and particularly in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia the situation was otherwise. It would seem to have been the part of wisdom for the State to take over first the badly managed areas, but there was another consideration which weighed heavily in the scales. The forests in the west belonged to Germans who might at a critical moment betray the State in which they were unwilling citizens. This was perhaps the unconfessed reason why the land reform was first applied to them.

There were those who believed that the partition of the great estates would decrease agricultural output. Land, it was said, can be more profitably worked in large rather than in small units. Such critics pointed to the high degree of agricultural efficiency achieved before the war, particularly in the western section of the State. The advocates of agrarian reform replied that the ownership of an adequate holding would stimulate the farmer to cultivate his land intensively, knowing that he would profit thereby. In saying this they counted on the native intelligence of the rural population and on the effect of the widespread agricultural education which the State intended to make available to all who desired it.

It must not be supposed that the science and art of farming had been neglected in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. There were, indeed, many schools of varying degrees of excellence, but the work was not coördinated and it needed to be greatly supplemented. Much less had been done in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia—so little in the latter country as to be

almost negligible. Czechoslovakia set about the task of organizing and unifying agricultural instruction. All schools of this nature except those of university grade were put in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture. New types of schools were introduced to meet the needs of the more diversified farming. Detailed questionnaires were circulated, and elaborate statistics were compiled dealing with practical questions. Congresses of teachers of agriculture were held in order that they might bring their experience to bear upon the subjects under discussion. Model farms and experiment stations were established. The whole idea was to raise the level of agricultural production in all its many branches, and it must be confessed that a large measure of success attended these efforts.

Another factor that wrought for the benefit of agriculture was the rapid growth of the coöperative movement. It had long been recognized as supremely important for the farmer to be able to secure at a low rate of interest funds which he needed for his work. Credit coöperatives had achieved a high degree of efficiency even before the war among both the Czechs and the Germans and had begun to extend their activities to the purchase of commodities indispensable in the carrying on of agriculture. The war undid much that had been accomplished. Dairy coöperatives, for instance, ceased to function and those of the distilleries almost went to the wall. Coöperatives that had been charged by governmental authorities with the purchase of cereals and potatoes grew so rapidly that this unsound expansion proved in the end to be an evil rather than a good.

But democracy served as a rich soil for joint organization. The coöperative form became the favorite one for enterprises of many kinds. Agrarian legislation gave an added impetus to the movement, providing as it did, among other things, that claimants for land might organize a coöperative, that farmers

might join together to apply for land needed for an additional undertaking, and that consumer societies might request land to raise foodstuffs for their members.

The strength of the coöperative movement in Czechoslovakia may be seen in the fact that at the end of 1937 there were 11,673 organizations numbering between 1,800,000 and 2,000,000 members. The separate organizations were grouped in twelve federations, the principle which determined the union being nationality or locality or political conviction or type of activity. Each federation had its own press which was used to educate its readers in the value and significance of coöperation and to instruct its employees. Courses were frequently organized to give professional training to those who wished to fit themselves to hold office. Two high schools were established for the same purpose, one in Prague and one in Bratislava. The chief function of the federations was to manage the funds of the member coöperatives, assisting with proper guaranties those that were in need. During the year 1937 the resources of the federations amounted to 2,127,600,000 crowns.

In 1921 the twelve federations were united in the Centro-coöperative, whose task it was to defend their interests in the realm of legislation and public administration, collaborating for this purpose with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Centro-coöperative played a large part in bringing into existence in 1934 the Grain Monopoly, by all odds the most important measure instituted by the Government in behalf of the farmer.

We turn now to a consideration of agriculture in Czechoslovakia. The lands which fell to the share of the new Republic brought with them a tradition with respect to how they could be most profitably cultivated. Experiment and long practice had shown what crops could be produced to the best advantage. Large areas for many years had been devoted to the growing

of the sugar beet, particularly in the basin of the upper Elbe, and sugar refineries were situated in the beet-growing districts. Some of these refineries in Bohemia grew from 30 to 40 per cent of their beet requirement, some in Slovakia 90 per cent, the balance being supplied by small landowners under contract. The average annual output of sugar for the years 1909-1913 amounted to 11,576,639 quintals, or 15 per cent of the world production.

Approximately one-eighth of the arable land of the State, much of it in the higher regions southeast of the Elbe, had been given over to potatoes. Large quantities were exported and still more were used for distilling alcohol. In 1912-1913, by no means an exceptional year, 750,470 hectoliters were produced, of which 220,862 were exported. These figures do not include Slovakia.

Barley had been cultivated in the Haná region of Moravia (noted for its fertility), in the Elbe valley in Bohemia, and in southern Slovakia. Before the war, in the period between 1903 and 1913, the average annual production totaled 1,516,246 tons. Much of this barley was converted into malt and shipped to European countries and to South America, Egypt, and Japan. Another well-known product noted for its fine quality was Bohemian hops, especially that grown in Žatec. In 1914 there had been under cultivation 12,408 hectares. Before the war 90 per cent of the hops were exported. Both malt and hops were used in the brewing of beer. At the outbreak of the war there were 666 breweries in the territory that became Czechoslovakia, with an annual output of 13,000,000 liters.

This account of one aspect of the agricultural heritage of Czechoslovakia will serve to make clear that production was closely bound up with industry. It was essential that raw produce of a particular kind be forthcoming if the wheels of the factories were to go round. Otherwise machinery would rust

out and fall to pieces. And, again, it was imperative that the products of this industry be marketed in order that funds might be available to pay for planting and harvesting. But outside markets were dependent on world conditions which had changed greatly since the war and over which the Czechoslovak Government had no control. Such a state of affairs was bound to create problems extremely difficult of solution.

It goes without saying that during the war agricultural production dropped enormously. This was due to a variety of causes, chief among them being the shortage of labor and the dearth of fertilizers. Tools and farm implements and buildings fell out of repair. The march of armies to and fro through Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia rendered desolate that part of the country. Seed was scarce and sometimes very bad. Toward the end of the war it often happened that even the potatoes reserved and prepared for planting were requisitioned. Farmers were obliged to use leftovers of all kinds, with the result that species became mixed and quality degenerated. And when the war was over, agriculture suffered from its aftermath. The new State had perforce to see that the price of food was within the reach of the population. Potatoes and grain were bought by the Government at prices fixed arbitrarily far below those in the world market. Incessant regulations and the control of commerce hampered private initiative. Commodities produced for export were at a disadvantage because the war took from Czechoslovakia most of the markets which she had formerly enjoyed. Within the limits of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire trade had been free. When the empire was broken up, customs barriers were erected between the various parts.

The low value of the Czech crown during the early period was a help to agriculture. As a consequence, prices were high in 1921 and in the first half of 1922. Moreover, in 1921, the State

ceased to control commerce and to mediate in the matter of food supplies for the people. Private initiative was left free to work its will. But in the summer of 1922 the Czech crown tripled in value on the international market. This was a staggering blow for the farmer. To give only a single instance, the price of wheat fell two-thirds, although the expenses of production remained the same. Agriculture suffered a loss which has been officially estimated at 10 milliards of crowns.

Despite a temporary improvement at the end of 1924 and the beginning of 1925 the agrarian crisis continued. Its cause lay primarily in the increasing disparity between the prices of agricultural commodities and those of manufactured commodities. This was in part due to the fact that with few exceptions no import duties were levied on field products, a circumstance natural enough considering the shortage of food in Czechoslovakia in the years immediately following the war. The wide disparity between the cost of production and the selling price of agricultural commodities was aggravated by the dumping which took place as a consequence of the monetary inflation in neighboring countries. Prices were dragged down by importations from Hungary and Germany and later from Poland. It was in the hope of bettering this situation that in June, 1926, Parliament passed a law which provided for tariff duties on agricultural products. These duties remained relatively low up to 1930; after that higher rates were introduced.

It has already been said that the close connection between agricultural production and agricultural industry, a large part of whose output was exported, made Czechoslovakia peculiarly sensitive to world conditions. Thus, when in 1929 the British Government lowered the tariff on raw sugar, British refiners of sugar were able to monopolize British markets to the detriment of the sugar industry in Czechoslovakia. The latter country

necessarily had to curtail the growing of the sugar beet. By 1931 the area devoted to this purpose had fallen to 2.5 per cent of the arable area of the State. The land released by the sugar beet was in large measure given over to cereals. It proved, however, to be a difficult matter to market these cereals. Here, again, continually changing external conditions altered the internal situation from month to month. It was impossible for the farmer to know in the spring what kind of harvest would sell best in the autumn. The Government did its best to protect him, but legislation often worked in unexpected ways. Thus, for instance, when in 1936 the duty on rye was raised, home stocks were soon exhausted and prices of rye and rye flour rose so rapidly that the duty had to be lowered.

It should be made clear at this point that Czechoslovakia both exported and imported cereals and other foodstuffs. This enabled her farmers to concentrate their efforts upon the production of those commodities which either in the raw form or industrialized promised to bring relatively high prices in the world market. But such a situation made manipulation of the tariff and import quotas an extremely delicate matter. The problem was to ensure the farmer a fair price for those products which he must perforce sell inside the country. With this end in view a temporary measure was passed which provided that import licenses for grain and flour would be dependent upon the purchase of a corresponding amount of these same commodities home-grown. In 1931 an Import Syndicate was constituted whose business it was to regulate the importation of these commodities and to stabilize their price, but the efforts of the syndicate were hampered by the fact that there was an unusually large harvest, in consequence of which prices fell. The farmers clamored loudly for relief; the Government tried one experiment after another. Finally, in July, 1934, it created a Grain

Monopoly. The administration was put in the hands of a chartered company composed of the agricultural coöperative organizations, the consumers' coöperative societies, the commercial mills with their central coöperative agencies, and the traders in grain representing the interests of private business. It was the task of this company to buy up all domestic grain at prices fixed by the Government and to export and import grain as occasion demanded. Thus the farmer would be spared the need of continually dealing with prices that fluctuated with supply and demand. So far as this commodity was concerned, he stood now upon safer ground, and it was in the very nature of things that this new security should lead him to plant more grain. But this enlarged area constituted a serious danger for the exchequer of the Government, bound as it was to purchase the grain at the price which had been fixed. It became evident that fixation of price without planned production was impossible. The Grain Monopoly was therefore reorganized. Its finances were severed from those of the State. Price limits for purchase and sale were adjusted and the area under cultivation was regulated on the 1930 basis. For a period all went well, since the rise in world prices in 1936 worked to the advantage of the Grain Monopoly, enabling it to export the stocks which had accumulated in the warehouses. In the summer of 1937 the farmers asked that prices be raised before the coming harvest because of the smaller yield of the year, the higher cost of production, and rising world prices. The Government objected, since in 1936 it had been obliged to export at a loss 23,000 trucks of wheat and 32,000 trucks of flour, but in the end it gave way. The price was raised and it was arranged that the grain would be bought on behalf of the Ministry of National Defense.

It is evident that the Grain Monopoly was a highly complex mechanism whose functioning depended upon the most careful

manipulation. It was a buffer intended to temper for the farmer adverse winds which might blow upon him from any quarter. That it was regarded by him as a blessing is self-evident. And it was only natural that there should have arisen a strong demand for an animal products monopoly. Stockbreeding was an important branch of agriculture in Czechoslovakia. In 1937 there were approximately 4,500,000 cattle, 3,250,000 pigs, and 1,720,000 goats, to say nothing of very considerable numbers of horses and sheep. Here, too, the farmer suffered from fluctuating prices which legislation was often unable to control. Again a single example will suffice. A supplementary duty on pigs was introduced in 1930 and was to be so regulated as to maintain a certain average price. But in spite of this duty and in spite of the fact that imports from abroad were small, the price of pigs fell steadily because of the great increase in home stocks. Such happenings strengthened the demand for an animal products monopoly, and it seemed well on the road toward realization in the early autumn of 1938. By this time there had also loomed upon the horizon the demand for a monopoly of hops, the production of which had taken a great leap forward in 1936 and which had again become an important article of export.

It remains now to consider the part played by vegetables and fruit in Czechoslovak agriculture. The area devoted to the growing of potatoes remained consistently very large from the beginning of 1922, increasing somewhat in the late 'thirties. In 1936 about 1,800,000 hectares were under cultivation. As in the days before the war, great quantities were used for distilling alcohol and a part of the surplus not needed for home consumption was made into starch and dextrin. Other vegetables were cultivated in an ever-larger measure during the twenty years of the Republic. Some varieties were dried, some were bottled in vinegar

or put through a special process of fermentation. Gherkins and tomato juice in particular became widely known for their fine flavor.

The fruit of Czechoslovakia has long had an enviable reputation, particularly that of Bohemia. Apples, pears, plums, peaches, apricots, and cherries are produced in great abundance. The trees often line the roads and border the fields so that when in bloom they give the country the aspect of a garden. There are grapes of many kinds, those that grow in the north being most highly esteemed. Moravia follows close upon Bohemia, whereas in Slovakia vineyards hold first place. The manufacture of preserves grew steadily from the early 'twenties. Already in 1925 there were 425 enterprises engaged in this work. By 1938 Czechoslovakia had achieved the distinction of being the greatest producer in Europe of raw fruit juice, the best known being that of the wild raspberry. Large quantities of plums were distilled into liqueur and grapes were made into wine.

It was in the use of these more perishable foodstuffs that home consumption steadily grew during the lifetime of the Republic. In truth, agriculture then provided better than ever before for those who were dependent upon it as their sole means of a livelihood. This was in some measure due to a more diversified farming whose products could be enjoyed at home and to the market within the country more or less untouched by world conditions. But it was also due to the strength of the Agrarian party that kept watch upon agrarian interests and influenced the Government in their behalf. The welfare of agriculture was, indeed, vital to the State now that, following in the wake of neighbor countries, it planned to satisfy its own needs in as large a measure as possible. The success of this policy may be measured by the fact that by 1934 Czechoslovakia had attained self-sufficiency in all agricultural production except for

pork and vegetable fats and the raw materials needed for textiles. Far outweighing this deficit was the surplus of other agrarian products which were exported in such quantities as to assist materially toward a favorable trade balance. This must be regarded as a really great achievement when considered in connection with the economic havoc brought to pass by the war and the world crisis. The merit of having accomplished so much in the face of seemingly insuperable difficulties belongs to the resourceful Government and to a people known in history for their patience, industry, intelligence, and unswerving integrity.

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Chapter XII

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ACHIEVEMENTS

BY GERHARD SCHACHER

THE ECONOMIST who had opportunity to observe and to analyze the development of trade and industry in Czechoslovakia from her foundation to her vivisection, and finally to her liquidation by the brutal force of her neighboring "protector," was struck first of all by a fact perhaps more important from the ethical than from the merely economic aspect. Here was a country of hard-working people leading a modest life, strictly limited by the framework of its current earnings, thus increasing its national fortune without foreign help and saving a considerable part of its annual income. Here was a country and a nation that knew it had to depend mainly on its own economic possibilities and the expansion of its trade, and not at all on foreign loans and political gifts. There was no other country in central Europe which was to such a degree able and willing to modernize and rationalize its entire economic system by its own means and almost entirely without foreign support. That this was done in Czechoslovakia without aiming at self-sufficiency was one of the greatest economic achievements in central Europe after the World War.

Whereas all the political allies and would-be allies of France and England in central and eastern Europe made use of their political positions to get numerous loans in the West and to obtain concessions in their trade from the Great Powers by stressing the value of their military forces, Czechoslovakia went ahead expanding her industrial production and her export surplus in an orthodox, unpolitical manner.

The economy of the country became strengthened in an amazing way after the foundation of the Republic, and some of its industries achieved leading positions in the world market; but it was the quality of Czech goods, the skill of Czech labor, the decency of public finances and currency policy, and the internal stability of the industrial firms and banks which made this development possible. Those who know the financial and business conditions in central European countries, especially since 1933, know how important it is to stress this special point in advance.

First of all, the proud fact is to be recorded that Czechoslovakia was the only state in central Europe which punctually met the service of its foreign debt. She did not default on any of her second foreign loans, which were indeed few in number. In regard to unsecured foreign loans and indebtedness arising from the World War, Czechoslovakia, like England, France, and every European state apart from Finland, failed to meet her obligations to the United States of America. But, having regard for the special nature of those obligations, the fact of nonpayment should not be allowed to obscure or to influence adversely the fine record of Czechoslovakia, unparalleled as it was in central, eastern, and southeastern Europe in recent times, when repudiation or default has unfortunately become far too prevalent.

An analysis of the internal state debt and the methods of financing the great defense program which became necessary

after the Nazis came into power in neighboring Germany leads to the following statements: (1) The state indebtedness of Czechoslovakia increased heavily between 1931 and 1938. Apart from the effects of the crisis, this increase was mainly the result of the inescapable need for providing the country in critical times with adequate means of defense against aggression. (2) The necessary funds were almost exclusively raised in the home market, but in this process recourse was had in large measure to short-term bills. Despite this, in view of the economic and financial strength of Czechoslovakia and having regard for the grave problems of finance which confronted every country because of international political conditions, the indebtedness of the country could not be regarded as excessive, especially as (a) the standing of Czechoslovakia was particularly good in all great financial centers owing to the country's punctual record of payment, and (b) the drop in interest rates and the fact that so large a proportion of the total indebtedness was internal had in 1937-1938 eased the position by comparison with 1931, even though the debt had become higher in capital amount.

In any estimate of the financial and commercial development of Czechoslovakia, of the country's power of resistance to the international economic crisis, the reader should have uppermost in his mind that this was the Succession State which inherited the most important industrial assets of the old Habsburg Monarchy. Before the war the whole amount of pit coal mined in Austria-Hungary was about 16 million metric tons, and of this not less than 13 millions came from territory which became part of Czechoslovakia. Sixty per cent of the total output of lignite, and 66.5 per cent of all the steam boilers in Austria-Hungary were in territory included in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Bohemia and Moravia alone accounted for no less than 52 per cent of the entire Austro-Hungarian industrial output.

In such circumstances, it was not long before a certain difficulty arose in disposing of Czechoslovakia's industrial products, inasmuch as the existing plants had been designed to meet the requirements of the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire and of the Balkan States, whereas the Czechs were confronted after the war with the stubborn fact that all the Succession States, and, indeed, most mid-European and southeastern European states, built up their own industrial plants in order to become independent of Czechoslovakia. This being the situation, the major problem for Czechoslovak industrialists and exporters was to replace lost markets by new ones in western Europe and overseas. The problem was the more insistent because, owing to the severe agricultural slump, the purchasing power of the central and southeastern European states fell heavily and they could only pay for imported goods by means of barter. This very important problem was solved by 1937, and, with the world economic crisis passed, Czechoslovakia's foreign trade was in a sounder condition and had greater powers of resistance, owing to its constituent elements, even than in 1929.

Whereas Czech trade with Germany was handicapped by the barter system applied by the Nazi government, Czechoslovakia's foreign trade with the Anglo-Saxon countries was steadily increasing. In the first half of the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, Czech exports to Great Britain were 237 million, 306 million, and 457 million crowns,¹ respectively, in value, and Czech imports from Great Britain rose from 166 million crowns in the first half of 1935 to 379 million crowns in the first half of 1937. In regard to the United States, there was an increase in the value of exports of from 266 to 515 million crowns for the same period, and an increase of from 164 to 407 million crowns in imports.

¹ The Czechoslovak crown fluctuated in value over a range of from 1-1½ cents in 1921 and 1½-3½ cents in 1922 to between 3 cents and 4 cents in 1924-1938.

A careful analysis of Czechoslovakia's trade balance, especially in the period from 1933 to 1938, proves that the Western orientation of the country's economic system was significant for its development. One of the main reasons for this fact was that the leading statesmen of the country recognized early, even much earlier than did economists and statesmen in western Europe, the great international danger of Nazi Germany's barter system, especially as applied to the smaller neighboring countries. It was as early as 1934 that Dr. Eduard Beneš, then minister for foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia, explained this to the present writer in an interview given for the *Manchester Guardian-Commercial*, dealing with the question of self-sufficiency and the countries applying the barter system:

"All these states, acting under the influence of the idea of 'autarchy' or national economic self-sufficiency, are basing their trade policies on purely military considerations.

"Almost everywhere in Europe this produced important modifications of international economic policy, largely structural modifications, in which political tendencies very often had an unfortunate influence. A consequence of these modifications was the necessity of a reorientation of commercial policy.

"This idea of autarchy gained ground not only in Europe but almost throughout the world; it meant an abandonment of the system of international division of labour that had brought such great benefits. Commercial treaties on the basis of the most-favored-nation clause are becoming more and more things of the past; their place is taken by import and export quotas, agreement for international clearing arrangements, and similar measures, all of which are fetters on international trade. Naturally trade falls and falls, and in the end the shrinkage produces a number of almost universal results—a reduced standard of living, unemployment, and other grave social troubles."

The ideal of freedom of trade is inseparable from the political ideal of personal democratic freedom, and this is the reason why the leading statesmen of Czechoslovakia, and especially Dr. Beneš, stressed the importance of international economic collaboration, even in a period when it was not realized in other democracies how much the trade methods of totalitarian states were working toward the dissolution of international treaties and international law and decency.

The following general conclusions may be drawn from a summary review of the foreign trade position of Czechoslovakia: (1) Czechoslovakia's foreign trade, especially after the world economic crisis, experienced an almost uninterrupted rise in the volume and value of purchases and sales. The value of foreign trade almost tripled between July, 1933, and July, 1938. (2) There had been a thoroughly healthy change in the outlets and markets of Czechoslovak foreign trade, inasmuch as those Western and overseas countries which were Czechoslovakia's main suppliers of raw materials—especially the United States and Great Britain—were also steadily becoming the principal purchasers of Czechoslovak exports. Since these countries, in contrast to Germany, paid in foreign exchange and not by means of clearing agreements, they thus were laying the best foundations for increased Czechoslovak purchases in their own markets.

Czechoslovakia's trade policy of being true to every concluded agreement and of never applying methods of dumping and similar indecent means for expansion of exports steadily increased the prestige of the country in the world market. The great wealth of Czechoslovakia's natural resources, her coal, her enormous forests, her many minerals, some of them (radium, for instance) very rare, and, above all, the industrial training and efficiency of her people, and the fundamentally conciliatory and democratic character of Czech businessmen and manufacturers,

were the basis of the enviable position which the country of Masaryk and Beneš had won in the world market. Czech businessmen had a reputation everywhere abroad for thorough dependability, and the country itself had shown again and again by the way in which it had met all its financial obligations, even during the worst years of the crisis, that it deserved its high reputation in international markets. Next to Germany, Czechoslovakia became the principal industrial factor in central Europe.

This statement applies especially to the armament industry, which was one of the most efficient in the world, and which was surrendered when the country was handed over to Nazi Germany. The skill of the Czech workers in the Skoda Works and the other great armament plants made it possible for England to equip her fighting force with one of the most efficient anti-aircraft guns ever constructed in Europe. In contrast to the armament industries of other countries, especially those of Germany, the great Czech armament plants were by no means limited to the production of weapons, for they were originally factories for all sorts of machines, thus serving the peace of their country and of Europe until the situation created by Nazi Germany made it necessary for them to work for the defense of their country and of others to the limit of their capacity.

The economy of Czechoslovakia was characterized by a large degree of harmony between agriculture and industry. Czechoslovakia could not be described either as a purely industrial state or as an agrarian state, in the same sense as her two other partners of the former economic Little Entente. Her agricultural resources did not originally suffice to feed the whole population, but, under the influence of the craze for self-sufficiency which seized upon the whole of central Europe, Czechoslovakia succeeded in extending the area devoted to agriculture and steadily diminished her deficiency in the production of grain. However,

whereas the industries belonging to Czechoslovakia had been designed to supply a large protected internal market of from fifty to sixty million people, there was now available an internal market of only fifteen millions. Industry had therefore to turn to export to a far greater extent than before the State was established, and here it found at the frontiers the usual obstacles, which were greatly increased during the economic crisis. The return to agriculture which took place in Czechoslovakia represented in large measure a consequence of industrialization in the neighboring central European states which had been her markets, for these made every effort to restrict the import of goods from Czechoslovakia, and did much to decrease the possibility of disposing of agricultural exports from the rest of central Europe in Czechoslovakia.

Although Czechoslovakia, as a result of her relatively trifling foreign debt, did not need to concern herself overmuch with having an excess of imports over exports, the statistical figures showed that she had a credit balance of foreign trade not only in the boom years but even in the crisis years. Not until 1932 did the balance change against her, a phenomenon closely connected with the development of extreme crisis in the Danubian states. Although the shrinkage of foreign trade went on into 1933, the excess of imports was already less in that year, and, if one omits the excess of imports attributable to the import of precious metals for coinage and looks only at actual trade in goods, by 1933 there was not only no debit balance of trade but actually a credit.

The year 1934 marks a sharp change in the economic development of Czechoslovakia, due to her currency and commercial policy. This turn in trade was the result of the devaluation of the Czech crown by 16 $\frac{2}{3}$ per cent, undertaken on February 17, 1934, on the advice of the former finance minister, Dr. Engliš.

This caused a rise of 20 per cent in the market value of gold and gold bonds, and a corresponding premium on exports. At the same time the cover for the currency was reduced by 25 per cent, but the gold securities' cover was given up, the whole of the cover being converted into gold. The stability of the Czechoslovak currency remained completely guaranteed after the devaluation, and the optimistic forecasts which had been made about the effect of the operation were justified by the results. Above all, the rise which had been feared in internal prices and the cost-of-living index number did not take place. Where rises did occur, they remained almost entirely within the limits of general international price movements.

It is to be stressed that the second devaluation carefully prepared and carried through by the Parliament in the autumn of 1936 succeeded even still more in increasing Czechoslovakia's international trade with the West and thus in strengthening her economic independence from her German neighbor. Both economically and financially, Czechoslovakia made substantial progress during the year 1937. This was seen most clearly in the sphere of foreign trade, in which exports realized 11,971 million crowns in 1937, as compared with 8,008 million crowns in 1936, and imports were 10,966 million crowns, as against 7,909 millions in the previous year. At the end of 1937 the number of unemployed was only 451,484, as compared with 619,143 at the end of December, 1936. Especially noteworthy is the fact that the decrease of unemployment in the German districts of northern and western Bohemia was particularly marked. The industries in these districts, which had suffered especially during the crisis, were now experiencing a much greater share in the general increase of prosperity than were those in the Czech and Slovak districts, particularly in the agricultural regions. Symptomatic of the improvements in 1937 was the rise in coal con-

sumption, amounting on the average to about 25 per cent. In iron production there was a rise of 47 per cent and in steel production one of 48.5 per cent.

The development of Czechoslovak foreign trade after the currency reforms showed clearly that the country was really the bridge between central Europe and the West. Here, too, in both the political and intellectual spheres, the ideals of the League of Nations and of democracy had taken deepest root in central Europe. Here, too, in economic and financial matters, in spite of all the embarrassments into which her geographical situation in the heart of central Europe relentlessly dragged Czechoslovakia, it was realized that the distressed continent could be saved only by adopting Western ideas of restoring free trade in goods and gold. In the sphere of general politics, also, Czechoslovakia had been forced to hold fast to the conviction that the entire central European problem could be solved and prevented from becoming a serious danger to the world only if the solution were truly European in character.

Czechoslovakia did, however, form part of central Europe, and it follows from this self-evident fact that the troubles of central Europe could not be ignored by her. It follows also that Czechoslovakia could not entirely withdraw herself from the craze for self-sufficiency into which central Europe was plunged. Among neighbors who were using all their means to shut themselves off from foreign goods, refusing to transfer or putting great difficulties in the way of transferring foreign credits, and cutting off or at least cutting down the interest payment on foreign loans, this country too had to shut itself off with protective tariffs and quotas, if the maintenance of the principle of free trade in a protectionist world was not to become a serious danger to her own economic system.

Anyone who objectively watched Czechoslovakia's economic

development will be forced to admit that here the return to agriculture and the movement toward self-sufficiency were kept down to the bare minimum inevitable in central Europe. Contrary to the progressive collapse of financial morality in central Europe, Czechoslovakia was the one state in that region which had not merely paid the interest on its foreign loans punctually, but had never even played with the idea of a moratorium of foreign loans. The devaluations of the Czech crown were voluntary measures dictated by consideration of the world economic situation, and not an experiment in inflation or dumping—and there is scarcely a serious student who has described them otherwise. Because it was here that the strongest support was to be found for the idea of international economic solidarity and for return to a world division of labor and for a joint solution of the problem of central Europe, some support should have been found in the West for this struggle toward a better and more rational economic order in central Europe.

It was the tragedy of Czechoslovakia, and even of Europe and Western civilization, that European statesmen in the crisis of 1938 and at Munich failed to realize the great importance of supporting this brave stronghold of European democracy and Western ideas in central Europe. From the viewpoint of the economist it ought to be stated that the Czechoslovak Republic from its foundation fulfilled its task of struggling for international coöperation and for peace and freedom of trade. Dr. Beneš, who has always known that political and economic problems are inseparable, in an interview in March, 1937, explained to the writer his conception of the basic ideas of Czechoslovakia's policy by quoting one of the earliest English economists, Sir Dudley North, who wrote in 1691 in his *Discourse of Trade*:

"It is peace, industry, and freedom that bring trade and wealth, and nothing else."


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Chapter XIII

SOCIAL REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

BY BRACKETT LEWIS

ALTHOUGH INDEPENDENCE was achieved in October, 1918, without bloodshed, its consummation has always been called by the Czechs and the Slovaks their "revolution." The war for independence was fought by Czechoslovak Legions during the World War on far fronts in France, Italy, and Russia, but the result was a thoroughgoing revolution, both political and social, within their country.

With the overthrow of Austro-Hungarian domination, the former ruling class was removed entirely from its position of control in political matters. Under the new Constitution, Parliament, through the land reform, ended foreign domination in the ownership of land and natural resources, and launched a program of social legislation which constituted a complete social revolution.

Reform principles had been growing in popularity through the years, and Parliament immediately set about codifying them into law under the leadership of the Social Democratic (Labor) party, the largest group on the floor during the first formative year. Even after the Marxist wing of the party split off and formed the Communist party in 1921, the combined Czechoslovak and German Social Democratic parties commanded as

many seats in Parliament as the Agrarians and far outnumbered the votes polled by other parties.

The social attitude of a vast majority of the population of all classes had always been far advanced. Visitors from abroad were impressed by the progressive attitude of factory owners and others toward the claims of labor and employees. The struggle between the two classes was less of a duel between entrenched interests, which still represents such a tragic problem in many countries, than a parliamentary struggle to improve the lot of the mass of the population. The fact that class distinctions and levels of wealth in Czechoslovakia were not nearly so marked as in the Western nations or even in Poland and Hungary, where the aristocracy contrasted so sharply with the populace, certainly contributed largely to social reform. A democratic outlook, which has been characteristic of the Czechs since 1848, seemed to pervade all classes, and found expression in literature, education, and the professions, as well as in political life.

Another very important element in social progress was the almost equal division of the population of the Republic with respect to occupations. According to the 1930 census, 33 per cent of the population was engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; 34.9 per cent in mining, industry, and crafts; 12.9 per cent in commerce, transportation, and finance; and 17.4 per cent in the professions and public service. Czechoslovakia was by far the most highly industrialized country of central Europe, but industry was not allowed to dominate legislation to the detriment of other national interests, vigilantly guarded by the large Agrarian party.

A third factor in social progress was the recognized right of all groups and interests to organize—labor, as well as capital. The struggle for labor's right to unionize had been fought in old Austria, beginning in 1878, and the principle was simply

taken for granted in the Republic. "White-collar" unions, teachers' associations, and even an "executive" of government employees seem to have been accepted as naturally as industrial associations.

The constitutional provision for proportional representation in Parliament led to an unusually large number of political parties: Agrarian, Social Democratic (Labor), Small Crafts and Trades, National Socialist (mainly "white-collar" groups and "intellectuals"), National Democratic (mainly property interests), Catholic, and others. This was an unwieldy system according to Anglo-Saxon views, but it did give representation to all on an absolutely proportional basis. Being represented in Parliament, the various occupational groups quickly came to rely on legislative means to defend their interests in place of the trials of strength, resulting in strikes and bloodshed, which still characterize the labor struggle in many countries.

Under this plan of legislative regulation of labor problems and collective contracts, there was a striking increase in union membership. There were only 246,902 members of industrial, transport, and other labor unions in 1918. By 1937 these unions had a membership of 1,241,100 workers, out of a total of 2,325,000 employed in these occupations—an increase of 402 per cent. There were 978,000 "intelligent workers"—private and government office employees, professional people, teachers, musicians—organized in various professional unions, as compared with 124,976 in 1918, an increase of 682 per cent.

As early as December 19, 1918, a law reduced working hours from the previous eleven a day to eight a day, and a 48-hour week for all industrial, transport, and even hotel, restaurant, and agricultural employees was inaugurated. Overtime was permitted in seasonal work, but was not allowed to exceed two hours a day or cover more than twenty weeks in a year.

Children under fourteen might not be employed; boys under sixteen and girls under eighteen could not be employed at heavy labor. No one under sixteen, and no woman, could be employed in mining or other dangerous occupations.

Collective contracts were provided for by law and had been worked out between unions and industrial associations in a large number of branches of industry, as well as for "white-collar" workers. At the end of 1936 there were 2,860 such collective contracts in operation covering 45,500 establishments and 995,000 employees—the largest numbers being in metal trades, textiles, building trades, and foods. A law of 1937 made such collective agreements "inclusive," in that no employee of an establishment under such a contract could be excluded from the collective agreement by signing a private contract, and "interminable" before the end of 1938 so that no changes could be made without the consent of both sides. They were also "obligatory" in the sense that the Ministry could force any new establishment opening up in a district where a collective agreement was in force to adhere to the agreement.

The Ministry of Social Welfare up to the end of 1937 had declared collective contracts obligatory in this sense in 123 judicial districts, embracing 1,063 textile mills and 124,875 workmen. The area of application was continually being extended at the request of both unions and operators' associations.

One of the most advanced measures was the law of 1935, revised in 1937, requiring an owner to notify the factory inspector fourteen days before closing a concern or discharging at one time more than 10 per cent of his employees. The inspector must then confer with the owner and the works committee on the reasons for closing or reduction of personnel; if the inspector found it possible for work to continue, he was empowered so to order. If the owner considered closing for more than three

months, he must so inform the Ministry of Social Welfare fourteen days in advance, giving full reasons. The Ministry must reply within six weeks, and could order continuance if it found insufficient reasons for suspending operations. The Ministry was also empowered to investigate any concern where the number of employees had been reduced by 40 per cent or more in the course of any calendar year and to stop further discharges if the owner could not show adequate reasons. The law required the payment of fourteen days' wages to all employees discharged collectively and three weeks' advance pay in the event of closing the establishment. Each worker must be given two weeks' notice before discharge if employed up to five years, and for each additional five years of employment an additional week's notice was required.

Furthermore, holidays and closing hours were regulated by law, as were paid vacations. One week's vacation with pay each year was assured all persons in any employment: at least six days of vacation each year for the first ten years with the concern, seven days for the next five years, and then eight days. This applied to industrial workers, and even to hotel and restaurant employees and household domestics. Office workers had vacations of from two to four weeks, according to length of service with the concern. There was little difficulty in enforcing this regulation, as the employer could arrange holidays at any time when work was slack; if vacations were not given, the employees took the matter up with the works committee and eventually the labor court. National holidays might not be counted in the workers' vacation. Although it was against the law for an employee to accept extra pay instead of his vacation, he naturally had no further claim if he did so.

A works committee of the employees was required by law for every establishment employing thirty or more persons.

These elected officers were of great benefit in relations between employers and employees, settling many disputes in minor matters, insisting on hygienic and safety measures, and enforcing the obligations of collective contracts. The works committees were represented in administrative councils and in many instances did much to increase the employees' sense of responsibility for the success of the concern as a whole.

The law set up in cities and districts special labor courts to which employees could take any complaints for which they had not received redress by negotiation. Hours and conditions of work, deductions from pay, illegal discharge, formed the bulk of the cases. Employers might be called for hearings and could be heavily fined and charged court costs. It was generally understood that these labor courts existed to protect the worker, and there was always some complaint that they usually favored him at the expense of the employer. The courts, however, dismissed thousands of cases each year without hearings because employees failed to produce sufficient evidence of injustice.

Health insurance and pensions.—Every employer was required by law to register each employee in a health insurance fund. These funds existed under the Austrian régime as private corporations, and insurance with them was voluntary. Insurance was made compulsory in Czechoslovakia, and the funds were so minutely regulated and inspected that they were to all intents state funds. Of the total of 4,500,000 persons employed in 1938 throughout the Republic, 3,300,000 were insured against sickness and 2,000,000 against industrial accidents.

The employer deducted from 2 to 3 per cent on a sliding scale from each weekly or monthly pay check of each employee, added an equal amount himself, and was required to pay the sum to the appropriate fund within fourteen days. The employee or any member of his family was then permitted to go

to a panel doctor, dentist, oculist, or other specialist for any illness—not simply for occupational diseases. The funds conducted their own clinics, sanatoria, convalescent homes, and centers for thermal, electrical, and other treatments, numbering some fourteen hundred medical institutions. The panel doctor might prescribe any form of treatment required, arrange to have the patient accepted in any institution of the fund, or even send him to the mountains for convalescence. Periods up to nine months might be prescribed at sanatoria for tuberculosis. Prescribed medicines were issued by pharmacists free or at greatly reduced prices on presentation of the fund ticket.

While unable to work on account of illness or accident, the patient received a stipulated daily allowance from his fund for a period up to fifty-two weeks. The worker might not be discharged while on sick leave. Workers' accident insurance was also prescribed by law and functioned much as the health insurance, although the funds were separate corporations.

Accident insurance was insurance not of individuals, but of whole concerns, with premiums calculated according to the degree of danger in fourteen classifications, reëxamined every five years on the basis of statistics. An employee suffering an accident either in the plant or anywhere he had been ordered to work, or even while going to or from work, was supported up to four weeks by the insurance fund, in industrial cases up to twenty-six weeks. If then unemployable, he received a pension equal to his calculable income for the previous year until such time as he was again employable. If the accident resulted in death, a burial allowance was made and the family received the pension. A widow who remarried received a sum equal to three years' pension allowance in lieu of further pension. There were insurance courts presided over by professional judges to hear claims if pensions or allowances were considered to be too low.

These laws applied equally to farm laborers, household servants, and other groups which in many countries have not been covered by social legislation. The State Statistical Bureau estimated that 8,000,000 persons were insured in 1938 against ill health, accident, invalidism, and old age. If one includes members of families, that figure represents over half of the total population. In 1936, a total of \$10,102,000 was paid on accident claims and \$33,627,000 on sick claims, including medical and dental care, hospitalization, clinics, and compensation for earnings while ill.

Pensions.—All office employees and “intelligent workers” had to be registered by their employers in the pension fund of their particular branch. These funds were subject by law to supervision similar to that given the health insurance funds and became virtually state corporations. Employer and employee shared equally in paying fees, graded according to salary rates. At the age of sixty-five in some funds, after thirty-five years’ service in others, the employee was then pensioned on a monthly allowance equal, on the average, to half his monthly pay during the last year of active employment. This law applied to state, provincial, and municipal employees, all teachers, and railway and postal workers. It applied equally to all private employees of the “white-collar” or office grades.

In the event of incapacity for work for any cause, an employee was pensioned prematurely on a prescribed scale of allowances. The widow of a pensioner continued to receive one-half of her husband’s pension as long as she lived. After a pensioner’s death each child received one-fifth of his pension if a half-orphan, two-fifths if a full orphan, until attaining seventeen years of age. In 1938, of the 475,891 office employees in the Republic, 464,807 were registered in various pension funds. During 1934, a total of \$41,569,000 was paid out in pensions.

When Czechoslovakia signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain it assumed responsibility for pensions of all former state officials of Austria and Hungary who were born in the territory of the Republic, so long as they continued to live within its boundaries. Currency inflation after the war destroyed pension-fund reserves, and the pensions had to be paid out of the current state budget. This item alone accounted for \$7,017,540 in the annual expenditures of the Czechoslovak State Railways, for instance.

Unemployment.—The Republic did not adopt a plan of unemployment insurance, but after heavy government contributions to support the unemployed from 1918 to 1925 it adopted the Ghent system. This is the plan whereby support during unemployment is given by trade unions out of fees paid in while workers are employed, augmented by government subsidies. Union funds were quite inadequate during the world depression, of course, and were largely supplemented by funds supplied by the Ministry of Social Welfare. This state contribution amounted at times to twice and thrice that of the unions. There was no "means test," and the amount an unemployed person received was usually two-thirds of what he would normally have been earning. This was later raised to the full amount he had been earning when last employed.

The unions were content with this plan, although it should be noted that employers were required to make no direct contribution. The Ghent system leaves unorganized workers and those who leave school during a long depression, with no opportunity to find employment or to join a union, to the care of feeding funds of cities and local administrative districts, which also were given Ministry subsidies. By far the larger share of unorganized labor was agricultural, however, where families had gardens and other means of partial support.

In the struggle against unemployment a large number of

public works were financed by the State: dams to produce electric power, highways, three new railway lines, and public buildings. Two national internal loans provided the funds. Private buildings and repairs were stimulated by tax concessions. The larger cities organized labor corps of unemployed young men from eighteen to twenty-four years of age, who worked on parks, sports fields, and other noncompetitive improvements. Remuneration was in the form of meals and small allowances, the boys continuing to live at home.

The attack on unemployment was just as energetic as in other countries, the number of unemployed being reduced from the peak of 920,000 in 1933 to 518,800 in January, 1938. One alleviating circumstance was that many factories—particularly glass, textiles, paper, porcelain—had historically been situated as fairly small units in villages of certain districts of Bohemia and Moravia. This allowed the cultivation of a small farm while one or two members of the family were employed at the factory, many of which had the practice of closing down when farm work was at its height. Losing his work at such a factory did not leave the employee destitute, for he still had his farm.

With respect to the treatment of minority nationalities in social welfare and unemployment relief, suffice it to say that exactly the same form of organization was applied in the German, Magyar, and Polish areas as among the Czechs and Slovaks. Public funds were made available, in principle, in exact proportion to population as between various groups. In practice, however, the economic stress in northern and western Bohemia, predominantly German-speaking districts, was a matter of more than proportional concern to officials because the industries of those districts—textiles, glass, and porcelain—suffered most during the depression, they being more largely dependent on exports. More state funds were expended for relief in those districts

in proportion to population than elsewhere. From 1930 through 1935 the State, according to a statement by the Minister of Social Welfare in Parliament, December 3, 1936, paid Czechoslovak unions \$33,648,307 on unemployment relief and German unions \$24,734,770. Thus the latter received 42.36 per cent of all state relief funds, although they represented but 22.3 per cent of the total population.

Child welfare.—The administration of child welfare was entrusted to special provincial offices, supervised and partially supported by the Ministry of Social Welfare. The ramifications of the work touched every town of the Republic with mothers' clinics, feeding and clothing of undernourished children in schools, and a multitude of other activities. A chart of the institutions related to the Children's Aid of Moravia, for instance, showed:

- 1,309 milk stations in schools
- 360 clinics for mothers and babes
- 31 free dispensaries
- 51 children's summer colonies
- 37 day nurseries
- 11 children's convalescent homes
- 44 orphanages, with 2,200 children
- 55 children's homes where small groups of orphans were cared for until placed out in families (5,578 orphans placed in families under constant supervision of trained workers)
- 3,410 local workers in 2,630 communities supervising the life of 38,032 children in families threatened by economic, health, or moral conditions

Following a survey of unemployed youth in Moravia in 1935, youth bureaus were increased in number from thirty-eight to seventy in order to cover all districts in the province. Seventeen club centers were opened for unemployed youth, and sixty-six

club centers for apprentices. There were twenty-two institutions in Moravia for blind, deaf, crippled, or abnormal children, with a total of 1,650 beds.

This Children's Aid served Moravia and Silesia, an area a little larger than Massachusetts and smaller than Maryland. Its budget was met by fees, gifts, collections, and government subvention—the latter being roughly one-third of the total budget. Exactly similar semiofficial youth welfare organizations existed in the German-speaking districts, entirely directed by German citizens of the Republic and supported by the province and the Ministry of Social Welfare in exact proportion to the population. In the last years of the Republic's existence, the state contribution to child welfare for the whole country was \$25,000,000 annually.

Summer colonies, camps, and convalescent homes were conducted for underprivileged children of all nationalities by schools, trade unions, and even political parties. A total of 48,100 children spent the summer of 1937 in 353 such fresh-air colonies. Some were in the mountains, a few on the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia. Although Czechoslovak cities did not have the slum conditions of England or the tenements of America, the benefits in health and outlook gained by the children of the poorer classes during a summer in the open air under the supervision of trained workers were of immense value in conserving the human resources of the Republic.

The position of women.—The Revolution of 1918 placed women in a position of complete equality with men; in fact, paragraph 106 of the Constitution stated that "no privilege of sex, birth or occupation shall be recognized." Women were granted universal and equal suffrage and were elected to Parliament from the beginning of the Republic.

Women had absolutely equal opportunities for education in

the Republic, all schools, universities, and technical institutes being open to them. Many women studied architecture, engineering, agriculture, medicine, law, and some even theology. The two last-named fields were not open to women under the Austrian régime, but after 1930 women were appointed judges. On the lists from which juries were chosen by lot, it was required that one-third should be women's names.

All appointments in state and municipal administrations were open to women, and many high positions were held by them. This perhaps was not in great contrast to the situation in Anglo-Saxon countries, but it was noteworthy in comparison with the situation in France, Germany, Italy, and the countries of central Europe. One of the great victories for sex equality was the abrogation in 1919 of the old Austrian law of celibacy, forbidding a woman teacher to marry and forcing her to leave her position if she did so. The directors of all girls' schools in the Republic were required to be women, and they could become teachers in boys' schools, if qualified.

Women had no advantage with respect to hours of work in industry, the organized women's movement having opposed any such distinction for fear it would reduce women's opportunities for employment. They were excluded, however, from night work, mining, and work with lead.

The health insurance law granted a woman in any employment six weeks' paid leave before childbirth and six weeks' after. Free medical care for both mother and infant was included, and her fund paid her full daily sick allowance for six weeks after the birth and half the allowance for a further twelve weeks as a contribution during the nursing period.

Labor legislation even discovered ways of enforcing health and maternity insurance for women in cottage industries. Seamstresses, embroiderers, lacemakers, and beadworkers who took

their orders home for execution were protected, even though they worked at piece rates. The rooms where they worked were subject to inspection. The factor who gave them the work was required to publish and post his rates in public, and any person of whom he tried to take advantage might complain to an inspector or labor court.

Housing.—Since there had been almost no construction of homes during the war, Prague and other larger cities in the new Republic found that they were facing a housing crisis; the solution of the problem comprises one of the chapters of social legislation. The Government might have followed the socialistic plan of building or helping municipalities to build large blocks of cheap flats. The law of 1919, however, chose the more democratic plan of assisting financially any organization or individual who would build flats of one-, two-, and three-room apartments of limited floor space to rent below certain set price limits. Under this law some 41,654 buildings with 124,085 apartments were constructed at an investment of \$291,800,000, of which the State loaned or guaranteed \$242,353,000.

This state assistance led to the formation of many building coöperatives, particularly among municipal, postal, and other employees. Teachers' organizations, both the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A., and many other organizations put up residence facilities with state aid which could not have been constructed on a commercial basis until years later.

In order to prevent profiteering during the housing crisis and the building boom, the law limited rents chargeable for homes of various sizes. As the crisis passed, these restrictions were lifted and rents became subject again to the law of supply and demand. By 1938 rents were restricted only on one-room flats, the homes of the poorest.

Coöperatives.—Coöperatives of many kinds reached a higher

stage of development in Czechoslovakia than in most countries, and were of great economic and social benefit to the population. Riding through the country, one would see great warehouses at railway centers bearing the names of coöperatives; in the cities they were as ubiquitous as the chain store in American cities.

From the beginning of coöperatives in 1860, one network included those for the provision of cheap agricultural credit for the construction of farm buildings and the purchase of tools, livestock, and seed. There was another network for the sale of farm products, which saved the farmers large amounts by storing and then making export sales. "At the end of 1935 there were 11,534 agricultural coöperative societies as shown below:

- 5,364 savings and credit societies
- 737 agricultural deposit banks
- 329 coöperative exchanges
- 483 coöperative dairies
- 74 coöperative mills and bakeries
- 357 coöperative distilleries and starch factories
- 32 coöperatives for drying chicory
- 30 coöperatives for growing flax and weaving linen
- 234 other producing coöperatives
- 288 coöperatives for stock raising
- 2,138 coöperative electric works and machine shops
- 150 agricultural building coöperatives
- 1,003 purchasing coöperatives
- 315 miscellaneous coöperative societies.¹¹

According to the State Statistical Bureau, there were 1,672,864 heads of families or individuals engaged in agriculture in the Republic in 1937. Of these, 567,842, or one-third, were members of coöperatives of some kind.

The amount of business the coöperatives did is indicated by the fact that in 1935 the agricultural credit societies had deposits

¹¹ Edgar P. Young, *Czechoslovakia, Keystone of Peace and Democracy* (London, 1938), p. 187.

to the total of \$632,500,000. This was one-third of all bank deposits in the country and nearly equal to the deposits in savings banks, which received 35 per cent of the nation's deposits. The credit coöperatives had a central bank in Prague with a paid-up capital of \$416,000, reserve funds of \$3,908,000, and deposits of \$33,690,000.

The network of consumers' (selling) coöperatives had a total of 886,000 members in cities and towns. These were grouped in five central associations, of which one was German for the German-speaking part of the population, managed, of course, entirely by Germans and enjoying exactly the same legal advantages as the Czechoslovak organizations.

Altogether, 11.3 per cent of the total population of the Republic were members of coöperatives: 1,675,087 members in a total of 17,021 societies. In 1935, their business amounted to \$591,985,000, including deposits in credit coöperatives and sales of producers' and consumers' societies.

State ownership of natural resources.—At the time the land reform was being discussed, Parliament decided not to allot all forest lands, but to retain some as public property after making compensation to the former owners. This was not carried out too rigidly, for, after towns and villages had received the forests which they could administer profitably, large areas were returned to the original owners. The State retained forests chiefly along the borders of the country where they were valuable because of strategic reasons. Thus the State came into possession of some 1,062,500 acres of forest land.

According to law, all forests, public and private, were cut and replanted according to strict regulations. Trees might be felled only on permission of the state forester of the district, and an equal number must then be planted within two years in order not to deplete the nation's resources.

As a result of the land reform, the State also came into possession of a number of rural industries such as fisheries, breweries, electric plants, and machine shops, as well as a few large, highly mechanized estates which could not be operated economically if broken up. The electric plants and machine shops were turned over to district coöperatives, the fisheries were administered as a state industry, and the farms were used for experimental purposes. A department of the Ministry of Agriculture managed all state forests, estates, and fisheries. Hunting in state forests was also a source of income, as the hunter paid for the game he shot.

All waterways, whether navigable or not, were state property. Fishing rights in all streams were leased by the provinces to associations or individuals and the income was used to restock the streams with young fish.

The world-famous radium mines at Jáchymov were state property operated by the Ministry of Public Works, as were the radium spa there and the baths and hotels at many other watering places. One of the great natural resources of the country was the spas, mineral springs, and curative baths. Whether operated by private or semipublic corporations, these were all carefully controlled by the Ministry of Public Health. At the most important spas for each type of ailment—heart, respiratory, digestive ailments, rheumatism—the health insurance funds had large sanatoria where their members took the cure free of charge or at reduced rates.

Communications and public utilities.—Czechoslovakia was no exception to the majority of countries in Europe in considering railways, telephone, and telegraph as being just as essential state services as the post office. They were all owned by the Republic except for a very few small private railways, which were leased to the State. Furthermore, in order to prevent motorbus

lines from merely competing with existing means of communication, the State Railways owned and operated several hundred bus routes. These transported passengers, freight, and mails to the nearest railway station and thus opened up new territory not previously served. An equal number of private bus lines existed, but were licensed only for noncompetitive routes. All schedules and rates were supervised to ensure cheap and efficient service for the public. The air lines of the Republic were concentrated in the hands of a state corporation and were operated on a commercial basis.

All street railways and electric, gas, and water services were owned and operated by the municipalities or, in some of the country districts, as coöperative enterprises. This arrangement avoided the endless conflicts about rates with private corporations which exist in some countries, and also earned profits for the community.

This summary of social reforms and social legislation is not exhaustive, but will suffice to show to what extent the people of Czechoslovakia owned the public services of their country, the methods used to conserve the country's natural resources, and the Government's truly progressive measures of welfare for the population. Students have said that the Czechs are the most hard-working and thrifty, the most energetic and rational people in central Europe. Their Republic was often called the best governed and the most progressive on the Continent. Certainly its social measures were excelled by none outside the Scandinavian nations, nor its utterly democratic spirit and achievements by those of any nation.

Many hold that it was this staunchly democratic spirit and the achievements of the Republic in progressive government which marked it for destruction by the Nazi régime. Dictators

are irritated by contrasting forms and ideals of government beyond their borders and have always sought to impose their will—their *Kultur*, as they call it—on neighboring peoples, particularly on those who are too small to resist by force or are abandoned by their allies.

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Chapter XIV

HUMANITARIAN PROGRESS

BY HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER

THE SEEDS that produced the social program of Czechoslovakia lie deep in history. The moral integrity of Hus and the democratic educational theories of Comenius (Komenský) were combined with many other forces through the ages to prepare the people for what they accomplished after 1918. The Declaration of Independence, written by Masaryk, not only embodied his own philosophy but also reflected the past and foreshadowed a future of which his countrymen approved.

The principles outlined in the Declaration were incorporated in the Constitution and gave the Republic a social plan from its first day. The fulfillment of this plan became the objective of both administration and popular will. With a brief twenty years for accomplishment, there were, inevitably, gaps left unfilled, but many democratic countries with centuries of evolution and goodwill, because of the hang-over of traditional institutions, fall behind Czechoslovakia in achievements. We must also remember that much that was attempted was not unique but was part of wide theory and practice in many parts of the world. The Czechs had no unusual insight as a basis for their ideas, but sought to profit by experience wherever found.

The extensive spread and intensive character of the human activities of Czechoslovakia make it impossible for an adequate picture to be presented in a summary, but some indication of the scope of the program can be given. Every aspect of life came under its influence. Although the Government provided the organization and instrumentality, the welfare program was democratic rather than paternalistic or ideological.

There were widely varying needs and levels of culture in the different parts of the country. The Czech areas had had vastly greater opportunities than Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, so that the problem of equalizing conditions presented an immediate challenge. In Czech regions there was virtually no illiteracy, but in Slovakia 39 per cent of the population was illiterate and in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia 67 per cent; other conditions in the two regions were correspondingly bad. The two decades of the Republic's existence did not give sufficient time to eliminate the discrepancies, but great progress was made because all aspects of the program were developed on a nationwide scale. The average illiteracy was reduced to 3.25 per cent. The Slovaks had never had many teachers; they had very few doctors or lawyers, and no trained government officials. It was necessary, therefore, to begin training in democracy at the same time that formal education and social improvement were undertaken. All agencies worked together, and the progress made was socially and statistically enormous.

At the end of the war there existed the inherited institutions of the aristocratic Austrian rule, the complete disorganization of economic life, and the difficulties of establishing a completely new government. To offset this inheritance, there were the various indigenous ideals and techniques that had enabled the people to survive the centuries of oppression. These were the dynamic factors in the social program that was inaugurated.

The new Ministry of Social Welfare began with the assumption that the promotion of employment, production, and trade on a sound basis must always go hand-in-hand with any sound social policy.

The Ministry summed up its constitutional scope in the following words: "The Constitution establishes democratic rights, freedom and civil duties, the effects of which are felt also in the social sphere. The leading principle is equality. All inhabitants enjoy complete protection of life and freedom, irrespective of their origin, citizenship, language, race, or religion. The Constitution guarantees personal freedom, freedom of property and the press, the right of assembly and association, secrecy of the post, freedom of teaching and conscience, and freedom of the expression of opinion. A limitation of these rights is possible only on the basis of legislation. A special article of the Constitution provides for the protection of national, religious, and racial minorities. Before the law, all citizens are equal, and enjoy the same political rights, irrespective of their language, race, or religion. The Constitution guarantees the national minorities the use of their language in private and commercial intercourse, in the press and publications, in assemblies and religion. . . . All citizens, without regard to their nationality, religion, or race, are guaranteed the right to found, direct, and manage charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, and other educational institutes, and freely to use their languages and religions there."¹

There was an unusual correlation between these stated objectives and their accomplishment in Czechoslovakia, in spite of the fact that old animosities were powerful obstacles. The ministries of Social Welfare and Public Health and Physical Culture were most directly concerned, but many other departments co-operated. In these ministries the proposals for social legislation

¹ *Twenty Years of Social Welfare in the Czechoslovak Republic* (Prague, 1938).

originated, but the actual programs were carried out by dividing the responsibility with local administrations and voluntary organizations.

According to Young,² the standard of living was low judged by British standards, but extensive public ownership brought many advantages to the people: inexpensive travel and recreational facilities, division of land, short working hours, liberty and protection for the worker, unemployment assistance, and housing control.

The new Constitution was adopted February 29, 1920. Dr. Alice Masaryk had already invited some trained social workers from the American Y.W.C.A. to come to Czechoslovakia to make a survey of Prague as a starting point for a national program of social work. By August of that year there was assembled a staff of twenty-five Czech and American workers, and a six weeks' summer training course was ready to begin. Books of the Russell Sage Foundation had already been translated.

The findings of this survey, which took eight months to complete, were published in several volumes, including *Directory of Social Agencies in Prague*, *The Public Health Survey of Prague*, *Social Care of Individuals in Prague*, and *Recreation in Prague*. It was, however, more than a survey, for the experience gained in making it, the coöperation between the Government and individuals, and the setting up of definite standards gave an impetus to the welfare program which lasted throughout the life of the Republic. The report on *Public Health*, in emphasizing the coöperation and the enthusiasm shown by voluntary agencies, concluded: "under the leadership of a government imbued with such unusual social spirit they were factors which foreshadowed rapid improvement all along the line."

² Edgar P. Young, *Czechoslovakia, Keystone of Peace and Democracy* (London, 1938).

This immediate voluntary activity was paralleled by the energy exhibited by the first provisional legislature, which passed advanced labor laws providing for limitation of hours of work, rest periods for women, and restrictions protecting minors. It also tackled vigorously the housing problem. Miss Masaryk had immediately organized the Czechoslovak Red Cross, and this proved to be an increasingly important agency throughout the whole period of the Republic, being one of the major instruments in the health and social education programs. Although the Red Cross was integrated with the Government, it functioned in harmony with voluntary associations and local administrations.

In 1921 the present writer stated in an article in the *Survey*: "The economic and social programs are fundamentally democratic. Slightly over half of the people vote for the various brands of socialism, but the prevailing policy is evolutionary socialization. The significant thing is that all the restless and constructive attitudes now prevailing in the world are stirring in Czechoslovakia, and the method of proportional voting gives an opportunity for every point of view to express itself."

The initiation of the social program, which was enthusiastically approved by the people, involved heavy economic burdens, but these did not hinder a continuous development. It is impossible to distinguish between that which came from legislation* and that which came from voluntary activity. On account of the democratic character of the Government, all legislation was a reflection of popular demand.

The four most important extralegal agencies were the Sokols, the Red Cross, child welfare organizations, and the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian associations.

The Sokols had been in existence for more than forty years

* See above, chap. xiii.

before the war, and played a very important part in securing independence. They had originated as a conscious attempt to develop a gymnastic technique in complete independence of the German method. They were entirely Czech in origin, but had spread throughout the Slavic world. From the beginning however, the Sokol was much more than a gymnastic organization. It was a social and political force of both intensive and extensive quality. In 1912, at the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the organization, the present writer saw representative teams from all the Slavic nations except the Poles, which, because there were Russians participating, would not send their people to take part, although they also had Sokols. The Sokol became a symbol of an all-Slavic consciousness; everywhere it was a nonpolitical organization. Its control was democratic and its vigorous discipline voluntary. It was this discipline that made the anabasis of the Czechoslovak army through Siberia so successful.

After the war there was no diminution of activity. The Sokols gave the people a unity. Every small community had its Sokol. Its purpose continued to be physical development, with a constant emphasis on character building, social attitudes, and patriotism. Dissident groups like the Catholic Orels and the Left labor parties, known as D.T.J., had the same program. In 1938 the Czechoslovak Sokol Union had eight hundred thousand members, composed of men, women, and children. In proportion to population the Sokols had a membership twenty-two times the membership in the Boy Scouts of America.

The Czechoslovak Red Cross was built upon elements that were left by the war. Dr. Alice Masaryk was its president from the beginning to the end of the Republic. It was a semiofficial organization and became an instrument of great educational importance. It had 288 first-aid stations, over a hundred children's

health stations, and many other centers of various types. Immediately after the annexation of the Sudete area the Red Cross took over the problem of helping refugees; this work, however, was soon crippled.

Each year at Easter the Red Cross sponsored what was known as the "Red Cross Peace," using its influence to calm the tone of the newspapers and to bar personal slandering of political enemies. It also sponsored at this time three days of constructive discussion in some one field. One year it was health, emphasizing the training of nurses; another, social welfare, focusing on the care of the aged; again, in the field of culture, the promotion of singing in homes and in schools. The Red Cross trained twenty thousand volunteer women as nurse aids, and seventy thousand firemen, called Samaritans, in first aid. In each village there were three firemen and two women so trained.

The Junior Red Cross was an entirely voluntary organization, nation-wide and all-inclusive in its scope. There were Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and Ruthenians on the national committee. It published three periodicals, one in German. The organization comprised about 750,000 school children. It did much to promote cleanliness in the schools and coöperated with the Ministry of Health in the care of children's teeth and eyes. It also was instrumental in laying out parks and improving the appearance of villages. In the words of the chairman of its advisory committee, Professor J. B. Kozák, "The chief work was educational: democratic ideology shown in inspiring examples and stories."

The Y.M.C.A. was born of the war. The army "Y" served Czechoslovak legionnaires on all fronts, and the workers who accompanied the soldiers across Siberia became part of the tradition of that exploit. In the whole period of the Republic the national secretaries were Americans, all other workers being Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and Magyars.

The Y.W.C.A. came by invitation of Miss Masaryk to make the social survey of Prague and remained in the country as a national organization working in close coöperation with the Y.M.C.A. Both grew rapidly from these beginnings and soon became indigenous Czechoslovak organizations with boards and secretaries of their own citizens. Both associations took advantage of state subventions for housing to build modern association buildings in the leading cities, although American money built the extremely popular Student Home in Prague. The association names were immediately Czechized and the initials were pronounced as words, *Ivka* and *Imka*, and took declensions.

The two associations were peculiarly successful in improving relationships between the various language groups. Many of the activities were carried on by mixed nationality groups, and the committees often conducted their meetings in two languages. The activities were those familiar to America but were entirely new in Czechoslovakia. The associations introduced several new sports, organized summer camps, and initiated Mother's Day, all of which soon became national institutions.

In what may be called the purely cultural fields of music, art, and drama, there was already an impetus that came from a long history of eminent accomplishment. All of these flourished in the Republic. There were not only the highly sophisticated and popular concert halls and theaters in Prague, but there were also orchestras, bands, and amateur dramatic clubs in almost every town in the Republic. There were seventeen thousand public lending libraries.

In the Declaration of Independence it was stated: "Women shall be placed on an equal footing with men, politically, socially and culturally." This promise was guaranteed in the Constitution and later implemented by laws. The response of

women to their new-made opportunities was general. They entered all the professions, a few even becoming judges and university professors. They were likewise active in politics and in the labor movement. All this activity greatly accelerated interest in social movements.

The Ministry of Social Welfare included in its sphere of operations: labor laws, protection of workmen, wage agreements, welfare of the unemployed, all forms of social insurance (including accident, sickness, old age, and retirement), housing, the protection of the consumer, and coöperative societies. The Ministry coöperated with many other ministries on matters of pauperism, justice, health, and welfare of agricultural laborers and traders.

The Masaryk State School of Health and Social Welfare was the center for the training of social workers. The Stefánik Institute in Turčiansky Sv. Martin, built by a gift of American Slovaks, was a training center for social workers and public health nurses in the rural districts of Slovakia. The zeal for improvement was indicated by the fact that delegations of social workers and administrators often visited other centers where they might get suggestions, whether in Germany, England, or the United States.

Since labor was a fundamental field which concerned the majority of the people and the soundness of the State, it was, perhaps, more highly developed than any other. Some things that were done in the Republic were only a long extension of what had existed before, but much was new and untried.

Even in the earliest days of the Republic, when the economic organization of the country was in confusion, the eight-hour day was adopted and given universal application. Overtime per person was limited to two hours a day and could not total more than 240 hours a year. Paid holidays were fixed by law. Wage

agreements could not be infringed upon by employers without consent of employees.

The difficult problem of home work received special attention, for the tradition of such work was old and general. The making of toys, leather goods, and musical instruments in the home had become one of the traditions of the country, and some two hundred thousand people were engaged in such work. Minimum wages were fixed, and health conditions and insurance for these workers were enforced under the authority of commissions.

Labor unions were an accepted and approved form of social organization.⁴ In every establishment with thirty or more regularly employed workers, works committees were authorized with numbers proportionate to the total number of employees. The purpose of these committees was "to protect and support the economic, social, and cultural interest of the employees in the works." Although they naturally sought advantages for the employees, the law imposed responsibilities on the committees and through them on all employees, to promote good relations and to enable the enterprise to be commercially successful. The usefulness of these committees was especially marked during the depression.

In certain specified hazardous occupations, special legislation aimed to protect the life and health of the workers.

In order to balance the supply and demand for labor, free labor exchanges were set up all over the Republic, with 227 in Bohemia, 77 in Slovakia, and 60 in Moravia-Silesia. In 1937 approximately a million and a half jobs were filled through the exchanges.

Unemployment relief had to be undertaken immediately after the war because of the economic disorganization, and

⁴ See above, chap. xiii.



HANDICRAFT OF ŠVAJNSBACH (SLOVAKIA) PEASANTS

of Youth. Of course the recreation facilities of the country were primarily designed for youth. Of these, the Sokols had the largest influence, but the Junior Red Cross, the educational system, and the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. were also very important factors.

One of the first problems facing the new Republic was the shortage in housing. At first there was stringent control of the existing buildings, and then a continuous program of subsidies to promote building. The details of the codes were meticulous and constructive, covering every phase of the housing problem, from the conditions of loans to the fixing of prices of building materials and the protection of tenants.

The progressive Ministry of Public Health coöperated with semivoluntary health organizations such as the Red Cross, the League against Tuberculosis, and various local groups, and with the schools. There was special emphasis on medical and preventive work.

In many respects the social program in Czechoslovakia represented pioneer effort, though it may have been in other respects only comparable to the best work in other countries and sometimes not their equal. Young says that Czechoslovak social workers were anxious to go to England to learn more, but his conclusion was that the social workers of England would get greater profit by going to Czechoslovakia.

No judgment should be passed, however, without remembering that the nation started from scratch in most of the fields of humane endeavor and carried on the work in the midst of the peculiar problems of setting up a government, radically new in form, whose problems were excessive. There was not only the postwar economic breakdown with which to contend, but there were also a great many variations of culture and economic levels, the problem of integration of the geographical parts of the coun-

try, and the minority problems, all of which had to be attacked at the same time. The social program was closely involved with the democratic ideals on which the State was established, and the amazing success in carrying the program out is the best measure of the success of the democracy.

Chapter XV

THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BY MATTHEW SPINKA

WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT of the Republic in 1918 the religious situation in Czechoslovakia underwent important changes which had far-reaching effects. In order to have an understanding of the underlying causes of these developments, it is necessary to preface the discussion by a brief introductory historical survey.

The native reforming movement of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which produced as its most famous leader Jan Hus, eventuated in the establishment of a legally recognized communion of the Utraquists. Besides this, there grew up another religious communion, which for a century and a half existed without legal recognition and became the most thoroughgoing and representative of the Czech churches—the *Unitas Fratrum*, or the Unity of Czech Brethren. It preserved the best traditions of the native reformation movement attending the Reformation in Germany by more than a century, but likewise freely accepted the best there was in the latter movement. The religious toleration accorded the Czech people by the "Letter of Majesty," granted by Emperor Rudolph II in 1609, legalized both the Lutheranized Utraquists, or the "Evangelicals" as they were now called, and the Unity of Czech Brethren, for both

parties adhered to the *Confessio Bohemica* of 1575. Thus both groups accepted the same doctrinal basis, although they differed in the matter of policy. Between them, they then accounted for a vast majority of the population of the country, although the Evangelicals were greatly in the majority. Some writers estimate that the Protestant communions comprised over 90 per cent of the population, as far as the common people and the lower nobility were concerned; the higher nobility was already recatholicized to a large degree, thanks to the zealous work of the Jesuits.

But the militant forces of the Counter-Reformation, connived at or actively aided by Emperor Matthias, soon rudely infringed on the liberties granted by Rudolph. This led to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, in the early years of which the Lands of the Bohemian Crown succumbed to the imperial armies. The struggle ended in the defeat of the Protestant forces at the Battle of White Mountain (November 8, 1620) and the flight of the Protestant king, Frederick, from Bohemia.

Then followed one hundred and sixty years of exceptionally cruel and relentless persecution of the Protestants, accompanied by zealous recatholicization of the remaining population. Protestantism was utterly proscribed, the Protestant nobility and the free citizens either were expelled or emigrated to other countries, those of the unfree population who did not succeed in escaping by stealth were forcibly recatholicized. Thus in the end the country became predominantly Roman Catholic.

And yet, despite this relentless process of conversion which lasted throughout the so-called "epoch of darkness," when Emperor Joseph II, in 1781, issued his "Toleration Patent," there came forth some seventy thousand survivors who boldly professed adherence to some of the ancient native Protestant communions. However, they were not allowed to revive these native churches, but were bidden to choose one of the legally recognized bodies

then existing within the empire, namely, either the Lutheran or the Reformed, which, along with the Roman Catholic, comprised the only legalized Christian communions after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. It was in this manner that these two Protestant bodies of foreign provenience became established in Bohemia.

Nevertheless, the fires of the ancient tradition of native reform were never extinguished. Throughout the nineteenth century, when the nation experienced a reawakening of its national consciousness, the patriotic view of Czech history saw the glorious era in the period extending from the reign of Emperor Charles IV and the Hussite movement to the Battle of White Mountain. The subsequent period, the "epoch of darkness," was associated not only with the Habsburg autocracy and the loss of independence and of cultural freedom, but also with the Counter-Reformation after the Battle of White Mountain, and as such it stood in the minds of the people as the memorial of their lost liberties.

Accordingly, the task confronting the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the new Republic was an exceedingly strenuous one, although it was not altogether hopeless. The Church undertook to salvage what could still be saved. It made a good beginning by elevating, in 1919, to the archiepiscopal see of Prague Dr. František Kordač, formerly professor of dogmatic theology on the theological faculty of Prague. It was significant that the new archbishop came from a middle-class family, in contrast to the previous occupants of the see who had usually been members of the nobility. His immediate predecessor, for instance, was Baron Paul Huyn, the son of a general, a zealous and pious hierarch. Just before the establishment of the Republic, he fell ill during a visit at Cheb (Eger), and his physicians urged him to go to Switzerland. He followed their advice. After the estab-

lishment of the Republic, notwithstanding the fact that he took the oath of allegiance to the new Government, his removal to Switzerland was interpreted as a desertion and he was not allowed to return.

Archbishop Kordač, despite his strict disciplinarianism and his unyielding character, which resulted in forcing the group of modernist, nationalistic, Roman clergy to establish a separatist communion, the Czechoslovak Church, had an understanding of, and sympathy with, social problems. The relations with the State were often strained, although the papal nuncio, rather than the archbishop, was usually responsible. The nuncio annually protested against the recognition by the Czechoslovak Republic of July 6—the date of the martyrdom of Jan Hus—as a holiday. In the end, the Government requested his recall in 1926. Archbishop Kordač also had difficulties with the nuncios, for his ascetic principles did not allow him to live in the ostentatious manner customary to his predecessors. It was generally assumed that his rigidity in this regard led him into an acrimonious dispute with the papal nuncio, Ciriaci, which resulted in the archbishop's resignation in July, 1931.¹ The official reason for his resignation was given as advanced age and ill health, which may very well have been important contributory causes for what turned out to be a forced retirement.

He was succeeded by the present archbishop, Dr. Karel Kašpar, a fellow-student of Pope Pius XII; he pleased the papal curia so greatly as to earn for himself the cardinal's hat. His policies were frankly ultramontane, and he played no leading rôle in the cultural or the spiritual Catholic awakening. But despite him, owing to the ability of other Catholic leaders, the Church was able to adjust itself to a remarkable degree to the new tendencies dominating life in the Republic.

¹ *Náboženská revue*, III (1931), 134 ff.

Moravia was not as violently affected by the changes occasioned by the creation of the Republic as was Bohemia. This was partly due to the more conservative temper of the people, but also in part to the character of the hierarchy. Under the old Austrian régime, the Moravian Church was governed by noblemen, the last of whom was Count Leo Skrbenský, archbishop of Olomouc, who resigned his office in 1920. He was succeeded by a man of the people, the popular preacher whose voice had often been heard by the crowds attending the numerous places of pilgrimages—Dr. Antonín Cyril Stojan. The new archbishop was an enthusiast for the so-called Cyrillian-Methodian idea, through which the Roman Catholic Church hopes to effect a reunion with the Orthodox Eastern Slavs, recalling the fact that the Greek missionaries, Cyril and Methodius, had carried the gospel to the Slavs in the ninth century. Archbishop Stojan was a man of apostolic poverty, who is said to have given away in gifts to the poor his entire income, so that after his death he had to be buried at the expense of the archdiocese. He is buried at Velehrad, the reputed location of Methodius' see. He was succeeded by the present archbishop, Dr. Leopold Prečan, a scholarly prelate, an expert in canon law, a zealous patron of education, who is likewise popular and patriotic. The Moravian Catholic Church was fortunate in possessing these generally esteemed prelates, for their influence went far in saving it from the reaction which so greatly damaged the Czech Catholic Church.

As for Slovakia, it had formerly been ecclesiastically subject to the archdiocese of Esztergom in Hungary. Owing to the vigorous protests of Esztergom's archbishop, Cardinal Serédi, against the diminution of his diocese, the ecclesiastical organization of Slovakia could not be definitely set up until 1937. In the meantime, five Slovak bishops administered the Slovak dioceses,

although only one of them was definitely acknowledged as in full exercise of his authority. This was Dr. J. Jantusch of Trnava. When at last the difficulties were overcome, and a definite delimitation of the five episcopal dioceses was effected, the consequent reorganization was not accomplished before the catastrophes of September, 1938, and March, 1939, had shattered the political organization of Czechoslovakia.

Furthermore, there was likewise a considerable difference in the character of Slovak and Czech Catholicism, which manifested itself in the continuous and sometimes violent political opposition to the Czechs. This opposition was led chiefly by the priesthood, with the famous Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, the papal prothonotary and a member of the Czechoslovak Senate, at their head. It is significant that the instrument of the violent rupture between Slovakia and Bohemia-Moravia which occurred in March, 1939, was a Roman Catholic priest, Dr. Tiso.

Beginning its life in the new Republic under such generally unfavorable circumstances, the Roman Church, however, soon found it possible to adjust itself to the demands of the prevailing circumstances, and to make itself necessary to the new State. President Masaryk, long before his assumption of office, was known to advocate the separation of Church and State. Such a measure was violently resented by the Church, which feared an expropriation of its possessions and the loss of state support. Since the democratic Constitution of the country gave the Catholic population a preponderant influence, the Parliament, which reflected this influence, dared not follow the president's personal wishes in the matter. Moreover, Masaryk, scrupulously observing the restrictions of his presidential office, made no gesture calculated to subvert the demands of the majority in deference to his personal views. Accordingly, in the course of time, although the new State never entered into a concordat

with the Vatican, a *modus vivendi* was established between the two parties which was fairly satisfactory to them both. Thus under the able and shrewd political leadership of Msgr. Dr. Jan Šrámek, who held a ministerial post throughout the greater part of the existence of the Republic, the Catholic party passed from the Right of reaction to the Center of coöperation, and by clever combination with other major political parties, such as the Agrarians and the National Socialists (the party of President Beneš, consisting of Socialists opposed to Marxism), it in the end attained to a decisive influence in the Government. Msgr. Šrámek, who had been a member of the Christian Socialist party, exerted himself in supporting legislation for the betterment of social conditions of the working classes, thus gaining a measure of favor for the Church. During his incumbency in the presidential office, Dr. Beneš was forced to lean upon the Catholic Center because of his opposition to the Agrarians and the National Democrats (the bourgeois party). Thus instead of separation from the State, the Roman Catholic Church received the treatment of a favored communion owing to its political strength; this was in the matter of the state support of the Church, which was regulated by the law of June 25, 1926.² Later on, even the Protestant churches were admitted to participation in this state support, but only from the budget voted periodically for this purpose, whereas the churches designated in the law of 1926 received their appropriations directly from the regular state budget. The difference between those two modes of support is that, in the event of a shortage, the voted budget might be cut accordingly, whereas the other, permanent, budget was not subject to such reduction.

The gradual readjustment of the Catholic Church to the

² F. Bednář, *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení ve věcech náboženských a církevních v republice československé* (Prague, 1929), p. 415.

new milieu, and its recovery of political and cultural influence, is in no small measure traceable to the religious and cultural influence of the Dominicans, Benedictines, Jesuits, and Franciscans. The first-named had their headquarters at Olomouc in Moravia, and were the leaders of the Neothomist movement. As in other countries, for instance in England, Dominicans undertook the translation of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas. They likewise exercised popular appeal by a publication entitled *Na blubinu*. With the Dominicans there was at first associated a popular Catholic writer, Jaroslav Durych, whose historical romances and other writings exercised a considerable sway over the youth of the country. One of his most widely read works was recently translated into English.³

The Benedictines were active in the Czech Catholic renaissance in the field of liturgy and church music, and in conducting popular lectures. One of the outstanding Benedictines, Abbot Ernest Vykoukal, of the Emmaus monastery, edited *Pax*. Another outstanding religious leader of the Czech Catholics was the abbot of the famous Premonstratensian monastery of Strahov, Dr. Methodius Zavoral. The Franciscans likewise played an important rôle in the movement, particularly in the work of establishing a rather extensive system of charitable centers and institutions and carrying on the work of social service. The Jesuits, as usual, engaged in school teaching, and also published a popular and widely circulated weekly.

Besides the work of the monastic orders, several influential organizations of a purely Catholic religious character helped to establish the Church as a factor in the life of the people. The League of St. Václav gathered into its ranks the educated classes. The college and university students had their own organization, the Academic League, which did rather effective work among

³ Jaroslav Durych, *Descent of the Idol* (New York, 1936).

them. The nonacademic youth, the clerks, apprentices, and factory workers, were organized in the Catholic Youth. The three groups published their own periodicals and other literature, and helped to consolidate the Church's influence among the people as a whole.

The progress made by the Roman Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia could be gauged by the popular success attending the First Congress of the Catholics of the Czechoslovak Republic, held in Prague on June 27-30, 1936.⁴ It was attended by the papal legate, Jean Cardinal Vergier, archbishop of Paris, and drew an immense crowd of visitors.

When the Pact of Munich delivered the Czech nation into the hands of the Nazi régime of the Reich, unfortunately a faction within the Catholic Church thought it an opportune moment to further their program. This was a militant, aggressive group of Catholics, with Jaroslav Durych as one of their leaders, who once more identified their cause with the opposition to the democratic Masaryk orientation of Czech culture. This noisy, denunciatory, fanatical faction tried to substitute the ultramontane policies symbolized in Czech history by St. Václav for the liberal, Protestant-inspired policies represented by the tradition of Jan Hus and Jan Amos Comenius, as interpreted by President Masaryk. But with the setting up of the "Protectorate" in March, 1939, the momentary flare-up of religious intolerance subsided. It should be stressed that the responsible political leaders of the Catholics, such as Msgr. Dr. Šrámek, did not share the views of the militant group, and remained loyal and faithful to the Masaryk-Beneš orientation. In fact, Dr. Šrámek fled abroad, joined the group of Czech political leaders gathered around Dr. Beneš, and became chairman of the National Com-

⁴ See *Acta et monumenta primi congressus Catholicorum reipublicae Cecoslovakiae* (Prague, 1936).

mittee. He was named premier in the Provisional Czechoslovak Government recognized by England on July 21, 1940.

Of those who seceded from the Roman Church after the setting up of the Republic, the majority organized themselves into an antipapal, nationalistic Czechoslovak Church. This body had its inception in the efforts of the "Unity of Catholic Clergy," which in 1919 undertook to wrest from the papal curia certain reforms which had been formulated two years earlier.⁵ Among the leaders of this group were Dr. Karel Farský, Father B. Zahradník-Brodský, Father G. A. Procházka, and others. The reforms comprised use of the vernacular in the liturgy, democratization of the parish organization, modifications in the training of theological students, lay representation in the governing bodies, abolition of compulsory celibacy, establishment of an autonomous Czechoslovak patriarchate, and a number of other items.

These demands met with a curt rejection by the papal curia. The more venturesome spirits among the reformist clergy thereupon contracted marriages, in order to force upon the hierarchy some reforms *via facti*. This defiance resulted in the adoption of stricter disciplinary measures: the archiepiscopal office condemned the demands as heretical and contrary to the papal encyclical *Pascendi*. Thereupon the proponents organized, on September 15, 1919, the "Club of Reformist Clergy." The archbishop retaliated in November, 1919, with an equally strict prohibition of the use of the vernacular in the Mass. Seeing the hopelessness of the task of obtaining their demands, the leaders of the reformists decided upon the radical measure of setting up a new national church. At the convention of the reformist clergy held on January 8, 1920, the Czechoslovak Church was organized, 140 delegates voting in favor of the organization and 66

⁵ *Náboženská revue*, VIII (1936), 102 ff.

against.* In a manifesto issued two days later, the character of the new communion was defined as follows:

The Czechoslovak Church, founded . . . on the basis of Christ's gospel, provisionally takes over, until such a time when its own order is established, the present religious order of the Roman Catholic church, adjusted to the spirit of democracy.

Consequently, it adopts as the fundamental principle of the Czechoslovak Church freedom of conscience and of religious conviction of each individual. Accordingly, no one may deprive another of his firm conviction or force anything upon it. . . .

The Czechoslovak Church, accordingly, takes over the present liturgical order, until this can be worked out in greater detail, with the exception, that all divine services . . . shall be conducted exclusively in the mother tongue.⁷

The new Czechoslovak Church grew with astonishing rapidity. As long as the movement involved primarily some two hundred recalcitrant or rebellious clergy, it was not regarded as dangerous; but when a large number of the lay membership followed their priests into the new communion, the hierarchy became alarmed. In some places, an entire parish entered the new body, as was true at the village of Kříč, where the parish of fifteen hundred members transferred its allegiance to the Czechoslovak Church. In Náchod, twenty thousand members withdrew from the Catholic Church. By 1922 there were 292 places of worship under the jurisdiction of the Czechoslovak Church.

The movement at first was Catholic, even though modernist and nationalist in character, but distinctly and bitterly antipapal and anti-Roman. It was in no sense a Protestant body, and at first did not wish to be so considered, although in the course

* F. M. Hník, *Za lepší církev* (Prague, 1930), p. 31.

⁷ V. Lemberk, *Církev československá* (Prague, 1921), p. 14.

of time it joined the ranks of Protestant communions.⁸ As a Catholic body, it needed an episcopate in the line of the recognized apostolic succession. In order to secure an ecclesiastical roof over their heads, the leaders of the movement attempted to win moral and ecclesiastical support in the Serbian Orthodox Church. As early as September 3, 1920, an overture was sent to the Hierarchical Sobor of the Serbian Orthodox Church,⁹ professing readiness to accept "the dogmatic teaching of the united Serbian Orthodox Church, expressed in the seven ecumenical councils and in the *Credo*, and to submit to the regulations and laws of the united Serbian Orthodox Church, reserving, however, freedom of conscience and a free religious development." But the Serbian Sobor must have been considerably surprised with the large number of special demands made by the petitioners: they wished to use the Czech language in the liturgy; for the present, to retain the accustomed rites (i.e., the Roman Catholic Mass); a democratic church government; the permission of clerical marriage even after ordination and for the second and the third time; the permission of married episcopacy; the rank of an autocephalous church as soon as the native bishops should receive consecration; the support of fifteen seminarians on the theological faculty at Belgrade; and several other items. Despite these demands, some of which—as the remarriage of the clergy after ordination and the married episcopate—could not be granted by any Orthodox Church, for they were contrary to the canons of the ecumenical councils, the Serbian Sobor acted favorably, except in the matter of the marriage of the clergy and bishops, which was referred to the next ecumenical council

⁸ This appears from its inclusion in the series edited by F. Siegmund-Schulze, under the general title of *Ekklesia*, in which Volume V, Part 20, is devoted to *Die Kirchen der Tschechoslowakei* (Leipzig, 1937). The Czechoslovak Church is here listed among the Protestant bodies.

⁹ Lemberk, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 ff.

for decision. The pro-Orthodox faction of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Church was in favor of accepting the Serbian reply as satisfactory; but the modernist faction voiced dissatisfaction with the refusal of the demand regarding clerical and episcopal marriages. After a period of tension and controversy, the pro-Orthodox group proved victorious and the Central Committee finally adopted, at its meeting on May 7, the dogmas of the Orthodox Church as the ideological basis of the new religious group. This resolution was approved by the Constituent Assembly which met in Prague in August, 1921. At that time it voted:

The Czechoslovak Church... stands upon the ideological base of the seven ecumenical councils and the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbol. . . . As by reason of this action there exists between the Czechoslovak and the Eastern Apostolic churches the same ideological foundation, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Church petitions that the bishops elected by its congregations be consecrated as soon as possible, so that the religious life of these congregations may not suffer

At the same time, three dioceses were erected; among the bishops-elect, Dr. K. Farský held not only the office of the bishop of Prague, but also that of metropolitan of the entire Church. But the consecration of the newly elected bishops did not proceed smoothly. When the Serbian metropolitan of Nish, Dositheos, came to Prague, only Bishop-elect Matthew Pavlík satisfied him with respect to his profession of, and adherence to, the Orthodox faith, and was consecrated to the episcopate by the Serbian patriarch at Sremski Karlovtsi. The other two Czech candidates were deemed by Dositheos too modernist in their theological views, and were consequently refused ordination.

Thereupon, there arose two parties within the Czechoslovak Church: the Orthodox party, confined largely to Moravia and headed by Bishop Matthew Pavlík, who after his elevation to

the episcopate assumed the name of Gorazd-Pavlík; and the modernist Czech party, headed by Dr. Farský. The latter, in collaboration with Professor František Kalous, issued in 1922 a catechism which was pronounced by Bishop Dositheos not only as non-Orthodox, but even as entirely outside the pale of all Christian creeds. Consequently, Dr. Farský realized that he could hope for no ordination at the hands of the Serbian patriarch. The third bishop-elect resigned.

The struggle between the two tendencies within the Czechoslovak Church in the end (1923-1924) led to the resignation of Bishop Gorazd-Pavlík from the episcopal office in the Czechoslovak Church. Henceforth, he devoted himself to the organization of his followers into a Czech Orthodox Church on a separate basis. Thus Dr. Farský was left alone as leader of the Church. Under his leadership the Czechoslovak Church renounced its former pro-Orthodox orientation, and in the end developed into a modernist communion, Unitarian in theology,¹⁰ strongly anti-Roman as well as anti-Orthodox.

Thereupon, the Czechoslovak Church was confronted once more by the task of deciding on the type of ecclesiastical polity on the basis of which its organization was to be built. Having failed to secure the episcopal ordination in some recognized line of apostolic succession, the leaders of the Church in the end decided to abandon any further search for it. Dr. Farský, and the rest of the new bishops as well, were ordained in 1924 presbyterially, although they assumed episcopal titles, Dr. Farský even receiving the title of patriarch. His successor, the present patriarch of the Church, is Dr. G. A. Procházka. Theologically, the Church is increasingly oriented in the direction of modernism, and has become a member of the International Association

¹⁰ Siegmund-Schultze, *op. cit.*, p. 178: a statement of the present patriarch of the Church, Dr. G. A. Procházka.

for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom, to which the American Unitarians and other radically modernist churches belong. In 1937 the membership comprised some 850,000 communicants.¹¹

The Protestant churches of Czechoslovakia likewise greatly profited by the establishment of the new Republic. Long before the World War, as well as during it, the possibility of uniting the two major evangelical communions—the Reformed and Lutheran—was discussed and received with favor. Thus, when religious liberty was granted by the Constitution of the new State, the ground was already prepared for action. No wonder therefore, that a week after the proclamation of the new State the representatives of the two churches met (November 5, 1918) and passed a resolution uniting the two churches into one, the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the basis of union being the *Confessio Bohemica* of 1575 and the Confession of the Czech Brethren of 1662. The Constituent Council, which met on December 17 and 18 of the same year, representing the churches of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, approved the union amid immense enthusiasm. Thus the native reforming tradition of the Czech Brethren, officially suppressed for three centuries, was revived along with the nation!¹²

The new organization was recognized by the State on November 25, 1919. Its membership was greatly increased as the result of the vast secession movement which ultimately cost the Roman Catholic Church one-sixth of its numbers. The Czech Brethren congregations in many places doubled and trebled, and in other places where none had existed before their churches were established and grew with astonishing rapidity. During the years 1921–1922, which marked the peak of this mass move-

¹¹ Siegmund-Schultze, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

¹² *Deset let českobratrské evangelické církve, 1918–1928* (Prague, 1928), pp. 13 ff.

ment, 55,769 joined the Czech Brethren Church; by 1927, when this movement subsided to assume more normal form, the total membership of the body rose from 160,000 (the 1918 figure) to 255,758, an increase of 60 per cent.¹³ In 1923 the work of the Church was extended into the territories of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. The latest statistics available (1935) reported 320,000 as the total membership.¹⁴ Accordingly, the Church has just doubled its membership since the establishment of the Republic.

Such an unprecedented increase called imperatively for increased ministerial forces. For many years the demand for ministers greatly exceeded the supply. But with the establishment of a Protestant theological seminary, known as the Jan Hus Theological Faculty (1919), this pressing necessity of training the Protestant ministerial students at home was provided for. Previously, under the Austrian régime, students for the ministry were obliged to study abroad—in Vienna, Basel, Aberdeen, Edinburgh, or at a German university—for there existed no provision for such training in Bohemia itself.

But despite the phenomenal growth of the Czech Brethren Church, the work of the Counter-Reformation had been so effective that Protestantism in Bohemia-Moravia is still weaker than in Slovakia. Accordingly, the strongest Protestant body numerically is the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in Slovakia, which according to the census of 1930 had 586,800 members in the entire Republic, of which 401,600 were in Slovakia. The Reformed Church in Czechoslovakia, the majority of whose members were Magyars, numbered over 219,000 members. Of course, the territory of this Church was

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 ff.

¹⁴ *Sedmý synod českobř. církve evangelické* (Prague, 1935), p. 33. It is estimated that for the remaining four years the normal increase could be placed at 20,000.

largely incorporated into Hungary in 1939. Besides these bodies, there are smaller communions, such as the Moravians, the Congregationalists, the Baptists, the Methodists, and a few others. These smaller bodies totaled a membership of over 31,000 in 1930, the largest among them being the Methodists with some 10,000. Altogether, the total number of Protestants, including the Czechoslovak Church, according to the statistics of 1930 was 1,923,200, as compared with 10,831,700 Roman Catholics.¹⁵ Owing to the recent radical changes in the boundaries of the country, the figures given do not reflect the present situation.

As for the cultural and religious life of the nation, despite its relative numerical inferiority, the Protestant element has played a rôle far beyond its strength in numbers. The president-liberator, Thomas G. Masaryk, had become, early in life, a convert to Protestantism, and remained a member of the Czech Brethren Church to the end. A large number of other political leaders were and are likewise members of one or another Protestant communion: Štefánik, the leader of the Slovaks during the struggle for independence; Premier Hodža, who served during the critical period in 1938; and Ivan Dérer, who was minister of education in the Hodža cabinet; in this group also are to be found ministers Slávid, Hurban, and Osuský—all of whom are grouped about Dr. Eduard Beneš in his struggle for the restoration of Czechoslovak independence. President Beneš' elder brother, Senator Vojta Beneš, is a member of the Czech Brethren Church. The two most outstanding Czech philosophers, both pupils and disciples of Masaryk, are likewise Protestants: Professor E. Rádl, whose originality in the treatment of ideas has made him justly famous; and Professor Jan B. Kozák, the son of an outstanding minister and himself formerly a minister of the Czech Brethren Church, who was until recently the

¹⁵ Siegmund-Schultze, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

leading member of the philosophical faculty of the University of Prague. He is at present teaching at Oberlin College. Among the theologians, none is more outstanding than Professor J. L. Hromádka, of the Jan Hus Theological Faculty, at present a member of the faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary, who has gained fame extending far beyond the confines of his own country.

The present period of the German "Protectorate" is characterized by destruction of all forms of Christianity except its own faith, which is the pagan faith of exalting the state as the highest object of loyalty. No Christian communion can give allegiance to this faith and remain Christian. The meaning of Czech history is essentially a religious one. Should the totalitarian Nazi philosophy become dominant, it would bring about the downfall not only of Christianity in Czechoslovakia, as elsewhere, but of the Czechoslovak nation itself. The nation existed before Naziism. It shall exist after it!

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EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY

BY FRANCIS H. STUERM

WHEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC took over the schools of the former provinces of Austria-Hungary from which it was formed, its Czech citizens were already democrats through inclination and generations of training. However, this training had not been gained in the schools. The Czechs were democratic because their former Habsburg ruler had made them classless, three centuries before, by decimating their nobility and because for generations they had learned coöperation in united opposition to the Habsburgs. Under the empire, the Czechs' chief medium for training in democracy had been their gymnastic societies, the Sokols.

The Austrian schools had been developed under a central administration determined to discipline young people for satisfied subjection to the Habsburgs. Decrees from the Ministry of Education at the imperial capital had been sent to provincial capitals, from which they were relayed to counties and towns, to school directors and teachers. The teacher in his classroom had been a more or less benevolent despot who expected his orders to be obeyed literally and his teachings to be memorized.

The whole imperial school system had emphasized the development of passive obedience in the pupil. The resulting

graduate of the schools had been an imperial citizen such as survived during the Republic to be called the "old generation" (*stará generace*). In his manner he was a cheerfully deferential "Austrian" subject. In essential character, however, he was usually a vigorous, active man who thought sturdily for himself and coöperated efficiently with his fellow Czechs in their unending, uphill fight to extend the nation's liberties.

One of the fruits of Czech political victories had been a continual expansion of the number of schools in which instruction was given in the Czech language. Even though the language of instruction changed, the method and purpose of the schools had not. Under the empire, they remained instruments of discipline for subjection.

Czech teachers had led the empire's educators in studying and advocating innovations of method. Their proposals, however, seldom passed the stage of theoretical discussion and pigeonholing in the files of the Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, in spite of rigid imperial adherence to methods of despotic discipline, the inherent character of the people of the Bohemian provinces had made it possible for certain democratic customs to develop within their schools, even under the empire.

The people of Bohemia and Moravia, for instance, had never built up the aristocratic *Vorschule* type of institution such as the English, the French, the Germans, and most other European peoples maintained for children who were expected to continue in the secondary school. In the Bohemian Crown Lands the children of all families of the population had always attended the five classes of the lower-primary school together.

Also, the democratic coöperation of the Czech people had always made it possible for a poor boy to get help in paying his way through the secondary school, if his teachers found him talented, thus assuring every potential leader a good education.

After the five-year lower-primary school, the majority of the young people in the towns attended the junior high school, the urban higher-primary school (*měšťanská škola*), often called the "people's secondary school." It afforded a practical preparation for the technical schools and gave the rank and file of Bohemian democrats the book learning necessary for efficient coöperation through the Sokols in the long fight for the nation's independence. Country children attended an eight-year primary school.

In the technical schools themselves, especially on the skilled levels, instruction was given chiefly by the method of individual work, which helped develop the habit of independent thought, one of the bases of democracy.

Ideas from abroad.—After the Republic was established, teachers who were interested in liberalization of method soon took advantage of their newly gained freedom to make study trips abroad. They attended progressive schools of pedagogy and observed progressive teaching in the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, England, and in the new Russia. They returned home filled with ideas and enthusiasm.

A few of them managed to establish small private schools, precariously supported by pupils' parents and other well-wishers. Most of these schools eventually "succumbed to financial difficulties." Bakule's and Bartoš' (Jedlička's) institutes for cripples, with their Tolstoyan collective activities, survived the longest. Sedlák and Žitný's school at Prague-Holešovice, experimenting in coöperation, lasted five years. Mužík's Tolstoyan experimental class at Prague—Nové Město ran for three years. Miss Kuehnlová's famous experimental class "u Studánky," applying American, Tolstoyan, and Dalcroze ideas, was discontinued when she joined the regular school system. The celebrated liberal three-room school at Krnsko, subsidized by the Government for the

orphans of Czech legionnaires of the World War, and taught artistically by Havránek, Krch, and Švarc, was closed when the youngest orphan was fifteen years old. The "Free School of Work" at Kladno, maintained by communist parents and teachers, was closed because of their impoverishment during the economic depression.

The chief task of the first decade.—Most of the teachers and the administrators of the regular school system were really too busy during the first decade of the Republic increasing the number of schools to liberalize their methods.

The Republic's guaranty to its minorities of instruction in their native tongue required the maintenance of schools taught in fifteen languages. The granting of equal opportunities to girls increased the number of secondary schools and the number and variety of schools teaching women's occupations. A comprehensive system of adult education was set up for citizens previously underprivileged, and a system of public libraries was established to supplement this work. The number of general and technical schools of all levels was increased greatly.

One of the Republic's largest educational tasks was to set up a complete system of education in the provinces of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. In these former provinces of Hungary there had been no universities or secondary schools taught in the vernacular, and not enough primary schools conducted in any language to teach more than half the population for four school years.

The herculean efforts of the Czechs, whose new republican government was administered by trained educators, succeeded within its first decade in extending schooling until nearly one-fifth of the whole population of all ages was continuously in attendance at schools. The busy educators of the new Republic contented themselves during this period in maintaining the

high instructional standards of the existing schools in the Czech provinces, and in trying to make all other schools measure up to these standards. The only curricular changes at this time in the public schools already up to standard were the revision of the history course from its Habsburg interpretation, and the introduction into all schools of the subject "fatherland lore" (*vlastivěda*), which had originated in Bohemia in 1915.

An American impulse.—During the Republic's early years there was a young Czech educator, Dr. Václav Příhoda, who was studying in the United States. He remained in America for several years, during which time he taught in a high school in Chicago, studied in the School of Education at the University of Chicago and at Teachers College, Columbia, observed the work of many American schools, and became profoundly influenced by the ideas of Dewey and Thorndike. When he returned to teach at Prague University, he also accepted a post at the School of Higher Pedagogical Studies, which the Czechoslovak Teachers' Community (association) had founded privately in 1921.

At that school—whose functions closely resembled those of Columbia's Teachers College, and whose classes were attended on week-ends by teachers from all over the Republic—he presented a reform plan which soon became the creed of all Czechoslovaks interested in school reform. It called for unity schools on each level, with classes differentiated within according to intelligence measured by a Thorndike type of objective test. The five-year lower-primary school was to be followed by a six-year "cosmopolitan" high school including instruction currently given in secondary schools and junior high schools, and in technical schools of their levels. The system was to be topped off by a four-year collegiate institution, and a three-year university graduate school. Instruction was to be by the democratic method

of integrated Deweyite project activities, which provide opportunity and stimulation for independent individual thought, "self-instruction," and voluntary public coöperation.

As early as 1925 the active leaders, who called themselves the Reform Committee at the School of Higher Pedagogical Studies, crystallized around Dr. Příhoda and his creed. By 1928 the committee had aroused enough public interest to support a request to the Ministry of Education seeking authorization for an experiment in school reform.

When Minister Dérer set up committees in 1929 for the reform of the schools, he chose the nucleus of his lower-primary and junior high school committee from Dr. Příhoda's Reform Committee at the School of Higher Pedagogical Studies. Dr. Příhoda himself was appointed chairman of this governmental committee.

With the prompt acceptance of the committee's recommendations by Minister Dérer, educational experiment under the Republic passed from its privately sponsored phase (that of 1919-1929) into its public phase (1929-1934). This transition was particularly significant in Czechoslovakia, because virtually all the children in the Republic attended public schools. Experimental education had never had a real chance for success until taken over into the public school system.

Public reform.—In the autumn of 1929 the Minister of Education authorized the establishment of experimental junior high schools (called Komenia, in honor of Comenius) and of lower-primary experimental schools.

The reformers were given free rein in certain school districts, where the majority of the parents were willing, to set up experimental schools. In order to attain coeducation, which was one of their tenets, they combined the local boys' school and the local girls' school in each district. Parents not in sympathy with

the experiments in method were requested to transfer their children to the nearest old-line school. Local conservative teachers were likewise asked to transfer elsewhere, so that the new school could be staffed by reformers.

The experimental schools were set up in industrial suburbs of Prague, in an industrial suburb of Brno, and throughout the whole school system of shoe-manufacturing Zlín, districts where worker-parents agreed to have this democratic "work" (activities) method tried. At the latter place, the reformers found a firm friend in Tomáš Baťa, the world's greatest shoe manufacturer and the most influential man in the district. Baťa's chief personal contribution to the industrial system had been an arrangement under which the managers both of his big factory units and of his sales units compete with each other like private proprietors. In order to make this arrangement effective, Baťa needed managers who could think for themselves. For this reason he welcomed the new democratic school methods which did away with the teaching of passive acceptance of authority and developed habits of independent thought and voluntary public coöperation in pupils.

The new schools got off to a lively start in the autumn of 1929. Conservative teachers everywhere in the Republic feared weakening of the high standards of the national schools through possible "soft pedagogy," and said so in lectures, articles, and pamphlets.

The Czechs have always considered the maintenance of the national culture as a duty sacred in its importance. Therefore, the best means of passing it on to the rising generation was regarded as a vital concern of the whole nation. The people generally were so interested in the new methods that they read articles eagerly, discussed the new schools vigorously—and split sharply into two groups. Conservatives predominated at first.

All the Komenia managed, nevertheless, to open without mishap. In some of the lower-primary experimental districts, however, even with the best possible preparation of local public opinion, opposition of a minority of the parents was so strong that the Ministry had to delay official authorization of their experimental status for a year.

In the new experimental schools the reformers, now in actual control, began applying their democratic teaching methods in a daily "open house" for parents, who were invited to come in to observe classes at any time they wished. In these districts, in fact, school visiting was never limited until the parents themselves eventually voted restrictions in their newly formed parent-teacher associations. They generally cut visiting down to a single day a week.

Organization of parent-teacher associations was another suggestion of the teacher-reformers incorporated in their pedagogical creed. Public coöperation was thus brought to bear upon the life of each experimental school from the beginning, and helped extend the field of pupils' study to include the life of the whole community.

It was the strong practical strain in the Czech character which caused initial reluctance among the citizens to permit change in schools which they knew were good. It was this same vein of common sense which made them support the new pedagogy once they were convinced that its practices were really as solid as they were democratic. By 1933, most of the changes made in the national curricula were innovations that had been suggested and tested in the experimental schools. By 1934, the experimental schools were licensed annually as model schools for experimenting with proposed innovations. In other words, they had become an accepted part of the national life.

Interest in their activities never died down. Articles on the

new schools appeared frequently in the general press, thus stimulating lay interest. The educational press never relaxed the vigor of its comment upon them; the bulk of the comment, however, gradually grew favorable. Teachers kept on visiting and observing the work of the progressive schools; and since the Republic's law granted competent teachers freedom of method, there was soon scarcely a schoolroom in which democratic method could not be discovered.

Everyone in the country learned a great deal about the new democratic teaching methods. Officials and public-spirited citizens responded gladly when committees of pupils asked them to speak at school assemblies. Manufacturers played the host proudly when children visited their plants, explaining the work to them and answering questions kindly; they also helped working groups of pupils in making outside studies and in developing projects at the schools. The majority of the junior high schools adopted systems of real pupil self-government, and established parent-teacher associations.

The graduate typical of the new democratic school was a straight thinker who could express himself with clear brevity, help plan well in a citizens' discussion group, and then coöperate with sensibly directed, wholehearted energy in carrying out a public project. Also, his habits of efficiency served him well in doing his daily work. He could have been observed, years before graduation, at eleven or twelve years of age, doing practical arithmetic problems in family expense and income, and with figures from the statistical annual of his province. As against the old method of group drilling, he was taught arithmetic in the new school by class discussion in the first and fourth hours of the week, and by individual practice in the second and third.

The new graduate was essentially well grounded in grammar, because he had been taught inductively, with plenty of prac-

tice in oral reports, group discussion, logical group planning of topics, and subsequent writing on his own initiative. His school work had alternated between the "self-instruction" of carrying on a good "workbook" and teamwork with his fellows. He had had as teachers highly trained professionals, expert both at tacit leadership in letting him work out things for himself, and in giving him information briefly when he asked for it. He had been trained to consider problems in practical comprehensive units. A youngster manually inclined developed habits of thinking in terms of various solid materials, and skill in carrying out his plans in the medium of his choice.

During the golden age of Czech democracy under the Republic, children coöperated freely in their classroom in the singing of patriotic songs and in the artistic speaking chorus, all of which heightened their feeling of national unity. They also learned to engage in public-spirited activity, an example of which was the paving of the Židenice suburb of Brno: a casual remark by a pupil in a classroom began a community project which enlisted the coöperation of parents, teachers, city authorities, engineers, and physicians, and eventually the enthusiastic support of the whole community.

Very few lower-primary schools set up self-government systems because it was found from experiment that they could not be effectively carried out below the fifth grade, the final year. However, in the first two grades, children developed their democratic habits (independent thought and coöperation) in projects permitted under the "free schedule." This enabled teachers to follow any program they chose, as long as they attained certain teaching objectives during the first two years. (In actual practice, the teacher usually took stock of class accomplishments under the free schedule about every second week.)

Under such a free schedule, a second-year pupil's remark

about a toy he had seen on his way to school or the winter dish of carp his family had enjoyed might open an avenue for a project study of products brought to Prague, say, during the winter. Children's drawings and paper models of all sorts of products, from overcoats and shoes to Christmas-tree ornaments, would soon fill the classroom. They would serve as excellent media for arithmetic, or as inspiration for the reading of simple Christmas stories or for group discussion of the season's customs, which would lead in turn to the children's choosing their own topics for composition and the songs they wished to sing together.


Such an activity might occupy the children for days, giving them a great deal of information and practice in every subject of the primary curriculum, as well as in the habits of a self-governing citizen. The only thing a good teacher would avoid was forcing a project to continue artificially if his pupils' interest began to flag.

Democratic habits, thus implanted in the lower-primary schools, were given full play in the liberal junior high schools with their fully developed pupil self-government. Clubs with interests of many kinds flourished in both.

However, in the secondary school, democratic teaching methods, permitted under the revision of 1934, were actually applied in spirit rather than in form. This was not necessarily because the public opposed change in the secondary schools longer than in the primary and junior high schools. It was chiefly due to the great mass of closely integrated, logically developed factual knowledge which the secondary school was required to impart, making adherence to old-line (logically developed) lecture methods, with occasional severe ten-minute oral quizzing, advisable as bringing the desired results more quickly than the new methods.



VACLAV SQUARE FROM THE NATIONAL MUSEUM, PRAGUE



THE NATIONAL THEATER, PRAGUE

Self-government organizations were not set up in the secondary schools, except in the single liberal-method "Athenaeum" (run as an officially "private" venture at Nusle by the Reform Committee at the School of Higher Pedagogical Studies). However, secondary school pupils of Bohemia and Moravia had always taken an active part in the public life of their communities, as members of junior sections of cultural and political organizations, both in chapters at their schools and in the communities at large. Also, on a school or a class basis, the pupils had always coöperated more or less informally in dramatic and other cultural and social activities, which naturally were the center of community interest. They simply had no time for further coöperation, if they were to pass their heavy schedule of studies.

Similarly, at the universities, although teachers might as individuals advocate the new methods, no change was made. The only innovation was five years of psychological and informational measurement of freshmen enrolled under the natural science faculty, a study whose results were published but were not applied.

Both university students and professors were permitted entire freedom not only of thought but of action as well. They could and did organize along any cultural and political lines they wished, or join such outside organizations as they chose. They used these opportunities both as graduates and as undergraduates to lead the nation in discussion and action. The republican "paradise of the Ph.D." continually welcomed new degree holders to help it govern itself.

Summary and conclusions.—The emotional basis of Czech democracy was the same inherent staying power which had maintained the nation in its precarious geographical situation since early tribal times. In harmony with the common-sense

practicality founded on this sturdy perseverance, the Czechs had built up in their character centuries-old habits of independent individual thought and public coöperation. These are, of course, the very stuff of democracy. In Austrian times, the training in the schools overlaid the Czech's democratic character with a surface attitude of acquiescent passivity. When the establishment of the Republic gave Czech democracy opportunity to flourish unhampered in its action, progressive educators developed a new method which gave it direct expression. Although the innovation was grounded solidly, the new country had entered on its second decade before the educational efforts bore widespread results. Graduates of the "new schools" were straightforward democrats who grew up with habits of democracy functioning as easily as the process of breathing. They represented the full flowering of democracy, a people inherently democratic, trained by itself for the maximum of individual freedom under an orderly government—efficient self-government.

The fact that the educational method which perfected the development of Czech democracy found its stimulus in the United States illustrates strikingly for Americans what can be accomplished with the ideas of their educators. Now that the military power of a much larger nation has crushed self-government and forced the Czechs into opposition once more, the strength of their recent training has become, if possible, even more impressive than before. It enables the present-day generation educated under the Republic to oppose a propaganda machine and police power such as the "old generation" under the easy-going old Austrian absolutists never dreamed of.

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Chapter XVII

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCIENCE

BY GERALD DRUCE

WHEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE regained its independence in 1918, its men of science looked forward to a future of fruitful, constructive effort. The tragic fate that has overtaken their country has, alas, put an end to twenty years of successful research and educational development.

Despite a long period of subjugation, the nation was able to look back with some pride upon a tradition of achievement in the field of science and learning. The University of Prague, the oldest in central Europe, had been founded in 1348 by Charles IV and had been placed upon a secure footing by his successor, Václav IV, by the Kutná Hora decrees in 1409. During the Middle Ages the study of the natural sciences flourished in Bohemia, as is shown by the number of herbals and contemporary mineralogical and alchemical works in the Czech language. Indeed, toward the close of the sixteenth century Prague was recognized as an important center of learning.

With the defeat in 1620 of Frederick, the elected king of Bohemia and son-in-law of James I of England, not only did the Czech nation lose its independence but an end was put to all cultural and scientific activities for more than a century. The

greatest Czech educator, Comenius (Jan Amos Komenský), was exiled, and, though his works were appreciated in Holland, Sweden, and Britain, they were denied to his own people. Prague University was handed over to the Jesuits, who had little use for science, and, although Adam Zalužanský, in 1604, had insisted that botany, for example, should be considered a separate subject, what courses were given included fragments from all the sciences.

Among the few distinguished professors during this "age of darkness" was Jan Bohadsch (Boháč), but even his comprehensive "*Flora, Fauna et Historia Regni Lapidei Bohemiae*" remained in manuscript. After he died in 1768 the chair of science remained vacant until 1775, when his pupil Zauschner gave some German lectures on natural history. He was followed by J. G. Mikan, a medical man who taught mainly chemistry.

A scientific revival first became possible toward the beginning of the last century. Indeed, the Czech national revival would seem to have commenced through the endeavors of enthusiastic men of science such as the Presls, Purkyně, and Sedláček, and of the historians Dobrovský, Šafařík, and Palacký, who received the patronage and help of certain enlightened noblemen, such as Count Kolovrat, Count Ignatius Born (who founded the Bohemian Scientific Society in 1775), Count Canal (who established an institute for the study of applied and economic botany), and especially Count Kašpar Sternberg, the first president of the Bohemian National Museum, which he was largely instrumental in founding in 1818.

The National Museum, with its ever-increasing collections of minerals and other specimens, developed an interest in science, though after Sternberg's death in 1838 it widened its scope to become a rallying point of all Czech culture. This was a period when Bohemia possessed a number of famous biologists

such as the brothers Presl, A. J. Corda, F. M. Opiz, A. Frič, and J. E. Purkyně. The University could not escape the effects of the national revival movement, and outstanding personalities like Purkyně lectured in Czech, despite official disapproval. Eventually, in 1882, the University was divided into the Czech (Charles) University and the German (Ferdinand) University, the latter retaining most of the buildings and possessions.

Despite difficult circumstances, the Czech men of science began to make valuable contributions to their special branches. Their first modern chemist was Štolba, who was followed by Bohuslav Brauner, but only after persistent pleas was the new Chemical Institute erected in 1903, largely on the strength of Brauner's international reputation from his work on the rare earths and atomic weights. A few other institutes, for example, for physics and botany, were eventually built, but the more specialized branches of science had to wait until the establishment of the Republic to have more than improvised accommodation.

Brauner died in 1935, after having made numerous discoveries in chemistry which gained for him many international honors. He studied under Bunsen at Heidelberg and under Roscoe at Manchester. His extensive investigations, mostly conducted before 1918, were directed toward substantiating Mendeléeff's Periodic Law enunciated in 1869 but only slowly accepted by men of science and then chiefly as a result of Brauner's advocacy and his work in removing some of the anomalies. Thus, Brauner "split" didymium into three rare elements, praseodymium, neodymium, and samarium, and it is to him that we owe the modern exact atomic weights of some of the elements. In this connection his pupil Professor J. H. Křepelka has continued this work of exact atomic weight determination and recently extended Brauner's pioneer work.

Brauner's accurate analytical work was the means of his suc-

cess in separating and identifying the very difficult group of rare-earth metals, a field in which another of his pupils, Professor J. Štěrbá-Böhm (1875-1938), also made discoveries relating to the compounds of germanium and scandium, many of which were made by him for the first time. This work is being continued by Professor O. Tomíček.

Perhaps the most outstanding chemical researches carried out in Czechoslovakia during the two decades 1918-1938 were the polarographic studies of Professor J. Heyrovský, using his dropping-mercury cathode method. With a number of collaborators Heyrovský has published over four hundred scientific communications on this subject. The polarograph is an instrument which shows automatically the amount of metal present in a solution by a wave in the deposition curve, registered automatically on photographic paper. As it becomes better known, the method is finding application in analytical procedure for all branches of pure and applied chemistry and has been used in the study of "heavy water."

Among the other distinguished Czech chemists of today, mention must be made of Professors E. Votoček, for his work on lesser-known sugars; A. Šimek, of Brno, for his physico-chemical researches on some peculiar properties exhibited by tellurium dioxide; C. K. Krauz, for his work on nitro compounds; J. Milbauer, for his work on catalysis and in photochemistry; V. Dubský, for his new precipitants for metals; J. Peklo, for his phytopathological investigations; J. Baborovský and the late J. Stoklasa, for their many contributions to science during the life of the Republic.

Chemical science in Czechoslovakia was served by several periodicals, namely, *Chemické listy* (founded in 1877), *Chemický obzor*, *Casopis českého lékařnictva*, and in particular for English- and French-speaking peoples the *Collection of*

Czechoslovak Chemical Communications, founded in 1929 and edited by Professors Votoček and Heyrovský. In the space of ten years the last-named periodical published hundreds of contributions in pure chemistry, recording the researches of the chemical institutes of the universities and technical colleges of Prague, Brno, and elsewhere. These articles were read by men of science all over the world, for the *Collection* is to be found in many university and other scientific libraries that would not normally receive Czech scientific literature.

Modern scientific and technical works in Czech began with the publications of Jan Svatopluk Presl, Václav Sedláček, and others from 1820 onward. The textbooks and treatises used in schools and colleges in 1938 were in no way inferior to those in use in any other country; and science is the poorer through the cessation of research and cultural activities in Czechoslovakia.

In physics the late Professor V. Posejpal (1874-1935) is known through his examination of the refractivity of gases at low pressures, and on account of his work on fluorescence phenomena, resonance, and spectroscopy. Professor V. Dolejšek, a pupil of Professor Manne Siegbahn, has developed modern X-ray spectroscopy, a work cognate with that of the Radium Institutes at Prague and Jáchymov (St. Joachimsthal), where uranium ores were worked up for radium. It will be recalled that it was while working with pitchblende from Jáchymov that Mme Curie discovered radium and initiated the whole science of radioactivity at the close of the last century. The mines have passed into German hands now, but during the period when the Czechs were able to develop their own scientific resources they extracted some hundred grams of radium salts in a pure state for scientific and medical use. Actually, the hundredth gram was isolated in 1936, and to obtain this amount no less than 10,000 tons of ore were treated with about 30,000 tons of chemicals.

Despite the fact that Tycho Brahe and Kepler carried out most of their observations in Prague during the period of its medieval greatness, the Czechs did not possess an important observatory until after the establishment of the Republic. General Milan Štefánik, the Slovak astronomer, studied, not in central Europe, but at Meudon observatory, near Paris. Until October, 1938, Czechoslovakia possessed four observatories and 120 meteorological stations. Of these, many were lost by the partition, including the Slovak observatory of Stará Ďala. A new one was to have been erected at Přerov in Moravia to replace it. The Czechoslovak Astronomical Society changed the title of its journal from *Říše hvězd* (The Kingdom of the Stars) to *Začínáme znovu* (We Begin Again) in a brave attempt to sustain an interest in its science.

It was in the biological sciences that Czech men of science made noteworthy advances a century ago. J. S. and K. B. Presl contributed to systematic botany, including a pioneer study of the cryptogams, and Purkyně (sometimes known as Purkinje) developed physiology and other fields of zoölogy. His researches covered such subjects as microscopic anatomy, cytology, neurology, physiology of vision and of the ear, biochemistry, and anthropology. Working under most unfavorable conditions (up to 1830 without a compound microscope), he laid the foundations in every subject he studied.

Count Kašpar Sternberg was interested in both biology and mineralogy and was a patron of Czech science at the time of the national awakening, as well as being an original investigator himself. His *Flora der Vorwelt*, based upon a study of fossil plants in Bohemian coal and written in conjunction with the Presls and A. J. Corda, remains a classic in plant paleontology.

Throughout the nineteenth century Czechoslovak biologists contributed much toward the development of knowledge in

various branches of plant and animal life. Dr. A. Frič made an exhaustive survey of European birds, and Professor F. Vejdvorský made important advances in comparative anatomy and embryology. Professor Velenovský's studies of fungi formed a basis of much modern knowledge concerning these lower plants, and Professor L. Čelakovský, who began valuable work on anatomy and plant physiology, has been succeeded by Professor B. Němec, who has also contributed much toward our present knowledge of bacteria and other microorganisms. Both he and Professor K. Domin have spent much time on botanical excursions in different parts of the world. Professor Domin recently compiled a comprehensive *Flora* of the Republic. Other botanical questions, such as those connected with symbiosis, have been investigated by Professor J. Peklo.

The semipopular biological journal *Vesmír* (The Universe) is a worthy successor to Presl's *Krok* and Purkyně's *Živa*, two pioneer periodicals that developed public interest in natural history at the beginning and during the middle of the last century.

Recently, Professor Němec wrote an entertaining volume, *Duše rostlin* (The Soul of Plants), setting out many interesting details concerning plant growth and adaptations, which is well worthy of translation into English.

At the beginning of the last century the French geologist Barrande, whose name appears in letters of gold upon the face of the rock he studied near Prague, came to Bohemia and made exhaustive investigations of the geological formations, minerals, and fossils of the district. Since 1918, Professor F. Slavík has continued Barrande's work both in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. Professor K. Absolon, curator of the Brno Museum, has made interesting archaeological discoveries relating to the antiquity of man. Excavations in mid- and southern Moravia at Předmost and Věstonice have revealed the settlements occupied

by mammoth hunters some twenty thousand years ago. Carved and plastic figures representing heads or bodies of contemporary animals and of a prehistoric beauty, the Věstonice Venus, to the modeling of which the artist gave evidently much thought and skill, show a remarkably high level of ability. Indeed, it is conjectured that diluvial man could count, since there were marks on bones found at Předmost which suggest that he had a scheme of reckoning.

At least two contemporary Czechoslovak men of science have gained eminence in the United States of America, namely, the late Professor J. V. Daneš and Dr. Aleš Hrdlička. The former carried out valuable surveys of the geographical distribution of populations, both in central Europe and in America. Dr. Hrdlička has conducted many anthropological studies during his association with the Smithsonian Institution.

In the field of applied science, Czechoslovak investigators have made their contributions to the general stock of useful knowledge. This is exemplified by their work in sugar and glass technology and in medicine.

An aspect of the country's national health policy was to provide adequate hospital and sanatoria facilities for the whole population. It was supplemented by the development of schools of medicine, which attracted considerable admiration from medical men in other countries. In particular, the dermatological researches of Professor V. Šamberger and Dr. E. Petráček attracted attention beyond the nation's confines.

Mention must also be made of the scientific work of the Sudete Germans, who, until the recent political upheaval in central Europe, worked in harmony with their Czech fellow citizens.

It will be recalled that Mendel was an abbot of Brno, where his experiments on the crossing of peas led to the origin of the

science of genetics. The botanists Sachs, Molisch, and Czapek were all connected with the German University of Prague, and so were the physicists Mach, Lecher, and Einstein. After the division of 1882, the German University of Prague concentrated mainly upon a study of German literature. Nevertheless, work of permanent scientific value has been achieved in recent years by Professors V. Rothmund, in physical chemistry; E. F. Freundlich, in astronomy; E. Waldschmidt-Leitz, in microchemistry; and E. G. Pringsheim and V. Czurda, in plant physiology; as well as by M. Stark, in mineralogy, and F. Starkenstein, in plant chemistry.

The German University served the German-speaking community of Czechoslovakia and, like the Czech universities of Prague and Brno, attracted many students from abroad. It will be seen that their liberation in 1918 did not blind the Czechs to their obligations in regard to the higher education and cultural needs of the other nationalities within the frontiers of the Republic, and adequate provision was made for them in elementary, secondary, and technical schools. The Germans in Czechoslovakia were the only minority to possess a university of their own.

Altogether, the Republic possessed some twenty-eight institutions of university rank. Advanced science teaching and original work were carried on at the universities and the polytechnics, and at various special schools such as that for mining at Příbram, at the Brno veterinary college, and at forestry schools and institutes for glass technology. All had generous support from an enlightened government. Moreover, a number of industrial undertakings also fostered specialized research work. Among these must be included the radium institutes, the research laboratories of the Chemical Union, and those of the sugar industry, the leather trade, and the forestry and agricul-

ture commission. Much of the horticulture at Blatná was work of a scientific character.

After twenty years of freedom, in which Czechoslovakia made remarkable contributions in many spheres of culture and education, the country was first mutilated (in September, 1938), and then overrun (March, 1939), by a ruthless enemy entirely out of sympathy with Czech aspirations and culture. Within the country today there can be no free expression or development in the arts or sciences, so that, just as in the seventeenth century, the nation's culture is being maintained by those of its people who are in exile.

At the moment, therefore, the efforts of the National Awakeners of the last century (which seemed to have been finally crowned with success after 1918) have been temporarily brought to naught. By courageously working for a reversal of recent events, it will still be possible that the words of Comenius, "I believe that, after the tempest of God's wrath . . . shall have passed, the rule of thy country will again return unto thee, O Czech nation!" will again come true.

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Much information is to be gained from the Museum journal, *Časopis Českého Musea*, 1827-1938, as well as from the various Czechoslovak periodicals and bulletins of learned societies and institutions, for example, *Sborník Masarykovy Akademie Práce* (Proceedings of the Masaryk Academy of Work), and *Rozpravy České Akademie Věd a*

ture commission. Much of the horticulture at Blatná was work of a scientific character.

After twenty years of freedom, in which Czechoslovakia made remarkable contributions in many spheres of culture and education, the country was first mutilated (in September, 1938), and then overrun (March, 1939), by a ruthless enemy entirely out of sympathy with Czech aspirations and culture. Within the country today there can be no free expression or development in the arts or sciences, so that, just as in the seventeenth century, the nation's culture is being maintained by those of its people who are in exile.

At the moment, therefore, the efforts of the National Awakeners of the last century (which seemed to have been finally crowned with success after 1918) have been temporarily brought to naught. By courageously working for a reversal of recent events, it will still be possible that the words of Comenius, "I believe that, after the tempest of God's wrath . . . shall have passed, the rule of thy country will again return unto thee, O Czech nation!" will again come true.

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Chapter XVIII

CZECHOSLOVAK MUSIC, ART, AND LITERATURE

BY JAROSLAV E. VOJAN

IS NOT POSSIBLE to discuss the last two decades of Czechoslovak music, art, and literature without a brief account of the development of these cultural activities in the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia up to 1920.

CZECHOSLOVAK MUSIC

Modern Czech music was founded by Bedřich Smetana. He, Antonín Dvořák, and Zdeněk Fibich were the creative leaders of the first romantic period, from 1865 to 1900.

Smetana (1824–1884) created modern Czech music without having had any predecessors and put it at once on the level of the most modern music of his time. He wrote tragic and comic operas, symphonic poems, songs, choruses, piano and chamber-music compositions. His music was recognized as being typically Czech. His charming comic opera, *The Bartered Bride* (first performance in Prague, May 30, 1866; in New York, February 19, 1909), known all over the world, reflects the spirit of the Czech people both in its lyrical mood and in its humor. Smetana's culminating works were the festival opera *Libuše* (the legendary Czech ruler who, with her husband Přemysl, founded the dynasty of the Přemyslides) and the cycle of six

symphonic poems, *Má Vlast* (My Country). The second poem of this cycle, "Vltava" (in German, Moldau, the main river of Bohemia), is very popular in the United States. These poems glorify the historical past of the Czechs and express Smetana's unshaken belief in the coming independence of his nation. The fifth poem, "Tábor," bears the name of the stronghold of the invincible leader of the Hussites, Jan Žižka, in the fifteenth century. The last poem is called "Blaník," for a mountain in southern Bohemia where, according to a folk legend, the army of Hussites sleeps ready to come to her aid whenever Bohemia finds herself in the greatest danger. The opera *Libuše* closes with Libuše's prophetic words, "My dear Czech nation will never die; it will overcome all horrors of the ages!" These compositions are the Czech national evangel. They poured new strength into the heart of the nation during the World War; they give new courage today. In the first concert of the 1939 May Music Festival the conductor of the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra, Václav Talich, at the close of the cycle *My Country*, faced the audience, raised the score to his lips, and kissed it, a spontaneous act of patriotic fervor which expresses the feeling of the Czech nation toward Smetana.

Dvořák (1841-1904) was a fiery musician and a divinely simple soul. His wealth of inspiration was unique. His *Slavonic Dances* (1878) took the public by storm. His great oratorio *Stabat Mater* (London, Albert Hall, March 13, 1883) won him the sympathies of the English public. The University of Cambridge bestowed its degree of Doctor of Music upon him in 1891. The following year he became head of the National Conservatory of Music in New York (1892-1895). Dvořák's Fifth Symphony in E minor, *From the New World* (New York, December 16, 1893), ranks with Schubert's Unfinished Symphony and Chaikovsky's *Pathétique* as one of the most popular sym-

phonies in the United States. Dvořák's chamber-music works (quartets and quintets), his Violin Concerto in A minor (1879) and Violoncello Concerto in B minor (1894), belong to the present world repertoire.

Fibich (1850–1900) was the creator of modern Czech melodrama. He began with melodramas for the concert podium, such as Schumann wrote, and then composed the trilogy *Hippodamia*, which consists of three all-evening dramas by Jaroslav Vrchlický, acted on the stage to the continuous orchestral accompaniment of symphonic music.

Josef B. Foerster (born 1859) is at present the nestor of Czechoslovak composers. He is a master of lyrical style. His operas and symphonies are of this character. His choruses for male and female choirs combine natural melodiousness with lyrical pathos. His eightieth birthday anniversary was celebrated by the Prague Teachers' Male and Female Choruses on December 19, 1939, at the Smetana Concert Hall in Prague. Foerster is the bridge between the first romantic period and the second generation of Czech composers.

The second period, from 1900 to 1920, had Vítězslav Novák, Josef Suk, Otakar Ostrčil, and Leoš Janáček as its leaders.

Novák (born 1870) explored new paths in musical composition. He combines creative intellectualism with passionate eruptiveness in his works. He studied the folk music of eastern Moravia and Slovakia, and his *Slovak Suite* (1903) and symphonic poem *In the Tatras* (Slovak mountains) are full of the glamour of Slovak rhythms and melodic originality new to Czech music. Novák's symphonic poems *Yearning* and *Passion*, his gigantic cantata *The Tempest* (1910), and his piano compositions "Pan" and "Sonata Eroica" all show evidence of his passionate emotionalism. He has also composed several operas and pantomimes.

Suk (1874-1935) had many things in common with his father-in-law, Antonín Dvořák. He possessed the same rich, intuitive sense of music, loved color effects, and had the same wealth of ideas. But he was always keenly conscious of the right balance between musical temperament and a well-thought-out conception. He was the greatest contemporary Czech master of instrumentation and as the second violin player of the famous Bohemian Quartet (Hofmann, Suk, Nedbal, and Wihan) penetrated into the tonal secrets of a string ensemble; for this reason his best works are his orchestral and chamber-music works. His symphonic poem *Praga* (1904) was followed by an autobiographical cycle: a symphony, *Asrael* (Angel of Death, 1905, written after the death of Dvořák and the premature death of his own wife); a suite, *A Summer Fairy Tale* (old memories and fresh hopes); and the symphonic poems *Ripening* (1912), *The Harvest of Love*, and *Epilog* (1925). He wrote also the music to Zeyer's play *Radúz and Mahulena*, from which the Polka is frequently played by American symphonic orchestras.

Ostrčil (1879-1935) was Fibich's best pupil. His constructivism caused him early to break away from romanticism. His works are characterized by a great breadth of conception, and therefore he found his best expression in operas and orchestral compositions. His symphonic variations *Way to the Cross* (1928), with the noble idea of compassion with Christ's human sufferings, belong to the most remarkable compositions of modern Czech music.

Janáček (1854-1928), a Moravian, was so different from the contemporary Czech composers and from the current ideas about music in his day that he had to wait long for recognition. His is a classic phenomenon of musical realism, in some way related to the Russian realistic operas, Borodin's *Prince Igor* and Moussorgsky's *Boris Godunov*. The best of his eight operas,

Jenufa (composed 1896–1903), was performed at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York on December 6, 1924, with great success.

Of other composers of the second period we can mention here only a few names: Karel Kovařovic (1862–1920), whose opera *Psoblavci* (The Dogheads) is among the most popular operas of the National Theater in Prague, its libretto being based on the historic novel of Alois Jirásek about the Chods, the defenders of the southwestern border of Bohemia who had the dog's head in their banner as a symbol of faithfulness; also Adolf Piskáček, Oskar Nedbal, Jan Kubelík (six violin concertos), J. Jindřich, and Eduard Tregler.

The third period of modern Czech music, the last two decades, comprises the composers who reached their maturity in the years 1900–1920. The artistic profile of many of them is still in the making.

Ladislav Vycpálek (born 1882) is one of the most remarkable representatives of the present generation. He combines a firm structure of themes with a strict polyphony. His cantata *About the Last Things of Man* (1921) was performed in Paris with remarkable success. Another cantata, *Blessed Be the Man* (1923), dedicated to President Masaryk, an apotheosis of the psychic forces which brought independence to the Czechoslovaks, is one of the outstanding creations of contemporary Czech composers.

Bohuslav Martinů (born 1890), living in Paris where he has been under the influence of Stravinsky and Roussel, promises to become the leading contemporary Czech composer. Some of his orchestral and chamber-music works are already known in the United States. Among his compositions are orchestral works such as *Czech Rhapsody* (1918), *Halftime* (1925), *La Bagarre* (1927), *First Symphony* (commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1928), *Jazz Suite* for chamber

orchestra (first performance, Baden-Baden Festival), and string quartets, ballets, operas, piano compositions, and opera-films.

Jaroslav Křička (born 1882) learned much, not only from Novák, but also from Rimsky-Korsakov. He has found his proper sphere in light and humorous compositions.

Otakar Jeremiáš (born 1892) composed a great choral work *Zborov* (on the battle of Zborov, in Russia, July 2, 1917, where the Czechoslovak brigade covered itself with glory), which was performed by the Prague Teachers' Chorus in New York and Chicago in 1929. His opera *Brothers Karamazov* (1928), based on the story of Dostoevsky's novel, proved his strong dramatic talent. His brother Jaroslav Jeremiáš (1889-1919), a very talented musician, died prematurely.

Jaromír Weinberger (born 1896) composed a charming opera *Švanda dudák* (Shvanda, the Bagpiper), which was performed at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York, on November 7, 1931, and at the University of Chicago, on April 20, 22, and 23, 1936. It was a tremendous success; the Polka and Fugue from this opera are played by all symphonic orchestras in the United States. He fled from the Protectorate last year to New York. Recently (November 26, 1939) his Variations and Fugue on an old English tune, "Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree," were performed by the Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York, John Barbirolli conducting.

Jaroslav Novotný (born 1885), a promising pupil of Novák, fell in the World War. Boleslav Vomáčka, V. B. Aim, Felix Zrno, Rudolf Karel, Otakar Zich, Vladimír Polívka, and Otakar Šín are other very promising composers.

A unique place is occupied by Alois Hába (born 1893), who writes in the quarter-tone scale. His aim is to create new music on the basis of this scale. The seriousness with which he follows this aim commands the respect even of those who are not con-

vinced of the success of his efforts. His opera *The Mother* (1931), which shows that he is able to apply this system even to the complicated forms of musical drama, had its first performance in Munich.

Under the influence of Leoš Janáček we find the following members of the Moravian group: Emil Axman, J. N. Poláček, Josef Černík, F. M. Hradil, Vladimír Ambros, Pavel Haas, Josef Holub, Jan Kunc, Václav Kaprál (whose atonal *Miniatures* for piano, 1922, are among the best works of modern Czech piano literature), Osvald Chlubna, Vilém Petrželka, Jaroslav Kvapil, and many others.

The youngest generation has its best representatives in Iša Krejčí (born 1904), E. F. Burian (1904), Jaroslav Maštálř (1906), Jaroslav Zich (1912), Vítězslav Nejedlý (1912, son of the prominent musical historian Zdeněk Nejedlý and pupil of Otakar Jeremiáš), Vítězlava Kaprál (1915, daughter of Václav Kaprál), and in Slovakia in Alexander Moyzes (1906) and Eugen Suchoň (1908).

This survey of Czechoslovak music may be aptly concluded by quoting an authority on the subject, Vladimír Helfert: "If we compare the general situation of Czech music after 1900 with the situation of European music, we shall find in both similar tendencies, pointing away from romanticism towards new forms of style and expression, the distinctive marks of which are still in the stage of progress and development. It is only natural that definite results could not yet be obtained, for the present times are characterized by an acute pursuit and searching of new ideas and by restless agitation and ferment. One trait is especially characteristic of modern Czech music: it is lacking in composers who would command such great technical craft and sophistication, or such resource of invention as are evinced for instance by Schoenberg, Stravinsky, or Honegger. On the other

hand, contemporary Czech music boasts of a greater depth of lyrical feeling and of ideas than the contemporary music of other countries, and this characteristic lends it a special physiognomy in European music. At all events, the existence of Janáček and Hába is the best proof of the fact that even Czechoslovakia has composers who are not afraid of radical reforms and innovations, without regard to the limitations imposed by existing tradition."

CZECHOSLOVAK ART

Painting.—As Smetana created modern Czech music, Josef Mánes (1820–1871) created modern Czech painting. He led the way to the portrayal of the Czech soul. One of his culminating works was the horologe for the Prague City Hall. The twelve months of the year are represented by twelve allegorical pictures of peasant life, being an idealistic representation of the relations of the tiller of the soil to Mother Earth (plowing, sowing, mowing, and the like), in a manner little short of epochal. Mánes created a type of peasant youth and girl, an idealized type of the Czechoslovak nature, which reached the very essence of the Czechoslovak national soul and became so dominant and so permanent that we meet with the same type in Aleš' lunettes and wall pictures in the foyer of the National Theater and in Myslbek's statuary groups on Palacký Bridge in Prague.

Mikoláš Aleš (1852–1913) was the heir of Mánes. His lunette cycle "Vlast" in the National Theater is a pendant to Smetana's symphonic cycle *Má Vlast* (My Country). Jaroslav Čermák (1831–1872) was a strong progressive spirit. From the year 1860 he made several trips into southern Dalmatia, and this acquaintance with the Slavonic south gave rise to a whole series of splendid paintings which brought to Čermák distinguished honors, among them being the Belgian Cross of Leopold in 1862 and

the French Legion of Honor in 1873. Václav Brožík (1851-1901) spent many years in Paris (1876-1893). Among Czech artists he alone enjoys the distinction of having had one of his paintings reproduced on an American postage stamp: the five-cent stamp of the Columbian issue, in 1893, reproduces Brožík's "Columbus at the Court of Isabella," a painting bought by Morris K. Jessup for the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. In Bohemia his most popular work is a great canvas, "Master Jan Hus before the Council of Constance," painted in 1883, which, together with his "George of Poděbrady, the Hussite King, Elected King in the Prague City Hall," now decorates the council room of that famous building.

Of other Bohemian artists of the nineteenth century whose talent blossomed out through the influence of the Paris atmosphere, the greatest were Chittussi, Hynais, Marold, Mucha, and Kupka. Antonín Chittussi (1847-1891) was the first modern Czech landscape painter. The Barbizon school opened his eyes. Veiled harmonies of Czech forest and sweet melancholy of great silences of fields and meadows together with dreamy pools are the kingdom of his poems in paint. Vojtěch Hynais (1854-1925) was a delicate poet depicting the beauty of the female body. Of his main works we mention only the curtain of the National Theater in Prague and the panels along the marble stairway leading to the royal boxes. Luděk Marold (1865-1898) created in 1888 a sensation by his picture "The Egg Market in Prague," which is now in the State Gallery of Prague, his native town. Then he went to Paris, where his talent blossomed into an intoxicating achievement. He produced thousands of delightful drawings and aquarelles for Paris newspapers and books and for the Munich *Fliegende Blätter*. Paris idolized the young portrayer of the elegance, charm, coquetry, attractiveness, and chic of the daughters of the French metropolis. For

Prague, Marold painted a gigantic panorama, "The Battle of Lipany, May 30, 1434."

Alfons M. Mucha (born at Ivančice, Moravia, 1860; died 1939) was another idol of Paris. When the Renaissance Theater in 1895 was staging *Gismonde* with Sarah Bernhardt, Mucha was asked to draw a big poster for this play, and the poster made him famous overnight. On his return to Prague, Mucha devoted himself entirely to the great cycle, sponsored by Charles R. Crane, *Slavonic Epopée*, an enormous series of twenty huge historical canvases (1910–1928). František Kupka (born 1871), who was president of the Czech colony in Paris during the war, made many illustrations, full of mordant irony, for Paris weeklies, drawings for *Man and Earth* by Reclus, etchings for *Erinnyes* by Leconte de Lisle, engravings in color for *Lysistrata* by Aristophanes, which rank among the finest productions of their class.

A very powerful influence on the present generation of landscape painters was exerted by Julius Mařák (1832–1899), who, like Chittussi, aimed at seizing the very soul of a landscape according to the variations of time and light. His outstanding pupil was Antonín Slavíček (1870–1910), the great master of Czech impressionism, gifted with a capacity to catch the spiritual contents of landscape as a whole.

Joža Úprka, the painter of the Moravian Slovakia (died January 12, 1940), reproduced with astounding accuracy Slovak scenery and the faces and gestures of the inhabitants of his native region.

Graphic arts.—Max Svabinský (born 1873, Kroměříž, Moravia) is the greatest portrait painter Czech art ever produced. As a shrewd psychologist, he knows how to decipher the spiritual face of his sitter behind the outward physiognomy and gestures. His portraits of Czech poets, artists, scholars, and men of science, such as Rieger, Kramář, Gebauer, Goll, Hostinský, Pekař, Ma-

saryk, Smetana, and Aleš, form a whole Pantheon of national glory. The engraver's tool also became a favorite instrument with him. His etchings are remarkable. In them we see the traditional note of Josef Mánes, the charm of his round contours, and the warmth of his inspiration. His female nudes, glowing with robust health, are of the same stock as the young peasant women of the master, Mánes.

František Šimon (born 1877) lived for ten years in Paris, and many art collectors who have his beautiful etchings think that Simon is a French artist. He visited Chicago thirteen years ago on his trip around the world. His Bohemian subjects are charming, but his colored etchings show us also Paris and New York, Brittany, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Algeria, and Japan, as well as other countries. Fine etchers also are Victor Stretti and his brother, Jaromír Stretti-Zamponi.

Adolf Kašpar was the book illustrator *par excellence*. To him the illustration of Czech books owes its present high artistic standard. He made drawings for all the principal historic novels of Alois Jirásek, and for the works of Zikmund Winter, Božena Němcová, Karel V. Rais, Herrmann, and Rubeš. His death a few years ago was a loss to all book lovers.

Sculpture.—The first Czech sculptor, Václav Levý (1820–1870), returned from Munich in 1848 as a mature artist, but could obtain no orders. He left his masterpiece, "Adam and Eve," in Prague and went to Rome. The next generation produced hardly any men of real talent. Sculptors were called upon to execute works only for churches and cemeteries. Such sculptors were out of touch with real life, lacking in the will to create. Only Antonín Wagner (1834–1895) and Bohuslav Schnirch (1845–1901) contrived to raise themselves above the common level, but they were not equal to the task of breathing new life into Bohemian sculpture. Wagner provided for the National

Theater in Prague two figures of legendary Czech bards, Záběj and Slavoj, and the group which was called the "Judgment of Princess Libuše." For the staircase of the Czech museum which overlooks Václav Square in Prague, he created a vigorous allegory of the Czech country. Schnirch made for the National Theater a graceful decoration for the façade of the building, consisting of Apollo and the Muses and of two powerful Victories, and for the Jubilee Exposition in Prague, 1891, the equestrian statue of King George, which is now in front of the castle at Poděbrady.

And then there came finally the great man, Josef Václav Myslbek (1848-1922), the real founder of modern Czech sculpture. "He was to give the inspiring example of a real creative effort. He was the first in Bohemia whose art was free from all academic influences, and borrowed nothing from the antique or the Renaissance. He was the first in Bohemia to understand and render the language of Nature, and to prove that sculpture is no mere journeyman's task, but the outcome of artistic inspiration drawn from the very depths of man's soul." Myslbek, a fervent admirer of Josef Mánes, accepted his influence as a moral obligation. His four groups on the pylons of Palacký Bridge in Prague ("Lumír and the Song," "Záběj and Slavoj," "Libuše and Přemysl," "Ctirad and Šárka") are a sculptural realization of Mánes' ideals. His power of composition reached its height in the St. Václav Monument in Prague; this is his masterpiece. It symbolizes the unquenchable vitality of the Czech revival and proves beyond all doubt that Czech sculpture has become a genuine art. The monument was unveiled in the summer of 1913.

The younger Czech sculptors all issued from Myslbek's

¹ Ant. Matějček and Zdeněk Wirth, *Modern and Contemporary Czech Art* (London, Routledge & Sons, 1924).

school. Stanislav Sucharda (1866–1916) soon gained the first place among his fellow pupils. His art, ideas, and beliefs are embodied in his monument to the great Czech historian and political leader František Palacký. Sucharda also turned out several plaquettes, improvising, in a spirit of ardent and impulsive patriotism, on heroic themes. Dreams of liberty, visions of Prague the victorious, are the underlying motives of his plaques.

Ladislav Šaloun (born 1870) created the Jan Hus Monument in the Old Town Square in Prague.

Bohumil Kafka (born 1878) was commissioned to create the Žižka Monument for the Žižkov Hill in Prague, but the Czechoslovak Republic will have to be restored before this monument of the invincible leader of the Hussites is allowed to crown the top of the hill.

Jan Štursa (1880–1925) was the leader of the younger generation. His "Wounded Soldier," his portrait of Masaryk, and many others of his works are splendid conceptions. His "Eve" is in the Munich Glyptothek.

Otakar Španiel made many delicate plaques and busts. The Musée du Luxembourg and the Petit Palais in Paris have fine specimens of his art.

Otto Gutfreund (1889–1927) made a beautiful monument—"Grandmother"—heroine of the classic novel by Němcová, for Ratibořice, in eastern Bohemia.

Josef Drahoňovský (1877–1938) is the sculptor who made the vigorous statue of Miroslav Tyrš, creator of the Sokol idea, for the Tyrš Home in Prague. But his international fame is connected with his revival of the forgotten art of crystal and glass engraving. As a glyptic artist he created exquisite "poems in crystal." When wishing to give official recognition to a distinguished person, the Czechoslovak Government used to present a creation of his as a gift. A great glass cup by Drahoňovský

was given, in 1930, in celebration of the Peace, to President Masaryk. Fine specimens of his work are to be found in the John Pierpont Morgan Museum, New York.

CZECHOSLOVAK LITERATURE

Czech literature in the first half of the nineteenth century was permeated largely with the romantic ideas of the rebirth of the nation. One of the masterpieces of this period is *Daughter of Sláva*, a Pan-Slavic cycle of 645 sonnets which almost contain the evangel of the young generation of those days. The author, Jan Kollár (1793-1852), a Slovak by birth, formulated here with great pathos his principles of Slavic reciprocity. František Ladislav Čelakovský (1799-1852), in his *Echo of Russian Songs* and *Echo of Czech Songs*, and Karel Jaromír Erben (1811-1870), in his ballads, grasp the very soul of the nation. Karel Hynek Mácha (1810-1836) is the first modern Czech poet. His *May* (1936), a lyric poem of desperate love, brought the Byronic spleen to Bohemia, but in an original Czech form. Karel Havlíček (Borovský), a poet of bitterly satiric vein and a martyr for freedom of his nation (1821-1856), wrote two splendid poems, *Tyrolean Elegies* and *The Baptism of St. Vladimír*, and numerous epigrams. *The Grandmother*, by Božena Němcová (1820-1862) is a classic of its kind of writing.

After 1850 the new literary generation began to turn its attention to more general motives, and to play upon social chords. Jan Neruda (1834-1891) is the founder of modern Czech poetry. His *Cosmic Songs*, a poetic credo of a sincere positivist and rationalist, his admirable ballads and romances and other poems, culminated in his *opus posthumum*, *Friday Songs*, which are a patriotic manifestation of the same significance for the nineteenth century as *The Last Will of the Dying Mother Unity of Brethren* of Komenský (Comenius) had for the sev-

teenth century. Neruda was also the creator of the Czech *milieu*. Vítězslav Hálek (1835-1874) wrote two very popular cycles of poems, *Evening Songs* and *In the Nature*, many of which were set to music by Czech composers, even by Smetana. Josef V. Sládek (1845-1912), who lived for two years in America (1868-1879), translated Longfellow's *Hiawatha* at Caledonia, a Czech village near Racine, Wisconsin. His complete translation of Shakespeare's plays is a masterly piece of work.

Jaroslav Vrchlický (1853-1912), the most fertile of Czech poets, displayed an astonishing command of form and brought the Czech poetic language to the highest point of development. Besides his original work, amazing in volume, he turned out a whole library of translations which in other nations would require a legion of poets. Among them are Goethe's *Faust*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and the works of Ariosto, Tasso, Calderón, Lord Byron, Shelley, Whitman, Hugo, Baudelaire, and many others. Julius Zeyer (1841-1901) was a mystical novelist and a revealer of medieval legends.

This group of writers with a cosmopolitan horizon was in contrast to the poets and writers of profound national sentiment. Svatopluk Čech (1846-1908) is the leading figure of this group. His epic poems are permeated with national spirit, whereas others, such as *Songs of the Slave*, are a social and humanistic echo of his days. The novel of this period treats segments of the nation's past and the rustic life. Alois Jirásek (1851-1930) revived the great epoch of Jan Hus, Žižka, the Hussite wars, and the "Hussite King," George Poděbrad, as well as the decades of the national awakening, with such epic strength and historical fidelity that his work will remain an inexhaustible source of patriotic inspiration forever. Karel V. Rais (1859-1926) wrote novels of village life in Bohemia. The brothers Alois and Vilém Mrštík depicted peasant life in Moravia.

Among Slovak poets the best were Ondrej Sládkovič (1820–1872), Pavel Orszagh Hviezdoslav (1849–1921), and Svetozar Hurban Vajanský (1847–1916).

Josef Svatopluk Machar (born 1864) was Neruda's successor both in the poems and in the *feuilleton*. Viktor Dyk (1877–1931) was the poet of Czech nationalism, before and during the World War. Petr Bezruč, the Silesian bard (born 1867, the son of the Silesian patriot, Professor Vašek), is one of the most original figures of Czech poetry. His outbursts of desperate anger, *The Silesian Songs*, turned the attention of the whole nation to the border districts where the Czech population suffered from German and Polish oppression. A rare poet was the modern mystic Otakar Březina (1868–1929). His poetical credo, expressed in dazzling pictures, culminates in his belief in the unceasing evolution of the Universe and God, and in the conception of the fraternity of all creation as the final phase of social philosophy. The critic and esthete F. X. Šalda (1867–1937), master of the literary essay, wrote also poems and plays; his comedy *The Child* (1923) is a most passionate condemnation of the bourgeois social order. Zikmund Winter (1846–1912) in his *Master Kampanus* succeeded in reviving so masterfully the tragedy of the Battle of White Mountain and the dramatic period, 1550–1620, that this work represents the highest development reached by the Czech historical novel. Antonín Sova (1864–1928) was a sensitive lyric poet. Jakub Arbes (1840–1914) created the exciting tale *Romanetto*, with its social, political, and utopian motives. Ignát Herrmann, the Czech Mark Twain and Charles Dickens in one person, depicted the life of the small bourgeoisie of Prague. K. M. Čapek-Chod (one of the most prominent representatives of the modern Czech novel), the novelists and playwrights Stroupežnický, Šubert, Jaroslav Hilbert, and F. X. Svoboda (whose play *The Last Man* [19 et with success also

in Germany and other countries) are only some of the numerous authors of the prewar period.

The generation of poets and writers who came forward just before the World War—the generation of the last two decades—matured during the war; since reaching full fertility, it has perfected the Czech language so that the most delicate nuances of feeling and reason may be expressed in it.

Karel Čapek (1890–1938), by his original plays, gained world-wide attention for Czech literature, of whose vigorous and progressive spirit he was a typical representative. Čapek's *R.U.R.* (Rossum's Universal Robots) was a tremendous success in the dramatic world (New York, Garrick Theatre, October 9, 1922). His word "robot" has been adopted by the dictionaries of the English language. Among his other plays are *The World We Live In* (in collaboration with his brother Joseph), and *The Makropoulos Secret*. His last two plays were *The White Sickness* (1937), based on the conflict between dictatorial and democratic principles, and *The Mother* (published in March, 1938), also with the background of the present Europe and its distress. He died on December 25, 1938, because, as Erika Mann suggests in *The Nation*, he could not stay in Bohemia after the Munich catastrophe nor could he live outside his unhappy native country. One of his last literary expressions, "A Prayer for Tonight," is reprinted in this volume.

Other prominent dramatic authors whose works are known abroad are František Langer, who wrote *A Camel through the Eye of a Needle*, *Periphery*, and *The Mounted Patrol* (the last named the success of the 1935 season on the stage of Bohemia; it depicts the spirit of the average Czechoslovak legionnaire during the Siberian anabasis and his attitude toward the Russian Revolution), and Vilém Werner, who in his *People on the Floe* analyzes the present struggle of the young generation for life.

The best novels of the "legionnaire literature" are those of Josef Kopta, whose works deal with the life of the Czechoslovak legionnaires who controlled the Transsiberian Railway at the end of the World War. The last of his saga, *Company Three*, *The Five Sinners*, and *The Watchman No. 47*, belong to the best works of postwar literature. Rudolf Medek should also be mentioned in this connection.

The novel was brought up to a new high level by Jaroslav Durych (born 1886), a Catholic neoromanticist. His most artistic work is *Bloudění* (translated into English under the title of *Descent of the Idol*). Ivan Olbracht (born 1882) has been very successful in his novels, which are filled with moral, social, and political conflicts; recently he has found new, original subjects in the peasant life of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. A very promising talent was exhibited by Jiří Wolker (1900-1924), a lyric poet who treated social problems in his poems.

Vítězslav Nezval (born 1900) is the outstanding representative of pure poetism. His poems are distinguished for their extreme spontaneity and soaring imagination. Two lyric poets of unusual character are Karel Toman and Petr Křička.

Of the Slovak authors, Ivan Krasko attracted earlier attention, Martin Rázus gained eminence during the war, and a whole phalanx, with E. B. Lukáč and Josef Gregor-Tajovský at their head, have been prominent since the war.

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(1890-1938)

DRAMATIST, NOVELIST, AND JOURNALIST

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PART IV: FOREIGN RELATIONS

Chapter XIX

DIPLOMATIC ORIGINS AND FOREIGN POLICY*

BY FELIX J. VONDRACEK

THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC owed its diplomatic origins to several sources. During the World War certain Czech and Slovak exiles, particularly Thomas G. Masaryk, Eduard Beneš, and Milan R. Štefánik, had convinced responsible Allied statesmen of the necessity of creating a new postwar Europe on the basis of national self-determination. The winning over of President Woodrow Wilson to the thesis of a disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the creation of a strong Czechoslovakia as the cornerstone of a reorganized Europe assured eventual triumph for the Czechoslovak cause. The successive *de facto* recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris by the Allied Great Powers and by the United States was followed by the proclamation of Czechoslovak independence on October 18, 1918.

The best efforts of a vigilant Austro-Hungarian police and spy system had not been able to prevent patriotic Czechoslovaks in the homelands from communicating with the exiles through the efficient "Mafia" organization. Both groups of patriots well

* Permission by Columbia University Press to the author of this chapter to condense portions of his volume *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935* in the present chapter is gratefully acknowledged by the editor of this volume and the University of California Press.

knew that success could be attained only through coöperation. Initially, Karel Kramář was the most influential Czech leader not in exile. However, his popularity ultimately was eclipsed by that of Masaryk, as the Czechoslovaks generally came to the belief that independence had been won through conversion of the Western Powers to their cause and that it could not have been attained by dependence upon Russian aid alone, as Kramář had advocated. The growing weakness of Austria-Hungary encouraged Czechoslovak revolutionaries actually to establish a new State by a bloodless revolution on October 28, 1918, at Prague. Three days later the Declaration of Geneva consolidated the two governments, Masaryk becoming president; Kramář, president of the Council of Ministers; Beneš, minister for foreign affairs; and Štefánik, minister for national defense.

The efforts of the predominantly Czech revolutionary leaders in Paris and Prague were supported by other Slavic groups. On June 30, 1918, American-Czech and American-Slovak leaders in the United States signed the Declaration of Pittsburgh, whereby, in the Czechoslovakia-to-be, the Slovak people were guaranteed their own assembly, courts, and administration. Similarly, by the Declaration of Turčiansky Sv. Martin, signed on October 30, the Slovaks in the homeland associated themselves with the new State. Three Ruthene national councils, organized during November at Přešov, Užhorod, and Chust, soon merged and on May 8, 1919, ratified the action taken in the preceding October by American Ruthenes, who, at the Philadelphia Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Central Europe, favored union with Czechoslovakia.

Despite these active revolutionary movements, an independent Czechoslovak State might not have been created had it not been for the military aid rendered to the Allied cause by the various Czechoslovak Legions. At the termination of the war,

Czechoslovak forces totaled 182,000 men, of which number 12,000 were serving in France, 78,000 in Italy, and 92,000 in Russia. The last of these armies had been particularly valuable to the Allies. After the military collapse of Russia, the Czechoslovaks formed the nucleus of an attempted resurrection of an eastern front. Subsequently, when friendship with the Bolsheviks had given way to friction, they became the backbone of Allied attempts to intervene actively in Russia. Through control of the Volga area and the Transsiberian Railway, the Czechoslovak army performed for the Allies services more valuable than the same forces could have rendered in France. Enmeshed in the Russian domestic chaos, and forced to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks after the World War had terminated, the Czechoslovak Legions became unwilling tools of a French and British diplomacy that wished to keep them in Siberia indefinitely. The heroism with which they fought their way to safety across several thousand miles of hostile territory is beyond praise, and their sacrifices were not in vain. Beneš, confronted with a situation over which he had virtually no control, yet not daring openly to criticize the Allied Great Powers which would determine the destiny of Czechoslovakia, nevertheless obtained in return definite Allied commitments that guaranteed the future of the new State. Thus, Czechoslovakia came to the Peace Conference assured of a high prestige because of the achievements of her Legions; because her leaders, particularly Masaryk and Beneš, had demonstrated by their actions and predictions a remarkably accurate comprehension of central European conditions and needs; and because France, by a treaty of September 28, 1918, had promised her a seat in the Peace Conference as an Allied Power.

At the Peace Conference, Czechoslovakia succeeded in realizing her major contentions. The territorial settlement met her

economic and military needs, but included also large minorities. Great Britain, France, and Italy envisaged Czechoslovakia as a barrier against a resuscitation of Pan-Germanism. To that end she was given direct territorial contact with Rumania. Possible objections of President Wilson to the violation of the principle of national self-determination were overcome when it was pointed out that the independent existence of Czechoslovakia would be rendered precarious without the Bohemian Germans, who in any event could not create a state of their own. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Government willingly ratified a treaty which amply safeguarded the rights of minorities.

On November 7, 1919, during the parliamentary debates concerning the ratification of the treaties of Saint-Germain with Austria and Versailles with Germany, Beneš explained the goal of his prospective foreign policy. Czechoslovakia would strive to maintain the status quo which had been established by the peace treaties, and by an extensive system of new agreements would endeavor to establish friendly relations with all her neighbors. His statement represented the first announcement of a new political system in central Europe.

During the first five years of Czechoslovak independence, 1918-1923, the domestic and foreign policies were successfully dovetailed. A comprehensive policy of domestic stabilization embraced four major aspects: finance, economics, social reform, and religion. The excessive nationalism prevalent in Czechoslovakia as in the rest of Europe retarded success, yet the currency was separated from that of Austria and Hungary and the finances placed upon a sound basis. The initially severe import and export regulations were gradually relaxed and replaced by regular commercial treaties, of which about forty had been negotiated by 1925. Extensive social legislation averted any possibility of a swing to bolshevism. However, the chief religious

problem—relations with the Catholic Church—remained unsolved until 1928.

The years 1918–1923 represented also the first phase of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy—the reconstruction of central Europe, which Beneš considered the most important of his many problems. In view of the changes wrought by the World War, the best efforts of all concerned would be required if stability were to be restored in this area. Central Europe could not follow blindly the policies of any Great Power, for it had its own peculiar problems. Beneš envisaged the diplomatic independence of at least the small victor states of this region, free from the rivalries of the Great Powers. If his ideal could be attained, central Europe might enjoy peace and prosperity.

In central Europe, besides Czechoslovakia, there were also victorious Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Poland, and vanquished Austria and Hungary. A common understanding satisfactory to all six states was nearly impossible of attainment. It would be difficult enough to arrive at some agreement acceptable to the victorious four, who might then impose it upon the vanquished two. Beneš' problem became increasingly difficult because Czechoslovakia regarded her small neighbors with varying degrees of friendship or antipathy. The most hostility was felt toward Hungary, which alone of the defeated states failed to resign herself even temporarily to the results of the World War. Czechoslovakia's antipathy toward Austria was much more mild, partially because of Austria's conciliatory policy, partially because of economic ties closer than those with any other small neighbor, and partially because of a desire to avert *Anschluss*. On the contrary, racial kinship and an almost entire absence of clashing interests dictated warmest friendship with Jugoslavia. The latter fact made for cordial relationships with Rumania also. With Poland alone were relations uncertain.

In many respects Czechoslovakia and Poland were analogous. Both were new Slavic states; in both, certain leaders had disagreed over whether salvation would come from the Central or Western Powers or from Russia, yet both had been liberated ultimately through the aid of France particularly; both were exposed to Russian bolshevism and to a possible resurrection of German militarism; and both had obtained such large minorities that they needed assistance in maintaining the postwar status quo. Consequently, coöperation against the former enemy states might almost have been taken for granted. However, racial appeals from Czechoslovakia evoked little response in Poland, which could not forget past oppression at the hands of Slavic Russia. Poland, feeling secure because of French support, had adopted an aggressive policy well calculated to develop antagonism on the part of all her neighbors. Beneš, deeming the course of Poland ill-considered, particularly in view of her exposed geographical position, warned against any too hasty relationship which might commit Czechoslovakia to a course foreign to her own best interests. However, the land hunger of both countries would alone have precluded immediate friendship. Until 1924 Czechoslovakia and Poland contested the possession of certain frontier areas, such as the Duchy of Těšín (Teschen), which was ultimately divided, and of Orava and Spiš, which went to Czechoslovakia. After direct negotiations had failed, the question had been referred to the Peace Conference and ultimately to the League of Nations. Particularly significant had been the fact that in 1920, when the headlong policy of Poland had involved her in a life-and-death struggle with Russia, from which she had been rescued only by French aid, Beneš had resisted extensive domestic and foreign pressure in refusing to take advantage of the distress of Poland.

A solid foundation for the reconstruction of central Europe

was laid by the creation of the Little Entente, which deserves to rank as Beneš' diplomatic masterpiece. Coöperation between certain Czechoslovak, Rumanian, and Yugoslav leaders during the World War had sowed the seed which blossomed into fruition during 1920 and 1921, when three bilateral treaties, supplemented by military conventions, created the bloc. These three treaties of alliance made a unit which henceforth wielded an influence comparable to that of a Great Power. Intended as a balance wheel which was to maintain the status quo in central Europe, it coöperated particularly with France on matters of general European policy, and yet safeguarded the diplomatic independence of the three partners, free from the orbit of any Great Power. Spasmodic coöperation with Poland enhanced its strength. In the process of its formation it had frustrated two attempts of former Emperor Charles to regain the throne of Hungary and thus alter the status quo. By first associating Austria with its general policy and by subsequently assisting the League of Nations in reconstructing both Austria and Hungary, the Little Entente helped to stabilize central Europe.

The first phase of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy witnessed also a clarification of her relations with the Great Powers. With her most powerful neighbor, Germany, the establishment of cordial relations proved surprisingly easy. Temporarily powerless, the German Republic desired to avoid friction, thus indicating the absence of any immediate designs upon the integrity of her small neighbor. Czechoslovakia sought to maintain friendship with each of the three Great Powers of the West, but attempted also to remain aloof from their antagonisms. Of these postwar feuds, the rivalry of France and Italy was perhaps the greatest potential threat to peace. Czechoslovakia found distress in Anglo-French friction regarding postwar policy. She hoped to avoid making a choice among her three friends, yet, had

she been compelled to do so, she would probably have chosen France. With the United States standing aloof from European entanglements and with Russia turned bolshevik, France showed the most interest in the future welfare of the small Slavic nations, with whom she had no interests that clashed. By creating ties with them, France would find compensation for her prewar alliance with Russia. Moreover, for continental purposes, France was the strongest in mere material force. Against Germany, Czechoslovakia hoped to find in her a powerful and willing ally, whereas Great Britain would be relatively weak as a central European force, even if she could be induced to participate in any such conflict, and Italy would be a dubious military quantity. Nevertheless, neither these facts nor considerations of gratitude for help in the past moved Beneš from his firm resolve not to permit Czechoslovakia to become a mere tool in the hands even of France.

In the estimation of Beneš, the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia should attempt to maintain a delicate balance between Eastern and Western orientations. Although predominantly Western, Czechoslovakia should also keep alive the possibility of an eventual *rapprochement* with Russia. Neither the immediate necessity of extricating the Legions from the Siberian adventure nor embarrassments caused by attempts to make Czechoslovakia bolshevik swerved Beneš from this ultimate objective. Eschewing both bolshevism and Allied intervention in Russia, he sought to have the Soviets resume normal relations with the rest of Europe. Beneš was a pioneer in advocating the recognition of Soviet Russia long before public opinion either in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere in Europe became converted to such a step. To him the U.S.S.R. was a major factor both as a possible future friend and as a potential market for Czechoslovakia's surplus of manufactured goods. When the Great Powers

of the West failed to effect a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union at the Genoa Conference in 1922, Beneš, by independent negotiations, succeeded in normalizing commercial relations between his own country and Soviet Russia. At the Genoa Conference, the bloc of the Little Entente and Poland had been considered, by Great Britain, France, and Italy, as a fourth Great Power for all practical purposes. Thus, central Europe had been enabled to work out its own particular problems of reconstruction with a minimum of interference by the Great Powers, which had been permitted to assist the small states of that area without attracting them within their special orbits.

With the virtual consummation of Beneš' plans for the reconstruction of central Europe, a wider and more distant horizon came into view. By the latter part of 1923, Beneš turned to the second phase of his foreign policy, the search for security. He came to doubt whether the League of Nations offered sufficient protection against Germany, the one potential threat which the Little Entente was not sufficiently strong to meet. The danger of losing a measure of diplomatic independence by appearing as the satellite of a Great Power seemed less acute than that of insecurity. Thus, although taking care to voice no public criticism of the League, in which he continued to proclaim the utmost faith upon every possible occasion, he sought also a supplementary military guaranty. When his first preference, a joint Anglo-French pact, failed to materialize, he gladly signed, on January 25, 1924, an alliance with France, the only Great Power willing to assume such a commitment. Negotiated essentially to defend the status quo, the treaty further provided for diplomatic consultation and agreement upon the specific measures that were to be adopted against any threat to their common interests. Czechoslovakia regarded this pact as next in importance only to her Little Entente treaties.

Italy, already fearful lest the Little Entente develop into an anti-Italian instrument in the hands of France, became further alarmed at the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance. In order to still such apprehensions and to confirm the fact that Czechoslovakia desired to remain on equally friendly terms with each of the three Great Powers of the West, Beneš, on May 18, 1924, drafted a treaty of friendship with Italy. Providing for the maintenance of the status quo, mutual economic advantages, and coöperation in time of war, this alliance, nevertheless, was not as close as that with France. Beneš considered these two alliances as the absolute minimum requirement for the adequate security of Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, Beneš kept in close touch with the lengthy Anglo-French *pourparlers*, whereby security negotiations were being conducted technically at least under League of Nations auspices. He played an important rôle in the drafting of the Geneva Protocol, which Czechoslovakia became the first state to ratify on October 28, 1924. When this project also failed, Beneš was willing to adopt any reasonable alternative which would provide for general security. Hence, when Germany, on February 9, 1925, suggested a general guaranty pact for the West, possibly to avert an Anglo-French alliance against herself, Beneš again accepted. The Locarno Protocol, initialed on October 16, 1925, provided for the Rhine Guaranty Pact among Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium; four arbitration treaties between Germany and Belgium, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; and French treaties of guaranty with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Even more important than the terms of this agreement was the spirit evinced—a coöperative feeling that all must unite to safeguard the peace of western Europe. For Czechoslovakia it meant a strengthening of her alliance with France. Hereafter, immediate French military aid was

promised specifically against an unprovoked German attack. Despite the fact that Beneš' attempt to extend after a fashion the spirit of Locarno to the east was only partially successful, since his own country rejected his proposal to recognize the U.S.S.R. *de jure* at this time, a *rapprochement* with Poland did materialize by 1926, thus assuring for Czechoslovakia a more secure all-round defense.

With the major problems of reconstruction and security apparently solved, for the immediate future at least, by Beneš' network of agreements, Czechoslovakia directed her next efforts to the maintenance of the new status quo. The situation was distinctly improved when the German minority became reconciled in 1926 and certain dissatisfied Slovaks a year later. The conclusion of a *modus vivendi* with the Vatican in 1928 brought another vexatious domestic problem much nearer an ultimate solution. Relations with France remained excellent. Beneš persevered in his as yet unsuccessful efforts to persuade his people to recognize Soviet Russia. Apparently irreconcilable, Hungary continued to remain central Europe's chief disturber, forgeries of Czechoslovak and French bank notes being followed by importation of arms from Italy contrary to Article 180 of the Treaty of Trianon. Investigations of both incidents by the League of Nations failed to produce results entirely satisfactory to Czechoslovakia. Ties within the Little Entente were strengthened, but attempts to enlarge the organization into a Danubian Confederation by including Austria and Hungary came to nothing. The larger unit would encounter certain opposition from both Germany and Italy, as well as from all its own member states. The idea had been favored by Great Britain and France. Eventually, even Beneš had been converted to the project as an alternative to *Anschluss*, but even he soon realized it could not be consummated. Beneš' efforts of almost a decade on behalf of

peace, security, and disarmament seemed to be realized when his country became one of the fifteen signatories of the Kellogg Peace Pact on August 27, 1928.

The world-wide economic depression of 1929 substituted selfish nationalism for international coöperation. In attempting to ameliorate their own distress, many nations aggravated the trend toward international chaos by seeking to alter such portions of the status quo as appeared detrimental to their own interests. The frustrated Austro-German Customs Union of 1931 was regarded by Czechoslovakia as one such attempt, as a step preparatory to a later political union. The Little Entente averted the threat of dissolution after the greatest internal crisis in its history when centripetal political forces triumphed over centrifugal economic factors. The gradual emergence of Italy as the leader of a revisionist bloc of states, including also Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, led to the formation of a status quo bloc composed of France, Belgium, the Little Entente, Poland, and possibly Great Britain. France met the challenge subtly in 1931. By a series of foreign loans, coupled with judiciously applied political pressure upon the recipients of her favors, she hoped to strengthen her own bloc and eventually disrupt the opposing alignment. However, despite two loans from France, Czechoslovakia's finances remained in a strained condition, chiefly because of the great decline of her foreign trade. Financial distress became so great that Czechoslovakia eventually followed the French example of defaulting on her debt to the United States.

Beneš struggled manfully but vainly to save the 1932 Disarmament Conference. When German demands for arms equality could not be reconciled with French insistence upon security first, Beneš appreciated the fact that another outstanding effort on behalf of collective security had failed and that henceforth

Czechoslovakia must face the possibility of new dangers arising from a Germany that might rearm in defiance of her neighbors. This apprehension was realized when Hitler became chancellor of the Reich on January 30, 1933. Czechoslovakia, of all the small states of central Europe perhaps the most endangered by the rise of the Nazi dictatorship, was well aware of her peril, yet at first deemed it a menace necessitating only great vigilance, not one which she need necessarily fear.

As Hitler continued to violate the Versailles Treaty, the new challenge to the status quo was answered energetically. On February 16, 1933, the Little Entente was reorganized and its unity enhanced. Czechoslovakia extended her hospitality to refugees from Germany and adopted a series of precautionary measures intended to curb undue Nazi activities within her own territory. In 1934 the Germano-Polish *rapprochement* and increasing Nazi interference in Austria were countered by intensified Czechoslovak coöperation with the states of the so-called status quo bloc. Thus, Czechoslovakia recognized Soviet Russia, supported whole-heartedly Soviet entry into the League of Nations, looked forward to an eventual Franco-Russian alliance, approved Litvinov's suggested Eastern Locarno Mutual Assistance Pact, and, during the summer crisis, took prompt military measures in conjunction with Italy and Yugoslavia to help preserve Austrian independence against Germany.

The isolation of Germany appeared complete when France and Italy signed the Rome Accord of January 7, 1935. The Stresa Conference of April 11-14, 1935, creating a united front of Great Britain, France, and Italy, represented a further joint effort on behalf of peace. Of far more import to Czechoslovakia was the Franco-Russian pact of mutual assistance of May 2, 1935. Two weeks later Czechoslovakia negotiated a similar treaty with the U.S.S.R. The pact was to be invoked whenever either became

the object of an unprovoked attack by another European state. However, France remained the key to the situation, since neither the Czechoslovaks nor the Soviets were obligated to aid the other if France should refuse to do so.

Czechoslovakia's fourth general elections to both houses of Parliament, held on May 19, 1935, revealed the rapid progress that had been made by Nazi influences. The Sudete German party, led by Konrad Henlein, formerly an obscure gymnastics instructor, polled over a million votes, against four million for the governmental coalition. It obtained sixty-seven seats in Parliament and concentrated in one party two-thirds of the votes of the German minority. As Czechoslovak distrust of Henlein's ultimate objectives mounted, the authorities were at a loss whether to adopt a policy of repression or one of conciliation, for both alternatives were distasteful. Beneš attempted in vain to extend the olive branch to Germany. Thereupon, Czechoslovakia began to construct extensive fortifications along the German frontier.

In the autumn of 1935 Mussolini's African adventure disrupted the unity of the anti-German front. Czechoslovakia participated in League sanctions, not because of any direct quarrel with Italy, but because she regarded the question as vital to her own future and to the principle of collective security. The Czechoslovak Government rightly regarded the Ethiopian crisis as a mere prelude to a much greater future one involving Germany. What right would Czechoslovakia have subsequently to invoke League assistance against Germany if she should refuse to support the League against Italy at this time? Rarely had Beneš attracted such general support, even from the Opposition. Amid the general acclaim, he succeeded Masaryk as president on December 18, 1935.

The fact that one co-founder of the Republic had succeeded

nother in the presidency pleased particularly the friends and allies of Czechoslovakia. It provided a guaranty that the foreign policy would remain unchanged. Fresh confirmation of this impression was received on March 1, 1936, when Beneš was succeeded as minister of foreign affairs by Dr. Kamil Krofta, his assistant since 1927.

The chief efforts of the relatively brief presidency of Beneš were bent toward furthering the principle of collective security against the continually increasing menace of Nazi Germany. In this connection it should be pointed out that the foreign policy pursued by Czechoslovakia throughout the two decades of the First Republic sought the well-being of democratic Europe as a whole; the best interests of the two never clashed. Beneš envisaged the future of his country, the only true democracy in central Europe, as inextricably linked with the future of the entire continent.

As one after another of France's small allies began to waver in its allegiance, Czechoslovakia remained loyal to her pledges. When Hitler in 1936 sought to take advantage of the general dismay felt among the smaller victor states of the World War over French refusal to take energetic steps against German fortification of the Rhineland, by offering Czechoslovakia "security" within the German orbit, his proposals were rejected. The re-orientation of the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia which was demanded by Hitler, particularly the scrapping of the alliances with the U.S.S.R. and France, not only would represent breaking faith with powerful friends, but would place the Republic entirely at the mercy of Germany. Acceptance would have merely hastened Czechoslovakia's post-Munich experiences. Moreover, entering into such an agreement voluntarily would have dealt a terrible blow to prospects of restoring Czechoslovakia's freedom of action at some future time. As Beneš has pointed out

repeatedly, he had no choice but to keep faith with the Soviets and with France, regardless of consequences; his course of action would be no different if he had to do it again.

In order to leave no stone unturned, the Republic tried again to conciliate its German minority. Protracted negotiations culminating in a law of February 18, 1937, granted extensive new concessions which failed, however, of their ultimate purposes, for Nazi activity, both within and without the Republic, continued to increase. The death of Masaryk the following September brought home to the Czechoslovaks even more clearly the dangers by which they were surrounded, and strengthened their determination to preserve his heritage.

The annexation of Austria by Hitler in March, 1938, despite his treaty of July 11, 1936, wherein he promised to respect her independence, gave further evidence to the Czechoslovaks that no faith could be placed in Nazi pledges, and that the Republic should consider itself as being the next potential victim of Nazi aggression. Determined to avoid if possible the fate of Austria, Czechoslovakia carefully prepared for the day of reckoning. Thus, on May 21, 1938, when Hitler sought to repeat his bloodless Austrian triumph, he found well-armed Czechoslovak forces awaiting him and so took no immediate aggressive steps. Available evidence indicates that Czechoslovakia's allies would have rallied to her side and a general war would have resulted. In this manner Czechoslovakia gave Nazi Germany its first diplomatic setback, a rebuff which Hitler would never forget nor forgive.

The 1938 crisis, culminating in the partition and temporary extinction of Czechoslovakia, demonstrated how artificially fomented and misleading propaganda could wipe off the map the most stable and democratic small state in central Europe. As the crisis developed, Beneš made clear to the friends of his country what yielding to Hitler involved, that racial and other claims

merely cloaked a desire to destroy a small neighbor whose prosperity and democracy could not be endured by a totalitarian state bent on dominating the entire continent. Vainly did Beneš maintain that it was impossible to appease Hitler. Chamberlain and Daladier preferred appeasement at the expense of Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia's hour of greatest need, France refused to honor her treaty of mutual assistance. The stand of the Western democracies encouraged Poland, Hungary, and the dissatisfied Slovak minority to revive old grudges against the Czechs. Soviet Russia alone would have given aid, even though her treaty obligated her to help only after France did so. Despite strong fortifications, an army perhaps the best in Europe for its size, and a Czech population willing to fight as long as any reasonable prospect of victory remained, the Czechoslovak Government realized that plunging into such a war, with its only ally, the Soviet Union, blocked off by neutral Rumania and hostile Poland, would be suicidal. No alternative remained but to yield, although Czechoslovakia was denied even a voice in her own dismemberment at Munich. There her fate was decided by Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain.

The First Republic ended at Munich. Faced with the ruin of his life's work, Beneš wisely resigned and went into voluntary exile. The Second Republic, the mutilated and hyphenated Czecho-Slovakia, was a puppet state whose president, Dr. Emil Hácha, faced a hopeless situation. The establishment of the Protectorate in March, 1939, ended that phase of "independence." Annexation, the logical sequel to Munich, demonstrated once more what travesties were the four-Power Munich guaranty of Czecho-Slovak independence and the belief that "peace in our time" could be purchased by such concessions. The systematic spoliation of Czech and Slovak resources, especially the seizure of arms and factories, had at least one virtue—apparently

it convinced even Chamberlain and Daladier that one-sided appeasement does not pay. Although no public statement has been made by the governments of Great Britain and France that the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia had been futile, the guaranties given other states during the summer of 1939 have amounted almost to a tacit admission of that fact. Particularly unprecedented were the British guaranties of independence given to Poland, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey.

When Hitler started to dismember Poland as his next victim, Great Britain and France honored the guaranties they had given and declared war on September 3, 1939. In this manner was begun the "second World War" for which many Czechoslovaks had been praying as their one hope of salvation after Munich. The Czechoslovak Republic continued to exist *de jure*, if not *de facto*. The United States, Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia, and Poland in particular had not recognized the annexation by Germany. On July 21, 1940, the British Government recognized the Provisional Czechoslovak Government headed by Dr. Eduard Beneš as president. As in the first World War, Czechoslovak Legions will be found in continually increasing numbers on all major Allied fronts. The most recent phase of Czechoslovak foreign policy is to be found in Beneš' newest objective, "a free Czechoslovakia in a free Europe," a goal subsequently endorsed by the governments of Great Britain and France. Allied triumph will result in the emergence of a restored Czechoslovak Republic, for, as Beneš has ever maintained, an independent Czechoslovakia is a necessity to permanent European peace and stability.

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Chapter XX

THE LITTLE ENTENTE AND THE BALKAN ENTENTE

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

ONE OF THE KEYSTONES of the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia was the organization in 1920-1921 of the Little Entente, composed of Czechoslo-

kia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. Czechoslovakia played a principal and even a dominant rôle in the Little Entente. President Thomas G. Masaryk, first as a philosopher and teacher before the World War, and then as president of his liberated country, gave an ideological foundation for the alliance. Dr. Eduard Beneš, as foreign minister and later as president of Czechoslovakia, was the major statesman of the Little Entente, not only within its inner circles, but in the League of Nations, and, therefore, in the councils of European diplomacy.

In a very real sense of the term, the foundations of the Little Entente—and of the Balkan Entente as well—were laid in the prewar era. The general ideal of reorganizing central and Balkan Europe on the basis of the free coöperation of the smaller peoples of that region may be traced back into the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth. The World War revealed the close community of vital interests of these peoples, for the Czechoslovaks, the South Slavs, and the Rumanians collaborated in their struggle against the Habsburg and the

Ottoman empires. The period of the Peace Conference of 1919 gave stress to the idea. The official commentary on Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points address of January 8, 1918, for example, noted that in the Balkans the American Government "is clearly committed to the programme of national unity and independence . . . and supports a programme aiming at a confederation of southeastern Europe." In October and November, 1918, Masaryk began a series of discussions with Nicholas Pašić and Ante Trumbić, the Yugoslavs, and Take Jonescu, of Rumania. President Masaryk wrote of these conversations:

... We contemplated a close understanding with the Southern Slavs and the Poles, as well as with the Rumanians and the Greeks, who had made a Treaty of Friendship with Serbia at the time of the Balkan wars. Though we were fully aware of the obstacles in our path, and particularly of the territorial disputes between the Southern Slavs and the Rumanians, we agreed to clear the ground for ulterior coöperation during the impending Peace Conference. The idea of the Little Entente was, so to speak, in the air. It had been developed by our joint work with the Rumanians and the Poles in Russia, by our close relations with the Southern Slavs in all countries during the war, by common enterprises like the Rome Congress of the Oppressed Habsburg Peoples, and by the organization of the Mid-European Democratic Union in America . . .¹

And Take Jonescu, the distinguished Rumanian statesman, wrote:

The conception of the dangers of the future, and the necessity of preventing the splitting up of Central Europe from becoming dangerous to the general welfare, imposed themselves on the politicians, who, in 1918, saw that with the materialization of their secular dream, heavy

¹ T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (London, 1927), p. 330. Masaryk went to Jassy, Rumania, in October, 1917, and he remarked that "politically, moreover, my stay at Jassy bore good fruit. Our personal acquaintance and coöperation with the Rumanians in Russia were the germ of the Little Entente" (*ibid.*, p. 180). See also Eduard Beneš, *My War Memoirs* (Boston, 1928), p. 316: also chap. v, this volume.

responsibilities would forthwith weigh upon their nations, now recalled to national life and liberty, but obliged henceforth to work for the maintenance of order and the liberty of all . . . I shall never forget the day when Professor Masaryk, elected President of the Czechoslovak Republic, passed through Paris, on which occasion I had a conversation respecting the future. I spoke of the necessity of enlarging our Entente till it stretched from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea, thereby introducing Poland and Greece respectively . . .²

Though these dreams were somewhat premature, the foundations for future negotiations were well laid during the war and at the Peace Conference. It is, perhaps, not without interest to note that Article XXI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which recognized the Monroe Doctrine, likewise made provision for regional understandings like the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. This was a definite acceptance of, and provision for, regional understandings which it was necessary to develop in order to attain European security and preserve peace.

Dr. Beneš opened negotiations again with the Yugoslavs in December, 1919, when he offered an alliance to M. Trumbić, of Yugoslavia. Negotiations with M. Vaida-Voevod, of Rumania, were initiated in the following January. The first alliance to be made was that between Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), on August 14, 1920.³

² Quoted in Robert Machray, *The Little Entente* (London, 1929), pp. 85-86.

³ The basic documents dealing with the negotiations are in the so-called Czechoslovak White Books: *Documents diplomatiques concernant les tentatives de restauration des Habsbourg sur le trône de Hongrie* (Prague, République Tchèqueoslovaque, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1922, 169 pp.); *Documents diplomatiques relatives aux conventions d'alliance conclus par la république tchécoslovaque avec le royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et le royaume de Roumanie* (Prague, République Tchèqueoslovaque, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Recueil de Documents, No. 2, 1923, 198 pp.). The texts of the treaties are in the League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, VI, 209, 215; A. B. Keith, *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs, 1918-1937*, I, 63-66. The Czechoslovak-Rumanian military accord was signed on July 2, 1921; the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav on August 1, 1921; and the Yugoslav-Rumanian on January 23, 1922.

The second treaty was that between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, signed on April 23, 1921, and the third, the Rumanian-Yugoslav accord, was signed on June 7, 1921. The treaties of the Little Entente obligated the three Powers to defend the territorial status quo of the Treaty of Trianon against Hungary and to oppose any attempt to bring back the Habsburgs. King Charles had tried to return to the Magyar throne in March and again in October, 1921. Article I of the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak and the Czechoslovak-Rumanian treaties, for instance, stipulated that "in case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary against one of the High Contracting Parties the other Party agrees to assist in the defense of the Party attacked . . ." The Yugoslav-Rumanian treaty, however, provided that "in case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary or of Bulgaria, or of these two Powers, against one of the two High Contracting Parties, with the object of destroying the situation created by the Treaty of Trianon or the Treaty of Neuilly, the other Party agrees to assist in the defense of the Party attacked . . ." There were no other common bonds within the Little Entente. Czechoslovakia had no obligation with reference to Bulgaria, since the problem was not common to her. No binding arrangements were made concerning Germany, or Italy, or Soviet Russia, a matter of great importance when the era of crisis dawned. Shortly after the formation of the political alliances, the three Powers concluded military conventions.

Such were the formal terms of the obligations of the members of the Little Entente. But in the background of the treaties was the idea that by such association the smaller states of central Europe might find that peace and security which were necessary for their consolidation. If peace could be thus assured, the states might be able to develop along democratic lines toward the solution of their manifold social, economic, and political problems.

There were many, too, who hoped that in time the Little Entente, through its economic development, might become the nucleus of a new Danubia. In a broadly philosophical address on February 6, 1924, Dr. Beneš declared that the Little Entente was not brought about by mere sentiment or tradition, or by transitory considerations of the moment. He continued:

Against the universal alarm in our neighborhood, the monarchistic plots, the threatened trouble from the east, and the reproaches levelled at our heads by Western Europe to the effect that we had "balkanized" Central Europe, we had to give a clear proof that we knew how to build up and maintain our States. This was the origin of the Little Entente. . . . At first it was not welcomed in Western Europe. We quietly went on, and later events have proved we were acting on the right lines. . . . Today after three years the group of these three States has shown great vitality; it has shown an example of close coöperation, loyalty and genuine friendship and has achieved considerable results in its policy; it has preserved the peace of Central Europe in the most critical moments, acted as a moderating influence in a series of conflicts, and brought about such a degree of consolidation in its neighborhood and within its own States that there is no important international statesman today who would not openly recognize its value.⁴

It was in the light of such a practical philosophy that the Little Entente had been formed. The reorganization of central Europe on the basis of friendly coöperation of independent communities was the aim of the Little Entente. The common bond in the alliance had to do with Hungary. But aside from the general problem of Hungary, the member states had their individual troubles, which, as we have seen, were not covered by the terms of the alliances—Yugoslavia with Italy, Rumania with Russia, and Czechoslovakia with Germany and Poland. Italy and Yugoslavia were embittered over the problem of Fiume, a question which was not settled at the Paris Peace Conference

⁴ Eduard Beneš, *Five Years of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy* (Prague, Orbis, 1924), pp. 12-14.

in 1919-1920. Czechoslovakia had difficulties with Poland over Teschen in 1920-1921. It looked for a time, however, as if this tension might be eased by the closer association of Poland with the Little Entente, through her anti-Soviet alliance of March 3, 1921, with Rumania. That, however, never developed.

Meanwhile, the members of the Little Entente began to make their voices heard immediately in the councils of Europe. One member held a "permanent" seat in the Council of the League of Nations. The Little Entente played a significant rôle in the rehabilitation of Austria in 1922, and was to do the same with respect to Hungary. Its voice was heard in the Conference of Lausanne in 1922-1923. On January 25, 1924, France, which had not looked with too much favor on the organization of the Little Entente, became allied with Czechoslovakia, and this move was followed in 1926 by a Franco-Rumanian understanding and a year later by a Franco-Yugoslav agreement. It is well to keep in mind, nevertheless, that only the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty had the character of a genuine military alliance.

With the passing of the years the Little Entente went through an interesting evolution. Its part in the Locarno Conference of 1925 was not insignificant, and relations with regional neighbors, with the exception of Hungary, improved. The organic structure of the Little Entente, which had been built simply on the foundations of bilateral treaties, was modified by virtue of an agreement of the members on May 21, 1929, that renewal of the alliance treaties should be made automatic at the end of each five-year period. Moreover, on the same day, the three states signed the Tripartite Treaty for the peaceful settlement of all their disputes in accordance with the model treaty of arbitration and conciliation which the League of Nations had adopted in 1928.

The coming of the world depression inaugurated portentous

difficulties for industry and agriculture in central and southeastern Europe, though political optimism, for a while, still prevailed. The advent of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany on January 30, 1933, which was to have such far-reaching consequences in central Europe, served immediately to strengthen the bonds of union among Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania against that menace. Partly as a consequence of the rise of Hitler, and also because there had been a long trend in that direction, the Little Entente, under the leadership of Dr. Beneš and Dr. Nicholas Titulescu, of Rumania, was transformed (February 16, 1933) virtually into a diplomatic federation.⁵ A Permanent Council of the States of the Little Entente, composed of the foreign ministers of the three countries, or their delegates, was created. "Constituted as the directing organ of the common policy of the group of the three states," the Permanent Council was to meet regularly at least three times a year. Article VI significantly declared:

Every political treaty of each State of the Little Entente, every unilateral act changing the present political situation of one of the States of the Little Entente in regard to a third State, as well as any economic agreement implying important political consequences, will thenceforth require the unanimous consent of the Council of the Little Entente. Existing political treaties of each State of the Little Entente with third States will be progressively unified as soon as possible.

An Economic Council was established "for the progressive coördination of the economic interests of the three States." Finally, the Little Entente now established a secretariat, one section of which was to function permanently at Geneva, Switzerland. As

⁵ See Eduard Beneš, *Le Pacte d'organisation de la Petite Entente et l'état actuel de la politique internationale*. Exposé du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères fait devant les Commissions des Affaires Etrangères de la Chambre des Députés et du Sénat le 1^{er} mars 1933 (Prague, Orbis, 1933, 64 pp.). Text of treaty is on pp. 59-64. See also Miloslav Niederle, *L'Evolution et l'état actuel de la collaboration économique dans le bassin du Danube* (Prague, Orbis, 1938, 92 pp.).

if to lay down the guiding principles which were to govern the new organic union, Article X noted:

The common policy of the Permanent Council must be inspired by the general principles contained in all the great international acts of the postwar era, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the General Act of Arbitration, the eventual conventions on disarmament and the Pacts of Locarno. Moreover, nothing in the present pact can be contrary to the principles and dispositions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

With greater strength and unity, the Little Entente seemed about to enter into another period of work in central Europe—a period of profound crisis. Early in 1933 the three states, together with Poland, protested bitterly and successfully against Mussolini's proposed Four-Power Pact, for they well understood the full implications of a grouping of Italy, Germany, France, and Great Britain, with its usurpation of the powers of the League of Nations and its antagonism against the rights of smaller nations. The Economic Council of the Little Entente was to lay the foundations for a general economic collaboration, including Austria and Hungary, without which there could be no salvation in the Danubian region. The members of the Little Entente were represented at the London Economic Conference in June–July, 1933, and on July 4 signed a nonaggression agreement with the Soviet Union. In the next year Czechoslovakia and Rumania entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, though Yugoslavia did not.

Aided and guided by Czechoslovakia, the influence of the Little Entente was extended into the Balkan region through the membership of Yugoslavia and Rumania, together with Greece and Turkey, in the Balkan Pact of February 9, 1934. But the Balkan Entente, like the Little Entente, had grown out of a movement of far-reaching significance. It was not simply a

development of power politics either in Europe as a whole or in the Balkan Peninsula in particular. The idea of Balkan coöperation, confederation, or unity, of one sort or another, is a very old one. More recently it had taken shape in the Balkan Conferences⁶ (1930-1934), semiofficial meetings of the more democratic elements in the region led by the late Mr. Alexander Papanastassiou, the eminent Greek statesman. There were, however, various obstacles, both internal and external, to the actual achievement of the ideal. Minority and frontier issues, the fierce and narrow nationalisms of the peninsula, were problems not to be easily solved. Moreover, the Great Powers, especially Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, did not look favorably on the development of Balkan unity, which would stand in the way of achieving their own secular, material aims. The basic idea of the movement was that only by means of a free union could the Balkan States secure their national freedom and their economic prosperity.

The Balkan Conferences registered no mean achievement, despite their unofficial character, though they were interrupted by the development of the European crisis and the trend toward authoritarianism in the Balkans. A political pact was drafted by the Third Conference at Bucharest in 1932, based on the ideals of the outlawry of war, arbitration, and mutual assistance. Machinery was provided for the settlement of the troublesome problem of minorities within the framework of existing treaties. The adoption of a draft convention on the right of Balkan citizens to travel, live, and work throughout the Balkans was another worthy accomplishment, for it looked toward those social, economic, and cultural contacts which would give a broad

⁶ See Robert J. Kerner and Harry N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935; A Study in the Recent History of the Balkan and Near Eastern Peoples* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1936, 271 pp.).

social basis for political understanding. The draft project of 1933 for a partial Balkan Customs Union was quite significant. One should also mention the projects for intellectual coöperation and for broad collaboration in the field of social legislation. The Conferences promoted a thorough system of sanitary and veterinary treaties, not to mention projects for a Balkan system of agricultural coöperatives, a system of agricultural credit, and a Balkan Chamber of Agriculture. Several projects were put into operation. A Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was set up at Istanbul in 1931, an Oriental Tobacco Office was created in 1933 by Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, and a Balkan Medical Union began to function in 1933. A Commission of Balkan Jurists performed pioneer service in the direction of legal unification. Furthermore, the ground was prepared for a Balkan Postal Union.

As the Balkan Conferences came virtually to an end in 1934, as a consequence of many factors, the Balkan Entente, formed by Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, came into being. Rumania and Yugoslavia had long since coöperated in the Little Entente with Czechoslovakia, and Greece and Turkey had settled their outstanding difficulties, having only recently signed a remarkable treaty of friendship and alliance. Albania was not invited to become a member of the Balkan Entente because of the fear of antagonizing Fascist Italy. And Bulgaria would not become a signatory, since she refused, naturally, to renounce her idea of territorial revision, under Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Balkan Pact of February 9, 1934, provided that "Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Turkey guarantee mutually the security of all their Balkan frontiers," and the parties promised to concert on the measures necessary to execute the agreement. They were pledged "to undertake no political action toward

any other Balkan country nonsignatory of the present treaty without previous mutual agreement and to assume no political obligation toward any other Balkan country without the consent of the other contracting parties." Moreover, a "secret protocol," signed on February 9, declared, among other things, that "the Balkan Pact is not directed against any country. Its direct object is to guarantee the security of Balkan frontiers against aggression on the part of a Balkan state." In Greece, especially, there was a fear on the part of Venizelos and his followers that the pact might involve difficulties with Fascist Italy. As it turned out, therefore, the pact was to apply only to a possible Balkan aggressor. There were no obligations of the signatories involving possible action against an extra-Balkan Great Power—Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or Soviet Russia. As for the Little Entente, so for the Balkan Entente, the absence of these more general obligations was to prove of great significance as the European crisis deepened.⁷

At a meeting in Ankara, Turkey, October 20–November 2, 1934, the four states organized the Balkan Entente, with a Permanent Council and an Advisory Economic Council as its controlling organs. If the Balkan Entente was designed to preserve the status quo, it was nonetheless true, as in the instance of the Little Entente, that its purpose was to give some kind of unity to the Balkans to prevent that region from becoming a pawn in the hands of some outside Great Power. As M. Titulescu, the Rumanian foreign minister of the day, said: "No longer will the intrigues and rivalries of the Great Powers be able to pit one of us against the other and plunge this part of the world into a war which might mean a greater conflagration than that of 1914." A program of wide collaboration along eco-

⁷ See Document XIV, "The Four-Power Balkan Pact of February 9, 1934," in Kerner and Howard, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–233.

nomic lines was initiated by the Advisory Economic Council beginning in January, 1935.⁸

Dr. Beneš well characterized the importance of the Balkan Entente in his address of July 2, 1934, before the Czechoslovak Parliament.⁹

We should not consider that the chief significance of the Balkan Pact lies in political or military agreements relative to the frontiers of the Balkan States or that it is aimed against Bulgaria. What has been realized in the form of a pact of guarantee is of infinitely greater importance and meaning, like that which has been and still is the principal meaning of the Little Entente: the Balkan Entente is in fact the putting into practice of this principle—the Balkans for the Balkan peoples. By this pact, for the first time in contemporary history, the Balkan states are organizing themselves by pacific means and are demanding of the Great Powers that they leave the Balkans to themselves . . . It is a sort of revolution in Balkan policy; it is an event of the first magnitude in European politics, an event which with perfect logic arrays itself among the contemporary postwar evolutionary tendencies . . . There will be no war in the Balkans if there are no rivalries there among the Great Powers. Then only will the famous historic word "Balkanization" lose all meaning. Under these conditions no local quarrel among the Balkan States will again provoke a European conflict.

As the world moved through the perilous years of crisis after 1931, the member states of both the Little Entente and, after its

⁸ As examples of this collaboration, the following may be noted: On January 24, 1936, a Balkan Entente Air Convention was signed by Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Turkey. A Balkan Press Entente came into being in May, 1936. The Economic Council, in July, 1936, recommended collaboration with the Little Entente in the establishment of a limited Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Union, and a convention for this purpose was signed by members of the two ententes on October 12, 1936, and went into effect on March 1, 1937. A permanent Balkan Maritime Committee was organized at the Piraeus in October, 1936. The Conference of the Central (National) Banks of Issue of the Balkan Entente held its first session at Athens on December 17–20, 1936. See Florin Codrescu, "La VII^e Réunion du Conseil Permanent de l'Entente Balkanique à Bucarest," *Affaires Danubiennes*, No. 3 (March, 1939), pp. 69–73.

⁹ Eduard Beneš, *Une Nouvelle Phase de la lutte pour l'équilibre européen* (Prague, Orbis, 1934, 62 pp.).

foundation in 1934, the Balkan Entente worked together in the cause of organizing and preserving peace. Under Dr. Beneš and Dr. Titulescu, especially, the Little Entente took a lead in urging action against Japan in the years 1931-1933. The smaller states, well knowing that their safety lay in the system of collective security, sought to strengthen the League of Nations. The two ententes stood together in the threatening crisis which centered around the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in October, 1934. In the Ethiopian conflict, precipitated by Fascist Italy's aggression in October, 1935, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente marched firmly with the League of Nations, under Anglo-French leadership, though the member states were well aware of the tremendous risks involved for them.¹⁰

As the Ethiopian war drew formally to a close in the spring of 1936, Nazi Germany, in violation of the Versailles and Locarno treaties, on March 7, 1936, moved into the Rhineland. The remilitarization of the Rhineland was of vast significance for the countries of the Little and Balkan ententes. Here was another open and defiant violation of solemn treaties. Moreover, remilitarization of the Rhineland might prove an effective barrier to any direct French assistance to Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente in the event of war. It might serve, in other words, to isolate central and southeastern Europe from France and Great Britain. Four days after the remilitarization, on March 11, a joint meeting of the two ententes was held in Geneva. Though no official communiqué was forthcoming, there were indications of support for France and the principle of collective security. Thanks to the failure of Great Britain and France to act in concert, however, Nazi Germany won its first major victory in the

¹⁰ See *Ethiopia*, No. 2 (1936). *Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy. Correspondence in connexion with the Application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations*. January, 1936. Cmd. 5072.

European struggle which had already begun. When Dr. Kamil Krofta, who had succeeded President Beneš in the foreign ministry at Prague, discussed the matter before the Czechoslovak Parliament on March 17, he was well aware of the serious problems involved:

No slight matter is at stake. The Locarno Treaty of 1925, alongside the Covenant, was the pillar of European security; and on its observance and efficacy were based the hopes of all the European States that desired peace . . . Our own attitude is determined by our fidelity to concluded obligations the validity of which we wish to maintain and also by our fidelity to our allies . . . We are conscious of our responsibility to our State and to the family of Nations, and we shall therefore with all emphasis uphold the principle that international obligations and duties must be fulfilled. We do not defend this principle on behalf of others only, but also on our own behalf, and we declare emphatically that we will fulfill all our duties and obligations fully and without exceptions.²¹

It was the remilitarization of the Rhineland, moreover, which precipitated the demand of the Turkish Republic for the remilitarization of the Straits in April, 1936. Turkey regained her right to refortify those strategic waters, with the full support of the members of the Balkan Entente, at the Montreux Conference in July, 1936.

The growing power and the menace of Nazi Germany, however, proved a threat to both groupings and tended to promote disunity among the member states, particularly when they witnessed the lack of solidarity in Anglo-French resistance to aggression. There was some evidence of disunity in the communiqué of the Little Entente at Bratislava in September, 1936, when Yugoslavia seemed bent on pursuing a separate policy with both Italy and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia, under the Stojadinović government, particularly, had shown separatist tendencies in her

²¹ Kamil Krofta, "On the European Situation," *The Central European Observer*, XIV (No. 6, March 20, 1936), 83-85. Address of March 17, 1936.

treaty with Bulgaria in January, 1937, and with Italy the following March. Dr. Krofta aptly characterized the serious political situation in an address on March 2, 1937:¹²

Of late the Little Entente [and the Balkan Entente as well] has been brought face to face with a changed situation in Europe caused by the development of the Abyssinian question and the initiative character of Germany's policy. These conditions concern both the individual Little Entente States and the Little Entente as an entity. Yugoslavia has been compelled to occupy herself with the new distribution of power in the Mediterranean Sea, Czechoslovakia with the intensive change in the policy of her neighbor on the north, while Rumania is affected by the relations of Europe to the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, at least formal unity still obtained within the circles of the Little Entente and, more especially, within the Balkan Entente. When the Czechoslovak crisis was forced on Europe by Hitler's desire to isolate and then to destroy Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente remained firm. The Balkan Entente, meeting at Salonica on July 31, 1938, moved toward an understanding with Bulgaria, which had pursued a correct policy toward the member states, by removing the military restrictions on that country. In return, Bulgaria reaffirmed her pacific intentions. At the meeting of the Council of the Little Entente on August 21—as it turned out this was the last meeting of the Little Entente!—an approach was made to Hungary, though it did not bring forth much fruit. Preliminary agreements were reached, however, recognizing "equality of rights for Hungary in the matter of armament and the reciprocal renunciation of any resort to force between Hungary and the states in question."¹³ But while that agreement was being reached, Magyar statesmen were making a deal with the Hitler

¹² Kamil Krofta, *Czechoslovakia and the International Situation at the Beginning of 1937* (Prague, Orbis, 1937, 52 pp.).

¹³ Text of the communiqué is in *Les Balkans*, X (1938), 348-349.

government concerning their share of a mutilated Czechoslovakia—a part of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

When the great crisis came in September, 1938, it is interesting to note that both Jugoslavia, thanks to popular pressure on behalf of Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, as members of the Little Entente, rallied to the support of the harassed Republic. They remained true to their obligations, and were ready to stand to arms, as long as they had any confidence in France and Great Britain. As early as September 24, it appears that Jugoslavia and Rumania warned Hungary that, "in case of an attack of Hungary against Czechoslovakia, they would be obliged to fulfill their engagements as members of the Little Entente."¹⁴

Only the Munich "Accord" of September 29-30 finally destroyed the Little Entente. But the Balkan Entente remained, though it was much weakened by the tragic events of September, 1938. As a writer declared in the *South Slav Herald*, of Belgrade, Jugoslavia, on October 1, 1938:

The lesson of the Czech crisis will be well learned in the Balkans, where proximity to the events has caused realism, not sentiment, to sway popular judgment. In circumstances closely similar to those of July, 1914, the Balkans have seen a small Slav country—the only democratic state left east of the Rhine—abandoned to its fate under the threat of armed force. No amount of relief at the temporary achievement of peace can blind the smaller nations of Europe to the price at which this postponement, this uneasy armistice, has been purchased. Nor can it blind them to their own ultimate fate if they do not make their own peace in time with the new masters of Europe.

And in the *Balkan Herald* (Belgrade) the statement appeared at the time that "only strict neutrality—and their own closer unity in such a firm *bloc* as the Balkan Entente—can preserve

¹⁴ *L'Europe Centrale*, No. 40 (1 octobre 1938), p. 639, dates the warning on September 26. The *New York Times*, September 25, 1939, dated it on September 24.

[the Balkan States] from a future full of uncertainty. The slogan 'the Balkans for the Balkan people' will gain added adherents as the full consequence of the Czechoslovak surrender appears."

The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente had their imperfections. These were faults and weaknesses common to Europe as a whole. The Little Entente, despite determined efforts, was unable to organize an effective, inclusive political and economic collaboration in central Europe, embracing Austria and Hungary. Austria appeared willing to coöperate in 1937-1938, when Dr. Milan Hodža, the Czechoslovak premier, was working in that direction, but feudal Hungary refused collaboration as long as her political claims against Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania were not adjusted according to her desires. The Balkan Entente did not include Albania or Bulgaria. Nevertheless, both ententes made excellent beginnings and they constituted definite steps in the right direction. It seems clear today that Fascist Italian, Nazi German, or Soviet Russian domination of central and Balkan Europe is not, will not, and cannot be a solution of the problems of that region in the interests of the peoples involved. Only a federation of the free and independent peoples of central and Balkan Europe offers the possibility of such a fundamental solution. Whatever their faults, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente looked forward to the federal idea. And both worked, not merely on the political, but on the broad social, economic, and cultural plane as well. Both offered a hope of organization and association in the Danubian and Balkan region which is present only dimly today.

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PART V: THE PASSING OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Chapter XXI

HITLER AND HITLERISM

BY WICKHAM STEED

THE TIME HAS NOT YET COME to see either Hitler or Hitlerism in historical perspective. Both the man and the thing are too near, they loom too large in the lurid murk of the European penumbra, for either of them to be portrayed with a nice sense of proportion. To Hitler, the man, I have paid careful heed since I first read his book, *Mein Kampf*, in 1928. Its turgid rhetoric awoke in my mind memories of the distant days, between 1903 and 1913, when I breathed in Vienna the atmosphere which its earlier pages evoke. I was actually in Vienna throughout the years Hitler spent there. Some of the men he names I knew personally. The tendencies he denounces, and distorts, were familiar to me; and the story of his adolescence, as he tells it with many twists and inaccuracies, rang true in the main. In Hitlerism, the movement and political phenomenon, I felt less interest—until it began actively to overshadow German life—because its doctrines struck me as a rehash of not a few older notions which had, in the years before the war of 1914–1918, gained many supporters in Germany and Austria. It was the personality of Adolf Hitler that lent them vigor. So Hitler, the man, struck me at first as more important than Hitlerism, the movement.

Even today it is hard to be sure whether Hitler should take precedence of Hitlerism in any careful estimate of the man and the movement, or whether the movement would have gone forward through other channels had Hitler never arisen to lead it. These questions may seem as idle as it would be to ask whether the Russian Bolshevist Revolution would have triumphed without Lenin in November, 1917, or whether the elements of Marxism—which were undoubtedly present in England and France during the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century—could have been fused into a body of dynamic revolutionary doctrine without Karl Marx. Yet, in a sense, the questions are not altogether idle, for the outcome of the war which Great Britain and France [up to July, 1940] have been fighting against Hitlerism may depend in some measure upon the degree in which Hitlerism existed before Hitler and the degree in which it may survive him.

It is therefore well to look into the origins of Hitlerism in order to discover to what extent Hitler caught up and gave "a local habitation and a name" to what was already in the air and in what measure he alone supplied a point around which "airy nothings" could crystallize. The fact that he served chiefly as a point of crystallization would not detract from the importance of the man himself; yet, so far as he was the occasion rather than the cause of the crystallization, doubt would remain whether, at some future time and in circumstances propitious, the essentials of Hitlerism might not reappear without a Hitler.

After having weighed this problem cautiously for some years, I have come to the conclusion that Hitlerism is far more formidable, and is much more deeply rooted in the German past, than Hitler himself or any man is or can be. Otherwise it would not be easy to account for the submissiveness of so many millions of Germans to Hitlerite doctrine. This submissiveness has not

been solely or, perhaps, even principally due to terror. Nor is it altogether attributable to the German liking for a word of command. What Hitler often terms "necessary brutality" helped to cow his opponents after he had established himself in power, just as the systematic and calculated violence of his "Storm Troops" and "Black Guards" hacked out his path to success. But, as he himself explains in *Mein Kampf*, brutal violence, no matter how thoroughly and ruthlessly it may be used, can only bring victory in a struggle between opposing political creeds if such violence has behind it the force of a faith. The real question for those who would assess the value of Hitlerism as a phenomenon in the political life of Germany is how Hitler contrived to give his doctrine the force of a faith and to get so many Germans to share it. In my own view he could hardly have done this had not the elements, the watchwords, and even the catchwords of this faith found a response in some quasi-mystical belief in the minds of the German masses, and not of the masses alone.

Inquiry into the political origins of Hitlerism leads at least as far back as Frederick William I of Prussia, father of the Frederick II who is usually termed "the Great." Frederick William I was a remarkable and unpleasant man who fashioned and set his stamp upon the Prussian State, if he did not actually create it, between 1713 and 1740. It has been well said of him that he had "the mind of a drill sergeant, the manners of a boor, and the moods of a savage." He filled his army with giants by the methods of a slave raider; and by way of chastening his son, and teaching him the Prussian spirit, he condemned him to witness, as one of many penalties, the beheading of a cherished friend. Frederick William I standardized "Prussianism," which, in its simplest form, is political servility coupled with ruthless military discipline. It is the spirit of an army carried over into civil

officialdom and into society itself. It is obedience to a single will—be the will that of a leader or that of a tyrant.

How well Frederick the Great learned his lesson may be judged from an episode in his own royal career. He ordered a chaplain, named Faulhaber, to be hanged without the last consolations of religion for having told a deserter that his transgression would be forgiven in the other world. The first volume of the *Diaries and Correspondence* of the Earl of Malmesbury contains a letter which he wrote from Berlin on March 18, 1776, to the Earl of Suffolk upon the character of Frederick the Great, then reigning. Frederick, he wrote, has "all along been guided by his own judgment alone, without ever consulting any of his Ministers or Superior Officers; not so much from the low opinion he entertains of their abilities, as from a conviction from his own feelings that if he employed them otherwise than as simple instruments they would, in time, assume a will of their own; and instead of remaining accessories endeavour to become principals. To persevere in this system it was necessary for him to divest himself of compassion and remorse, and of course of religion and morality . . . Thus never losing sight of his object he lays aside all feelings the moment that is concerned; and, although as an individual he often appears and really is humane, benevolent and friendly, yet the instant he acts in his royal capacity these attributes forsake him and he carries with him desolation, misery, and persecution wherever he goes."

The analogy between these traits of Frederick's character and those of Adolf Hitler's would in any event be striking. Closer still is the parallel between the German admiration of Hitler's achievements and the way in which Frederick's unprincipled exploits and successful acts of violence were received by Germans outside Prussia. For the first time since the Thirty Years' War Germans felt that Frederick had given them something

to be proud of, and however much their princes may have detested the "mischievous rascal," as George II of England, Elector of Hanover, called him, the people of Germany were elated by his exploits. And is not half of the secret of Adolf Hitler's hold upon the millions of Germans in Germany, who detest his system, the fact that he "got away" with the reoccupation of the Rhineland, conscription, the annexation of Austria, and the destruction of Czechoslovakia, not only without war, but against the advice of his generals? Even his war against Poland was not unpopular; rather the contrary. Hitler will be execrated only after military defeat—if even then.

Hitlerism might need to bring irreparable disaster and protracted woe upon the German people before their faith in the ideas which Hitlerism embodies could be uprooted. Twenty years after the death of Frederick the Great, Prussia, smashed at the battle of Jena, lay helpless at the feet of Napoleon. Yet within eighteen months of that disaster the philosopher Fichte succeeded in appealing to the undercurrent of German vanity, the same undercurrent that had found expression in gladness at Frederick's exploits. Unlike the great Hessian Ritter von Stein, who had freed the Prussian peasants from serfdom and had sought to instill into the people a moral sense, Fichte persuaded himself that God spoke through him, and that Prussia and Germany must rise again in the service of a German God. If Fichte was not the first to give a mystical and semireligious turn to German pride of race and yearning for political mastery, he was the first to proclaim dogmatically that Germanism is the supreme possession of mankind. True though it be that another philosopher, Herder, and even the poet Schiller, had affirmed that the German spirit alone communes with the spirit of the Universe, Fichte taught that military force must be the instrument of this spirit, despite his assertion that German *Kultur*

must and would prevail because of its own intrinsic superiority to all other forms of civilization. This superiority, he declared (in his *Fourteen Speeches to the German Nation*), existed independently of the military weapons which would ensure its triumph, since it is rooted in the eternal order of things. A Hitler would hardly have spoken otherwise.

The essential difference between the Germans and other peoples, Fichte went on, is reflected above all in their language, and in the fact that this language has been spoken from time immemorial by the same aboriginal stock on the same soil as an expression of the inmost character of the German folk itself. The distinction arose on the first splitting of the primeval human stock, and consists in the fact that the Germans speak a tongue derived from the first outpouring of the vital power of Nature, whereas the other Germanic peoples speak only tongues of which the surface moves while their roots are dead. Unlike other peoples who had learned to speak strange tongues without originality, the Germans had kept their language in direct contact with things, making it therefore living and life-giving. For this reason the Germans are the *Urvolk* speaking the *Ursprache*—the aboriginal people speaking an aboriginal tongue—and are entitled to call themselves simply “The People,” so that the name “German” can be seen in its true significance.

When I first read Fichte’s *Fourteen Speeches* as a student at Berlin University, forty-odd years ago, their political meaning escaped me. Not until I had read and reread Adolf Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, some ten years ago, and had seen what his territorial doctrine might portend for other European peoples, did I understand how straight is the line that runs from Fichte to him. Whether or not Hitler has ever read a line of Fichte I do not know; nor does it greatly matter. It is enough to compare his insistence upon the right of the German folk to *Lebensraum*,

or "room to live in," and his tirades upon the sacredness of the German blood to be shed in winning more soil for the German plow, with Fichte's statements to perceive the identity of Fichte's conception with his. The German people, Fichte wrote, must be free within their own boundaries—primarily, inner boundaries to include all who speak the German tongue. No people of other blood or tongue can be allowed to dwell within them. A people which, like the German, has remained true to Nature can, if it finds its own homeland too small, gain more space by conquering the territories of its neighbors and driving out their inhabitants. It may wish to exchange a rough and barren land for soil more blessed; in this event also it will drive out the earlier inhabitants. The only real balance of power would be to set up in the center of Europe an overwhelmingly powerful German nation, pure and uncontaminated, inspired by a common will and united in a common strength against which other Europeans would strive in vain. Is there in the whole world another people like this aboriginal German folk? Any man, Fichte declared, who seeks to answer this question in the light of deep thought must answer "No." If the Germans go down, the whole of mankind goes down, never to rise again.

Along various channels marked by well-known names—from those of Hegel, Goerres, and Schlegel to those of Treitschke, Lamprecht, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain (the Germanized Englishman who inspired Emperor William II)—Fichte's doctrine irrigated German minds throughout the nineteenth century, and permeated that of Adolf Hitler. Traces of it are to be found in many other writers, too numerous to name; but in the light of my personal experience I am inclined to attribute the formation of Hitler's ideas chiefly to the anti-Jewish "Aryan" Pan-German atmosphere which was condensed by Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*

into a tangible body of opinion in the early years of the present century. It was in this atmosphere that Hitler spent his years of adolescence at Vienna. And it is an interesting fact that Houston Stewart Chamberlain himself—he who had written monumental epistles, in the style of Fichte, to flatter William II between 1901 and 1923—should in the latter year have transferred his allegiance to Adolf Hitler. To Hitler, Chamberlain wrote on October 7, 1923—a few weeks before the Munich *Putsch*—a letter hailing him as the savior of Germany. In it he said:

Ever and again I ask myself whether the lack of political instinct for which the Germans are so generally blamed is not a symptom of a much deeper State-building disposition. German talent for organization is unsurpassed. And German capacity for science is unequalled . . . The ideal of politics would be to have no politics. But this non-politics would have to be frankly professed and imposed upon the world by force. Nothing can be done as long as the Parliamentary system rules; God knows that the Germans have no spark of talent for this system. Its prevalence I regard as the greatest misfortune, for it can only lead again and again into a morass and bring to nought all plans for restoring the Fatherland to health and lifting it up . . .

My faith in Germanism has not wavered an instant, though my hope—I confess it—was at a low ebb. With one stroke you have transformed the state of my soul. That in the hour of her deepest need Germany gives birth to a Hitler proves her vitality; as do the influences that emanate from him; for these two things—personality and its influence—belong together . . . May God protect you!

It has become the fashion in many quarters to attribute the rise of Hitler and Hitlerism to the Treaty of Versailles, and especially to the occupation of the Ruhr by the French in 1923. Such explanations of a phenomenon so remarkable strike me as being far too shallow. They take no account of the volume of German sentiment and political beliefs which, in the form either of Pan-Germanism or of less definite territorial aspiration, had

dominated German thought before 1914. And they attribute to the Versailles Treaty greater and more lasting influence than has been exercised by any political treaty of which I have knowledge. True though it be that the loudest denunciations of "Versailles" come from people who have never read or studied that much-maligned treaty, its authors would have needed to work with devilish cunning to produce one tithe of the effects which we see in Hitlerism. The Nazi movement was much more than an expression of a desire for revenge, which, when I was in Germany in 1926, for instance, was certainly not uppermost in German minds. How is it that the German Nationalists, who hated the Versailles Treaty as fiercely as Hitler hated it, never managed to get any great hold on the German people? Hitler himself says, on pages 714 and 715 of *Mein Kampf* (which were written in 1926), that propaganda inspired by genius would have been able to exploit "Versailles" in such a way as to make the rage and indignation of the German people boil over. "What," he asks, "have our Governments done again to plant in our people the spirit of proud self-assertion, manly defiance and angry hate?" In order to do this, he goes on, every journal, theater, cinema, poster, and placard would have had to be pressed into the service of one great mission. But everything had been neglected and nothing done. What wonder then that the German people were not what they might and should be.

Hitlerite propaganda worked precisely on these lines. It created a movement for revenge, and more than revenge. So long as the German people believed that their armies had been beaten in the field, they remained pacific. Hitler's propaganda, "inspired by genius," taught them that Germany had been victorious in the war but that the fruits of her victory had been snatched from her by Jews, Marxists, and other traitors. This was one secret of Hitler's success. He used a deliberate false-

hood, but a falsehood that appealed to the comforting belief in the invincibility of German arms which Bismarck's victories over Denmark in 1864, over Austria in 1866, and over France in 1870-1871 had, before 1918, implanted in German minds. In this way Hitler at once ministered to the wounded vanity of his people and, while awaiting and preparing for the day when they should be able to crush their former foes, gave them "traitors" to hate and to crush at home.

Coolly regarded, without moral preoccupation, this was a considerable achievement. Whatever else may be thought of Hitler, he is a man of unusual dimensions. Nor is he merely a ranting demagogue or a spellbinder of the largest size. Evil, or almost wholly evil, though his instincts are, it would, I think, be unjust and unwise to belittle him. Houston Stewart Chamberlain had set out to find what he called a "true religion" for the Germanic peoples. So his book became a mystical essay upon Nordic "Aryan" race purity as a holy sacrament. Hitler, taking race purity as his gospel, has acted under a similar "religious" impulse. He has long been convinced that his own inspiration, if not, indeed, his own person, is divine and that—as he writes of his persecution of the Jews—he is "doing the work of the Lord." In this belief he looks upon himself as superior to common morality. For him, evil is resistance to his will. Any means of breaking such resistance is good whether it be falsehood, torture, murder, or the persecution and extermination of individuals or of races. He and his party are identical with the State—a State conceived, more or less as Hegel conceived it, as "the movement of God on earth," "the Divine will as the present spirit unfolding itself in the actual shape and organization of a world," "the absolute power on earth," "the ultimate end which has the highest right against the individual, whose highest duty is to be a member of the State." Such a State,

as Hegel explained in his *Philosophie des Rechts*, can have no obligations, moral or other, toward other states or be bound by treaties or agreements with them one moment longer than such treaties serve its purpose. For it, international morality does not exist.

Hitler accepts and practices these Hegelian principles, though he has carried his theory of the State a step farther. He affirms that the State is not an end in itself but a means to the end. "The end is the preservation and the fostering of a community of living beings who are physically and mentally alike . . . States that do not serve this end are misconceptions, nay, abortions . . . The State is form, not substance. Therefore a people's level of culture is not the standard by which the goodness of a State can be measured. Comprehensible though it be that a highly-civilized people should appear to be worthier than a negro tribe, the State organism of such a people, viewed from the standpoint of the attainment of its end, may be worse than that of negroes."

In the light of this doctrine Hitler's hatred and scorn of the "so-called democracies" can be readily understood. They are worse than negro tribes. They are misconceptions, nay, abortions. They do not even seek to preserve or to foster a community of living beings who are physically and mentally alike. Rather do they try to preserve such a degree of freedom for those living beings that each may find play for individual talents and make life more varied by becoming less like each other. To Hitler all this is anathema; for behind his ideal of like-mindedness and physical resemblance among members of a community lies his conviction that only through "herd-unity" can Germans gain mastery. It was, he writes, the lack of this herd-unity in 1914-1918 which cost the German Empire the mastery of the globe. Had the Germans then possessed it, "history would have

¹ *Mein Kampf*, pp. 433-436.

taken another course, and who can say if this course would not have led to what so many purblind pacifists hoped to get by whining and whimpering—a peace not supported by the tearful pacifist lamentations of palm-waving females but founded upon the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur!*²

It would therefore seem that one object of Hitlerism is to enforce like-mindedness as a means of creating that German herd-unity which will bend the world to the service of German *Kultur*. What *Kultur* may be, is a mystery which I have long sought to fathom. It is certainly not “culture”; nor is it “civilization.” The shrewdest and most painstaking student of it, Professor Edmond Vermeil of Paris University, who is one of the foremost living authorities on German thought, has reached the conclusion that *Kultur* is in reality the German expansionist urge to escape from territorial limitations and to gain greater unity. He continues:

This explains the meaning which German thought gives to *Kultur*. Here, *Kultur* means mastery, effort ceaselessly renewed, constant struggle without final satisfaction in principle. By “civilization” the West understands the sum total of the institutions which came at once out of Antiquity and Christianity, the acknowledged sources of Western thought and of Western universalism. But Germany only learned late, and indirectly, the thought of Antiquity. Nor was she so strongly impregnated by Christianity as were the other peoples of Western and Southern Europe; and, perhaps for this reason, she has preserved her original traits. It is, above all, this double tardiness which leads her to set up the concept of *Kultur* against the concept of “civilization,” and, not without disdain, to throw back the latter concept on to the West.³

Western Europe, Professor Vermeil explains, looks upon “civilization” as a system of spiritual attainments which are both

² *Mein Kampf*, pp. 437–438.

³ *The International Mind*, April, 1936.

humane and universal. Germany, on the contrary, understands by *Kultur* an intimate union, continually adjusted or renewed, between natural forces in the Universe and a human discipline designed to moderate and control them by methods of which Germans alone have the secret. This is why Fichte reminded the Germans that they are the "aboriginal people" (*Urvolk*) who speak the "aboriginal tongue" (*Ursprache*). In point of fact the Germans feel that they stand closer than other peoples to the primitive world. They return to it more easily, as to the fount of their own genius; and they seek to do it by ridding themselves of the alien influences which have emanated from Antiquity, the Jewish Scriptures, and Christianity. In Hitlerism this effort is intensified.

If this reading of Hitlerism is warranted, as I think it is, an adequate explanation may be found of the deed which, more than any other, heralded the outbreak of the present war. This deed was Hitler's attempt to destroy Czecho-Slovakia utterly after having rendered her defenseless by the Munich "Agreement" of September 30, 1938. The only plausible basis on which the British and French governments could justify their acceptance of that "Agreement" was that it represented Hitler's last territorial claim in Europe and that it satisfied his yearning for German racial unity by transferring the Sudete Germans from the Czechoslovak Republic to the Third Reich. But when Hitler proceeded, on March 15, 1939, to subjugate the non-German regions of Czecho-Slovakia, and to bring them under the Third Reich in the form of a "Protectorate," he was obviously obeying an impulse stronger than that of racial unity or even of military expediency. He was destroying something incompatible with and antagonistic to German *Kultur*, antagonistic especially to his own idea of the purpose of a true State. The Czechoslovak State had been fashioned and inspired by

the ideas of Thomas G. Masaryk. Long before either Hitler or Hitlerism became formidable, Masaryk had reached conclusions (upon the German tendencies of which Hitlerism is the present embodiment) that reveal the depth of this antagonism. These conclusions he summed up in his work *The World Revolution* in which he interpreted the meaning of the World War of 1914-1918. Roughly, Masaryk looked upon that war as a struggle between the ideas of the West and the ideas of Germany. The ideas of the West, he argued, are legacies of the Renaissance and the Reformation with their outcome in the English, American, and French revolutions, the parents of democracy. He defined democracy as an attempt to organize mankind intensively, as distinguished from the theocracy of the Holy Roman Empire which tried to organize European mankind extensively. Before the advent of Hitlerism, Masaryk looked upon the postwar period as a transition from a residue of theocracy to the development of democracy on a humanitarian basis. And he viewed Hitlerism, after its advent, as an effort to set up a new theocracy on the basis of the God-given superiority of a Nordic "Aryan" German race.

In the Middle Ages, Masaryk pointed out, German thought and culture were identical with those of Europe. But in more modern times they became increasingly differentiated and isolated. The Prussian State, which the Reformation strengthened, was aggressive from the outset and dominated Germany. In western Europe, where what was called the "State-idea" also prevailed for a time, the State itself gradually became an organ of Parliament and of public opinion. In Germany, on the contrary, the monarchical State was literally deified, and its absolute power was generally recognized. Prussia and Germany were organized Caesarism; and Frederick the Great, Bismarck, William I, and William II were essentially Caesars. The Prussian

officer, the soldier, became the German standard for the organization of society and, indeed, of the world. The soldier and war were regular institutions. Nor did the Reformation, classical Humanism, science, art, and philosophy prevail over theocracy in Germany so thoroughly as they prevailed in the West. For the German people accepted the Reformation only in part, and the Lutheran Reformation in Germany "received" and adapted itself to Roman law—the law of a State founded on slavery—coupled with certain principles which the Roman Church had taken over from the Roman Empire. Just as the Emperor Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, was in reality the first pope, so there arose in Germany a sort of caesaropapism with a monarch ruling by divine right over State and Church alike; and, in course of time, Pan-German imperialism took the place of the humanitarian ideals which Lessing, Goethe, Kant, and others had derived from Western evolution and from participation in it.

Both in doctrine and in policy Pan-Germanism (of which Hitlerism is the latest expression) declined to recognize the rights of peoples to independence. Germany was to be lord and master over all. Thus war and the waging of war came to be looked upon and proclaimed as belonging to the divine order of the world. The assertion that all right is born of might became a dogma—might, in its turn, being identified with violence. In the name of this doctrine the German people were declared to be the ruling race. Even in 1922 the German professor Schaefer maintained in his book, *State and Society*, that right is solely the expression of might, and treated might as the equivalent of violent force. He said textually: "The thing cannot be otherwise; force and might can create right."

Masaryk's analysis of the historical process of which Hitlerism is the outcome is singularly apposite today when Hitlerism has functioned in the way Masaryk predicted that it would. It

prefers, as he said, the hugeness of a colossal tower of Babel built by German hands to the grandeur of a humanity united in freedom. And its belief in the titanic superiority of Germanism, its doctrine of the German superman, is, in the last resort, belief "in an irritable, nervous creature who seeks, in death or war, relief from chronic excitement, that is to say, relief in an excitement still more acute."

The shrewdness and insight of Masaryk's criticism of German thought and practice are even more apparent today than they were at the time he wrote. Though Hitlerism as a political phenomenon had not then arisen, Masaryk's diagnosis of the mental and moral disease which is called Hitlerism today lays bare the root of the disease itself. The whole system of Hitlerite propaganda depends upon the fostering of chronic excitement from which relief is sought in preparation for war, and in war itself, as the means of gaining "liberation" and world mastery. There is good evidence that Hitler looks upon himself as something more than a superman. He has spoken publicly of the "somnambulistic" certainty of his decisions; and in 1924 his principal mentor, Gottfried Feder—whom Hitler discarded after the "clean-up," or massacre, of June 30, 1934—declared in a book on *The State* that Hitler's followers require and expect from their leader not so much comprehensive or precise knowledge as "somnambulistic sure-footedness of decision." Hitler has more than once assured his advisers that he is the greatest German who has ever lived. To one of them, who has placed his words on record, Hitler said: "Mankind, led by the German race, is now in a period of transition, just as it was when men first began to pass from the ape-like into the human stage. Now they are passing from the human into the super-human stage. I have preceded them. In so far as there is a God in this world, I am He."

No fair-minded observer of Hitler will deny him a measure of

ntuitive genius. Most demagogues and many great orators possess the power to divine the half-formed thoughts and unconscious impulses of their hearers, and to express those thoughts and impulses in words that strike their hearers as a revelation. Hitler has this power in a supreme degree. Without much education, and often in language that defies accurate translation since it cannot be translated without improving it, Hitler has the gift of stimulating the open and hidden impulses, ideas, appetites, vanities, and ambitions which German and Pan-German writers and teachers have fostered from Fichte onward. Some observation and experience of international affairs during the greater part of the past half-century have convinced me that there is a kind of inner logic in such impulses and ideas that makes them work themselves out to definite consequences. The consequences of wholesome ideas are likely to be good; those of ideas which are evil or distorted, to be fraught with disaster and woe.

I look upon the ideas which Hitlerism embodies as being essentially evil; and I have long been convinced that their inner logic would drive them into conflict with saner and sounder ideas such as those which inspired the effort of Masaryk to build up the Czechoslovak Republic. Compare, for instance, Masaryk's teaching upon the authority of the State with the teachings of Hegel and Hitler. In his *World Revolution*, Masaryk declared that there is only one remedy for abuses and defects in the life of the State—truth and truthfulness, coupled with freedom to speak and to write the truth. Democracy, he insisted, should mean moral renovation in politics, in education, and throughout the whole range of public and private life. It does not and should not mean a belittling of the State's outward authority. He went on:

I do not belittle this authority, but I cannot deify it and its power.

When I took upon myself the obligations of the Presidential office, well knowing what my daily administrative tasks would be, it was clear to me that no State or policy can prosper unless the groundwork be moral. As St. Paul wrote at the beginning of the fourth chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians: "Therefore, seeing we have this Ministry, as we have received mercy, we faint not; but have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness nor handling the word of God deceitfully; but by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." This is the programme of democracy *sub specie aeternitatis*. The ethical basis of all politics is humanity, and humanity is an international programme. It is a new word for the old love of our fellow-men.

And, in direct opposition to Hegelian teaching, he declared it to be a false notion that political men need take no thought of ethical principles when the interest of the State is involved:

No State, no society, can be managed without general recognition of the ethical bases of the State and of politics; and no State can long stand if it infringes the broad rules of human morality. The authority of the State and of its laws is derived from general recognition of ethical principles and from general agreement among citizens upon the main postulates of philosophy and life. Once again:—Democracy is not alone a form of State and of administration. It is a philosophy of life and an outlook upon the world. The Greeks and Romans declared justice to be the foundation of States; and justice is the arithmetic of love. The law, written and unwritten, enables the State gradually to extend the injunction of love to all the practical relations of social life and, in case of need, to enforce compliance with it. Hence the old dispute about the relative value of morality and law. Though an ethical minimum, the law, as the embodiment of public right, carries great weight by reason of its definiteness and practical adequacy. In practice, the State approaches the ethical maximum—the ideal—through the ethical minimum—the law—and human evolution brings the minimum ever nearer to the ideal.

The inner logic of Hitlerism, with its nonethical premise of the God-given superiority of a Nordic "Aryan" German race

against which no other races have any rights whatsoever, could not tolerate the continued existence, in a country bordering on Germany, of a Czechoslovak State inspired by the principles of Masaryk. The destruction of Czechoslovakia became a necessity to Hitler and Hitlerism; and since force, abetted by the shortsightedness of the Western democracies, was on the side of Germany, the destruction was accomplished. When the time comes to review Hitler and Hitlerism in historical perspective, it may nevertheless be seen that the destruction of Czechoslovakia was their supreme error. It ranged against them the moral forces of civilization. Not only did it shock the stagnant conscience of the Western world; it frightened the Western democracies into perceiving that everything they held dear, including their own freedom and independence, might likewise be endangered. It upset their fond belief in Hitler's assurances that his only aim was to unite Germans in one great Fatherland. It broke the spell which Hitler's incantations had cast upon them. At last they remembered that the things for which the Czechoslovakia of Masaryk and Beneš had stood were the very things that make life tolerable in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

So the war came, ostensibly on account of Hitler's attack upon Poland. Had he attacked Poland first, it is doubtful whether Great Britain and France would have opposed him in arms. But after his suppression of Czechoslovakia his purpose could no longer be hidden. Against Poland he used his murderous technique once too often. The choice before the Western democracies lay between surrender and war. Rightly, they chose war.

No man with knowledge of all that Hitlerism implies will lightly foretell the outcome of this struggle. Hitler, the man, may disappear before it is over. Hitlerism, the movement, may

be worsted and its Third Reich or Nazi State be overthrown. Or the Third Reich itself may be transformed into something closely akin to Soviet Russia. But this may be said without fear that events will belie the forecast: unless the overthrow of Hitler and his system entails also the lasting discredit of the tendencies which Fichte encouraged, Pan-Germanism strengthened, and Hitlerism embodied, the cessation of armed strife will not bring peace to Europe or to the world. Peace can be founded only upon a community of free, democratic, and ethically minded peoples resolved to work together as equals in the spirit of Masaryk's faith. Hitlerism, in the broadest sense, is the foe of civilized humanity; and in nothing was Masaryk greater than in his insistence that the idea of his people must be: "Jesus, not Caesar."

Chapter XXII

THE ROAD TO MUNICH AND BEYOND

BY BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT

AFTER THE SEIZURE of Austria by Germany on March 12, 1938, the position of Czechoslovakia became extremely dangerous, for the richest, most populous, and most industrialized parts of the State—Bohemia and Moravia—were now surrounded on three sides by German territory. Although Czechoslovakia was insured, at least on paper, by alliances with the Little Entente and France and by a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, German policy had become so reckless and the attitude of Great Britain and France so submissive (in fact, as opposed to words),¹ that the Government in Prague had henceforth to discount seriously the official assurances offered by the German Government on March 11 and March 12 that it had no designs against Czechoslovakia. For a year and two days Europe was to pass through a succession

¹ In spite of the fact that the German action was a flagrant violation of the treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain, and upset the political balance of Europe, the British and French governments contented themselves with verbal protests. On March 13, the day following *Anschluss*, the French Government stated publicly that it would fulfill its obligations toward Czechoslovakia under the treaty of 1925; but on March 24, Mr. Chamberlain, the British prime minister, although declaring that there were certain things for which his country would fight, flatly refused to give a "prior guaranty" to help Czechoslovakia if she were attacked or to assist France if she executed her pledge to do so.

of crises which culminated in the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia on March 14, 1939. Although a vast amount of information is available concerning these breath-taking events, it is necessary to point out that very few official documents have been published, that little is known of those confidential exchanges between governments which give meaning to diplomacy, and that foreign offices seldom reveal their hands fully even to the most trusted representatives of the press. In other words, the brief account here offered leaves many questions unsettled because authoritative information is lacking and the historian is often reduced to guessing in regard to either what happened or why it happened.

The avalanche of 1938-1939 began at the very end of March, 1938. On the twenty-eighth, Dr. Milan Hodža, the Czechoslovak premier, thoroughly aware of the changed international situation, announced the intention of his government to codify in a single "nationalities" law all the legal provisions relating to the minorities. This was the more necessary because the two German parties in Czechoslovakia which had since 1926 accepted the existing political order and held portfolios in the cabinet—the German Agrarian League and the Christian Socialist party—had abandoned the Government and united with the Sudete German party. On the following day, March 29, one of its leaders, Ernst Kundt, demanded full autonomy for all the minorities, and was supported by Father Hlinka's Slovak Autonomists and by the Poles. Thus two contradictory programs stood clearly face to face. For the moment, the issue perhaps might be regarded as domestic. But on April 24, the Sudete leader, Konrad Henlein, finally threw off the mask. In a speech at Karlsbad, he declared that in order to maintain friendly relations with the German nation the Czechs must abandon the "mistaken Czech historical myth," give up their "unfortunate

conception" that it was their rôle to be a bulwark against the *Drang nach Osten*, and revise their foreign policy, which was based on the pacts with France and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he put forward eight demands which, if accepted by the Czechoslovak Government, would not only transform the character of the State but put it at the mercy of Germany.² The conflict, in short, assumed an international twist.

For this reason, M. Daladier, the new French premier, and his foreign minister, M. Bonnet, almost immediately (April 28-29) went to London for a conference with the British Government, for France had publicly committed herself to defend Czechoslovakia against aggression and Great Britain had just as publicly refused to do so. As had happened again and again in the postwar years, a somewhat meaningless compromise was reached. The two governments agreed to make representations in Berlin, Prague, and Warsaw urging a settlement of the minorities questions in Czechoslovakia and to warn Germany that war with Czechoslovakia might lead to a general conflict. Such advice might indeed induce Prague (which was not in a position to defy the Western Powers) to make all concessions "compatible with the security of the state"; but until Great Britain "implemented" her warning by a definite promise of military aid to Czechoslovakia, it was not likely—given the Nazi mentality in general and the disdain of Herr von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, for England in particular—to make very much

² The eight points: (1) full equality of Sudete Germans and Czechs and abandonment of the conception of a Czechoslovak State with a German minority; (2) recognition of the Sudete Germans as a legal personality; (3) establishment and recognition of the boundaries of the territories inhabited by Germans; (4) autonomy of this territory in every department of public life; (5) guarantees for those Germans settled outside the areas recognized as German; (6) removal of all injustices done to the Sudete Germans since 1918 and reparation for all damage suffered thereby; (7) German officials in all German districts; (8) full liberty for Germans to proclaim their adherence to the ideology of the Reich.

impression in Berlin. Mr. Chamberlain is supposed to have informed American newspaper correspondents early in May that Czechoslovakia could not survive in its existing form and that he favored the cession of a "fringe" of territory to Germany. How far the British prime minister was influenced by his personal abhorrence of war, which was as sincere as that of Sir Edward Grey in 1914; how far he submitted to the pressure and counsel of the Conservative party, many of whom, for all their dislike of Nazi methods, still looked upon Germany as a bulwark against Soviet Russia; how far he was reluctant to assume military commitments at a moment when the military strength of Britain, especially in the air, may have made any kind of promise dangerous—these are questions which have caused endless speculation and much vituperation, but which a historian is at the moment reluctant to try to answer.

It was against this background that preparations began to be made for municipal elections in Czechoslovakia—at the end of May. In order to show a spirit of conciliation, the Government raised the ban on political meetings and demonstrations which had been imposed some months before. But this only led to clashes between Henleinists and Czechs and to a worsening of the general atmosphere. Then suddenly, on May 19, rumors began to circulate in Europe concerning German troop movements in the direction of Czechoslovakia. According to the Czechs, their minister in Berlin was told that Germany would march to "rescue" the Sudete Germans unless Prague changed its policy. The German version was that the movements were of a "routine" character, and, later on, Herr Hitler ascribed the rumors to the machinations of the British secret service. Whatever the truth, an atmosphere of such great alarm was immediately generated that the Czechoslovak Government, during the night of May 20–21, decided to call up one class of reserves

and a number of troops for special services, and within a few hours the Czech "Maginot Line" facing Germany was manned with strong forces.

For twenty-four hours or so Europe seemed on the verge of war; but the resolute action of Czechoslovakia, coupled with the strong diplomatic representations of France and Great Britain, apparently made the German Government realize that it could not repeat the Austrian coup of March, and it promptly assumed an attitude of injured innocence. There can be little doubt, however, that Herr Hitler deeply resented the check—the first he had received; not only did he on May 29 order a large increase in the German army and air force and the rapid completion of German fortifications in the west, but he determined (so far as it is possible to judge from fragmentary evidence) to "settle" the Sudete question by a serious threat of war, or, if necessary, by war. At the moment, there was great rejoicing among the friends of Czechoslovakia and the enemies of Germany that "the Nazi bluff had been called," and the belief was confidently expressed that in the future "firmness" would again safeguard peace, that is, that Germany would not attack Czechoslovakia if she were convinced that she would also have to fight both France and Great Britain. In the light of subsequent events, this hope was probably a delusion.

The most immediate effect of the crisis was to restore the authority of the Czechoslovak Government in the Sudete areas and ensure that the municipal elections were held peacefully. Konrad Henlein was unable to obtain the revocation of the military measures as the condition preliminary to negotiations about the nationalities law, even though his party polled about 85 per cent of the German vote. Accordingly, on June 7, he submitted to Premier Hodža a memorandum based on his Karlsbad speech which might be set off against the Government's plan,

as yet not published, and on June 23 a conference was held between members of the cabinet and representatives of the Sudete Germans. Outwardly, at least, a *détente* had taken place; there seemed to be the possibility of an accommodation, even if the Slovak Autonomists and the Magyars continued to support the position of the Sudete Germans.

In reality, the situation was deteriorating. The Sudete leaders, on the one hand, were not satisfied by what they learned of the Government's plans on June 30, for autonomy or "home rule" was not mentioned, and the press and the radio of the Reich kept up an unrelenting campaign of abuse and propaganda against Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Government, relying on the great success of its tactics on May 21, and encouraged by the blunt declaration of the French premier on July 12 that "the solemn engagements undertaken towards Czechoslovakia are for us indisputable and sacred," could not bring itself, for obvious reasons, to concede the essential demand of the Sudete Germans for autonomy and thus take the wind out of the sails of both them and the Reich. As the deadlock deepened, all eyes began to be turned on Paris, where the British sovereigns were to pay a state visit at the end of July, the first event of its kind since their accession to the throne and clearly designed to be more than a conventional call. If the conversation of British and French ministers reaffirmed the attitude of May, the position assumed by Czechoslovakia would certainly not become less firm. But that of Germany might also stiffen. It was therefore hardly surprising that on July 18, just before the departure of King George and Queen Elizabeth for Paris, Captain Wiedemann, who had been Herr Hitler's company commander during the war of 1914 and had since become his personal emissary for confidential missions, appeared in London to talk with Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary. He is supposed to have

complained because the negotiations over the Sudete question were moving so slowly and to have expressed a hope for an improvement in Anglo-German relations; but no precise information is available.

If, as was suspected in many quarters, the real purpose of the Wiedemann mission was to drive a wedge between Britain and France, it was outwardly unsuccessful, for King George and Queen Elizabeth were received in Paris with unparalleled enthusiasm and welcomed home in a similar mood. Nevertheless, while in Paris, Lord Halifax apparently secured the consent of the French Government to the sending of Lord Runciman, a member of the British cabinet, to Czechoslovakia on a mission of investigation and mediation; the significant point is that, although the French declined to participate in the mission, they did not oppose it. In announcing the mission on July 26, Mr. Chamberlain denied that he wished to "hustle the Czechs," but his attitude was evidently different from what it had been during the crisis of May 21. The guess may be ventured that the British Government had been somewhat frightened by the very success with which they had blocked Herr Hitler in May and, fearing that on a second occasion Germany would march, determined to recommend the cession of the Sudete areas if that was the price of peace. In this connection, it is to be remembered that the Anglo-Italian agreement of April, designed to weaken the Rome-Berlin Axis, had not been put into effect (thanks to the continued resistance of the Spanish Government to General Franco's troops) and that Hitler's spectacular visit to Rome had drawn the Nazi and Fascist dictators closer together than ever. That Mr. Chamberlain really expected Lord Runciman to effect a settlement between Germans and Czechs is of course possible, for the British prime minister was a novice in international politics and, according to many reports, was prone to disregard the

advice of his Foreign Office; but he must have realized that the noble lord's presence in Prague would be interpreted as clear evidence of British sympathy with the Sudete Germans and would encourage them to be stiffer in their demands. To put the matter in another way, Mr. Chamberlain made up his mind not to fight on the issue of keeping three million Germans in Czechoslovakia against their will and adopted the policy of persuading the Czechoslovak Government to accept this as an alternative to war. The wisdom of such a decision would depend upon its results, whether such "appeasement" would satisfy Germany and preserve the peace of Europe.

On the same day as the Runciman mission was announced, the Government in Prague revealed its own intentions, which involved a considerable devolution of power from Prague to provincial and local bodies. But autonomy was not conceded, and by this time the Sudete leaders would hear of nothing less, whereas their extremists were bent on annexation to Germany. The fact that Lord Runciman consorted chiefly with the Sudete leaders did not help matters, and on August 17 the negotiations between Dr. Hodža and the Sudete German party broke down. The Czechoslovak Government was indeed on the horns of a dilemma. If it conceded the demands of the Sudete Germans and the other minorities, it would cease to be master in its own house and might be overthrown by the parliamentary coalition on which it depended; if it did not concede these demands, it had to face not only the diplomatic pressure of Britain and France, but also the military pressure of its mighty German neighbor.

For early in August the Reich had announced that the annual army maneuvers would begin on August 15 and involve over a million men; at the same time the fortifications in the west were being pushed forward at great speed and with enormous

bodies of men. The danger to Czechoslovakia became all the more evident because Britain and France did not take counter-measures to offset those of Germany. Nor was British diplomacy any more reassuring. On August 27, Sir John Simon, the chancellor of the exchequer, made a speech at Lanark which had been expected to clarify the British position. Actually, Sir John failed to renew the specific warnings of May 21, and contented himself with repeating the somewhat general language of March 24 (see above, p. 409, footnote 1). The only tangible result of this hedging was to make the crisis really acute, for the simultaneous British announcement that the Home Fleet would leave for Scottish waters—that is, for its war stations—was promptly countered by a German announcement of naval maneuvers during September. Recollections of July, 1914, made such moves seem extremely ominous.

Indeed the month of September, 1938, was, in its atmosphere of crisis, the most serious period in European history since the Thirteen Days from July 24 to August 4, 1914. For just as the Austro-Serbian antagonism of 1914 was transformed into a European quarrel by the Austrian ultimatum of July 23, so the Czech-Sudete German dispute now rapidly transcended the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and threatened to usher in a European war. On August 28 President Beneš had submitted yet another plan—"No. 3"—for the settlement of the Sudete problem, and at Lord Runciman's suggestion Konrad Henlein took this to Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden on September 1. Thus the British statesman had—whether deliberately or not, it is impossible to say—converted himself from a mediator between rival groups within Czechoslovakia into a kind of mediator between the Czechoslovak and German governments. The cabinet of Prague at once sensed the changed situation; for when Henlein failed to bring back an answer from Hitler to Plan No. 3

and when the British minister in Prague urged Beneš to "offer immediately and without reservation those concessions without which the Sudete question could not be considered settled," it was evident that the time had come for a supreme stroke. Accordingly the Czechoslovak Government communicated to Lord Runciman on September 5 and on the following day to the Sudete leaders its "Plan No. 4," which conceded in substance what the Sudete Germans had asked for in April.³ From the Czechoslovak point of view, this offer might be compared with the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum: it represented all that could be reasonably expected of an independent government and its rejection would demonstrate to all the world the bad faith of Henlein and Hitler. Runciman himself subsequently admitted, in his famous report to Mr. Chamberlain, that the new plan "embodied almost all of the Karlsbad eight points and with a little clarification and extension could have been made to cover them in their entirety"; he also recognized that the concessions were acceptable to the "more responsible Sudete leaders," who preferred autonomy within Czechoslovakia to incorporation in the Reich.

Since the French foreign minister on September 4 declared that his government "at all events would remain faithful to its pacts and treaties," and enough reservists, chiefly technicians, began to be called up to bring the Maginot Line to full strength,

³ Inasmuch as the plan never went into effect, only a brief summary seems necessary: (1) all nationalities were to participate in offices of the State in proportion to their numbers; (2) a loan of 1,000,000,000 crowns was to be raised before the end of the year, of which 700,000,000 crowns would be devoted to the relief of distress in Sudete areas; (3) the old regulations were to be restored, by which responsibility for public order and security would be divided between state and local police; (4) the German, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and Ruthenian languages were to be placed on an equality with the Czech; (5) the principle of national self-government was to be admitted by the establishment of "cantons" defined according to nationality; (6) the minorities were to be represented in a system of local diets and the principle of reciprocity was to be recognized.

the Czechs may have hoped against hope that their concessions would save them. But the German press condemned the plan and the German Government remained silent. And even more dangerous, from the Czech point of view, was the clear evidence of divided counsels in both Britain and France. On September 7 the London *Times* suggested that "it might be worth while for the Czechoslovak Government to consider whether they should exclude altogether the project, which has found favour in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous state by the cession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation with which they are united by race." Although the article was promptly disavowed by the British Government, it gave encouragement to those elements in France which were disposed to argue that the Sudete question was "domestic," and above all it must have strengthened the arguments which Herr von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, was said to be using with Herr Hitler that, in the last analysis, Britain would not fight for Czechoslovakia. On this same day, September 7, a minor clash between Czech police and Sudete deputies at Moravská Ostrava provided a pretext for a new rupture of negotiations; although negotiations were resumed on September 10, new incidents continued to occur. On September 11 a statement was issued "from a responsible source" in London that "in certain eventualities" Great Britain might go to the aid of France; but this was interpreted in some quarters as reflecting a split in the British cabinet, and the French Foreign Office asked for "clarification." At Geneva, the Soviet foreign minister, M. Litvinov, was asserting that Russia would support Czechoslovakia if France did, according to the terms of the agreements of 1935. In Rome, a communiqué stated that, although Italy favored autonomy for the minorities of Czechoslovakia, she had never suggested that they should continue to form part of the

Czechoslovak State. Obviously, everyone—the Sudete Germans, the Czechoslovak Government, and its friends and allies—was waiting to hear what Herr Hitler would say at the Nuremberg Congress of the Nazi party on September 12.

In his speech the *Führer* demanded self-determination for the Sudete Germans (although he avoided mentioning a plebiscite), declaring that their “persecution” was “not a matter of indifference” to the Reich and that “the Germans of Czechoslovakia are neither defenseless nor forsaken.” Without irrevocably committing Germany to war, Hitler declared that she must “face the consequences” of her attitude and expressed the hope that “foreign statesmen” would understand that he had not used “mere words.” At the end of the speech, which was broadcast, fighting took place in many Sudete towns between the Henleinists and the Czech police and troops—which led to the proclamation of martial law by the Czech Government in many districts, the final rupture of negotiations between the Government and the Sudete leaders, and the return of Lord Runciman to London. By September 14 large German forces were drawn up along the Czechoslovak frontier, and Henlein had fled to the Reich, where he issued a proclamation stating that the Sudete Germans wished to “go home to the Reich.” Confronted by what appeared to be the imminent danger of an immediate German invasion of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden on September 15 for a personal conference with Herr Hitler. For even if the British prime minister accepted all the Sudete and German complaints against the Czechoslovak régime and was personally convinced of the necessity of far-reaching changes, even territorial, it was one thing to have this settled by international negotiations and quite another to see it brought about by force of arms. France was the avowed ally of Czechoslovakia, and Britain was under certain commitments to France. In spite

of the strong feeling which undoubtedly existed in many circles in both Britain and France that the integrity of Czechoslovakia was not worth a European war, no one could foresee the consequences if German troops actually marched into Czechoslovakia. Since he hated the idea of war and was prepared to make large concessions to avoid it, Mr. Chamberlain's plan was intelligible; whether or not it was wise, as far as diplomatic technique was concerned, will doubtless be endlessly debated, for the spectacular airplane journey (his first) of the elderly British prime minister probably served to strengthen the German chancellor in his conviction that Great Britain would not fight.

Our knowledge of the conversations at Berchtesgaden is limited to what Mr. Chamberlain revealed in his speech to Parliament on September 28. "Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudete Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich"; moreover, he was "prepared to risk a world war" to obtain this. The only concession he would make was an offer to "refrain from active hostilities" until the British prime minister could consult his colleagues and if possible obtain their consent to the principle of self-determination. In substance, the German demand was an ultimatum which, so far as is known, was not met by any British counterdemand.

When the British cabinet met on the following day, September 16, Mr. Chamberlain's proposal to accept the German demands was supported, it is believed, by Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare, both former foreign secretaries, and by Lord Runciman, who, although he blamed Henlein for refusing to accept the final Czech plan as a basis for further negotiations, had come to the conclusion, somewhat inconsistently, that the areas with "important German majorities" would have to be

of the strong feeling which undoubtedly existed in many circles in both Britain and France that the integrity of Czechoslovakia was not worth a European war, no one could foresee the consequences if German troops actually marched into Czechoslovakia. Since he hated the idea of war and was prepared to make large concessions to avoid it, Mr. Chamberlain's plan was intelligible; whether or not it was wise, as far as diplomatic technique was concerned, will doubtless be endlessly debated, for the spectacular airplane journey (his first) of the elderly British prime minister probably served to strengthen the German chancellor in his conviction that Great Britain would not fight.

Our knowledge of the conversations at Berchtesgaden is limited to what Mr. Chamberlain revealed in his speech to Parliament on September 28. "Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudete Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich"; moreover, he was "prepared to risk a world war" to obtain this. The only concession he would make was an offer to "refrain from active hostilities" until the British prime minister could consult his colleagues and if possible obtain their consent to the principle of self-determination. In substance, the German demand was an ultimatum which, so far as is known, was not met by any British counterdemand.

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ceded, without a plebiscite. The opposition of Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, was futile, and thus the great decision was made. But could France be prevailed on to accept it also?

Apparently not only the French cabinet was badly split, but the armed forces as well; at any rate, it was said that General Gamelin, the head of the army, was for resistance, whereas General Vuillemin, the chief of the air force, who had recently been allowed to see something of the German air arm, was against fighting. When, therefore, on September 18, French and British ministers met in London to formulate an answer to Germany, the resolute will to oppose Germany, even at the risk of war, was lacking. In both countries there were not lacking those who pointed out both the ignominy and the danger of surrender, and there can be little doubt that, if the governments had decided to fight, their peoples would have responded loyally and courageously; but because Herr Hitler had cleverly adopted the Allies' own principle of self-determination, the case for Czechoslovakia was not clearly understood by the French and British masses, who were content to follow the policy of appeasement adopted by their governments.

It is such circumstances and considerations which explain the Anglo-French decision of September 19, shocking though it was to millions of people throughout the world. The Czechoslovak Government was informed that "the maintenance of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia's vital interests" could not be assured without the cession of the Sudete areas to Germany, that is, of those areas where the Germans numbered more than 50 per cent of the population; but Britain and France hoped that adjustments of frontiers might be arranged by an international body, "including a Czech representative," and that this body might take up the question of an exchange of populations left as minorities within the new frontiers. In order to soften the

blow a little, Britain offered to join in an international guaranty of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State if the latter would abandon its existing military alliances (with France, the Soviet Union, and the Little Entente). A reply was requested "at the earliest possible moment," so that Chamberlain could resume his conversations with Hitler on September 21. Like the German demand on Britain, this was virtually an ultimatum, and when the Czechoslovak Government sought to gain time by appealing to the Czechoslovak-German treaty of arbitration of 1925 (in a note which the British Government refrained from publishing in its "White Paper"), the British and French ministers in Prague insisted on seeing President Beneš at 2:15 A.M. on September 21. They told the Czech statesman that if his government did not accept the Anglo-French plan unconditionally it would be considered solely responsible for the war which would ensue, that Britain would not fight, and that France would not fulfill her treaty obligations. The British and French governments may have honestly believed that without such brutal pressure the invasion of Czechoslovakia could not be avoided and that by so desperate a measure they might salvage something for the emasculated Czechoslovak State; but if they preserved any feelings of honor or sensibility, they should have reproached themselves for dealing so harshly with a state which they had helped to create and which for twenty years had been their close diplomatic associate or ally. But since innumerable details of this episode remain either unknown or disputed, the final verdict must be left to future historians who may have access to the archives. Here it must suffice to record that late on September 21, after a day of uninterrupted discussion, Dr. Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government accepted the Anglo-French plan, on condition that the practical details should be agreed upon with the Czechoslovak Government. Up to now, the

Czechoslovak people had kept themselves in hand with great forbearance, but when the news of the surrender became known the indignation and grief were so great that Dr. Hodža was forced to resign. He was succeeded as premier by General Jan Syrový, inspector general of the army.

At the moment there were twenty-two divisions of the German army concentrated along the Czechoslovak frontiers, and there was no promise of help from Britain and France. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak army was a superb fighting instrument, and its lines of defense were almost, if not quite, the equal of the Maginot Line in France; the people were ready, even eager, to fight. According to any reasonable calculation, Czechoslovakia could hold out, singlehanded, for some time against Germany. Nor was it out of the question that the Soviet Union might come to the help of the little state, although by the treaty of 1935 it was bound to do so only if France moved first. If Dr. Beneš, with whom the ultimate decision rested, yielded to the demands of Britain and France, the explanation appears to be twofold: in the first place, he wished to spare his people the horror of a war, the results of which were necessarily uncertain, and, secondly, he feared that if Czechoslovakia fought with only Russia as an ally she would be labeled as a "Red" state (however preposterous that might seem) and forfeit whatever advantages might be contained in the international guaranty offered by Britain. Subsequent events were to prove that the Czech calculations were unsound, but at the moment it could be argued that surrender was the lesser of two evils.

Once the great decision had been made to cede the Sudete areas to Germany without war, Czechoslovakia ceased to play an important rôle in the international drama. Having placed her fate in the hands of Britain and France, she could only do as she was told and trust that they would actually obtain for her

the terms promised in the communication of September 19. From this point, the story is concerned primarily with the negotiations of Britain and France with Germany and can therefore be briefly summarized. On September 22 Mr. Chamberlain flew a second time to Germany, to meet Herr Hitler at Godesberg on the Rhine. The German chancellor, evidently surprised that Britain and France had accepted his demands in principle so readily, now raised his terms. He asked for territory where the majority of the population was Czech and demanded plebiscites in still other areas; he made clear, for the first time, that German troops would have to enter the territory to be ceded not later than October 1; and he declared his support for Polish and Hungarian demands on Czechoslovakia. "Shocked" by these proposals, which he required to be put in writing, the British prime minister returned to London without accepting them and declined to advise their acceptance by the Czechoslovak Government, which, in fact, rejected them, as going far beyond the original Anglo-French terms, and proceeded to order mobilization. After consultations between the British and French governments, it was announced that France would, after all, support Czechoslovakia and that Britain and the Soviet Union would stand by France. As military preparations were being pushed on all sides, it appeared on September 26 as if a European war was almost unavoidable, all the more so since Herr Hitler was scheduled to make a speech that evening at the Sport Palace in Berlin, and moderation was hardly to be expected on such an occasion.

Since the British and French governments were desperately anxious to avoid war—regardless of what might happen to Czechoslovakia—Mr. Chamberlain on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth sent his special confidant, Sir Horace Wilson, who was not a Foreign Office expert, to Berlin with a letter to Herr Hitler proposing a Czech-German conference for carrying out

the details of the Anglo-French plans. Not only did Hitler reject this proposal, but in his speech at the Sport Palace he denounced the Czechoslovak Government and its president with unexampled insolence; more important still, he made known to Wilson, then or the next day, and to the Italian ambassador his intention to mobilize the German army at 2:00 P.M. on Wednesday, September 28. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt had telegraphed to the German chancellor in the interest of peace, and Signor Mussolini had also taken a hand—at the request of Mr. Chamberlain, and also in his own interest. Apparently Herr Hitler paid no attention to Mr. Roosevelt, but the pressure of the Italian *duce* and the firm language of Mr. Chamberlain in a broadcast to the British Empire on the evening of September 27 induced him to pause, and on September 28 the British prime minister was able to announce in Parliament that Germany had agreed to participate the following day in a conference at Munich at which Italy, France, and Britain would be represented—the Soviet Union being deliberately ignored, not to mention Czechoslovakia, although the inclusion of both had been suggested by Mr. Roosevelt.

All day long on Thursday, September 29, Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Daladier wrestled with the problem, and not until the early hours of the next day did they reach an agreement. The essential question was not whether Czechoslovakia should surrender her Sudete areas—Britain and France had agreed to that on September 18 and Chamberlain had guaranteed to Hitler that Czechoslovakia would do so—but whether the surrender should be on the basis of the Anglo-French proposals or on the terms of the Godesberg ultimatum, which both Britain and France had declared unsatisfactory. That the Czechs were completely ignored is well known, although their representatives were present to be consulted; that Mussolini sup-

ported Hitler may be assumed, for the two had conferred before the conference on the train bringing the *duce*; but, actually, little is known of what went on between the four men. The one clear fact is that the agreement signed conformed in almost every respect to the Godesberg terms. Was, then, the conference—and the whole crisis—a mere show, deliberate play acting, as some commentators have argued? Probably not. The guess may be ventured that Mr. Chamberlain went to Munich with every intention of resisting the Godesberg demands and bringing them more into line with the Anglo-French proposals. But he had not yet learned to talk to Herr Hitler in the only language that the latter understood; at heart, he was so bent on peace that when he found himself confronted by the alternative of the Godesberg terms or war he could not convince himself that the differences between his own terms and those of Hitler were worth war, for in any event Czechoslovakia would be reduced to powerlessness and was destined to fall within the German orbit. An experienced diplomatist has suggested to the writer that Mr. Lloyd George would have bluffed Herr Hitler into accepting less, and this seems plausible. As for M. Daladier, he was controlled by those elements in France which were for appeasement at any price because they feared and hated the alliance with Russia, and at the same time he could not support the Czech cause without the help of Mr. Chamberlain. Whether or not Hitler was bluffing and could have been tamed by a resolute front on the part of Britain and France is a question which cannot now be answered with certainty. The present writer's opinion—which is no more than an opinion—is that he was not bluffing, and that if Chamberlain and Daladier had not accepted the Godesberg terms the German armies would have promptly invaded Czechoslovakia.

By the Munich Agreement Germany was given authority to

occupy the Sudete areas of "predominantly German character" in five stages, the last stage to be completed by October 10. An international commission—consisting of the secretary of the German Foreign Office, the British, French, and Italian ambassadors in Berlin, and a Czech representative—was to determine the areas in which a plebiscite would be held by November 30 under supervision of an international force; furthermore, it was authorized to delimit the final boundaries, as well as to recommend "minor modifications" in accordance with ethnographical convenience. The Czechoslovak Government was to hand over all the territories "without any existing installations having been destroyed," and to release all Sudete Germans from its military and police forces and all political prisoners. The only concession to Czechoslovakia was a right of option into and out of the transferred territories. Britain and France reaffirmed their guaranty of the new boundaries "against unprovoked aggression," but Germany and Italy withheld their guaranty until the questions of the Polish and Hungarian minorities had been settled. If these questions were not settled within three months, the four Great Powers were to meet again to deal with these matters. Such was the agreement for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, which had no parallel since the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. It was perforce accepted by the Czechoslovak Government on the same day.

The agreement was hailed with relief in both Britain and France, in the sense that war had been avoided, and many people sincerely believed that the terms were not unreasonable, the Czechs being blamed for not having pursued a more conciliatory policy toward the Sudete Germans in the twenty years from 1918 to 1938. On the contrary, many other persons felt deeply that their governments had "sold out" Czechoslovakia and saved their skins at the expense of their honor. Without entering into

any discussion of the question, which has many aspects and ramifications, the Agreement must be judged, by a pragmatic standard, as a failure. On his return to England, Mr. Chamberlain expressed the belief that his policy had assured "peace for our time." Had this proved true, the reduction of Czechoslovakia to its ethnographic frontiers and its subordination to German political and economic domination might have been justified as the price, if indeed a high one, of the peace of Europe. But in less than a year the policy of "appeasement" adopted by Mr. Chamberlain, of which the Munich Agreement was the keystone, culminated in the outbreak of a new European war; under the circumstances it is hardly a sufficient answer to say that his policy was motivated by the best of intentions.

The German troops occupied the first four districts, where the German majority was large, by October 7. With respect to the fifth zone, the international commission followed the Austrian census of 1910 rather than the Czech census of 1930, which worked greatly to the German advantage, and also announced that no plebiscite would be held; the British and French ambassadors took little part in the discussions, and Czechoslovakia was left to German mercy—or rather lack of mercy. In the end, Germany acquired more territory than was demanded even at Godesberg! According to Czech estimates, more than 750,000 Czechs were incorporated in the Reich, whereas probably only a third as many Germans were left in the "rump" Czechoslovakia. Economically, the effects of the dismemberment were extremely serious. The main east-and-west railway between Prague and Moravia was cut by the cession of the area north of Zwittau; likewise the transfer of Lundenburg (Břeclav) cut the connection between Prague and Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. Most of the lignite and coal mines and the chief electric power stations were lost; also many chemical factories and

glass-producing centers. In short, the nice balance between industry and agriculture which had evolved in Bohemia and Moravia within their thousand-year-old frontiers was badly upset, so that the industrial Sudete areas could no longer be fed from the food-producing Czech districts; but only a detailed analysis and a fairly large-scale map could show the damage wrought. Last of all, the frontiers as finally fixed were quite defenseless from a military angle, whereas the ancient Bohemia was a natural fortress, quite apart from the magnificent lines built by the Czechs after 1932. Germany was not treated more savagely in the Treaty of Versailles than was Czechoslovakia by the *Münchener Diktat*, and the consequences were not long in manifesting themselves.

The troubles of the Republic did not come to an end with the occupation of the Sudete areas by Germany. An important factor in the Czech decision not to fight had been the attitude of Poland, with whom relations had long been uncertain. When the Habsburg Monarchy collapsed in 1918, the Poles had been able to occupy the old Duchy of Teschen, a district containing both Poles and Czechs and rich in coal fields and metallurgical works; but during the subsequent disputes between Poland and Soviet Russia, the Czechs had in turn seized the territory. In the end, the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris had divided the region, awarding the industrial section to Czechoslovakia, which left some 75,000 Poles within the State. Although the compromise satisfied neither party, their relations continued to be "correct" and at times even friendly down to 1934, when the Polish Government signed a pact of nonaggression with Germany. After that date the Polish press and sometimes the Polish Government complained of the oppression of the Polish minority in Teschen, and it was too much to expect that Poland should not take advantage of German pressure of Czechoslovakia (in

spite of the fact that Poland herself contained a large minority population) for her own profit. The hostile attitude of the Polish Government, even before Munich, made certain that if resistance to Germany were attempted the Czech armies would be attacked on the flank and their defense lines turned; resistance, in any event difficult, would then have become hopeless, and this may well have clinched the decision of Prague to surrender. But even this did not save Czechoslovakia from having to swallow a bitter pill; for, on the day after Munich, Poland presented an ultimatum demanding the immediate cession of the territory originally taken over by Poland in 1918 as well as two small sections of Slovakia—a demand which Prague could not resist, and the areas were handed over on November 1.⁴ The Polish action aroused much indignation, at least in the United States; as events have turned out, the Polish Government might have been better advised to support Czechoslovakia to the limit against Germany and to have avoided adding over 100,000 Czechs to its already large minority population.

Hardly had the Government in Prague yielded to the Polish ultimatum than it was confronted by another from Hungary demanding large cessions of territory based on the Hungarian census of 1910 (Germany, it will be remembered, had insisted on using the Austrian census of the same year). When the newly constituted autonomous Slovak Government refused to concede these demands, Hungary appealed to the signatories of the Munich Agreement and began mobilizing. Inasmuch as Britain and France had already disinterested themselves in the frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia, it was not to be expected that they

⁴ The Poles somewhat precipitately occupied the important railway junction of Bohumín (Oderberg), which was included in the German demands at Godesberg. This was perhaps the first rift in the Polish-German friendship. After the partition of Poland in 1939, the districts taken from Slovakia were restored to that nominally independent state by Germany.

would act in behalf of Slovakia; but in this instance, Italy was concerned in assisting her protégée Hungary, who wished to obtain Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and thus secure a common frontier with Poland. In the end, Germany and Italy rendered an "arbitral" decision by which the line between Slovakia-Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and Hungary was fixed according to ethnographical principles—which left Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, with its Ukrainian population, to Czecho-Slovakia and thus deprived Hungary and Poland of the much desired common frontier. Although these three most interested parties were all dissatisfied with this award, Germany and Italy compelled its acceptance, Germany supposedly desiring to use Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as a springboard for agitation in the Soviet Ukraine and Italy yielding to this because she could not prevent it. If Mussolini had contributed powerfully, according to good reports, to restraining Hitler from invading Czechoslovakia on the eve of Munich, the latter had now evened the score and made clear who was the dominant partner in the Rome-Berlin Axis.

The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia for the benefit of Germany, Poland, and Hungary cost the country 29 per cent of its territory and 34 per cent of its population. If an unnecessarily large number of Czechs and Slovaks were now placed under foreign rule, and undoubtedly the new frontiers would have been drawn in more equitable fashion (as could also those of 1919, especially those of Hungary), the prospects of the truncated Republic did not seem utterly hopeless, for on October 4 the British Government declared that it considered the guaranty of the new frontiers against unprovoked aggression, which had been an integral part of the Anglo-French proposals of September 19, to be morally in effect, and it soon advanced to the Government at Prague a considerable sum of money to tide over the immediate difficulties. Rome and Berlin, however, found

excuses for delay until the new frontiers were delimited on the spot and the internal constitution of the country had been settled, and, in the end, no treaty of international guaranty was concluded, although this had been one of the express conditions on which the Czechoslovak Government had accepted, and the British Government had justified, the terms of September 19. Not that any such treaty would have deterred the German Government from its subsequent actions! But it seems futile to criticize Britain and France because they made little or no effort to obtain the execution of the terms of September 19, either at Munich or afterward. They were not disposed to fight for Czechoslovakia, whereas Germany was prepared to use force to obtain her maximum demands. Once they yielded on the main issue, the details were of small moment. The primary purpose of the treaty makers of 1919 had been to give Czechoslovakia frontiers which would make the country economically viable and therefore politically independent. If these frontiers were seriously modified in order to apply the principle of self-determination, the country would be automatically reduced in large measure to the condition of a small agricultural state whose continued existence would depend entirely on the whim of its powerful neighbors and not on the promises or desires of distant France and Britain. The proper criticism of Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier is that they professed to believe that the dismembered State could long survive the operation performed upon it at Munich.

The Czechs themselves were under no illusions. Dr. Beneš resigned the presidency on October 5 and was succeeded, after a time, by Emil Hácha, an experienced administrative official and judge who might be considered as a nonpolitical appointee. General Syrový gave way as premier to Rudolf Beran, the Germanophile leader of the dominant Agrarian party, and Dr.

Krofta was succeeded as foreign minister by František Chvalkovský, the minister in Rome, who had long advocated an understanding with Germany. So far as personnel was concerned, the Government was now headed by those who were ready to "coöperate" with the Reich. Not only that, but the State itself was reconstituted as "Czecho-Slovakia," that is to say, the country ceased to be a centralized state and both Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia were made autonomous with their own ministries, so that Prague was left with the control of only foreign policy, national defense, and national finance. When on December 14 Parliament granted the Government wide powers to govern by decree, the democratic Republic of Masaryk and Beneš ceased in fact to exist; when the French military mission, which had spent nearly twenty years building up the Czecho-slovak army, left the country, and when the French armament firm of Schneider-Creusot sold its interest in the famous Škoda works to the Czecho-Slovak Government, the last links with the old policy were broken, although the alliances with France and the Soviet Union were never formally denounced. Surrounded on three sides by German territory, the new State could not hope to become, as had at one time been promised by the advocates of "appeasement," an "eastern Switzerland": it could not escape the fate of being a mere appendage of the Third Reich.

Not much imagination is required to envisage that fate. On the political side the Czecho-Slovak Government was forced to suppress all anti-Nazi tendencies and to institute a rigorous control of the press. It was required to accept a treaty with the Reich by which persons "belonging to the German *Volk*" in Czecho-Slovakia were allowed to become German citizens and be subject to German law—a revival of the system of capitulations formerly used in Eastern countries for the benefit of

Western nationals and rather generally abandoned since the World War. In Slovakia a German totalitarian organization was set up and given a share of positions in the state civil service. In Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia German agents fostered a movement for Ukrainian independence and unity, seemingly intending to turn the minuscule area into a Ukrainian "Piedmont." Meanwhile a strongly anti-Czech propaganda was conducted by German radio stations, especially that broadcasting from Vienna. Economically, Czecho-Slovakia had to agree to the construction of a motor highway across its territory from Breslau to Vienna which was to be owned by the Reich and to the building of a canal connecting the Oder and the Danube. No part of the public debt of the old State was assumed by any of the three partitioners (although in 1919 Czechoslovakia had been compelled to assume its fair proportion of the debt of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy). Efforts were made to compel the Czech Government to allow the circulation of German marks and demands were made for the redemption of this paper from the Czecho-Slovak gold reserves! Only a detailed account could reveal all the indignities, injuries, and humiliations to which the helpless Government and people were subjected by the Reich and the Sudete politicians, who were once more elevated to the position of *Herrenvölker* which they had enjoyed before 1918 and who were more than prepared to pay off any scores, real or fancied, which had accumulated during the twenty years following. It is not to be thought that Messrs. Hácha, Beran, and Chvalkovský were the mere slaves of the Reich. They remained patriotic Czechs who tried to salvage what was possible from the wreck of the free Republic of 1918-1938, and from time to time they adopted an attitude of passive resistance which in some measure baffled the Germans. But if it be true, as was recently stated, that between Munich and the German

occupation of Prague more than a hundred ultimata were delivered to the Czech Government, independence had become a sham; and that was indeed the one fact on which all reports agreed. And of course this political and economic subjection carried with it the gradual destruction of the spirited intellectual and artistic life which had made Czechoslovakia a center of light and hope at a time when dictatorships in Russia, Italy, and Germany had suppressed all initiative, and when in Britain and France the traditions derived from the days of plutocratic ascendancy still controlled to a marked degree.

The end came rather suddenly and unexpectedly. By the beginning of March, 1939, the separatist elements in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, encouraged and supported by Nazi agents on the spot and by the press of the Reich, were getting out of hand, as far as Prague, which was trying to make the new federal constitution function efficiently, was concerned. On March 6, President Háchá dismissed the cabinet in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, asking the premier, M. Vološín, to form a new government without pro-German members. Three days later, the Slovak cabinet of Dr. Tiso was dismissed and martial law was proclaimed in Bratislava. From both Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and Slovakia appeals were promptly directed to Berlin, and Hitler at once ordered Háchá to convoke the Slovak Parliament. Meeting on March 14, it voted, after three polls, for complete separation from Czecho-Slovakia and thus established a nominally independent state. This action, taken in the face of a German threat to divide the country with Hungary, left Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia "in the air," so that the provincial Parliament at Chust (the new capital since the dismemberment in the autumn) could hardly do otherwise than proclaim the independence of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia—although the province would have preferred to remain part of Czecho-Slovakia.

This independence lasted just twenty-four hours, that is, until Hungarian troops were able to march and seize the territory. In October, 1938, Germany had refused to let Hungary do this very thing, although it was strongly urged by Italy. At that time German policy was supposed to contemplate using Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as a springboard for attacking the Soviet Ukraine; whether in March, 1939, events moved too quickly for Hitler or whether he had already given up that plan and was working toward the agreement of August 23, 1939, with the Soviet Government, it is not clear. At any rate, Hungary advanced another step on the road toward the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, and acquired a common frontier with Poland. Although Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was given a vague promise of autonomy, nothing positive was done, and the province reverted to direct Hungarian rule, as of 1918.

There remained Bohemia and Moravia, the most thickly populated provinces of Czecho-Slovakia, the most advanced economically and culturally, the most deeply rooted in the democratic ideal (in spite of the fascist inroads made under Nazi pressure). On March 14, while the Slovak Parliament was proclaiming the independence of Slovakia, German-Czech clashes were occurring, and President Háchá was summoned to Berlin. Although received "with honors befitting the sovereign head of a state," he was subjected to hours of personal conversation with Herr Hitler, who is reported to have threatened that German planes would bomb Prague unless the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia was accepted. At any rate President Háchá at 4:30 A.M. on March 15 signed a document which created the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" and placed "the destiny of the Czech people and lands trustfully in the hands of the *Führer*." Not even the treatment of Herr von Schuschnigg, the Austrian chancellor, just a year before was more brutal—it was in fact less

hypocritical; no action of Napoleon I was more cynical than the conduct of the German chancellor toward the aged and helpless president of Czecho-Slovakia. On that same day German troops occupied Prague and late that evening Hitler himself arrived. The proclamation of the "Protectorate" on March 16 merely recorded formally that Czecho-Slovakia had gone the way of Czechoslovakia and established a date which may be said to mark the beginning of the *Vorgeschichte* that culminated in the German invasion of Poland on September 1 and the outbreak of a European war on September 3, 1939.

What motives impelled Herr Hitler to abandon his oft-proclaimed ideal of a state containing all Germans and only Germans (for "independent" Slovakia and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia became, for all practical purposes, parts of the Reich), thus renouncing his new-fangled "racialism" for old-fashioned conquest, cannot be determined with certainty. A review of all the events and circumstances from March, 1938, to March, 1939, suggests that this was in his mind from the beginning and that the Agreement of Munich was never intended to be kept, being a mere interruption dictated by the expediency of the moment. The precise reasons, however, do not greatly matter and can hardly be settled until, years hence, archives are opened and personal memoirs released. What does matter is that the solution of the Czech, Czechoslovak, or Czecho-Slovak question (whatever one may choose to call it) has not yet been found. The old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy did not provide a solution. The Czechoslovak Republic of 1918-1938 was satisfactory to the Czechs and to a majority of the Slovaks, but not to a considerable section of the German and Magyar minorities, the inclusion of whom was necessary to make the State economically viable; moreover, the State could not exist without the support of powerful military alliances.

The Czecho-Slovakia which was created after Munich probably never had a chance for real independence. However, the "solution" imposed by the brute force of Nazi Germany is obviously no solution, for throughout many centuries both Czechs and Slovaks have resisted domination and assimilation by other races. No more difficult problem will confront the makers of peace after the present war than to devise an arrangement by means of which these heroic and gifted people can obtain political independence and economic security, play their part in the cultural life of Europe, and at the same time achieve satisfactory and friendly relations with their German, Magyar, and Polish neighbors. A historian can only hope that the experiences of the years since 1918 may contribute something to a clearer understanding of a most baffling problem.

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Stuart Hodgson's *The Man Who Made the Peace: Neville Chamberlain* (New York, 1938) is a defense of the British prime minister. G. J. George's *They Betrayed Czechoslovakia* (London, 1938) is the work of a Czech journalist. An important recent publication is by Pierre Buk, *La Tragédie tchécoslovaque de septembre 1938 à mars 1939. Avec les documents inédits du Livre blanc tchécoslovaque* (Paris, 1939). Joan and Jonathan Griffiths' *Lost Liberty? The Ordeal of the Czechs and the Future of Freedom* (New York, 1939) depicts events in Prague from September 15 to December 15, 1938, as seen by two English journalists. Maurice Hindus' *We Shall Live Again* (New York, 1939) is a sympathetic presentation of the Czech point of view by an American who went through the crisis of September, 1938, on the spot. Eugene Lennhoff's *In Defence of Dr. Beneš* (London, 1938) is the work of an Austrian refugee. Alfred Fabre-Luce's *Histoire secrète de la conciliation de Munich* (Paris, 1938) presents a defense of French policy by a well-known conservative writer. André Tardieu's *L'Année de Munich* (Paris, 1939) was written by the last survivor of the French delegation at the Peace Conference of 1919. Other works on the subject are Benno von Arent, *Ein Sudetendeutsches Tagebuch, 13. August bis 19. Oktober, 1938* (Berlin, 1939), and Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *From Versailles to Munich, 1918-1938* (Chicago, 1939).

Documentary material concerning the Munich crisis has been published by the Foreign Office of Great Britain under the following titles: *Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia, September 1938*, Cmd. 5847 (London, 1938); and *Further Documents respecting Czechoslovakia*, Cmd. 5848 (London, 1938).

Vojta Beneš and R. A. Ginsburg, in *Ten Million Prisoners (Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia)* (Chicago, Czech-American National Alliance, 1940) present the Czech side of life under the German heel since the creation of the Protectorate.

Chapter XXIII

CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY:
WAS IT WORTH WHILE?

BY JAMES T. SHOTWELL

THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION has already been given in the preceding pages. There can be no doubt that the history of Europe and of Western civilization has been immensely enriched by the philosophy and statesmanship of President Masaryk. Neither can there be any doubt that the Czechoslovak Republic has left a remarkable record in the annals of history; one which, with all its mistakes—and they must be admitted—proved the competence of this branch of the Slavic peoples in the art and science of government. We must remember that the judgments of history are always relative to the conditions under which events happen; we must also consider the antecedent conditions which determine the outlook and temper of both the people and their leaders. It is with these determining facts in mind that we must come to conclusions whether the great experiment of Czechoslovak independence was justified or not.

It should be stated at the outset that the question is in the main unreal. It would seem to imply that in 1918 the peoples living within the Habsburg Monarchy had a free choice concerning whether they were going on under the old sovereignty or not. The action of the Czechs in setting up an independent

government in Prague on October 28 was but one of a series of such acts by which the former Habsburg Monarchy was partitioned. The day before the Czechs took action, a National Council had been set up at Lemberg in Galicia, at the far eastern end of the great Austrian crescent, and at Agram, the capital of Croatia, in the extreme southwest. On October 25 Hungary declared herself independent of the Habsburg crown; and there was only German Austria left, with revolution in the streets of Vienna. It is true that Emperor Charles delayed his abdication until November 12, one day after the armistice with Germany, but the process of disruption was already fully under way. The Monarchy came to an end as the result of the war which its foreign minister Berchtold had forced upon the world in 1914 on the theory that the risk of war had to be taken because it was the only way for the Monarchy to be preserved. An empire, relying as it did upon the most dangerous of political forces, prestige, was forced to the wall by the fact that the war became a blockade, which wore down its civilian as well as its military strength under the strain of continued military and naval pressure. During the war, the military authorities had stepped into control of much of the Austrian bureaucracy, and when the war was over the weakened machinery of government virtually ceased in much of its ordinary functioning. The bureaucracy could not recapture its lost authority; anarchy was rapidly developing, and out of that anarchy came a new States System, which happily for itself could invoke the one principle of Woodrow Wilson's peace terms which most applied to the new order of things, "self-determination."

Neither Wilson nor even Masaryk dominated the situation at this critical juncture. It was the change from one régime to another under the force of circumstances at the end of an unsuccessful war. It is of course possible to argue that at some time

during the war this centrifugal force might have been stopped by a compromise peace, if the question of Germany's terms had not taken precedence over Austria's plight in the eyes of the Allied and Associated Powers in the last phase of the war. The Dual Monarchy was dragged along by Germany to share in a common defeat which, although it brought disaster to the Hohenzollern empire, meant inevitable extinction for that of the Habsburgs. These facts should be borne in mind by those who think of the Czech experiment as one which the Czechs were wholly free to try or refuse to try. What other choice was left them in those fateful days of October, 1918? It is true that the Slovaks joined with the Czechs a few days later only to give political reality to the unity proclaimed in America and symbolized by Masaryk himself. But the Hungary out of which the Slovaks came was also facing social as well as political disorders. The strong hand of Tisza was no longer there, and that powerful oligarchy of Magyar magnates which had for so long steered the Hungarian ship of state through many perils was not in a position to assert its traditional authority. Under these conditions the oldest of all political forces in that part of Europe, the submerged sense of nationalism, came to the fore, partly through spontaneous movements, partly stimulated by political leaders. Before the Paris Peace Conference met, these elements of the new régime, that of the Succession States, were taking shape, and there was nothing else to replace them.

One hears at times from American commentators on the European scene words of regret and even of blame that President Wilson did not move to prevent the breakup of the Habsburg Monarchy, so that it might have been kept to serve both as a check upon German ambition and as a guaranty of economic prosperity for the Danube Valley through maintenance of better conditions for trade and commerce. It does not seem

to have occurred to these objectors that this could have been done only by sending American troops into all of these different sections of the former Monarchy, to police them in the interest of an outworn system. Can anyone imagine what the American people would have said if, after having secured the condition of freedom for these peoples through a costly war, we then had turned upon them and repressed their liberties in the interests of the sovereign whose authority they had renounced?

Even if it had been possible to turn back the clock in this way and secure a reformation of the Habsburg Monarchy instead of continuing the war to bring about its dissolution, what guaranty have we that the reform would have been worked out in terms of a genuine Federal System? Or that it could have been maintained for any length of time after the immediate pressure of the postwar period had passed away?

A clue to the answer lies in what happened in the Republic of Austria itself. Nowhere else in the Monarchy was there anything like the intellectual leadership and enlightenment which distinguished the capital city, and nowhere else was there such a body of administrators who, while loyal to the dynasty, were also the conscious exponents of the interests of the Austrian middle class. Yet it was Austria, and not Germany, in which the liberties of the citizens were first repressed in savage domestic conflicts. If it be objected that the real cause of this lay in the economic disasters of Austria and that Czechoslovakia escaped internal disorder because of its greater prosperity, we are at once led to examine the causes of the alleged prosperity, and, although we find them partly in the better-balanced economy of the country, we must give much of the credit to the heroic fiscal policy with which the young Republic began its career. Dr. Rašín paid with his life for the maintenance of a sound financial policy, but even the assassin's bullet did not check his reforms,

and the currency of Czechoslovakia kept its place among the sound moneys of Europe, whereas Austria went bankrupt.

This fact should be borne in mind in judging the capacity of the Czechoslovak State to take its place among the nations of the world. It is true that the structure of Austrian finance had been gutted by the war and that the disruption of the Monarchy called for a reorientation of whatever business was left for Austrian bankers, merchants, and industrialists. But, as time was to show, there were hidden resources in the old Austrian economy which in course of time tended to redress the balance of its losses. The contrast between Austria and Czechoslovakia in the early postwar years is therefore one which, although it cannot be pressed too far, is at least a sufficient answer to those Austrians who in the prewar years had denied the capacity of the Slav for self-government.

If it is perhaps unfair to judge, on the basis of what postwar Austria really was, what a reformed Habsburg Monarchy would have been, we may perhaps get a less controversial clue by examining the political theories of Austrian liberal thinkers and comparing them with those of Masaryk. It must be remembered that in the prewar period Austria was an outstanding center for the study of the political sciences and that the leaders in this movement of enlightenment were also responsible for the training of those in high government positions. Their ideas therefore were something more than pure academic theory; they represented authoritative trends of thinking. During the war years the foremost figure among these Austrian economists was Professor Friedrich von Wieser, who became minister of commerce during the war and who was the Austrian director of the Economic and Social History of the World War for the Carnegie Endowment. In the years immediately following the war he summed up his conception of government in a massive volume,

Das Gesetz der Macht. The contrast between the thought which dominates this book and that of President Masaryk is especially significant when one recalls the fact that Professor Wieser was by sentiment and training deeply influenced by English liberal thought of the nineteenth century. Whereas Masaryk built his hopes upon a system of friendly neighborhoods under a régime of freedom, Wieser saw the ultimate solution for the anarchy of postwar days in the steady, majestic growth of law and order, based upon an understanding of social justice and the real needs of the peoples concerned. Thus the two approached the problem from opposite sides, the one voicing the sense of community action, the other emphasizing the need of regulatory control.

Now there can be no doubt that the Czechoslovak Republic followed Masaryk's lead much farther than the Republic of Austria followed the lead of its liberal thinkers. Masaryk, of course, had the advantage of high office and great political prestige; but more than one of his Austrian confreres held high office in Vienna, and yet they were obliged to witness the overthrow of their plans and hopes for a liberal Austria in much greater degree than was ever true in Czechoslovakia. This is not to say that the generous quality of Masaryk's political thought was not given satisfactory application in the practical politics of the new Republic. His effort to teach the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson not only to his own people but to the others of east-central Europe did not wholly succeed; for the task was well-nigh impossible. The Austrian system of government under which the Czechs had lived, and still more Hungary's rule of the Slavs within its frontiers, were both far removed from the American democratic federalism, which was the basis of Masaryk's political philosophy. Although the Habsburgs had been forced to recognize the different national stocks which composed their varied empire, the bureaucracy and the army held these

peoples together in a way which failed utterly to satisfy their aspirations for political self-expression. True federalism flourishes only under a régime of liberty, and that was something foreign to the Habsburg tradition.

No discussion of this subject would be complete, however, which left out of account the extreme nationalism which characterized so much of the history of this part of Europe after the World War—the movement which ultimately found its most extravagant expression in Nazi Germany. The peoples of the Danube Valley were divided by old antagonisms and resentments which were now given free expression under the divided sovereignties. This situation was accentuated by the fact that the idea of the State which had been taught in the schools was that of the Germanic concept of absolute sovereignty. Each people, therefore, that achieved its independence was intent upon realizing it in the full sense of the word, even to its own economic detriment. But there were increasing signs that this condition of affairs was being improved as the first decade after the war wore away. But whether or not this betterment in international relations would ultimately have gone on to fulfill Masaryk's conception of the free interplay of free peoples is a question that can never be answered, for two things blocked such progress: the economic difficulties of the 'thirties, and the intransigence of the new and menacing power of German Nazism. Against these powerful forces of economic and political reaction the young liberalism of central Europe had small chance of holding its own. Nevertheless, it would be a wholly false reading of history to regard the present situation as registering the final judgment concerning the vitality of democratic institutions in eastern Europe.

The great experiment of Czechoslovak independence will be lost to the world only if Europe itself is lost.

A PRAYER FOR TONIGHT*

BY KAREL ČAPEK



LORD, CREATOR of this beautiful land,
thou seest our suffering and our de-
spair; to thee we need not describe
what misfortune has befallen us or
how our heads are bowed. Not bowed in shame; we have no
cause for shame, though fate strikes us with an iron hand. We
have not been crushed; we have not shown too little courage.
Our nation did not lose its honor; it lost only part of its body.
We are like the man who, caught in the cogs of a wheel, feels
from the very first and with most excruciating pain that he is
alive. Our nation lives and, in this overpowering pain, feels how
potently, how vitally it still lives.

O Lord, creator of this nation, to thee we need not recount
our woes. But for ourselves alone, our mouths and hearts strive
to formulate that which we must never lose, and that is faith.
Faith in ourselves and in our history. Faith that in history we
have never stood and never will stand for wrong. Faith that on
our side and in our striving there is more hope for future good,

* The original Czech version published in the *Lidové Noviny* (Brno), September 22, 1938, was obtained for the editor of this volume by Dr. Arne Laurin, editor of *New Yorkské Listy*. The translation published here is by the editor of this volume and is based on this text in Czech and in part on the published English version of the National Union of Czechoslovak Protestants in America.

for growth, and for flowering into a rich fruitage than there is on the side of force and temporary power.

Greater than power is truth because truth endures. But even in this trying hour we must take a solemn vow not to stand idle. Now more than ever before must we work for our nation, for its inner strength and unity. The better people we can make of our nation, the more will we do for that better side in history. In our fate a universal drama is being enacted which will be carried through with great and glorious effort.

We have nothing to fear from the course of world events; on the contrary, every resort to brutal force is brief compared to the lasting need of man for liberty, peace, and equality among peoples and nations. We must work tirelessly among ourselves; we must love our nation even more than we have in the past; we must have a greater love for each other. We believe that in this, and chiefly in this, is our mission on earth: to make of ourselves a nation in every way capable of building a better future in the days to come than the present dark period in the history of Europe indicates.

O Lord, we do not pray that we may be avenged. But we do pray that thou wilt inspire each of us with the spirit of faith and hope; that thou wilt let none of us yield to despair. Let each of us seek only how we may serve the future, the eternal destiny of our nation. We have no need of those who despair. We need faith. We need internal strength. We need an efficacious love which will increase our strength tenfold.

Never can a nation be called small whose faith is great enough to build a better future.

*“President-Liberator, we will remain
faithful to the heritage which you have
laid in our hands!”*

—Masaryk Funeral Oration,

by EDUARD BENEŠ, September 21, 1937

PART VI: CHRONOLOGY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A CHRONOLOGY

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

I. EARLY HISTORY

- Ca.* 500 B.C. Gaulic-Celtic tribes appear in Czechoslovak territory. Boii give name to Bohemia. Kotins inhabit Moravia and western Slovakia.
- Ca.* A. D. 100-500 Various Germanic tribes appear in country.
- 500-600 Slavic groups occupy Czechoslovak territory.
- 623-658 Frankish merchant Samo creates empire, first great state among Western Slavs.
- Ca.* 800 Charlemagne (805) subdues Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia and begins to spread Latin Christianity among them.
- 800-850 Rise of Slav Kingdom of Great Moravia.
- Ca.* 863 At the request of Prince Rostislav, Eastern Christianity brought to Moravia by SS. Cyril and Methodius, apostles to the Slavs, who introduce Slavonic alphabet and liturgy.
- 903-907 Moravian kingdom overthrown by Magyars. For next thousand years Slovakia separated from remainder of Czechoslovak lands.
- 929 Death of St. Václav (Wenceslaus), prince and martyr, who becomes patron saint of nation.
- Tenth century Rise of nucleus of new Czech State centering around Prague, under Přemyslides (Bořivoj, Spytihněv, Vratislav).
- 929-999 Reigns of Boleslav I (929-967) and Boleslav II (967-999). All Czech tribes submit to Prague princes. Moravia and western Slovakia, and for a time even upper Silesia, united to Bohemia.
- 973-974 Foundation of Bishopric of Prague, first Bohemian diocese, including Bohemia, Cracow, Moravia, Nitra district in Slovakia.

- 1039-1056 Henry III, Holy Roman Emperor, forces Bohemia under Brětislav I to become fief of Holy Roman Empire (1041). Magyars take possession of western Slovakia.
- 1114 Bohemian princes hold office of imperial cupbearer to Holy Roman Emperor.
- 1157 Bohemian duke Vladislav II receives the royal crown as a hereditary right from Frederick I Barbarossa.
- 1276 Emperor Rudolf of Habsburg forces Přemysl Otakar II to surrender Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Cheb, and to receive Bohemia and Moravia in fief.
- 1278-1305 Václav II adds the crowns of Poland (1300) and Hungary (1301) to that of Bohemia.
- 1310-1346 John of Luxembourg introduces House of Luxembourg, which takes up traditions of House of Přemyslides.
- 1344 Bishopric of Prague raised to rank of archbishopric, the bishoprics of Olomouc and Litomyšl being subordinate thereto.
- 1346-1378 Reign of Charles IV, who extends Czech power, secures important position in Holy Roman Empire for Bohemia, and makes Prague the capital of his empire.
- 1348 Charles IV founds the Charles University of Prague, modeled after the University of Paris. A Czech university, first in central Europe.
- 1356 The Golden Bull of Charles IV. Election of Holy Roman Emperor by seven electors, including King of Bohemia, who is archseneschal. Establishment of indivisibility and inalienableness of electoral states. Bohemia allotted first place above all imperial electors. Confirms special rights of Bohemia, complete internal independence.
- 1390-1460 Life of Peter Chelčický, great Czech religious leader, Tolstoyan in outlook.
- 1415 The burning of Jan Hus by the Council of Constance. The Hussite movement assumes revolutionary character.
- 1458 George Poděbrad, Hussite noble, chosen king of Bohemia.
- 1468 First Czech and Slavonic printing press established.
- 1471-1526 Weak rule of Vladislav II and Louis (Jagellon dynasty), who are also kings of Hungary. Czech State again in close contact with Slovakia.

II. CZECHOSLOVAKS UNDER THE HABSBURGS

- 1526 Ferdinand I of Habsburg elected king. In his empire (personal union of Austrian Alpine Lands and kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary) Bohemia is the largest and most important part.
- 1592-1670 Jan Amos Komenský, or Comenius, writer, teacher, philosopher of world repute.
- 1609 The Letter of Majesty of Rudolf II guaranteeing religious liberty in Bohemia; those who had adhered to Bohemian Confession of 1575 granted right of free exercise of their religion.
- 1618-1648 Period of Thirty Years' War.
- 1618 May 23 The defenestration of Prague.
- 1619 Aug. 19 Ferdinand II deposed by unanimous resolution passed in the general Diet of all Bohemian Lands.
- Aug. 26 Prince Frederick of the Palatinate, son-in-law of King James I of England, chosen to throne of Bohemia. He is also head of the Protestant Union of German Princes. Forced to flee after Battle of White Mountain.
- 1620 Nov. 8 Battle of White Mountain. Defeat of the Czechs, subjugation of Bohemia, end of political independence, execution of leading rebels, extirpation of Bohemian Protestantism. Violent move against Protestants in Austria and Silesia.
- 1627 Renewed Land Ordinance.
- 1637-1740 Under the Habsburgs Ferdinand III, Leopold I, Joseph I, and Charles VI material and moral oppression result in the almost complete destruction of intellectual life among the Czechs.
- 1740-1790 Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and her son Joseph II (1780-1790), by means of vigorous centralization and Germanization, unconsciously strengthen awakening national consciousness among the Czechs, though their efforts at centralization of empire seriously affect principle of independence of Bohemian Crown.
- 1763-1829 Josef Dobrovský, distinguished philologist whose works become bases of Czech and Slavic philological study.
- 1773-1847 Josef Jungmann lays foundations of Czech literary language.
- 1781 Patent of Toleration of Joseph II by which Catholics are permitted to proclaim adherence to Lutheran or Reformed Confession.

- 1790-1848 During this period of absolutism (Leopold II, Francis II, and Ferdinand I), the national consciousness of Czechs and Slovaks is aroused by the devoted work of "National Awakeners."
- 1793-1852 Jan Kollár, Slovak, who formulates principles of Slavonic unity in poetic form.
- 1795-1861 Pavel Josef Šafárik, Slovak, distinguished philologist.
- 1798-1876 František Palacký, who attempts first detailed study of Czech history. His historical and political concepts are first Czech political program and have profound influence on later political development of Czech nation in nineteenth century and fire Czech aspirations toward independence.
- 1804 Francis II takes title of Austrian Emperor. Lands of the Bohemian Crown preserve own special constitutional position within Habsburg Empire.
- 1810 Foundation of the Prague Conservatory of Music.
- 1818-1903 František Ladislav Rieger, political leader with program based on nation's right of self-determination and on Slavonic consciousness.
- 1820 Foundation of the National Museum.
- 1821-1856 Karel Havlíček (Borovský), journalist, who exerts great influence on development of people through fight against reaction after 1848.
- 1848-1849 Revolution in the Germanies and in the Habsburg Empire.
- 1848 June 2 Slavonic Congress in Prague called by the Czechs under the leadership of František Palacký to unite opposition of Slavonic peoples of Austria against domination of Germans.
- June 12-17 Uprising of Czechs in Prague suppressed by Windischgrätz.
- 1848-1849 Nov., 1848-
Mar., 1849 The Kremsier (Kroměříž) Congress. Dissolution by emperor on March 6, 1849. Attempt to construct a democratic, federative, constitutional structure for Danubian region. Dr. Josef Redlich: "Compared with other constitutional legislation of the year '48 in Europe, compared even with the great work of the Frankfurt Assembly, the achievement of the men of the Kremsier Congress is of equal rank; in some respects it undoubtedly surpasses contemporary efforts. For it is the first serious and well-considered attempt to construct, on the basis of a democratic constitution, a great

- Empire embodying the new fundamental principle of national equality. And at the same time it seeks to preserve both the imperial dynasty and the position of the Empire as one of the great powers in Europe."
- 1850-1937 Life of Thomas G. Masaryk, born March 7, 1850.
- 1860 Foundation of *Národní Listy*, first great Czech newspaper. The October Diploma of Francis Joseph I promising to exercise legislative authority only in coöperation with diets of the Lands and the common imperial Parliament.
- 1861 Feb. 21 The February Constitution, by which the emperor provides for parliamentary rule, with a Diet for Bohemia. Magyars refuse to accept February Constitution.
- June Slovak Memorandum of Turčiansky Sv. Martin addressed to Hungarian Diet demanding independent individuality of Slovak nation is recognized by law, use of Slovak language in public matters, schools, churches, etc.
- 1862 Foundation of the Sokols. Organization of Slovenská Matice, an association for publication of Slovak books. Dissolved in 1875.
- 1866 Seven Weeks' War between Austria and Prussia. Invasion of Bohemia by Prussian armies, June 22-25.
- 1867 The Compromise (*Ausgleich*) establishing the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, which denies equal rights to the Czechoslovaks and the other nationalities of the empire.
- 1871 Sept. 12 Bohemian Diet obtains promise that emperor will recognize historic rights of Kingdom of Bohemia by taking coronation oath. Never fulfilled.
- 1881 Feb. 11 Lectures in Czech established at the University of Prague.
- 1881 Foundation of the Národní Divadlo (National Theater), at Prague. Rebuilt after fire, in 1883.
- 1882 The University of Prague is divided into two bodies, Czech University and German University. Restoration of the Czech University.
- 1884 May 28 Birth of Dr. Eduard Beneš.
- 1890 Foundation of the Czech Academy of Science, Literature and Arts.
- 1897 Apr. 5 By ministerial decree in Austria the Czech language is placed on an official equality with German in Bohemia. Riots follow in Bohemia. In Reichsrat

- violence and obstruction by Germans produce deadlock which lasts during 1898-1899, resulting in temporary suspension of Constitution.
- 1900 July 20 Repeal of language ordinance in Austria followed by obstruction by Young Czech party, which begins active struggle for universal suffrage.
- 1907 Jan. Austro-Hungarian electoral reform law. Constituencies increased from 425 to 515. All male citizens over twenty-four years of age enfranchised with one year's residential qualification.

III. THE CZECHOSLOVAK STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (1914-1918)

- 1914 Dec. 17 T. G. Masaryk leaves Prague for Italy via Vienna. Arrives in Rome on December 22, 1914.
- 1915 Jan. 3 Formation at Berne, Switzerland, of a Central Executive Committee of Czech Societies in Switzerland.
- Jan. 13 Formation of a Congress of the Czech National Association in America, at Cleveland, Ohio.
- Jan. Formation of first Congress of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia.
- Feb. First meetings of the secret Mafia in Prague: Drs. Scheiner, Kramář, Šámal.
- July 4 Masaryk inaugurates revolutionary movement by lecture on Jan Hus at Zurich.
- Sept. 1-3 Escape of Dr. Beneš into Switzerland via Germany.
- Nov. 14 Czech Foreign Committee issues manifesto for Czechoslovak independence.
- 1916 Feb. Foundation of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris: Masaryk, president; Dürich, vice-president; General Štefánik, the Slovak representative; and Dr. Beneš, general secretary.
- Feb. 3 M. Briand, French foreign minister, receives Masaryk and agrees with policy of liberating subject Habsburg peoples.
- 1917 Jan. 10 In Allied reply to President Wilson's note of December 21, 1916, asking for definition of war aims, the liberation of Czechs and Slovaks is declared to be a main peace condition.
- Mar. 24 Miliukov, Russian foreign minister of Provisional Government, confirms regulations for formation of Czechoslovak army.
- Apr. 6 Entry of the United States into the World War.
- Oct. 20 Recognition by the Allied Powers of the Polish National Committee.

- direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks."
- 1918 Sept. 9 The Japanese Government recognizes the Czechoslovak army as a regular belligerent force and the National Council as its supreme organ.
- Sept. 26 The Czechoslovak Provisional Government is set up at Paris: T. G. Masaryk, president of Provisional Government, president of Council of Ministers, and minister of finance; Eduard Beneš, minister of foreign affairs and of interior; Milan Štefánik, minister of war.
- Sept. 28 Franco-Czechoslovak agreement embodying recognition of independence.
- Oct. 3 Recognition of belligerency of Czechoslovak National Council by declaration of Italian president of Council.
- Oct. 14 Beneš notifies Allied and Associated Powers of decision to establish a Provisional Czechoslovak Government.
- Oct. 15 France recognizes Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia.
- Oct. 18 Proclamation of Czechoslovak independence by President T. G. Masaryk at Washington, D.C. Declaration of Common Aims of Mid-European Democratic Union at Philadelphia, October 26.
- Oct. 18 President Wilson rejects Austrian proposal of "autonomy" as solution of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav problem. Recognition of Provisional Government.
- Oct. 24 Italian recognition of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government.
- Oct. 28 The Czechoslovak National Council proclaims deposition of Charles as king of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Slovakia and the establishment of a free and united Republic of Czechoslovakia. Revolutionary movement in Prague. Czechoslovak Independence Day.
- Oct. 30 Declaration of Slovak leaders at Turčiansky Sv. Martin agreeing to form part of new state.
- Oct. 31 Declaration of Geneva, by the delegates of the National Council of Prague, approving the policy and actions of the Czechoslovak National Council transformed into the Provisional Government of the Czechoslovak Lands.
- Nov. 4 Dr. Beneš invited to take part in armistice negotiations. Austria-Hungary accepts Allied armistice

- 1918 Nov. 5 Czechoslovak delegates return to Paris from Geneva.
- Nov. 14 Czechoslovak National Assembly deposes the Habsburgs, proclaims a republic, and elects T. G. Masaryk president by acclamation. First cabinet set up consisting of Dr. Karel Kramář, premier; Dr. Eduard Beneš, foreign minister; and Dr. Alois Rašín, minister of finance.
- Nov. 15 First British and French military missions appointed to Prague.
- Nov. 22 Greece recognizes Provisional Government.
- Nov. 28 Belgium recognizes Provisional Government.
- Dec. 4 Allies recognize the Czechoslovak State and authorize Czechoslovak troops to occupy Slovakia and supervise administration in former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
- Dec. 19 Enactment of Eight-Hour Labor Law by the Czechoslovak Parliament.
- 1919 Jan. 18-June 28. . The Paris Peace Conference. Masaryk, Beneš, Kramář, Štefánik, the chief Czechoslovak delegates.
- Jan. 24-Feb. 5 . . . Armed clashes between Czechoslovak and Polish forces over the territory of Těšín [Teschen].
- Apr. 9 Land Expropriation Act, first great Czechoslovak land reform.
- May 8 The Ruthenian leaders decide to bring Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia into the Czechoslovak State.
- June 28 Signature of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany. Recognition of the independence of Czechoslovakia.
- July 8 Resignation of the first Czechoslovak cabinet of Dr. Karel Kramář, which had been formed on November 14, 1918.
- July 8-May 25, 1920 First cabinet of Vlastimil Tusar.
- July 17 Enactment of the Czechoslovak Child Labor Law.
- Sept. 9 Signing of the Czechoslovak Minorities Treaty.
- Sept. 10 Signature of the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria. Recognition of the independence of Czechoslovakia.

IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1920-1938)

- 1920 Feb. 29 New Czechoslovak Constitution adopted. Republic. President elected by bicameral legislature acting as National Assembly, for period of seven years. Senate chosen for eight years, Chamber of Deputies for six years. Ministry responsible to Chamber. Elections, April 18 and 25.

- two countries except those affecting their territorial status.
- 1925 Oct. 16 Arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia, at Locarno, Switzerland.
- Nov. 29 Austro-Czechoslovak Commercial Agreement.
- Dec. 9—
Mar. 18, 1926 . . Second cabinet of Antonín Švehla. Old-Age Insurance Law.
- 1926 Mar. 19—Oct. 12 . Cabinet of Jan Černý, second cabinet of officials.
- Apr. 1 Czechoslovak National Bank established.
- June 13 Czechoslovakia and Rumania renew treaty within Little Entente for three years.
- Oct. 12—
Feb. 1, 1929 . . Third cabinet of Antonín Švehla. A German Christian Socialist enters cabinet.
- 1927 May 27 President Masaryk elected for third time as president of Czechoslovakia.
- 1928 Aug. 27 Signature of the Paris (Briand-Kellogg) Anti-War Pact by various governments, including Czechoslovakia.
- 1929 Feb. 1—Dec. 7 . . First cabinet of František Udržal, composition as in preceding cabinet.
- May 21 Treaties of Little Entente renewed, a Tripartite Agreement providing for peaceful settlement of all disputes among members.
- Dec. 7—
Oct. 29, 1932 . . Second Udržal cabinet, including one German Social Democrat and one representative of German Farmers' party.
- 1930 May 14 Bulgaro-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression.
- Oct. 4—12 First Balkan Conference, Athens, attended by unofficial delegations from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Turkey.
- 1931 Mar. 19 The Austro-German Customs Union project signed; announced March 21.
- 1932 May 9 Little Entente treaty renewed.
- Oct. 29—
Feb. 4, 1934 . . First cabinet of Jan Malypetr. This cabinet includes one German Social Democrat, one German Agrarian.
- 1933 Jan. 30 Adolf Hitler becomes chancellor of Germany.
- Feb. 16 Statute of the Little Entente completed. Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia form diplomatic federation; Permanent Council organized;

- Economic Council organized, and economic collaboration prepared; Secretariat established.
- 1933 July 3 An Eastern European Nonaggression Pact signed by the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey at the London Economic Conference.
- July 4 The U.S.S.R. and members of the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—conclude an identical Nonaggression Pact.
- 1934 Feb. 9 The signature of the Pact of the Balkan Entente at Athens. Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey become signatories.
- Feb. 14 Second Malypetr cabinet, including one German Social Democrat and one German Agrarian.
- Mar. 17 Signature of the so-called Rome Protocols by Italy, Austria, and Hungary. The three states are to collaborate in their foreign policy and to conclude reciprocal commercial agreements.
- June 9 Czechoslovakia establishes diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
- 1935 Jan. 13 The Saar plebiscite restores Saar district to Germany.
- Mar. 16 Germany announces institution of military conscription.
- May 2 The Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, providing for immediate consultation for enforcement of Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the event of aggression against either party.
- May 16 The Czechoslovak-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact is signed. Stipulates that if either state is victim of unprovoked aggression the other will support it, provided France honors her treaty.
- May 19 Sudete German party under Konrad Henlein polls 1,294,000 votes and elects 44 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 23 Senators.
- June 4 Third cabinet of Jan Malypetr.
- Nov. 8 Dr. Milan Hodža becomes prime minister and organizes cabinet. Remains prime minister until the period of Munich Agreement, in 1938.
- Dec. 14 President T. G. Masaryk resigns presidency of Czechoslovakia for reasons of age and health.
- Dec. 18 Dr. Eduard Beneš, by vote of 340 out of 440 in the National Assembly, becomes the second president of Czechoslovakia.
- Dec. 18 Second cabinet of Dr. Milan Hodža. Dr. Kamil

- Krofta enters cabinet as foreign minister in March, 1936.
- 1936 Mar. 26 The Czechoslovak Law for the Defense of the State enacted. All districts within 25 kilometers of border and certain interior districts declared frontier zones in which emergency law might prevail even in peace. Unreliable citizens not to own, operate, or be employed in certain industries of national importance.
- Apr. 1 Austria repudiates the military clauses of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.
- July 11 The Austro-German agreement whereby Germany agreed to respect Austrian independence and integrity. Austria to consider herself as German state.
- July 17 Beginning of so-called Spanish Civil War.
- Nov. 25 German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact. The two nations agree on collaboration to combat spread of "communism" by Komintern.
- 1937 Jan. 24 Bulgaria and Yugoslavia sign treaty of perpetual friendship and peace.
- Feb. 18 Fundamental agreement between Czechoslovak Government and the German Activist parties on public works, social welfare, minority rights, language problem, etc.
- Mar. 26 Italy and Yugoslavia agree to respect their respective frontiers and to refrain from supporting any aggressor in the event either should be attacked by third Power.
- Apr. 1 Council of Little Entente meets in Belgrade.
- June 25 Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies passes bill for premilitary training.
- July 17 Czechoslovak cabinet resigns.
- July 21 Dr. Milan Hodža forms third cabinet. Only change from previous cabinet is resignation of Dr. Kalfus, minister of finance.
- Aug. 30-31 Conference of the Permanent Council of the Little Entente at Sinaia.
- Sept. 14 Death of President-Liberator T. G. Masaryk (1850-1937). Press bulletin: "The First President of the Czechoslovak Republic, President-Liberator T. G. Masaryk, died at Lány Castle at 3:29 this morning, aged 87 years, 6 months, 7 days."
- Sept. 21 Great state funeral for President Masaryk. Dr. Beneš delivers the oration pledging loyalty to Masaryk's ideals of democracy.

- 1937 Sept. 27 Permanent Council of the Little Entente, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, expresses itself in favor of continuing negotiations for improved economic relations among Danubian nations.
- Oct. 11 Opening of Tenth Session of the Economic Council of the Little Entente at Trenčianské Teplice. Emphasis on steady progress in expanding economic contacts among members of Little Entente.
- Dec. 13-15 Conference of the chiefs of the General Staffs of the members of the Little Entente at Prague.

V. THE DESTRUCTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1938-1939)

- 1938 Jan. 17 Chancellor Hitler receives Dr. Schuschnigg, chancellor of Austria.
- Feb. 3 Crisis in Berlin. Marshal von Blomberg and General Fritsch resign.
- Feb. 5 Hitler makes changes in army, diplomacy, and administration, concentrating more power into own hands. Göring becomes field marshal. Herr von Ribbentrop succeeds Freiherr von Neurath as foreign minister.
- Feb. 10 Octavian Goga resigns as premier of Rumania after forty-five days in office. Personal dictatorship of King Carol.
- Feb. 12 Dr. von Schuschnigg pays visit to Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
- Feb. 16 Dr. von Schuschnigg reconstructs his cabinet to include Nazis. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pays visit to Herr Hitler, February 17.
- Feb. 20 Anthony Eden resigns as foreign minister of Great Britain.
- Mar. 9 Schuschnigg announces plebiscite to be held on question of Austrian independence.
- Mar. 11 Chancellor Schuschnigg resigns; succeeded by the Nazi, Dr. Seyss-Inquart. German troops begin occupation of Austria. Field Marshal Göring assures Czechoslovak minister in Berlin of desire to improve relations with Czechoslovakia, no aggressive designs. Baron von Neurath assures Czechoslovak minister that Germany considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of October 16, 1925.
- Mar. 14 Herr Hitler enters Vienna. Premier Blum confirms France's engagements to assist Czechoslovakia.

- 1938 Mar. 15 Soviet Government announces help for Czechoslovakia under Mutual Assistance Pact of May 16, 1935, if France carries out her obligations.
- Mar. 17 Foreign Minister Litvinov reiterates position on Czechoslovakia.
- Mar. 18 Litvinov urges Franco-Anglo-American-Soviet Conference on measures to prevent further aggression.
- Mar. 22 The German Agrarian party (five members) withdraws from the Czechoslovak Government coalition and joins the Sudete German party.
- Mar. 24 Chamberlain minimizes efficacy of League of Nations and withholds "prior guaranty" to Czechoslovakia.
- Mar. 28 Premier Hodža states Government will codify nationalities law.
- Apr. 18 Dr. Franříšek Chvalkovský, Czechoslovak minister in Rome, informs Count Ciano that Czechoslovakia recognizes the Italian Empire, i.e., conquest of Ethiopia.
- Apr. 24 Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudete German party, in a speech at Karlsbad, announces eight-point program, including complete autonomy for German minority, right to espouse Hitlerism, and abandonment of Soviet alliance.
- May 5 Official communiqué of Little Entente Conference stresses unanimity of members on all questions of interest to alliance and determination to continue collaboration in efforts for peace and understanding, especially for neighborly relations in Danubian area.
- May 7 British and French ministers in Prague, Mr. B. C. Newton and M. de Lacroix, in talks with Dr. Krofta, express readiness of their governments to assist in friendly solution of German problem in Czechoslovakia.
- May 14 Herr Henlein calls at Czechoslovak Legation in London, and talks with Mr. Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak minister.
- May 19 Rumors of German troop movements near Czechoslovak frontier.
- May 21 Czechoslovakia mobilizes about 300,000 troops on German frontier.
- May 22 Beginning of local elections, which pass off quietly. Increased vote for Henlein party and also for Czech parties in the German-speaking districts.

- 1938 May 26 Mr. William Strang, of the British Foreign Office, arrives in Prague.
- June 14 Dr. Milan Hodža receives delegation of Sudete German party, and gives answer of Government to party's memorandum in connection with proposed nationalities statute.
- June 23 Dr. Hodža has further talks with Sudete leaders.
- June 26 M. Maxim Litvinov, Soviet foreign minister, speaking in Moscow, declares that Czechoslovakia is a peace-loving country, and that Soviet-Czechoslovak pact has reduced danger of war.
- July 12 M. Daladier, French premier, speaking in Paris, reaffirms determination of France to fulfill her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia.
- July 26 The British Government asks Lord Runciman to act as adviser in negotiations between Czechoslovak Government and Sudete Germans.
- July 28 Text of new Local Government Bill handed to Sudete German party by the Czechoslovak Government.
- July 31 Bulgaria and members of the Balkan Entente sign a Nonaggression Pact at Salonica.
- Aug. 3 Lord Runciman, with Lady Runciman and staff, arrives in Prague. Dr. Hodža receives leaders of the Sudete German party.
- Aug. 4 Lord Runciman sees Dr. Beneš, Dr. Hodža, Dr. Krofta, and delegation of the Sudete German party.
- Aug. 5 Lord Runciman talks with Sudete delegation and with Deputy Jaksch and other representatives of the German Social Democratic party.
- Aug. 9 Lord Runciman has further talks with Sudete German leaders.
- Aug. 18 Lord Runciman talks with Herr Henlein at Rothenhaus Castle.
- Aug. 21 Permanent Council of Little Entente at Bled, Yugoslavia, affirms unity. Agreement on rearmament with Hungary, but no nonaggression pact.
- Aug. 21 Admiral Horthy visits in Berlin.
- Aug. 27 Sir John Simon, at Lanark, reiterates position that war against Czechoslovakia might spread, but Britain's commitments are not changed.
- Aug. 28 Lord Runciman talks with Herr Henlein.
- Sept. 1 Lord Runciman received by President Beneš. Herr Henlein visits Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
- Sept. 4 Czechoslovak Government decides on new and defi-

- nite proposals for settlement of Sudete problem. Far-reaching concessions in direction of autonomy.
- 1938 Sept. 5 Nuremberg Congress of the National Socialist party convenes.
- Sept. 6 President Beneš receives Sudete leaders.
- Sept. 7 Sudete leaders break off negotiations, after having accepted government proposals as basis of negotiations, on ground of incidents at Moravská Ostrava. London *Times* suggests desirability of Czechoslovakia's permitting secession of "that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nations with which they are united by race." Dr. Beneš broadcasts message to nation with proposals for settlement of Sudete problem.
- Sept. 12 Hitler at Nuremberg demands freedom for Sudete Germans, declaring Germany will help them if they cannot secure freedom by themselves. British cabinet meeting.
- Sept. 13 Sudete leaders provoke grave incidents on frontiers of Bohemia.
- Sept. 14 Henlein informs Runciman that conditions for settlement no longer exist in view of incidents.
- Sept. 15 Mr. Neville Chamberlain calls on Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Herr Henlein demands secession of areas with German population and inclusion in Germany.
- Sept. 16 Czechoslovak Government orders dissolution of the Sudete German party. British cabinet meets to hear Mr. Chamberlain and to receive Lord Runciman's report on Czechoslovakia.
- Sept. 18 Mussolini demands "totalitarian solution" of Czechoslovak problem. Henlein issues call to arms to Sudete German party. English and French ministers meet in London.
- Sept. 19 Anglo-French proposals for settlement of Sudete problem under discussion by Czechoslovak Government. Attacks on frontier posts by Germans.
- Sept. 21 British and French ministers, at 2:15 A.M., demand that President Beneš capitulate to German demands. Czechoslovak answer is acceptance of very harsh terms. Maxim Litvinov, Soviet foreign minister, tells League of Nations Assembly that he officially informed France on September 19 that U.S.S.R. was ready to fulfill its treaty obligations.

- 1938 Sept. 22 Mr. Chamberlain flies to Godesberg to visit Herr Hitler. The Hodža cabinet resigns to be replaced by cabinet of National Unity under General Syrový, inspector general of the army.
- Sept. 23 Chamberlain and Hitler exchange letters before final talk takes place in which Mr. Chamberlain accepts German memorandum containing Hitler's final demands for presentation to Czechoslovak Government. Litvinov, speaking before Political Committee of League of Nations Assembly, declares it was Czechoslovakia which insisted that Soviet-Czechoslovak pact be conditioned on assistance by France. U.S.S.R. has no obligations in the event France does not come to Czechoslovakia's assistance. Mobilization of the Czechoslovak army on information that British and French governments "cannot continue to take the responsibility of advising them [the Czechoslovak Government] not to mobilize." Soviet Russia warns Poland that any violation of Czechoslovak frontier will cause denunciation of Soviet-Polish Nonaggression Pact.
- Sept. 24 Mr. Chamberlain returns to London.
- Sept. 25 Meeting of the British cabinet with MM. Daladier and Bonnet.
- Sept. 26 President Roosevelt sends message to Berlin and Prague, as well as to London, Paris, Warsaw, and Budapest, urging peaceful settlement. Mobilization of British fleet as precautionary measure. Hitler's speech at the Sportpalast in which he denounces Czechoslovakia as a "lie" created by the "liar" Beneš.
- Sept. 28 Poland takes note of Czechoslovakia's agreement to cede Těšín [Teschen] district. Roosevelt appeals to Hitler to preserve peace. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons, announcement of Munich meeting. Telephone conversations between Hitler and Mussolini.
- Sept. 29-30 The Munich Conference. Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini confer on terms for settlement of Czechoslovak-German problem. Four zones of Sudetenland to be occupied by Germans between October 1 and 7; the fifth, containing remainder of predominantly German territory, to be determined by mixed commission and occupied by October 10. Commission to choose other

- districts for plebiscites under international control and make final determination of borders. Czech evacuation to be carried out without injury to property. Germany, Italy, England, and France to guarantee integrity of new borders when Hungarian and Polish problems have been settled with Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia informed she can expect no assistance from England and France if she rejects Munich decisions.
- 1938 Sept. 30 Czechoslovakia accepts Munich decisions.
- Oct. 1 First German soldiers cross Czechoslovak frontiers. Czechoslovakia receives Polish ultimatum demanding cession of the Těšín [Teschen] district and accedes to demand.
- Oct. 1-10 German occupation of Sudetenland.
- Oct. 5 The resignation of Dr. Beneš as president of Czechoslovakia, "lest his person should prove a hindrance in the future development to which our State must accommodate itself." Reconstruction of the Czecho-Slovak cabinet: M. Jan Černý becomes vice-premier and minister of interior, and Dr. František Chvalkovský succeeds Dr. Kamil Krofta as foreign minister.
- Oct. 6 Monsignor Josef Tiso appointed minister for the administration of Slovakia in the Prague cabinet.
- Oct. 7 The Czecho-Slovak Government accepts resolutions passed at Žilina for autonomy of Slovakia, and a Slovak cabinet with Monsignor Tiso as prime minister is appointed.
- Oct. 8 Negotiations between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia for new frontiers.
- Oct. 11 Ministry for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia appointed.
- Oct. 18 Monsignor Tiso visits Munich and talks with Herr von Ribbentrop.
- Oct. 20 Suspension of the Communist party in Czecho-Slovakia.
- Oct. 21 Czecho-Slovakia informs the U.S.S.R. that it is no longer interested in the Mutual Assistance Pact. General Syrový, premier, announces that in sphere of foreign policy "a speedy and complete agreement with all the Republic's neighbors is being sought."
- Oct. 22 Dr. Beneš and Mme Beneš arrive in England.
- Oct. 26 Monsignor Augustin Vološín is appointed minister for the administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. The Czecho-Slovak Government announces

- arbitration by Germany and Italy to settle boundary dispute with Hungary.
- 1938 Oct. 30 Germany and Italy agree to arbitrate the Czecho-Slovak-Hungarian dispute.
- Nov. 2 German and Italian foreign ministers in Vienna deliver decision on new frontiers between Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and Hungary. Hungary receives 4,200 square miles of territory with 1,060,000 people.
- Nov. 15 Czech and Slovak leaders agree on terms of new Constitution. Slovakia enjoys autonomy, but departments of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, and communications are to be common to State as a whole.
- Nov. 16 The Czecho-Slovak National Unity party constituted (former Agrarian, National Socialist, Traders, National Union, and Czechoslovak Catholic parties).
- Nov. 19 Czecho-Slovak Parliament passes measures bestowing autonomy on Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Signing in Berlin of a Czecho-Slovak-German agreement providing for the construction of an automobile highway across Czecho-Slovak territory from Breslau to Vienna and a canal connecting the Danube and the Oder rivers.
- Nov. 30 Dr. Emil Hácha elected third president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Syrový cabinet resigns. M. Rudolf Beran becomes premier in new cabinet.
- Dec. 1 New Beran cabinet includes Dr. Chvalkovský as foreign minister, and General Syrový as minister of national defense.
- Dec. 6 Franco-German declaration of perpetual friendship.
- Dec. 14 Czecho-Slovak Parliament passes Enabling Act giving President Hácha and the Government power to make certain amendments to Constitution by decree.
- 1939 Feb. 20-22 . . . Meeting of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Balkan Entente at Bucharest, Rumania.
- Mar. 9 Prime Minister Beran dismisses Father Tiso, Slovak premier, and all other ministers except two.
- Mar. 11 New Slovak cabinet appointed with Karl Sidor as premier.
- Mar. 13 Father Tiso and Hitler confer in Berlin.
- Mar. 14 Conference between President Hácha, Foreign Minister Chvalkovský, and Chancellor Hitler in Berlin.

- 939' Mar. 14 Hungary sends twelve-hour ultimatum to Prague, demanding the withdrawal of Czech troops from Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Hungarian troops cross frontier and advance toward Chust. Slovak Diet declares independence of Slovak State.
- Mar. 15 German troops occupy Czecho-Slovakia. Hitler forces Hácha to sign agreement making Bohemia and Moravia a protectorate of Germany.
- Mar. 16 Hungary formally annexes Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Slovakia a German protectorate.
- Mar. 23 Hungarian troops cross eastern Slovak frontier. Germany guarantees political independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia for twenty-five years.
- Mar. 31 Mixed Hungarian-Slovak Commission modifies frontier between Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, giving Hungary additional 400 square miles with control of the Ung Valley.
- Apr. 5 In Bohemia-Moravia the German military government of the army of occupation is replaced by a civil government under the protector, Baron Konstantin von Neurath.
- Apr. 8 Hungarian troops occupy former Czechoslovak territory, to the border determined by agreement with Slovakia on April 4. Troops are followed by police and government officials to administer 386 square miles of land and 45,000 new citizens.
- May 25 The British Legation in Prague is closed.
- June 9 Following killing of a German policeman in Nachod, near German frontier, repressive measures are taken in entire police district.
- June 21 Reich Protector Baron von Neurath establishes Jewish (Nuremberg) Law in Bohemia-Moravia.
- June 22 The Czechoslovak National Defense Act of 1936 is declared valid for the protectorate in favor of Nazi Germany.
- June 23 A new authoritarian constitution is laid before the Parliament of Slovakia in Bratislava.
- Aug. 8 Title to a large part of the forests of Bohemia-Moravia is transferred from the Czech owners to the Nazi-controlled Land Reform Compensation Fund.
- Aug. 18 The Government of the Reich announces that it has taken military possession of the "independent" state of Slovakia "owing to the existing situation." An agreement is reached placing the Slovak army under German command.

- 1939 Aug. 19 German troops mass on Slovakia's Polish frontier. Germany and the Soviet Union conclude a commercial agreement.
- Aug. 20 Poland shifts large numbers of troops to the Moravian, Slovak, and Hungarian frontiers.
- Aug. 23 Germany and the Soviet Union sign a ten-year non-aggression pact.
- Aug. 29 German troops complete the occupation of Slovakia. Poland protests.

VI. THE CZECHOSLOVAKS IN THE WORLD STRUGGLE

- 1939 Sept. 1 Adolf Hitler unleashes his war on Europe by a "counterattack" against Poland.
- Sept. 3 Great Britain and France declare a state of war against Germany.
- Oct. 2 Premier Daladier of France signs an agreement with Stefan Osuský, the Czechoslovak minister in France, providing for the recognition and the reconstruction of the Czechoslovak army in France, bringing "fresh man power to the Allied cause."
- Oct. 23 The Republic of Slovakia is recognized by the Soviet Union with the acceptance of the first Slovak minister to Moscow, M. Vrano Tiso, cousin of Premier Father Josef Tiso. Germany announces intention to restore about 220 square miles of land in the Cadeo region, with a population of 45,000, to Slovakia.
- Oct. 26 The Slovak Parliament chooses Father Josef Tito as president of the Republic of Slovakia. He is succeeded in the office of premier by Béla Tuka.
- Oct. 28 Police clash with Czechs who were peacefully demonstrating on the twenty-first anniversary of Czechoslovak independence.
- Nov. 12 Winston Churchill, first lord of the Admiralty, declares in radio address: "... I will say without doubt that the fate of Holland and Belgium, like that of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, will be decided by the victory of the British Empire and the French Republic."
- Nov. 15 In Prague students of Charles University, on the occasion of the funeral of a student injured on October 28, engage in demonstrations and many are arrested by the German police.
- Nov. 17 After German garrison at Prague has been reinforced, attack with machine guns is made on all

student dormitories and homes, the students defending themselves by barricades. Nearly 30 students shot down. That night 9 leaders of student organizations, including lecturer, Dr. Josef Matoušek, are arrested and shot without trial before the students, some 2,500 of whom, boys and girls, are arrested and many sent to concentration camps, according to reports from Czech quarters. The climax of this Nazi orgy against the future Czechoslovak intellectual élite and the professors is the closing of all 9 universities and polytechnic schools, including all their scientific institutes, for a period of three years. Great libraries closed or in part transported to Germany. Definite attempt to destroy national intellectual life of Czechoslovaks.

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues the following communiqué: "On November 13 the Minister of Czechoslovakia in Paris informed the French Government that M. Beneš, General Ingr, M. Osuský, M. Outrata, M. Ripka, M. Slávik, Msgr. Šrámek, and General Viest had just constituted the Czechoslovak National Committee. The French Government has taken note of the constitution of this Committee which will in particular be qualified to put into application the Agreement of 2nd October concerning the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak Army."

1939 Nov. 18 The German authorities execute three more Czech students and impose martial law in Prague and vicinity.

Dec. 20 The British Government, through Lord Halifax, the foreign minister, announces recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee as "qualified to represent the Czechoslovak peoples." In a manifesto the Czechoslovak National Committee announces: "We shall continue in this struggle united, single-minded and steadfast until the final victory; it is a struggle for a *free Czechoslovakia in a free Europe*."

1940 Feb. 9 In first official declaration of the British Labor party on war and peace aims the Labor party calls for certain "acts of restitution" on the part of Germany and states that "restitution must include freedom for the Polish and Czechoslovak peoples."

- 1940 Feb. 24 Prime Minister Chamberlain declares that "the independence of the Poles and the Czechs must be secured" as one of the aims of the war.
- Mar. 7 On the ninetieth anniversary of the birth of President Masaryk, Dr. Eduard Beneš receives the honorary D.C.L. degree from Oxford University, England.
- June 29 The Czechoslovak National Committee in England announces the successful evacuation of the Czechoslovak armed forces from France to England, where they are to serve in association with the British Army.
- July 21 Recognition by Great Britain of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government and of Dr. Eduard Beneš as president of the Czechoslovak Republic. Msgr. Dr. Jan Šrámek is prime minister; Jan Masaryk, son of the first president, minister of foreign affairs; General Sergěj Ingr, minister of national defense; and Dr. Juraj Slávik, minister of home affairs. President Beneš, in appointing the cabinet of the Provisional Government, wrote: "We shall continue in the traditions of the first Republic of Masaryk and we shall prepare a new Republic, which will adapt itself to the events of the war and to the new conditions which will arise when the war is over . . ."

INDEX

INDEX

[Compiled by Martine Emert and E. Louise Peffer]

- Abbeville, Interallied Conference at, 58
- Absolon, K., 322
- Academy, Czech, of Sciences and Arts, founded (1890), 49
- Activism, of German Agrarians and German Social Democrats, 155, 179
- Agrarian reform, 131, 153, 154, 155, 208-209, 219-240; *see also* Agriculture
- Agrarians, Czechoslovak: in 1907, 46; political party, 138, 143-144, 147, 151, 153, 154-155, 156, 157, 159-160, 161, 162, 205, 237, 253, 254, 290, 433; elections of 1935, 163-164; Agrarian Era, 154-163
- Agriculture: rich and prosperous in Bohemia, 48; large land holdings, 131, 147-148, 209, 219-228; Land Office, 148, 155, 221, 223, 224, 226; peasant land holdings, 154, 209, 219-221; Agricultural Chambers Act (1923), 155; Grain Monopoly, 162, 230, 234-236; law of April 9, 1919, 220; law of 1920, 221-224; agricultural industries, 225-226; judgment on land reform, 226-227; nationalization of forests, 227-228; coöperative movement, 229-230; sugar beets and sugar refineries, 230-231, 233-234; potatoes and alcohol, 231; barley, 231; hops, 231; breweries, 231; World War and, 232; value of Czech crown and, 232-233; Import Syndicate, 234-235; vegetables and fruit, 236-238; harmony between agriculture and industry, 246-247; *see also* Coöperatives; Economic development; Forests; Land reform
- Aim, V. B., 332
- Aleš, Mikoláš, 334, 337
- Alexander, King, of Yugoslavia, 380
- Allies (World War, 1914-1918), 54-55, 57-62, 73, 81, 202, 204, 349, 350-351, 443; Interallied Conference of June, 1918, 58; Interallied Conference at Abbeville, 58
- Ambros, Vladimir, 333
- America (Americans), *see* United States
- American Czechs, 6, 53, 72-77 *passim*, 83, 185-186, 350
- American Ruthenians, 201, 203, 211, 350
- American Slovaks, 72, 73, 74, 75, 185-186, 279, 350
- Anglo-Italian agreement (April, 1938), 415
- Anschluss* (Austrian), 167, 179, 181, 364, 393, 409, 413; *see also* Austria
- Anthem, Czech national, "Where Is My Home" (*Kde domov můj*), 37
- Anthropology, Czechoslovak, 3-6
- Aquinas, St. Thomas, and *Summa theologiae*, 291
- Arbes, Jakub, 342
- Army, Czechoslovak (1914-1918): under Austria and Germany, 51, 52, 53, 54; organized in Russia, France, and Italy, 54, 57, 58, 252, 351; Kerensky and, 57; Trotsky and, 59; *anabasis*

- Army, Czechoslovak (*Continued*):
 across Siberia, 58-61, 74, 78-80, 276,
 277, 350-351, 356; recognized as
 Allied army, 58, 61, 79; Cheliabinsk
 incident, 59; Masaryk, Wilson, and,
 78-79; after 1918, 141, 154, 179; in lit-
 erature, 343-344
- Art, Czechoslovak: painting (Mánes,
 Aleš, Brožík, Mucha), 334-336;
 graphic arts (Švabinský, Šimon, Kaš-
 par), 336-337; sculpture (Myslbek,
 Sucharda, Drahoňovský), 337-340
- Assembly, Czechoslovak National: to
 frame Constitution, 109, 111-116; and
 central administration, 116; composi-
 tion of, 119; as supreme legislative
 body of State, 119-126; *see also* Par-
 liament, Czechoslovak
- Astronomical Society, Czechoslovak,
 321
- Augsburg, Confession of, 22; Evangel-
 ical Church of the (Slovakia, 1930),
 299
- Augsburg, Peace of, 23
- Ausgleich*, *see* Compromise of 1867
- Austria: relations with Bohemia before
 1620, 23-24, 103 n. (*see also* Habs-
 burg dynasty, and individual rulers);
 Kingdom of Bohemia subjected to
 (1620-1720), 29-32, 177; Kingdom of
 Bohemia amalgamated with (1720-
 1848), 32-38, 95, 177; German in-
 fluence in, 32, 177, 183; Czech ef-
 forts at federal reorganization in
 (1848-1867), 38-42; and Czech be-
 trayal (1867-1871), 43-44 (*see also*
 Compromise of 1867); relations with
 Czechs (1871-1914), 44-46, 144, 196,
 199, 201, 204, 205, 220, 222, 228, 232,
 242-243, 253, 257, 260, 264, 272,
 288, 299, 302-303; Austro-German
 Alliance (1879), 47; Kramář and Ma-
 saryk and, 47-48, 74; World War and
 dissolution (1914-1918), 51-58, 61-62,
 73, 75, 77-87 *passim*, 109, 111, 139,
 140, 141, 144, 146, 147, 252, 349, 350,
 368, 417, 418, 441-446; Peace Con-
 ference, 63, 64, 65 (*see also* Saint-
 Germain, Treaty of); Palacký and,
 102; Federalization Manifesto of Oc-
 tober 16, 1918, 109; Czechoslovak
 Constitution and, 113, 114, 118-132
passim; Sudete areas of, 177-178;
 Republic of, 178, 361, 444-446; Ger-
 man annexation of, *see* *Anschluss*;
 and foreign policy of Czechoslo-
 vakia, 353, 355, 359, 360; and Little
 Entente, 373, 375, 384; *see also* Con-
 stitutions, Austrian; Parliament,
 Austrian
- Austrian Hereditary Lands, 32, 33, 34,
 102
- Austro-German Alliance (1879), 47
- Avars, 4, 5, 9
- Baborovský, J., 319
- Bach, Alexander, 42
- Bach system (1849-1865), 199-200
- Badeni, Count, 139
- Bakhmach, 59
- Bakule's and Bartoš' institutes, 304
- Balbín, Bohuslav A., 35
- Balch, Emily Greene, 72
- Balfour, Arthur James, 79
- Balkan Entente, 375-385; *see also*
 Little Entente
- Balkans, 6, 47, 48, 63, 243, 368-369,
 375-385
- Baltic peoples, 92
- Banská Bystrica, 36
- Barrande, Joachim, 322
- Bartha, Nicholas, 196
- Bartoš (Jedlička), *see* Bakule's and
 Bartoš' institutes
- Basel, Council of (1432-1433), 17
- Baťa, Tomáš, 308
- Bavaria (*Bohvaria*), 3, 8; *see also* Maxi-
 milian of Bavaria
- Beghards, 16
- Béguines, 16
- Beneš, Eduard: and Mafia, 52-53; and
 the Czechoslovak National Council

- (Paris), 53-54, 57-58, 61, 79; minister of foreign affairs in Provisional Government, 62, 82; and the independence movement in America, 73, 78, 82, 84; peasant origin, 92; and the Constitution, 108, 112, 115; president of Czechoslovakia (1935-1938), 125, 165; foreign policy of, 138, 141, 204 n., 349-366 (*see also* Foreign policy); and National Democrats, 141-142; affiliated with non-Nazi, non-Marxian National Socialist party, 145; ministry of (1921-1922), 152-153; resignation as president, 169, 433; and minorities, 172, 206, 211; recognition of Nazi danger, 244-245; and commercial position of Czechoslovakia, 246; conception of basic ideas of policy, 250; and the Catholics, 290; and Šrámek, 292; followers of, 300; and Balkan Entente, 368, 369 n., 370, 372, 374, 379, 380, 381; and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, 407, 417, 423-424, 433, 434; *see also* Masaryk
- Beneš, Vojta, 300
- Beran, Rudolf, 433, 435
- Berchtold, Count Leopold von, 442
- Bereg: Ruthenian settlements in, 194; promise of autonomy in, 202
- Bernolák, Antonín, 36, 38
- Bezruč, Petr, 342
- Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 42, 93, 398, 402
- Blatná, 325
- Bobrinsky, Count V. A., 201
- Bohadsch, Jan (Boháč), 317
- Bohemia: origin of name, 3, 8; early Celtic, Germanic, and Slav tribes in, 4, 8-9, 176; gains independence from Moravian Empire, 10; Germans in, 11-12, 13-14, 176-177 (*see also* Sudete Germans); relations with Holy Roman Empire before 1620, 11-13, 15; relations with Hungary before 1620, 11, 19-20; relations with Habsburgs, *see* Habsburg dynasty; religion in, 15-18, 20-27, 284, 285, 288-289, 298-299; oligarchy in, 19-21; Germanization of, 19, 21, 24, 32; serfdom in, *see* Serfdom; constitution of 1500, 20, 21, 106-107; intellectual and cultural activity in, 23, 327; end of independent existence, 27, 106-107; as province in Habsburg Monarchy, 29-33, 40, 55, 63, 107; Peasant Revolt of 1775, 33; economic development in, 44, 47, 48, 64 (*see also* Economic development); and Těšín question, 67; scant knowledge of, in United States, 72; Austrian proposals concerning (1918), 77; riots in, 78; Bohemian patriotism, 94-95; Palacky's interpretation of history of, 96-105; and Czechoslovak Constitution, 117; labor in, 200; agriculture in, 219, 220, 228, 231, 237 (*see also* Agriculture); industry in, 242, 248, 261, 409; education in, 303, 313 (*see also* Education); scientific development in, 316-318, 322; German intervention in, *see* Germany
- Bohemia, Kingdom of: constitution of, 20, 21, 30, 36, 106-107; reduced to three provinces in Habsburg Monarchy, 29, 32; Renewed Land Ordinance, 30, 34, 36, 37; wealth of, 31; revolt of Czech peasants (1680), 31; reaction in, 34; request for restoration of ancient rights of, and modern constitution, 37, 39; historic rights of, 41, 45; Rescript of September 26, 1870, 43; "Fundamental Articles," 43; Rescript to the Bohemian Diet (September 12, 1871), 43
- Bohemia and Moravia, Protectorate of, *see* Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
- Bohemian Brethren, *see* Unity of Czech Brethren
- Bohemian Crown, Lands of the (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia): economic and

- Bohemian Crown (*Continued*):
 social revolution during twelfth century in, 13; culture and prosperity in, 14; religious conflict in, 15-18, 20-24; oligarchy in, 19-21; Estates in, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26; Habsburg rule in, 20-21 (*see also* Habsburg dynasty); Germans in, 21, 37-38, 43, 176-177 (*see also* Sudete Germans); and Thirty Years' War, 26, 285; union with Austrian Lands, 32, 33, 34, 102; "Fundamental Articles," 43; Peace Conference and, 63, 66; economic unity of, 64, 178; and Czechoslovak National Assembly, 109, 112, 114; and Czechoslovak Constitution, 118, 128; political parties in, 144; Těšín, 188; education in, 303; *see also* Bohemia; Diet of Lands of the Bohemian Crown; Moravia; Silesia
- Bohemians, *see* Czechs
- Bohumín: seized by Czechs (1918), 188; occupied by Poland (1938), 431 n.
- Boii, 3, 8
- Boiohaemia* (Bohemia), 3, 8
- Boleslav II, 11
- Bolshevism (Bolshevik Revolution, Bolsheviks), *see* Russia
- Born, Count Ignatius, 317
- Borovský, Karel Havlíček, *see* Havlíček
- Botto, Jan, 38
- Brahe, Tycho, 321
- Bratislava (Pressburg), 230, 381, 429; defeat in 907 at, 10; Hungarian Diet (1687) assembled at, 31; center of Slovak renaissance, 36; Peace Conference difficulties concerning, 65, 67; martial law proclaimed in, 436
- Brauner, Bohuslav, 318-319
- Brauner, F., 39
- Břeclav, *see* Lundenburg
- Breslau, 435
- Brest-Litovsk, Peace of, 58, 60
- Brethren, *see* Unity of Czech Brethren
- Břetislav I, King of Bohemia, 11, 12
- Břevnov, 26
- Březina, Otakar, 49, 342
- Briand, Aristide, 54
- Brno (Brünn), 67, 129 n., 308, 311, 319, 322, 323, 324; university at, 320, 324
- Broumov, 26
- Brožík, Václav, 335
- Bucquoy, General, 27
- Budapest, 46, 67, 139
- Buell, R. L., 213
- Bukovina, 67, 194 n.
- Bulgaria, 61, 92, 108, 360, 374, 377, 379, 381, 382, 384
- Burian, E. F., 333
- Canal, Count, 317
- Čapek, Joseph, 343, 345
- Čapek, Karel, xvi-xvii, 343, 345; "Prayer for Tonight," 448-449
- Čapek, Thomas, 72
- Čapek-Chod, K. M., 342
- Carpathian Mountains, 4, 194, 213
- Carpatho-Ruthenia, *see* Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia
- Časopis českého lékařnictva*, 319
- Catholicism (Catholics): conflict with Protestantism, 16-18, 21-27, 284-286; Catholic court party, 22; triumph after 1620, 29-31, 285; restrictions on, 33, 35; Palacký and, 96-97, 98, 101; in Polish tradition, 99; and Czechoslovak nationalism, 107; in Czechoslovak Republic, 184-185, 286-295, 298, 300, 352-353; Catholic Orels, 276; and destruction of Czechoslovak State, 292; *see also* Clerical parties; Concordat; Slovaks; Vatican
- Čech, Svatopluk, 49, 341
- Čelakovský, František Ladislav, 37, 340
- Čelakovský, L., 322
- Čermák, Jaroslav, 334
- Černý, Jan: first ministry, 150-151; second ministry (1926), 157

- "Certain Frontiers" treaty, III
 Červinka, Vincenc, 52, 56
České Slovo, organ of non-Nazi, non-Marxist National Socialist party, 145
Český časopis historický, 105 n.
 Chalúpka, Samo, 38
 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 395, 396, 397
 Chamberlain, Neville: and appeasement, 365-366, 409 n.; before Munich, 411-412, 414-416; Runciman report to, 418; and Berchtesgaden, 420-423; from Berchtesgaden to Munich, 425-426; Munich, 426-428; after Munich, 429; criticism of, 433; *see also* Great Britain; Munich, Conference and Agreement of
 Charles I, Emperor of Austria (1916-1918): succeeds Francis Joseph, 54; and Czernin, 55; amnesty for political prisoners, 56; proposes to federalize empire, 61; Wilson's reply to, 62; and Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence, 83, 84, 85; Federalization Manifesto (1918), 109; failure to prevent dissolution of empire, 202; failure to regain throne of Hungary, 355, 371; abdication of, 442; *see also* Austria; Habsburg dynasty
 Charles IV, Holy Roman Emperor, 14, 15, 100, 286, 316
 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, 20, 21
 Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, 26
 Charles of Žerotín, 26
 Chelčický, Peter, 18
 Cheliabinsk, 59, 60; *see also* Army
 Chemical Institute, 318
 Chemical Union, 324
Chemické listy, 319
Chemický obzor, 319
 Child welfare, *see* Social reform
 Chittussi, Antonín, 335, 336
 Chust (Hust): Ruthene national council at (1919), 203, 350; provincial parliament at (1939), 436
 Chvalkovský, František, 434, 435
 Ciriaci, Pierre, 287
 Císař, Jaroslav, 83
 Clam-Martinic, Premier, 56
 Clerical parties and power, 142, 143, 146, 151, 153, 156-160 *passim*, 164, 184, 205, 254, 290
 Coalitions, political: Red-Green (socialist-agrarian), 130, 147, 148-151, 159-160; Green-Black (clerical-agrarian), 158, 159-160; Red-Black (socialist-clerical), 159-160
Collection of Czechoslovak Chemical Communications, 319-320
 Comenius, *see* Komenský
 Communism (Communists) (in Czechoslovakia): in Social Democratic party, 144; Communist party, 145, 151, 152, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162-163, 164, 190, 205, 252; attempted coup d'état, 152; Ruthenians become bulwark of, 205; school maintained by, 305
Compactata (1436), 18, 21, 22
 Compromise of 1867 (Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich*), 39, 42-44, 183; "Fundamental Articles," 43
 Concordat, 143, 289; *see also* Vatican
Confessio Bohemica (1575), 22, 23, 24, 285, 298
 Confession of the Czech Brethren of 1662, 298; *see also* Unity of Czech Brethren
 Congress (Rome) of Oppressed Races (Austria-Hungary), 57-58, 77, 369
 Constance, Council of, 16
 Constantine, *see* Cyril
 Constitution, Czechoslovak: of medieval Bohemian State, 20, 21, 30, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 106; after Battle of White Mountain, 107; Masaryk and Beneš and, 108; drawn up by National Assembly, 109-116, 141, 146, 149; Provisional Constitution (1918), 112; the presidency, 112-113, 125-127; suspensive veto, 113; preamble and comparison with Ameri-

- Constitution, Czechoslovak (*Cont.*):
 can Constitution, 114-115; unity of
 Czechs and Slovaks to be consoli-
 dated, 115-116; central administra-
 tion, 116-117; Constitutional Court,
 118; Supreme Court, 118, 124; and
 judicial review, 119; and legislative su-
 premacy, 119; Chamber of Deputies,
 119-120; Senate, 119-120; impeach-
 ment, 122; quorums in Parliament,
 122; *règlement* of the houses, 123;
 safeguards for legislation, 123; no
 coups d'état, 123, 137; special com-
 mittee, 124; stabilization, 125; minis-
 terial responsibility, 127-128; judi-
 ciary, 128-129; no social credo, 130;
 civil rights, 130-133, 273; minorities,
 133-135, 173, 273; operation of, 137,
 140, 144, 150, 151; Henlein, the Su-
 dete Germans, and, 165, 166, 182; and
 land reform, 252; and proportional
 representation, 254, 289; and posi-
 tion of women, 263, 278; and social
 welfare, 271, 273, 274; and religion,
 273, 289, 298
- Constitutions, Austrian: of 1848, 40;
 of Count Stadion, 41; Diploma of
 October, 1860, 42; Constitution of
 1861, 42; of 1867, 42; constitutional
 history, 107
- Coöperatives, 265-267, 268, 269; agri-
 cultural, 224-230 *passim*, 235, 266-
 267; building, 265
- Corda, A. J., 318, 321
- Counter-Reformation, 23-27, 31, 96,
 285, 286, 299; *see also* Jesuits
- Curie, Mme Marie, 320
- Cyril, 10, 288
- Cyrillian-Methodian idea, 288
- Czech Brethren, *see* Unity of Czech
 Brethren
- Czech Mother (*Matice Česká*), 37
- Czechoslovak Church, 158 n., 287,
 293-298, 300
- Czechoslovak-French Alliance, 357-
 358, 363, 373, 409, 411, 420, 423, 434
- Czechoslovak-German Treaty of 1925,
 423
- Czechoslovak-Italian Treaty of Friend-
 ship, 358
- Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Treaty, 370-
 371; *see also* Little Entente
- Czechoslovak People's party (Catho-
 lic), 142-143
- Czechoslovak-Rumanian Treaty, 371;
see also Little Entente
- Czechoslovak Treaty with U.S.S.R.,
 361-362, 411, 423, 434
- Czecho-Slovakia (1938-1939): destruc-
 tion of, 64, 182, 186, 401, 436, 437,
 438; statistics of nationalities after
 1938 cession of territory, 187, 429;
 puppet state of, 365, 432, 434-439
- Czechs: origins and physical character-
 istics of people, 3-5; numbers and
 dispersion, 6, 9; lead in unification
 of Slav tribes, 11; antagonism be-
 tween Slav and Teuton, 14, 16, 21, 24,
 98-105, 139, 141, 171, 176-177 (*see also*
 Hitler and Hitlerism); creative gen-
 ius, 14-15; religion, 16, 22, 23, 26, 73
 (*see also* Religion); and "Four Ar-
 ticles of Prague," 17; growth and
 prosperity of, 19; and Thirty Years'
 War, 26; army at White Mountain,
 27; threatened Germanization of, 32,
 33, 34, 103; influence on Slovak na-
 tional movement, 38; efforts to bring
 about a federal reorganization of
 Austrian Empire (1848-1867), 38-42;
 betrayal by Austria (1867-1871), 43-
 44; relations with Austria (1871-1914),
 44-46, 135, 139; rise of bourgeoisie,
 45, 47; struggle with Austrian Gov-
 ernment (1914-1918), 52-62; and Peace
 Conference, 62-69; American people
 made aware of Czech cause, 71-78;
 Palacký and, 94-105; social changes
 (1620-1860), 107; political apprentice-
 ship of, 107-108; *see also* Agricul-
 ture; Art; Bohemia; Constitution,
 Czechoslovak; Economic develop-

- ment; Education; History; Humanitarian progress; Literature; Minorities; Music; Science; Social reform
Czernin, Count O., 55
- Daladier, Edouard: and appeasement, 365-366; before Munich, 411, 474; meeting in London, 422; Munich, 426-428; criticism of, 433; *see also* Chamberlain, Neville; Munich, Conference and Agreement of
- Daneš, J. V., 323
- Danube: valley of, 10, 169, 375, 443, 447; island of Grosse Schütt, 65; customs union, 66; basin, 115, 214; contrast in states of, 137, 147, 247; Danubian Confederation plans, 359; Little Entente and new Danubia, 372, 384; canal between Oder and, 435
- Deák, Francis, 200
- Declaration of Independence (Czechoslovak), 61-62, 82-87, 271, 278, 349; *see also* Independence movement
- "Defenders," Protestant, 23, 25
- Defenestration of Prague, 26
- Democracy, Czech: exception among neighbors, 92; Palacký and, 94-105; Palacký creates symbol and basis of Czech nationalism, 95-97; Masaryk, Beneš, and, 108; and Constitution, 130, 140, 150; end of, 169; foundations of, 226, 249, 253; and coöperatives, 229; training for, in Slovakia, 272; success of, 283; produced in the schools, 302-315; its historical value, 441-447; Masaryk's free interplay of free peoples, 447
- Denis, Ernest, 52
- Dérér, Ivan: minister of education in Hodža cabinet, 300; organization of schools under, 307-314
- Diet, Bohemian, 24, 30, 32, 35, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 77
- Diet, Hungarian, 31, 35, 38
- Diet, Moravian, 45, 129
- Diet of Lands of the Bohemian Crown, 22-23, 40, 41, 57, 129
- Diplomatic origins, 349-352; *see also* Foreign policy
- Disarmament Conference, Beneš' attempt to save, 360-361; *see also* Beneš
- Dobner, Felix Jacob, 35
- Dobrovský, Joseph, 35, 37, 317
- Dolejšek, V., 320
- Domin, K., 322
- Drahoňovský, Josef, 339-340
- Druce, Gerald, xiv; "Czechoslovakia's Contributions to Science," 316-326
- Dual Monarchy, *see* Austria
- Dubský, V., 319
- Durych, Jaroslav, 291, 292, 344
- Dvořák, Antonín, 49, 327, 328-329, 330
- Dyk, Viktor, 342
- Economic development: before 1918, 19, 48-50; in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 208; unpolitical character of, 240-241; service on foreign debt, 241; internal debt, 241-242; inheritance from Austria-Hungary, 242-243; absence of autarchy, 243-244; foreign trade, 243-250; armament industry, 246; harmony between industry and agriculture, 246-247; value of Czech crown, 247-248; disastrous effects of Sudete cession, 429-430; *see also* Agriculture; Trade, foreign
- Education, 150, 153, 282; in Bohemia before 1918, 33, 34, 38, 49, 92, 100, 271; and Constitution, 132-133, 134-135; political parties and, 141, 142, 143, 146, 149, 154; for minorities, 175, 176, 305; in Slovakia, 184-185, 272, 305-306; statistics, 190; in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 196, 197-198, 200, 207-208, 209, 212-213, 272, 305-306; agricultural, 228-229; for women, 263-264, 305; background of Czech system of, 302-304; new ideas from

Education (*Continued*):

abroad, 304-305; small private schools, 304-305; in first decade of Republic, 305-306; Pfišhoda and American impulse, 306-307; public reform (the Komenia), 307-309; results, 309-310; self-government in schools, 311-313; conclusions, 313-314

Elections: *municipal*: (1919), 146; (1922), 153; (1931), 206; (1938), 167, 181, 412, 413; *national* (1920), 150-151; *parliamentary*: (1925), 156; (1929), 158-159; (1935), 163, 181, 190, 205, 362

England, *see* Great Britain

Entente, *see* Balkan Entente; Little Entente

Eötvös, Joseph, 200

Erben, Karel Jaromír, 340

Estates: of Lands of the Bohemian Crown, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26; Protestant, 25, 26; Bohemian, 37, 95
Esztergom, 288

Fabricsius, 26

Fascism (Fascists) (in Czechoslovakia): in National Democratic party, 141, 162-163, 164; in Populist party, 142; rejected by Henlein, 163

Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Bohemia, 20-22

Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Bohemia and Hungary, 25, 26, 27, 30

Ferdinand V, Emperor of Austria, 36, 40, 41

Fibich, Zdeněk, 49, 327, 329, 330

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 393-396, 401, 405, 408

Finances: Rašín reforms, 147, 444-445; foreign loans, 150, 153; abandonment of gold standard, 161-162; foreign debt, 241; internal debt, 241-242; value of Czech crown, 247-248, 250; agricultural credit, 266; currency on sound basis, 352; *see also* Economic development

Fischer, Josef, 97 n.

Foch, General Ferdinand, 61

Foreign policy: Mafia, 349-350; origins, 349-352; *first phase* (1918-1923): dovetailing of domestic and foreign policy, 352; efforts at common understanding in central Europe, 353; difficulties with Poland, 354; creation of Little Entente, 355; clarification of relations with Great Powers, 355-356; *rapprochement* with Russia, 356-357; *second phase* (1923-1926): alliance with France (1924), 357; alliance with Italy (1924), 358; Geneva Protocol (1924), 358; Locarno and guaranty treaties, 358-359; *new phase* (1926-1938): Danubian Confederation, 359-360; Kellogg Peace Pact, 360; Austro-German Customs Union prevented, 360; Disarmament Conference, 360-361; rise of Hitler, 361; German-Polish *rapprochement*, 361; pact with U.S.S.R., 361-362; Ethiopian War, 362; Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, 363; annexation of Austria, 364, 409 (*see also* *Anschluss*); *final phase* (1938-1939): Nazi Germany disclaims designs on Czechoslovakia, 409; Hodža and codification of "nationalities" law, 410; Sudete German program, 410-411; Daladier and Bonnet in London, 411; Chamberlain and American correspondents (May, 1938), 412; German coup (?) and Czech mobilization (May 20), 412-413; Daladier declaration on alliance with Czechoslovakia, 414; Captain Wiedemann's mission, 414-415; Lord Runciman's mission, 415-422; Hodža and Sudete German negotiations, 416-418; Litvinov's speech in Geneva, 419; Hitler's Nuremberg speech, 420; Chamberlain flies to Berchtesgaden, 420-421; British decide on cession of Sudete districts,

- 421-422; France agrees to cession, 422; both compel Czechoslovakia to accept (September 21), 423; Chamberlain at Godesberg, 425; Czech mobilization, 425; mediation of Mussolini, 426-427; Conference and Agreement of Munich, 427-429; the Poles gain cession of Těšín, 430-431; Hungary imitates Germany and Poland, 431-432; resignation of Beneš, 433; Hácha succeeds Beneš, 433; Chvalkovský new foreign minister, 434; French interests liquidated, 434; Hácha, Beran, and Chvalkovský mere puppets, 435; Hitler ends Czecho-Slovakia, 436-438; *see also* Beneš; Krofta; Masaryk
- Forests, 195, 209, 221, 224, 225, 227, 245, 267, 268
- "Four Articles of Prague," 17
- Four-Power Pact, 375
- France, relations with Czechoslovaks: *before 1914*: Kramář desires alliance with, 47; Palacký and French historiography, 93-94; *from 1914 to 1919*: and *de facto* recognition of Czechoslovakia, 53, 58, 61, 78, 79; and Czechoslovak army, 54, 57-60, 77, 79, 252, 350-351; and Peace Conference, 64, 351-352; and Czechoslovak liberation, 354; *from 1919 to 1940*: and Constitution, 116, 119, 126; Anglo-French relations and plans, 168, 355, 357-358, 380-381, 422-423, 425-427, 432; negotiations before Munich, 168, 365, 409-426; and foreign policy, 204 n., 355-366 *passim*; Genoa Conference, 357; Locarno Protocol, 358; Franco-Czechoslovak alliance, 358, 373, 409, 411, 420, 423, 434; loan to Czechoslovakia, 360; Franco-Russian pact, 361; Rome Accord, 361; Stresa Conference, 361; remilitarization of Rhineland, 363, 380; Munich Conference and Agreement, 365-366, 426-429; after Munich, 366, 401, 407, 429, 431-433, 436; Franco-Rumanian understanding, 373; Franco-Jugoslav agreement, 373; Little Entente, 373, 383; Four-Power Pact, 375
- Francis I, Emperor of Austria, 36
- Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria: reactionary policies of, 41-42; Compromise of 1867, 42; Rescripts of 1870 and 1871, 43; oppression of Slovaks, 44; Czech policy toward government of, 44-46; death of, 54
- Franco-Jugoslav agreement, 373
- Franco-Russian pact (1935), 361
- Frankfurt Parliament, 40
- Frederick Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor, 12
- Frederick of the Palatinate, King of Bohemia, 26, 27, 285, 316
- Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, 13
- Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia: and War of Austrian Succession, 32; and Duchy of Těšín, 66; and Bismarck, symbol of invincibility of Prussian army, 93; and Hitlerism, 391-393; and Caesarism, 402-403
- Frederick William I, King of Prussia, 391-392
- Frič, J. V., 39
- "Fundamental Articles," 43
- Gaganetz, Bishop, 200
- Gajda, General Rudolf, 159, 162
- Galicia, 67, 77, 442
- Gamelin, General Maurice, 422
- Garrigue, Charlotte, *see* Masaryk, Charlotte Garrigue
- Gebauer, Jan, 45, 336
- Geneva, Meeting and Declaration (October 28-31, 1918), 62, 350
- Geneva Protocol, 358
- Genoa Conference, 357
- George VI, King of England, 414-415
- George Poděbrad (Jiří z Poděbrad), King of Bohemia, 18-19, 338, 341; proposes league of nations, 18-19

- German political parties and power in Czechoslovakia, 157, 161, 165-169, 179-183; National Socialists, 138, 163-164, 167-169, 179; Social Democrats, 144, 155, 159, 160, 167, 181, 252-253; Agrarians, 144, 155, 157, 159, 160, 164, 167, 179, 181, 410; clericals, 151, 160, 164; Socialists, 156, 164; Christian Socialists, 157, 167, 179, 410; Catholics, 159, 181; middle-class party, 159; Nationalists, 160; Declaration of February 18, 1937, 166, 168; Communists, 181; Sudete German party, 362, 410-411, 416; *see also* Henlein
- Germans (in Czechoslovakia): early Germanic tribes in Bohemia, 3, 8; Slav-Teuton conflict, 4-5, 8, 10, 14, 16, 21, 24, 98-105, 139, 141, 171, 176-177 (*see also* Hitler and Hitlerism); influence in Bohemia, 11-12, 13-14, 19, 21, 24; and University of Prague, 16, 34; German Protestants, 20, 21, 27; German Catholics, 21, 23; belief in own racial and cultural superiority, 37, 393-396, 402-408; in Austria (1848-1918), 38, 40, 41, 42, 139; German Confederation, 40, 41, 42; in Czechoslovakia (1867-1914), 43, 44, 45, 46, 95, 229; in Czechoslovakia (1919-1938), *see* Sudete Germans; Austro-German Alliance (1879), 47; in Těšín, 67; ideals and symbolism of, 93, 95, 99; German historiography, 94; and large estates in Czechoslovakia, 148, 220, 227, 228; and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 194 n., 195, 213, 214, 215; and Hitler propaganda, 396-398; and *Kultur*, 399-401; German concept of absolute State, 447; *see also* Germany; Pan-Germanism
- Germany: Czechoslovaks in, 6; Lutheranism in, 20, 21, 22, 284; Austria driven out of, 32; World War and end of empire, 51-52, 54, 58-60, 76, 78, 79, 82, 85, 87, 140, 146, 442, 443; Peace of Brest-Litovsk, 58, 60; treatment of minorities, 76, 188; Western enlightenment in, 97; socialism in, 149, 150; Sudete area never part of, 178; European policy of, 181-183 (*see also* Hitler and Hitlerism); *Republic of*, 64, 69, 133, 138; and Czechoslovak foreign policy, 355-361 *passim*; and Locarno Protocol, 358; and Rhine Guaranty Pact, 358; and Little Entente, 372; *Nazi Germany*, 64, 132, 179, 242, 375, 384; intervention in Czechoslovakia, 65, 68, 125, 131, 138, 167-169, 186-187, 246, 269-270, 277, 361, 362, 364, 365, 409-439; Polish-German Nonaggression Pact, 189, 430; barter system of, 243, 244, 245; and destruction of Christianity, 301; and Czechoslovak foreign policy, 361, 362, 363; and Balkan Entente, 376, 378, 380, 381, 382; extravagant nationalism and menace of, 447; *see also* Germans; Henlein; Munich, Conference and Agreement of; Prussia; Sudete Germans; Versailles, Treaty of
- Godesberg, Conference of, 425-427, 429, 431 n.; *see also* Germany
- Golden Bull of 1356, 15
- Goll, Jaroslav, 45, 105 n., 336
- Graham, Malbone W., xi; "Constitutional and Political Structure" 106-136; "Parties and Politics," 137-170
- Grain Monopoly, State, 162; and agriculture, 230, 234-236
- Great Britain, relations with Czechoslovaks: *before 1914*: slight knowledge of, 72; basic democratic tradition, 93, 402; comparison of medieval constitutions, 106; *from 1914 to 1919*: and *de facto* recognition of Czechoslovakia, 58, 61, 78, 79; Peace Conference, 64, 352; and Czechoslovak army in Russia, 351; *from 1919 to 1940*: and Czechoslovak finances,

- 153, 241; Anglo-French relations and plans, 168, 355, 357-358, 380-381, 422-423, 425-427, 432; negotiations before Munich, 168, 409-426; trade with Czechoslovakia, 233, 243, 245, 246; comparisons of social welfare, 263, 279, 282; and Czechoslovak foreign policy, 356-361; Genoa Conference, 357; Munich Conference and Agreement, 365-366, 426-429; after Munich, 366, 390, 401, 407, 429, 431-433, 436; and Little Entente, 375, 380, 383; Anglo-Italian agreement (1938), 415; Runciman mission, 415-421; *see also* Chamberlain, Neville; League of Nations; Munich, Conference and Agreement of; Peace Conference
- Greece, 108, 366; and Little Entente, 369, 370; and Balkan Entente, 375-379
- Grosse Schütt, 65
- Hába, Alois, 332-334
- Habsburg dynasty: rule of, before 1620, 14, 20-27; from 1620 to 1720, 29-32, 106, 302; from 1720 to 1914, 32-46, 63, 200; from 1914 to 1918, 51-62, 77, 139, 285-286, 371, 443; imperialism of, 64; Palacký and, 102, 103 n.; *revanche* and Czech nobility, 107; confiscation of estates of, 131, 148; and federalism, 446-447
- Habsburg Empire (Habsburg Monarchy), *see* Austria
- Hácha, Emil, president of Czechoslovakia, 125, 365, 433-438
- Halifax, Lord, 414, 415, 422
- Hanka, Václav, 98
- Havlíček, Karel (Borovský), 37, 39, 48, 105 n., 340
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm F., 98, 395, 398-399, 405-406
- Henlein, Konrad, 121, 134-135, 145, 163, 164-166, 181-182, 362, 410-411, 413, 417-418, 420; *see also* German political parties; Germans in Czechoslovakia; Hitler and Hitlerism; Sudete Germans
- Henry III, Holy Roman Emperor, 11-12
- Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor, 12
- Henry VII, Holy Roman Emperor, 14
- Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 36, 98, 393
- Heyrovský, J., 319, 320
- Historical Association, Czechoslovak, 105 n.
- Historiography: rôle of, 93; Czech (Palacký), 94-105; German, 94, 101; French, 94; English, 97
- History, of Czechoslovaks (to 1918): early, 8-11; Přemyslide line, 10-14; Luxembourg line, 14-18; George Poděbrad, Hussite King, 18; Jagellon line, 19-20; Habsburg line, 20-62
- Hitler, Adolf (Hitlerism): *Mein Kampf*, 163, 389, 391, 394, 397; declares himself protector of German subjects of other countries, 167; agitation and threats of, 181, 182; becomes chancellor, 361, 374; and Treaty of Versailles, 361, 396-397; proposals to Czechoslovakia (1936), 363; *Anschluss*, 364 (*see also* *Anschluss*); diplomatic setback by Czechoslovakia, 364; Beneš on appeasement of, 365; destruction of Czechoslovakia, 382-383, 401-402, 409-439; precedence - Hitler or Hitlerism, 389-390; origins of Hitlerism, 390-395; Hitler's religious impulse, 398; *Kultur*, 400-401; Masaryk's philosophy and Hitlerism incompatible, 401-402; Pan-Germanism, 403-404 (*see also* Pan-Germanism); Masaryk's critique of German thought, 404-407; destruction of Czechoslovakia necessary to Hitler and Hitlerism, 407-408; *see also* Germans in Czechoslovakia; Germany; Henlein; Sudete Germans

- Hlinka, Msgr. Andrej: leader of Slovak People's party, 142-143, 289; refuses participation in Hodža cabinet, 165; and Pittsburgh Agreement, 184-186; death of, 186; and Slovak Autonomists, 410
- Hodža, Milan, 38, 49; supports Maly-petr, 162; ministry (1935-1938), 165-168; Declaration of February 18, 1937, 166, 168; and problem of Sudete Germans, 181-182, 184, 300; and Little Entente, 384; and "nationalities" law, 410; and Henlein, 413-414; breakdown of negotiations with Sudete Germans (August 17, 1938), 416; resignation, 424; *see also* Henlein
- Hoetzl, Jiří, 114
- Hohenwart, Karl Sigmund, ministry of, 43
- Holy Roman Emperors, 12-17 *passim*, 20-27 *passim*
- Holy Roman Empire, 30, 178, 402
- Howard, Harry N., xv; "The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente," 368-385; "Chronology," 453-476
- Hradčany, 26
- Hrdlička, Aleš, ix; "The Czechoslovaks—Anthropological Notes," 3-7; eminence of, 323
- Humanitarian progress: Masaryk's philosophy, 271; humanitarian activities, 272-273; Dr. Alice Masaryk and Y.W.C.A., 274-275; Sokols, 275-276; Red Cross, 276-277; Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., 277-278; training of social workers, 279; welfare of youth, 281-282; *see also* Social reform
- Hungarian Crown, Lands of the, 34, 42, 63, 118, 195
- Hungarians, *see* Magyars
- Hungary: Czechoslovaks in, 6; relations with Bohemia before 1620, 11, 19-20, 24; oppression of Slovaks in, 31, 35, 38, 42, 109, 135, 183, 305, 446; Habsburgs declared hereditary kings of, 31; Kingdom of, 33, 38, 40, 193; Slovak national movement in, 38; Magyar becomes official language of, 38; Compromise of 1867, 39, 40-42, 183; feudal structure of, 46; Peace Conference and, 63, 65-66; and destruction of Czechoslovakia, 68, 186-187, 365, 382-383, 425, 431-432; and Treaty of Trianon, 109, 359, 371, 437; Czechoslovak Constitution and, 114, 116, 119, 127; Catholic political power in (after 1918), 142; minorities in, 188, 193-202; and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 193-207 *passim*, 210-214 *passim*; census of 1910, 194, 207, 431; class distinctions in, 253; and religion in Slovakia, 288, 299-300; and Czechoslovak foreign policy, 353, 355, 359, 360; and Little Entente, 371, 372, 373, 375, 382, 384; freedom from Austria, 442, 443; *see also* Diet, Hungarian; Language, official, in Hungary; Magyars; Parliament, Hungarian; Slovaks; Turks
- Huns, 5, 8-9
- Hurban, Josef, 38
- Hurban, Vladimír, 300
- Hus, Jan, 97, 101, 292; life and teachings, 16-17, 71; Czech celebration of birthday of, 156, 158; and Germans in Bohemia, 177; influence on Czechoslovak democracy, 271; leadership of, 284; date of martyrdom a holiday, 287; Jan Hus Theological Faculty, 299, 301; monument to, 339; in literature, 341; *see also* Hussites
- Hussites: movement, 15-18; wars, 17-18, 100, 106, 341; George Poděbrad, Hussite King, 18-19; *Compactata*, 21; Unity of Czech Brethren, 21-23; *Confessio Bohemica*, 22-24; and Slovak Reformation, 35; period, 37; and Masaryk, 48; rehabilitated by

- Palacký, 96-97, 100-102, 104; Czechs as heirs of Hussite tradition, 133; and Czech Golden Age, 286; poetry on, 328; *see also* Hus, Jan; Unity of Czech Brethren
- Hust, *see* Chust
- Hviezdoslav, Pavel Orszagh, 49, 342
- Independence movement (Czechoslovak): inaugurated by Masaryk, 53; November, 1915, manifesto, 53-54; demand in Austrian Parliament, 56; Declaration of January 6, 1918, 57; Declaration of Independence by Masaryk, 61-62, 82-87, 271, 278, 349; Czech National Alliance (United States, 1914), 73; Czechoslovak National Council (United States, 1915), 73; Palacký on Czech dream of independence, 102-103; political preparation of people, 107-108; Czechs supported by other Slavic groups, 350; *see also* National Council, Czechoslovak (Paris)
- Innocent III, 13
- Intervention (in Russia), 60-61, 78-79, 356; *see also* Army, Czechoslovak; Cheliabinsk
- Italy (Italians): relations with Czechoslovaks before 1914, 15, 23, 31, 34, 42; from 1914 to 1919, 54, 57, 58, 61, 64, 77, 78, 79, 82, 252, 351, 352; and Hungary, 66; Fiume, 82, 372; and destruction of Czechoslovakia, 168; and Czechoslovak foreign policy, 355-362 *passim*; and Little Entente, 357, 358, 371, 372, 375, 381-382; Locarno Protocol, 358; Rome Accord, 361; Stresa Conference, 361; Ethiopia, 362, 380, 382; Munich Conference and Agreement, 365, 426-428; and Balkan Entente, 376, 377, 378; Anglo-Italian agreement (1938), 415; Rome-Berlin Axis, 415, 432; after Munich, 432-433, 436, 437
- Jablunka, pass of, 67, 68
- Jáchymov (St. Joachimsthal): radium mines at, 268; Radium Institute at, 320
- Jagellon dynasty, 19
- Janáček, Leoš, 329, 330-331, 333
- Japan, 60, 61, 75, 231, 380
- Jászi, Oscar, xii; "The Problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia," 193-215
- Jeremiáš, Otakar, 332, 333
- Jesuits: brought into Bohemia, 21-22; forcibly convert population, 29-30; triumph of, 31; dissolution of, 33; and University of Prague, 34, 317; work of, 285, 291; *see also* Counter-Reformation
- Jews, 44, 132; Palacký and, 98; and minority problem, 171, 173-176, 181, 187-189, 191, 194 n., 195; in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 196, 198, 203, 212; and Hitler, 397, 398
- Jirásek, Alois, 49, 331, 337, 341
- John of Luxembourg, King of Bohemia, 14
- Jonescu, Take, 369
- Joseph II, reforms of, 32-34, 35-36, 95, 101, 285-286
- Judiciary, 113, 118, 119, 128, 129, 155
- Jugoslavia (Jugoslavs), 34, 56, 58, 65, 76, 77, 78, 82, 85, 158 n., 204 n., 263, 353, 355, 361; and Fiume, 82, 372; and Little Entente, 368-375, 381-382; and Balkan Entente, 375-384
- Jungmann, Josef, 37
- Kalina, Antonín, 55-56
- Kant, Immanuel, 47, 96, 97, 403
- Károlyi, Count Michael, 197, 202
- Karwin coal basin and mining area, 67, 68, 188
- Kašpar, Adolf, 337
- Kde domov můj* (Where Is My Home), Czech national anthem, 37
- Kellogg Peace Pact, 360
- Kerner, Robert J., x; "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle of White

- Kerner, Robert J. (*Continued*):
 Mountain to the World War," 29-50; "World War, Revolution, and Peace Conference," 51-70
- Kinský, Count, 35
- Klicpera, Václav, 37
- Klofáč, Václav, 52, 56
- Kohn, Hans, xi; "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy," 91-105
- Kollár, Jan, 36, 37, 340; his *Daughter of Sláva*, 37, 340
- Komenia, 307-309
- Komenský, Jan Amos (Comenius), 30-31, 71, 271, 292, 317, 325, 340
- Kopta, Josef, 344
- Kovařovic, Karel, 331
- Král, Janko, 38
- Královedvorský manuscripts, 98
- Kramář, Karel: life (to 1914), 46-48; contrasted with Thomas G. Masaryk, 46-48; leader of Mafia, 52, 350; arrest and imprisonment of, 52, 54-55; liberated, 56, 62; ministry of, 137; leader of National Democrats, 140-142, 167; resignation of ministry, July 8, 1919, 147
- Kramerius, Václav Matěj, 35
- Krofta, Kamil, 138, 165, 204, 363, 381, 382, 434
- Kroměříž, 16, 41
- Kun, Béla, 129
- Kundt, Ernst, 410
- Labor, Czechoslovak: demands for organization (1848), 39; Masaryk and, 48; unions, 132, 253-255, 260, 262, 263, 280, 281; safeguards in Constitution, 132; and political parties, 144, 145, 149-150; labor court, 256-257; *see also* Social reform
- Lamprecht, Karl G., 395
- Land reform, 143, 147-148, 154, 209, 219-228, 252, 267-268; *see also* Agriculture
- Lands of the Bohemian Crown, *see* Bohemian Crown, Lands of the
- Langer, František, 343
- Language, official: in Czechoslovakia, 21, 34, 38, 39, 40, 45, 123, 133-134, 173; in Hungary (Slovakia), 36, 38, 183, 186; in Constitution, 133-135; constitutional guaranties, 273
- Languages: Czech, 21, 30, 34-40 *passim*, 44, 45, 67, 123, 134, 149, 166, 171, 188, 295, 303, 343; German, 21, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 45, 123, 171, 188; Latin, 23, 34, 35, 38, 183; Slovak, 36, 38, 44, 49, 123, 183, 186, 194 n.; Magyar, 38, 123, 183; Polish, 67, 123, 188, 190, 194 n.; Ruthenian, 123, 198, 200, 206, 213; Ukrainian, 193-194 n., 206, 208, 213; Russian, 194 n., 206, 208
- Lansing, Robert, 58, 60, 77, 78, 85, 172
- Lausanne, Conference of, 373
- League of Nations, 68-69, 141, 172-173, 193-194 n., 211, 214, 249, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 368, 380; Covenant of, 370, 375, 377, 380, 381; Council of, 373; *see also* Peace Conference
- League of St. Václav, 291
- Legislation, social, 252-270; *see also* Social reform
- Leipzig, University of, 16, 177
- Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor, 31
- Leopold II, Emperor of Austria, 34, 35, 36
- "Letter of Majesty," 25, 26, 284
- Lewis, Brackett, xiii; "Social Reform and Social Legislation," 252-270
- Liberties, civil, 130-133, 273
- Liberty, religious, 23, 133, 200, 273, 298
- Libuše, 9, 327-328, 338
- Lichtenstein family, property holdings of, 219
- Lipany, Battle of, 18, 336
- Literature, Czechoslovak, 37, 49, 340-344 (Kollár, Čelakovský, Erben, Mácha, Havlíček, Němcová, Neruda, 340; Vrchlický, Čech, Jirásek, 341;

- Machar, Březina, 342; Karel Čapek, Langer, 343; Kopta, Durych, Nezval, 344)
- Little Entente: origins, 82, 86, 368-372; and Czechoslovak Church, 158 n.; economic comparison in, 246; in Czechoslovak foreign policy, 354-360; reorganization of, 361; treaties of, 370-371; Beneš and reasons for, 372; and Austria, 373; and Hungary, 373; Locarno, 373; five-year validity, 373; diplomatic federation, 374; Economic Council of, 374-375; Permanent Council of, 375; and non-aggression agreement with U.S.S.R., 375; Balkan Entente and Pact, 375-379; Beneš and Balkan Entente, 379; and Rhineland occupation, 380-381; and Ethiopian conflict, 380-382; and menace of Nazi Germany, 381-384, 409, 423; *see also* Mid-European Democratic Union
- Litvinov, Maxim, 361, 419
- Locarno Protocol, 358, 359, 373, 375, 380, 381
- Lodgmann, Rudolf, 155
- London Economic Conference, 375
- Louis, King of Bohemia, 20
- Lundenburg (Břeclav), 429
- Lusatia, 14, 19, 26
- Lutherans (Lutheranism), 20-25, 26, 35, 101-102, 286, 402-403; Czech Lutheran party, 22; "Evangelicals," 284-285; and Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, 298
- Lützow, Count Francis, 72
- Luxembourg, line of Bohemian kings, 14-18
- Macartney, C. A., 199, 201, 207, 214
- Mácha, Karel Hynek, 340
- Machar, Josef Svatopluk, 49, 342
- Mafia (*Maffie*), Czech, 52-53, 349-350
- Magyars (Hungarians): oppression of Slovaks, 5, 38, 42, 44, 49, 63, 132-133, 139, 140, 183, 185; significance of arrival and rise to power, 10-11; interfere in Bohemia, 12; routed at White Mountain, 27; dominant in Slovakia (Hungary), 29, 35, 38, 46, 183, 443; and Catholicism, 31; and Protestantism, 31; efforts of Joseph II to denationalize, 34; revolutions of 1848, 40-41; Compromise of 1867, 42; oppose Rescript to the Bohemian Diet, 43; Magyar Law of Nationalities, 44; in World War, 52, 59; Peace Conference and, 63, 65, 66; national movement of, 92, 102, 103 n.; minority in Czechoslovakia (1918-1938), 117, 123, 135, 139, 144, 151, 157, 159, 160, 164, 166, 167, 174-176, 183-187, 191, 261, 277, 299, 414, 428, 438, 439; Magyar culture, 185; and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 194 n., 195-204, 210, 211, 214; *see also* Hungary
- Mainz, archbishop of, 11, 14
- Malypetr, Jan: ministry recast (1934), 161-162; third ministry (1935), 164-165
- Mánes, Josef, 334, 337, 338
- Manifesto of Czech Writers (1918), 56
- Mansfeld, Count, 26
- Marcomanni (Marchmen), 3, 8, 9
- Maria Theresa, reforms of, 32-33, 34, 35, 36, 95
- Mármáros: Ruthenian settlements in, 194; promise of autonomy in, 202
- Martin, *see* Turčiansky Sv. Martin
- Martinic, 26
- Martinů, Bohuslav, 331-332
- Marxism (Marxists), 48, 252, 290, 390, 397
- Masaryk, Alice, 74, 274, 275, 276, 278
- Masaryk, Charlotte Garrigue (Mrs. Thomas G.), 47, 75
- Masaryk, Thomas G.: professor at University of Prague, 45; life (to 1914), 46-48; contrasted with Karel Kramář, 46-48; disciple of Palacký, 48, 95, 103 n., 104, 105; member of

Masaryk, Thomas G. (*Continued*):

Czech Mafia, 52-53; founds Czechoslovak National Council abroad, 53-54; activity in Russia, 56-57; Declaration of Independence, 60-62, 82-87, 271, 442; serves as president of Provisional Government, 62; comes to United States, 72-73; understands America and wins her support, 74-75; Masaryk's relation to Woodrow Wilson, 77-80, 349; meeting of Oppressed Nationalities (New York), 80-81; Mid-European Democratic Union, 82; prime minister in Provisional Government, 82; president of Czechoslovakia, 86, 125, 127, 141-142, 148, 149, 153, 165, 179, 246, 350; and national movement, 92, 101, 442, 443; and Constitution, 108, 112, 115, 132; life work and teachings of, 169, 246, 405, 407, 408, 434, 441, 445-447; Pittsburgh Agreement, 185-186; and Ruthenians in America, 203; and religion, 289, 292, 300; and music and art, 331, 336-337, 339; and Peace Conference, 351; succeeded by Beneš, 362; death of, 364; helps create Little Entente, 368-370; and Hitlerism, 402-404, 405; *see also* Beneš

Masaryk State School of Health and Social Welfare, 279

Matice Česká, *see* Czech Mother

Matice Slovenská, *see* Slovak Mother

Matthew of Janov, 16

Matthias, Holy Roman Emperor, 24-26, 285

Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary, 19

Maurice, C. E., 72

Maximilian II, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Bohemia, 22-23

Maximilian of Bavaria, 27

Methodius, 10, 288

Metternich, Prince Klemens von, 36,

Mid-European Democratic Union, 82, 86, 350, 369; Declaration of Common Aims, 86; *see also* Little Entente

Milič of Kromčíž, 16

Miller, Herbert Adolphus, x; "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia," 71-87; "Humanitarian Progress," 271-283

Ministries, 127-128; Ministry of Agriculture, 148, 219-230 *passim*, 268; Ministry of National Defense, 235; Ministry of Social Welfare, 255, 256, 260, 262, 263, 273, 279; Ministry of Public Works, 268; Ministry of Public Health, 268, 273, 277, 282; Ministry of Physical Culture, 273; Ministry of Education, 307-314

Minorities, 37, 62, 74, 77-78, 80-81, 111, 118, 133-135, 141, 143, 146, 193-194, 202, 261-262, 352, 354, 376, 416, 422, 428; Germans in Lands of the Bohemian Crown, 37, 43, 44, 45; Minorities Treaty, 64, 172, 173, 204, 352; Europe and, 171; Wilson and, 172; Peace Conference Committee, 172; League of Nations (1919), 172; Third Assembly, League of Nations, 173; statistics, 174-176; Chamber of Deputies, 175; schools, 175-176; schools in Slovakia, 184; minorities after Munich, 187; losses of minorities, 190-191; *see also* Congress of Oppressed Races (Austria-Hungary); Jews; Magyars; Poles; Ruthenians; Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia; Sudete Germans

Mohács, Battle of, 20

Mojmir, 10

Monroe, W. S., 72

Montreux Conference, 281

Moravia (Moravians); settled by Slavs, 4; original language and culture preserved in, 5; early Celtic and Germanic tribes in, 8; conflict with Germans and downfall of empire,

- 10; becomes part of Bohemia, 11, 19; German influence in, 12, 13-14; "Four Articles of Prague," 17; Hussite movement in, 17-18; Catholic reaction in, 18; intellectual and cultural activity in, 23; ceded to Matthias of Habsburg, 24; and beginning of Thirty Years' War, 26-27; from 1620 to 1914, 29, 31, 36, 41, 45, 49, 107, 139, 219; Peace Conference and, 63, 67; Masaryk and, 74; Crown Lands of, 109, 194; administration in, 117, 129; minorities in, 174, 178, 189, 190; agriculture in, 231, 237; industry in, 242, 261, 409; child welfare in, 262-263; labor in, 262, 280; religion in, 288, 291, 296, 298, 299, 300; education in, 303, 313; science in, 321, 322; German occupation of, 410; results of Munich cession, 429-430, 431, 437; *see also* Bohemian Crown, Lands of the; Diet, Moravian
- Moravian Gap, 66
- Moravská Ostrava, 419
- Mucha, Alfons M., 335, 336
- Munich, Conference and Agreement of, 64, 68, 117, 138, 168-169, 177, 178, 181, 186, 189, 250, 292, 363, 364-366, 383, 401, 427-439; pre-Munich negotiations, 409-426; *see also* Foreign policy; Germany; Hitler and Hitlerism
- Murmansk, 59
- Museum, Bohemian National, 37, 317
- Music, Conservatory of, 49
- Music, Czechoslovak, 37, 49; Smetana, Dvořák, and Fibich, 327-329; Novák, Suk, Ostrčil, and Janáček, 329-331; recent period, 331-334; Helfert's comment, 333-334
- Mussolini, Benito: and Ethiopia, 362; Four-Power Pact, 375; Hitler's visit to Rome, 415; Munich, 426-428; and boundaries of Slovakia, 432; *see also* Italy
- Myslbek, Josef Václav, 334, 338
- Národní Noviny* (The National News), 39
- National Council, Czech (in Prague): names National Council in Paris its representative at Peace Conference, 61; takes over power, October 28, 1918, 62
- National Council, Czechoslovak (in Paris): founded by Masaryk, 53-54; negotiates inclusion of liberation of Czechoslovaks in war aims of Allies, 54; creates armies, 56-57; recognized as political head, 57; promises of *de facto* recognition as government, 58; Russian section of, 59; given *de facto* recognition, 61, 77, 79, 82, 85, 349; designated as Prague National Council's representative at Peace Conference, 61-62; personnel of, 82; Beneš, secretary of, 138; Masaryk, chairman of, 186
- National Council, Czechoslovak (in United States), 73
- National Democrats: strong defenders of army, 129; policies of, 140-142, 161; contrasted with Agrarians, 143; elections of June, 1919, 146; defeat in 1920, 151; in *Pětka*, 151-152; elections of 1925, 156; in Švehla cabinet, 157; in Udržal cabinet, 160; in Malypetr cabinet, 161-162; join fascist group, 162; elections of 1935, 164; join Hořdža coalition, 167; and proportional representation, 254; opposed to Beneš, 290
- National movement, Czech, 37-39, 92; radical groups in (1848), 39, 40-41; liberal groups in (1848), 39, 41; revolutions of 1848, 39-42; *see also* Nationalism; Renaissance
- National Socialist party (non-Nazi, non-Marxist), 52, 145, 147, 151, 156, 157, 159, 160, 164, 205, 254, 290
- Nationalism, 65, 100, 116, 142, 183, 360, 443, 447; Czech nationalism, 94-96, 102, 103 n., 107, 139, 212, 341; Slovak

Nationalism (*Continued*):

- nationalism, 107; Czechoslovak nationalism, 137, 140-141, 293, 352; nationalist phase in Czechoslovak politics (1918-1919), 139-148
- Nazi Germany, *see* Germany
- Němcová, Božena, 337, 339, 340
- Neruda, Jan, 49, 340-341, 342
- Neuilly, Treaty of, 371
- Nezval, Vítězslav, 344
- Novák, Vítězslav, 329, 332
- Oderberg, *see* Bohumín
- Old Czech party, 45
- Olomouc (Olmütz), 288, 291
- Orchestra, Czech Philharmonic, 328
- Ordinance, Renewed Land, of 1627: Bohemia punished by Ferdinand II, 30, 34; restored by Leopold II, 36; debates concerning, 37
- Orthodox Church: Slavophiles and, 99; in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 200, 201, 207; of Eastern Slavs, 288; of Serbia, 295-296; and Czechoslovak Church, 295-297; Dositheos, Serbian patriarch of, 296, 297; Czech Orthodox Church, 297
- Ostrčil, Otakar, 329, 330
- Otakar I, *see* Přemyslide line of kings
- Otakar II, *see* Přemyslide line of kings
- Otto of Brunswick, 13
- Pact of Paris, 375
- Paderewski, Ignace Jan, 80, 81
- Palacký, František, 36, 37, 39, 40-41, 43, 45, 94-103, 317; Masaryk disciple of, 48, 95, 103 n., 104, 105; creates basis of Czech nationalism and democracy, 95-97, 103-104; his *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 96; Reformation (Hussitism) and Counter-Reformation, 96-102; theories on rise of modern Europe and French Revolution, 103-104; commemorative bridge in Prague, 334, 338; monument to, 339
- Pan-Germanism, 40, 47, 48, 51, 155, 165, 352, 393-408; *see also* Fichte; Germans; Hitler and Hitlerism
- Pan-Slavism, 40, 47-48, 51, 141, 158 n., 201; *see also* Slavs
- Papanastassiou, Alexander, 376
- Papoušek, Jaroslav, 105 n.
- Parliament, Austrian, 40-46 *passim*, 51, 55-56, 77, 107-109, 120, 121, 123, 129, 139; *see also* Austria
- Parliament, Czechoslovak, 130, 135, 143, 145, 173, 181, 233, 248, 252-253, 254, 262, 263, 267, 289, 434; elections to, 150-151, 156, 158-159, 163, 181, 190, 205, 362; coalitions in, 155, 156, 157, 159-162, 165-167 (*see also* *Pěška*; Coalitions, political); *membership*: (1925), 156-157; (1929), 158-160; (1935), 163-165
- Parliament, Hungarian, 46, 107-108, 129, 196, 198; *see also* Hungary
- Pašič, Nicholas, 369
- Peace Conference (Paris): Czechoslovak delegates at, 51, 351; and the Czechoslovaks, 62-70; historic rights (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia), 63; ethnic rights (Slovakia), 63, 65-66; arguments for and against inclusion of Germans, 63-65; delimitation of Slovak districts, 65-66; Těšín (Teschen), 66-68, 354; German propaganda, 68-69; and minorities in Czechoslovakia, 111, 171, 178, 202, 351-352; and Balkan unity, 369-370; and Fiume, 372; and the Succession States, 443; *see also* League of Nations
- Peace treaties, 352; *see also* Neuilly, Treaty of; Saint-Germain, Treaty of; Trianon, Treaty of; Versailles, Treaty of
- Peasants: in Czechoslovakia, 143, 148, 219-238; in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 196-199, 201, 205, 207, 209-210
- Pekař, Josef, 105 n., 336
- Pelcl, František Martin, 35

- Penza, Convention of, 58
 People's Socialist party, *see* National Socialist party
 Pergler, Charles, 73, 76
Pětka: coalition of five major parties, 140; guides Černý cabinet, 151; in Beneš cabinet, 152-153
 Philip of Suabia, Holy Roman Emperor, 13
 Pittsburgh, Declaration of, 185-186, 350; *see also* Hlinka; Tuka
 Poděbrad, *see* George Poděbrad
 Podkarpatská Rus, *see* Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia
 Poland (Poles), relations with Czechoslovaks: before 1914, 10, 11, 12, 19, 34, 92, 99, 102, 139, 198; from 1914 to 1919, 56, 76, 77, 78, 171, 172; Těšín (Teschen), 66-68, 188-190, 430-431; seizure of Czechoslovak territory (1918 and 1938), 68, 186, 188, 189, 365, 430-431, 432; German invasion of, 68, 366, 393, 407, 438; and Czechoslovak Constitution, 111; Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia, 123, 174-175, 186, 189, 190, 191, 194, 195, 261, 410, 411, 425, 428, 430-431; and National Democrats, 142; and militarism, 154; propaganda in Czechoslovakia, 188-189, 206, 211; Polish-German Nonaggression Pact, 189, 430; and Czechoslovak foreign policy, 204 n., 353-355, 357, 358-360, 369, 370, 372, 375; and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 212-215 *passim*; Czechoslovak imports from, 233; class distinctions in, 253; and Sokols, 276; and problems of the next peace, 439
 "Police-State," 36, 41-42
 Polish-German Nonaggression Pact of 1934, 189, 430
 Political parties, *see* Agrarians; Clerical parties; Communism; Czechoslovak People's party; German political parties; National Democrats; National Socialist party (People's Socialist party); Populists; Slovak Autonomists; Slovak People's party; Slovak Populist party; Small Traders party; Social Democratic party; Socialists
 Populists, Catholic political party, 142-143, 151, 157, 160, 164
 Pragmatic Sanction, 32
 Prague, city of: as religious center, 118 *passim*, 26, 286, 292, 296; German merchants in, 13; as cultural center, 15, 37, 49, 132, 316, 331-338 *passim*; as political center, 15, 20, 39-44, 51, 67, 78-79, 104 n., 129, 139, 140, 168, 177, 181, 182, 184-185, 188, 189, 191, 194, 204, 350, 411, 416, 429, 441; beautification in, 15, 334; military action at, 21, 25, 27, 41; Pan-Slav Congress at, 40-41; as educational center, 230, 304, 308, 320, 321, 322; social conditions in, 265, 274, 278; as financial center, 267; as scientific center (Radium Institute), 326; occupied by Germany, 432-433, 435-436, 437-438; *see also* National Council, Czech (Prague); Prague, University of
 Prague, University of: founded (1348), 15, 316; doctrinal disputes at, 16; German emigration from, 16, 177; Slovak students at, 17, 25, 49; Protestants demand control of, 24; change from Latin to German language in, 34; Czech language at, 35; separation into Charles (Czech) and Ferdinand (German) universities, 45, 318, 324; faculty of, 301, 306, 324; Kutná Hora decrees (1409), 316; handed over to Jesuits, 317; and national revival movement, 318; chemical institute in, 320
 "Prayer for Tonight," by Karel Čapek, 448-449
 Přemyslide line of kings of Bohemia, 9-14; semilegendary marriage of peasant Přemysl and princess Li-

- Přemyslide line (*Continued*):
 buše, 9; Přemysl Otakar I (1197–1230), 13–14; Přemysl Otakar II (1253–1278), 14; in opera, 327–328; in sculpture, 338
- Presidency, Czechoslovak, 125; Masaryk elected, 125; Beneš elected, 125; Hácha elected, 125; powers of, 126–127
- Převšov, 350
- Pressburg, *see* Bratislava
- Pressburg Journal*, 36
- Preuss, Hugo, 114
- Přihoda, Václav, 306–309
- Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (German), 64, 169, 292, 301, 365, 401, 437, 438
- Protestantism (Protestants): origin of, and early conflict with Catholicism, 15–27, 284–285; oppression after 1620, 29–31, 285–286; school at Bratislava, 36; Palacký and, 96–97, 99–102, 103 n.; in Republic, 290, 292, 294–295, 298–301; Protestant Estates, *see* Estates; *see also* Hussites; Lutherans; Unity of Czech Brethren; Utraquists; Zwinglians
- Provisional Constitution (1918), 111–113, 126, 127; *see also* Constitution, Czechoslovak
- Provisional Government (1918): recognized by Allies, 62; and minorities, 111
- Provisional Government (1940), 292–293
- Prussia (Prussianism), 32, 41, 42, 81, 93, 94, 391–393, 402–403; *see also* Germany
- Punktationen* ("Points"), 46
- Quadi, 3, 8
- Races, *see* Czechs; Germans; Magyars; Poles; Slovaks; etc.
- Radium Institutes at Prague and Jáchymov (St. Joachimsthal), 320, 324
- Rákóczi, Francis, 31, 199
- Rašín, Alois: member of Czech Mafia, 52; National Democrat, 140–141, 161; financial reforms of, 147, 444–445; floats loan in New York and London, 153
- Reformation, Czech, 97, 101, 103, 104, 284; *see also* Hussites; Unity of Czech Brethren
- Reichsrat (Austrian), *see* Parliament, Austrian
- Religion: introduction of Christianity, 10–12; conflict of Protestantism and Catholicism, 15–27, 284–286; Catholic triumph, 29–31; toleration, 33, 284, 285–286; Palacký and, 96–105; democratic movement in, 106; safeguards in Constitution, 133; question of separation of Church and State, 141, 142, 146, 149, 152, 289, 290; and the Ruthenians, 197, 198, 200–201, 207; survey of religious situation in Czechoslovakia, 284–301; *see also* Catholicism; Czechoslovak Church; Hussites; Lutheranism; Orthodox Church; Protestantism; Unity of Czech Brethren; Utraquists
- Renaissance, Czech: Golden Age of Charles IV, 14, 15; in sixteenth century, 23; in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 29, 32, 34–38, 45, 49, 92, 101, 177; and Palacký, 94–105
- Revolutionary National Assembly, 122–123, 126, 130, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 151
- Revolutions of 1848, 32, 36, 38, 39–41, 42, 93
- Rhine Guaranty Pact, 358
- Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 411, 419
- Rieger, František Ladislav, 39, 40, 45, 336
- Říp, 3
- Rokycana, Jan, 18
- Rome Accord, 361
- Rome-Berlin Axis, 415, 432
- Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 426

- Rostislav, 10
- Roucek, Joseph S., xii; "Czechoslovakia and Her Minorities," 171-192
- Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences, 34-35
- Rudolph I of Habsburg, Holy Roman Emperor, 14
- Rudolph II of Habsburg, Holy Roman Emperor, 23-25, 284-285
- Rumania (Rumanians), 34, 65, 103, 108, 175, 176, 194, 195, 202, 204, 214, 352, 353, 365, 366; and Little Entente, 355, 368-384; Czechoslovak-Rumanian treaty, 371; Rumanian-Yugoslav treaty, 371; Franco-Rumanian understanding, 373; and Balkan Entente, 376-384
- Runciman, Lord, mission of, 415-418, 420, 421
- Ruska Kraina, *see* Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia
- Russia (Russians): Czechoslovaks in, 6; aids Francis Joseph (1849), 41; and Kramář, 47; revolution and civil war, 47, 54-57, 108, 141, 390; Russo-Polish relations, 47, 68, 369, 430; Pan-Slavism, 47-48, 51-52, 98, 141, 201; and Czechoslovak army, 54, 57-61, 252, 351; Allied intervention in, 60-61, 78-79, 356; bolshevism, 60, 131, 220, 352, 354, 356, 412; and Hungary, 66; and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 193-194, 200, 201, 206, 213-215; language, 193-194, 206, 208; and Sokols, 276; and Czechoslovak foreign policy, 350, 354, 356-357, 359, 361-366, 371, 375, 378, 409; Franco-Russian pact, 361; Czechoslovak-U.S.S.R. pact, 361-365, 411, 419, 423-425, 434; and Little Entente, 372, 373, 382, 384; dictatorship in, 436; Russo-German agreement, 437; *see also* Ukraine
- Ruthenia, *see* Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia
- Ruthenians: minority in Czechoslovakia, 123; cultural conditions of, 135, 206-208; Ruthene agrarians, 144; Uniates, 158; aggressive demands of, 167; migration, 195-196; backward condition, 196-199; faithful to their rulers, 199-200; program of 1849, 200; Károlyi's autonomy offer, 202; American Ruthenians favor federal union with Czechoslovak State, 203-204; political conditions, 205-206; economic conditions, 208-210; Beneš and immediate autonomy, 211; complaints against Czechs, 211-213; future of, 211-215; and Red Cross, 277; national councils, 350; Philadelphia Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Central Europe, 350; *see also* Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia
- Sabina, Karel, 39
- Šafařík, Pavel Josef: student in Bratislava, 36; author of *Slavic Antiquities*, 37; liberal leader (1848), 39; and Czech national revival, 317
- Saint-Germain, Treaty of, 260, 352, 409 n.
- St. Joachimsthal, *see* Jáchymov
- St. Václav, 292; hymn to, 35
- St. Václav Monument, 338
- Šalda, F. X., 342
- Šamberger, V., 323
- Samo, King, 9
- Schacher, Gerhard, xiii; "Czechoslovakia's Economic Development and Achievements," 240-251
- Scheiner, Josef, 52
- Schlegel, Friedrich, 395
- Schmerling, Anton von, 42
- Schmitt, Bernadotte E., xv-xvi; "The Road to Munich and Beyond," 409-440
- Schnirch, Bohuslav, 337, 338
- Schools, *see* Education
- Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 437
- Schwarzenberg, Bohemian possessions of family of, 219

- Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix, 41
- Science contributions of Czechoslovakia: 1620 marks end of cultural-scientific activities, 316-317; Komenický (Comenius), 317; Czech scientific revival, 317-318; Counts Kolovrat, Sternberg, and Canal, 317; National Museum, 318; Bohuslav Brauner, 318-319; J. Heyrovský, 319; journals for chemistry, 319-320; physics, 320; astronomy, 321; botany, 321-322; geology, 322; archaeology, 322-323; Czech scientists in America (Daneš and Hrdlička), 323; applied science, 323; scientific work of Germans, 323-324; institutions of university rank, 324; destruction of Republic a catastrophe to science, 325
- Scientific Society, Bohemian, 317
- Sedláček, Václav, 317, 320
- Sedlák and Žitný's school, 304
- Seidler, Ernst von, 56
- "Self-determination of the nations," 55, 62, 64, 75, 76, 77, 115, 171, 182, 183, 187, 202, 349, 352, 420, 421, 422, 433, 442
- Semenov, Ataman G. M., 58
- Serbia, 51-52, 54, 60, 102-103, 108, 369, 417, 418; Orthodox Church of, 158 n., 295-296; Dositheos, patriarch of Serbia, 296-297
- Serédi, Cardinal, 288
- Serfdom: decreed (1487), 19-20; peasant uprising (1680), 31-32; revolt of 1775, 33; demand for abolition of (1848), 39; abolished, 41; Slovaks reduced to, 44; Palacký and, 100, 101, 102
- Seton-Watson, R. W., 52
- Sèvres, "Certain Frontiers" treaty signed at, 111
- Shorwell, James T., xvi; "Czechoslovak Democracy: Was It Worth While?" 441-447
- Siberia, *see* Army; Intervention (in Russia)
- Siegbahn, Manne, 320
- Sighet, *see* Mármaros Sziget
- Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor, 17-18
- Silesia (Silesians), 10, 11, 14, 18, 19, 29, 31, 32, 63, 66, 67, 107, 109, 117, 129, 174, 178, 188, 190, 263, 280, 298
- Šimek, A., 319
- Šimon, Sir John, 417, 421
- Šimon, František, 337
- Šín, Otakar, 332
- Škoda Works, 246, 434
- Škrbenský, Count Leo, 288
- Škroup, František, author of Czech national anthem, *Kde domov můj* (Where Is My Home), 37
- Slavata, 26
- Slaviček, Antonín, 336
- Slavík, F., 322
- Slávik, Juraj, 300
- Slavophiles, 98, 99
- Slavs, 3-4, 8-12, 14, 37, 38-48 *passim*, 60, 72, 176, 177, 204, 206-207, 275-276, 288, 350, 353, 356, 368, 369, 441, 445, 446; Palacký's theory of basic conflict of Slav and Teuton, 98-105; *see also* Pan-Slavism
- Slovak Autonomists, 410, 414
- Slovak Mother (*Matice Slovenská*), 44
- Slovak People's party (Catholic), 142-143, 165
- Slovak Populist party, 184
- Slovakia: early Celtic, Germanic, and Slav tribes in, 8-9; Hussite movement in, 17; George Poděbrad recognized as king, 18; relations with Habsburgs before 1620, 20; education in, 49, 184-185, 272, 279, 305; and Czechoslovak Constitution, 114, 115-117, 127-129; separatism in, 117, 142, 165, 167, 184-186, 359, 365, 410, 436 (*see also* Hlinka; Tiso); nationalities in, 174; minorities in, 183-184, 191; and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 194-195, 204, 211-212; local industries in, 210; agriculture and land

- reform in, 219, 223, 224, 227, 228, 231, 237 (*see also* Agriculture); depression in, 248, 261, 280; Unity of Czech Brethren Church in, 299; autonomy in, 431, 434, 435, 436; Polish demands, 431; independence of, 437, 438; seized by Hungary, 437
- Slovaks: join Czechs to form new State, 3, 109, 204, 252, 350, 443; origin and characteristics of, 3, 5; preserve original language and culture, 5; oppression by Magyars, 5, 35, 42, 44, 49, 63, 139, 140, 183, 185; students at Prague, 17, 25, 49; Catholics, 31, 36, 44, 132, 151, 156, 159 *passim*, 164, 165, 184-185, 288, 289; Protestants, 31, 36, 299, 300; language, 36, 38, 44, 49, 135; culture, 36, 38, 49, 272; national movement, 36, 38, 92, 183; peasants, 38, 44; Masaryk and, 47, 49; literature, 49 (*see also* Literature, Czechoslovak); Peace Conference and, 63, 65, 67; nationalism, 107; apprenticeship in government, 107-108; political life and parties, 140, 142-143, 146, 147, 151, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 184; compact political bloc in Revolutionary National Assembly, 146-147; not considered a minority group, 184; Pittsburgh Agreement, 185-186; after cession of 1938, 187-188, 189, 432; birth rate, 191; and Ruthenians, 194 n., 195; and Republic of Hungary, 202, 383; in Junior Red Cross, 277; in Y.M.C.A., 277
- Small Traders party, 156, 157, 160, 161, 164, 205, 254
- Smetana, Bedřich, 49, 327-328, 334, 337, 341
- Social Democratic party, 144-145, 147, 151; Left Wing general strike, 152, 252-253; elections of 1925, 156, 157, 254; elections of 1929, 160, 161; elections of 1935, 164, 205
- Social reform: political parties and, 142, 143, 148-150, 152; social insurance, 153, 155, 161; Udržal and, 160-161; reform principles, 252; Social Democratic (Labor) party and, 252-253; a parliamentary struggle, 253; division of occupations, 253; recognized right of organization, 253-254; and proportional representation, 254, 280; increase in union membership, 254; working hours, 254; collective contracts, 255; special labor courts, 257; health insurance and pensions, 257-260, 268; unemployment, 260-262; child welfare, 262-263, 281-282; position of women, 263-264; housing, 265, 282; coöperatives, 265-267; natural resources, 267-268; utilities, 268-269; dictators and, 269-270; *see also* Humanitarian progress
- Socialism, 98, 99, 137, 141-154 *passim*, 157, 160, 275, 290
- Socialists: political parties, 143, 144-145, 147, 156, 160, 161; Socialist rule (1919-1920), 148-153, 154
- Sokols, 52, 74, 275-276, 282, 302, 304; Czechoslovak Sokol Union, 276; Tyrš, creator of, 339
- Sova, Antonín, 49, 342
- Soviet Russia (Soviet Union), *see* Russia
- Spinka, Matthew, xiii; "The Religious Situation in Czechoslovakia," 284-301
- Spíš, 354
- Šrámek, Msgr. Jan: political leader of Catholics, 290; premier of Provisional Czechoslovak Government, 292-293
- Sremski Karlovtsi, 296
- Staahlberg, Kaarlo J., 114
- Stadion, Count Francis, 41
- Stadion, Count Rudolph, 40
- Stalin, Josef, 213
- Staněk, František, 55
- Stará Dála, 321
- Stark, M., 324
- Starkenstein, F., 324

- State, Bohemian: expires as state of nobility, 107; Masaryk and Beneš and, 108; national, III; conservative, III
- State Gallery of Prague, 335
- Steed, Wickham, xv, 52; "Hitler and Hitlerism," 389-408
- Štefánik, General Milan R.: leader of Slovaks during struggle for independence, 54, 300; minister of war in Czechoslovak National Council, 82, 349; astronomer, 321; minister for national defense (1918), 350
- Štefánik Institute, 279
- Štěrbá-Böhm, J., 319
- Sternberg, Count Kašpar, 317, 321
- Štítňý, Thomas, 16
- Stojadinovič government (Yugoslavia), 381
- Stojan, Antonín Cyril, 288
- Stoklasa, J., 319
- Strahov, Premonstratensian monastery of, 291
- Stresa Conference, 361
- Stretti, Victor, 337
- Stretti-Zamponi, Jaromír, 337
- Stuerm, Francis H., xiv; "Education in a Democracy," 302-315
- Štúr, Ludevít, 38
- Stürgkh, Count Carl, 54
- Sub-Carpathian Russia, *see* Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia
- Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia: settled by Slavs, 4; made part of Czechoslovakia, 63; and Czechoslovak Constitution, 109-III; administration in, 117, 126; separatist movement in, 117, 436; autonomy in, 134, 434; minority problem in, 166, 172, 202, (Magyars) 183, (Jews) 189, (Ukrainians) 193-194; nationalities in, 174; and Ukrainian unification, 193; region of Ruthenian settlement, 194-195; program of 1849, 200; Pan-Slavistic agitation, 201; Károlyi's autonomy offer, 202; American Ruthenians favor federal union with Czechoslovak State, 203-204; Krofta and, 204; political conditions, 205-206; cultural conditions, 206-208; economic conditions, 208-210; agriculture in, 208-209, 219, 224, 228-229, 232; Beneš and immediate autonomy, 211; complaints against Czechs, 211-213; future of, 211-215; forests in, 228; illiteracy in, 272; Czech Brethren Church in, 299; education in, 305; in literature, 344; and Hungary, 383, 432, 437; German propaganda in, 435; *see also* Ruthenians
- Sucharda, Stanislav, 339
- Sudete Germans: problem at Peace Conference, 63-66, 171, 172, 352; and Czechoslovak Constitution, 117, 120-121, 123, 134-135; history of, 176-183; decline in numbers, 189-191; unemployment, 248; social welfare, 261-262, 263; coöperatives, 267; Junior Red Cross, 277; Y.M.C.A., 277; scientists, 323; Czechoslovak efforts at conciliation of, 359, 364; and Hitler, 401; and destruction of Czechoslovakia, 410-411, 412, 413-421, 424, 425, 427-428, 435; *see also* German political parties
- Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront*, 163
- Sudetendeutsche Partei*, 165
- Suffrage, 91, 98; in Austria (1907), 46; in Czechoslovakia, 119, 140, 141, 146, 263
- Suk, Josef, 329, 330
- Švabinský, Max, 336-337
- Švarc, 305
- Svatopluk, 10
- Švehla, Antonín, ministry of, 153-157, 161
- Syrový, Jan, ministry of, 168-169, 424; and Munich Agreement, 168-169; succeeded by Beran, 433
- Szabó, Orest, 197-198
- Taafe, Count Eduard, ministry of, 45-46, 107

- Tábor (Taborites), 17-18, 328
 Teschen, *see* Těšín
 Těšín: question of, 66-68; minorities in, 188-190; disputed with Poland, 354, 373, 431; annexed by Poland, 430-431
 Textor, Lucy E., xii; "Agriculture and Agrarian Reform," 219-239
 Theater, Czech National, 49, 331, 334, 335, 337-338
 Third Reich, *see* Germany
 Thirty Years' War, 26, 29-31, 285, 392
 Thomson, S. Harrison, ix-x; "The Czechoslovaks to 1620," 8-28
 Tiso, Josef, 289, 436
 Tisza, Koloman, 44, 443
 Titulescu, Nicholas, 374, 378, 380
 Tököly, Emeric, 31
 "Toleration Patent" (1781), 285-286
 Tolstoy, Count Leo, 206
 Tolstoy experimental schools, 304-305; Mužík's, 304; Miss Kuehnelová's, 304
 Tomek, Václav, 39
 Trade, foreign, 160, 161, 162, 179, 232-238 *passim*, 243-250, 360
 Treitschke, Heinrich von, 94, 395
 Trianon, Treaty of, 109, 359, 371, 437
 Trumbič, Ante, 369, 370
 Tuka, Béla (or Vojtěch or Albert): and Slovak People's party, 142-143; treason trial (1929), 186
 Turčiansky Sv. Martin, Declaration of (1918), 109, 350; Štefánik Institute in, 279
 Turkey, 91, 366, 375, 377, 378, 379 n., 381
 Turks, 19, 20, 22, 24, 31, 183
 Tusar, Vlastimil, prime minister, 147, 148-149, 150, 151
 Tyl, Josef Kajetan, 37
 Udržal, František: succeeds Švehla as prime minister (February, 1929), 157-159; second ministry (1929-1932), 160-161
 Ugosca: Ruthenian settlements in, 194; promise of autonomy in, 202
 Ukraine (Ukrainians), relations with Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 92, 174, 191, 193-194, 195, 198 n., 201, 203, 206, 208, 212, 213-214, 432, 435, 437
 Ung: Ruthenian settlements in, 194; promise of autonomy in, 202
 United States (America), relations with Czechoslovakia, 6, 44, 53, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 71-87, 92, 119, 184, 198, 201, 203, 211, 241, 243, 245, 263, 266, 274, 276, 277-279, 349, 350, 356, 360, 366, 369, 443-444, 446; Masaryk in, 71-87; *see also* Declaration of Independence; Independence movement; Masaryk
 Unity of Czech Brethren (Unitas Fratrum): origin of, 18; repression of, 20, 21; struggle with Catholic court party, 22, 23; Testament of Comenius, 31; and Slovak Reformation, 35; influence of, 48, 284-285; Palacký and, 96, 97, 101; Evangelical Church of, 284-285, 298-299; Confession of the Czech Brethren of 1662, 298; Masaryk, Kozák, and other leaders, members of, 300-301
 Universities, Czech, 49, 212, 313, 320, 324; *see also* Brno; Prague, University of
 Utraquists, 17, 22, 23, 25; "Evangelicals," 284-285
 Užhorod (Ungvár), 203, 206, 350
 Václav II, King of Bohemia, 14
 Václav IV, King of Bohemia, 16, 316
 Vatican, relations with Czechoslovakia, 143, 149, 153, 158, 289-290, 359; *see also* Catholicism; Concordat
 Vavák, František J., 35
 Vávra, Vincenc, 39
 Vermeil, Edmond, 400-401
 Versailles, Treaty of, 146, 352, 361, 380, 396, 397, 409 n., 430; *see also* Peace treaties; Saint-Germain; Trianon

- Vistula River, 4, 66
 Vladislav I, King of Bohemia, 12
 Vladislav II, King of Hungary and Bohemia, 19-20
 Vladivostok, 58, 60, 78
 Vlček, Jaroslav, 49
 Vojan, Jaroslav E., xiv; "Czechoslovak Music, Art, and Literature," 327-345
 Vojtěch, second bishop of Prague, 11
 Vološín, Augustin, 207 n., 436
 Vondracek, Felix J., xiv; "Diplomatic Origins and Foreign Policy," 349-367
 Vratislav, King of Bohemia, 12
 Vrchlický, Jaroslav, 49, 329, 341
 Vuillemin, General Joseph, 422
 Vycpálek, Ladislav, 331

 Waldenses, 16
 Waldhauser, Konrad, 16
 Weimar Republic, *see* Germany
 Weinberger, Jaromír, 332
 Westphalia, Treaty of, 30, 286
 White Mountain, Battle of, 27, 29, 31, 33, 96, 103 n., 107, 177, 220, 285, 286, 342
 Wiedemann, Captain Fritz, 414-415
 Wieser, Friedrich von, 445-446
 William I, German Emperor, 43, 402
 William II, German Emperor, 81, 395, 396, 402
 Wilson, Sir Horace, 425-426
 Wilson, President Woodrow, 54, 60-62, 73-87, 172, 349, 352, 369, 442, 443
 Windischgrätz, Prince, 41
 Winter, Zikmund, 49, 337, 342
 Women, position of, 119, 146, 263-265, 278-279, 305
 "Wonder Rabbis," 197
 World War (1914-1918), 44, 46, 50, 91, 104 n., 128, 138, 139, 158 n., 171, 178, 185, 189, 193, 200, 201, 210, 232, 240, 241, 252, 349, 353, 355, 368, 435, 447; Masaryk and, 48, 402; attitude of Czechs, 51-62; Czech soldiers, 54, 350-351, 366; Manifesto of Czech Writers, 56; Czech activities in United States during, 71-87; *see also* Allies; Army; Independence movement; National Council, Czechoslovak (Paris); individual nations, e.g., France, Germany, Great Britain, etc.
 World War (1939-), 138, 298, 366, 390, 401, 407, 417, 429, 438, 439
 Wyclyf, John, 16

 Young Czechs (political party), 45, 46, 120, 140-141

 Zborov, Battle of, 57, 332
 Zelenohorský manuscripts, 98
 Zhitomir, 59
 Žitný, *see* Sedláč and Žitný's school
 Žižka, Jan, 17, 328, 339, 341
 Župy (administrative areas), 11, 116-117
 Zwinglians, 23